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In a time of extreme political polarization in America, it is necessary to understand how 
political attitudes are shaped and how and why political perspectives shift. This study explored 
political polarization and the search for common ground among American voters in order to 
evaluate 1) political orientation and associations with current and shifting political attitudes, 
perceptions, behaviors, and learning; 2) political efficacy and associations with political 
participation; 3) contributions of individual events, experiences, sources and/or social 
interactions to shifting political perspectives; and 4) the potential role of observational learning 
and experiential learning as it relates to political attitudinal change. 
Through a mixed-methods design, this study utilized both quantitative and qualitative 
methods in two phases in anticipation of the November 2020 U.S. presidential election. First, a 
survey was administered nationwide on Facebook in July and August of 2020. Second, a small  
number of participants that indicated that their political views had shifted during the Trump 
presidency were interviewed in October 2020 to discover more in-depth responses regarding 
both the formation and shifts of their political ideologies and attitudes.  
Quantitative statistical analysis from the survey (n = 1,313) revealed that 1) political 
orientation was significantly associated with a variety of current and shifting political attitudes, 
political participation, cognitive perceptions and emotions, social media and news media usage, 
and learning; and 2) personal and collective political efficacy was significantly associated with 
  
 
increased political participation. Qualitative analysis from the semi-structured interviews (n = 
16) utilizing the Framework Method indicated that 1) social interactions with role models and 
media sources informed shifts in political attitudes, especially in regard to family; 2) deeper 
understandings of shifting political attitudes emerged when viewed through the observational 
learning subprocesses of attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation; 3) shifting political 
attitudes were associated with cognitive perceptions and emotions of partisan ingroups and 
partisan outgroups; 4) deeper understandings of shifting political attitudes emerged when viewed 
through the experiential learning stages of returning to the experience, attending to emotions, and 
re-evaluating the experience; and 5) barriers to shifting political attitudes were related to the 
cognitive perceptions of reason and emotion, whereas rewards for shifting political attitudes 
were related to increased political participation and learning.  
The study’s conclusions reaffirmed that there is widespread political polarization in the 
United States but that there are certain pathways towards common ground through civility and 
respect, intentional listening, and through the sharing of personal and emotional stories and lived 
experiences. Those who did shift their views shared an openness to learning through the 
observation of role models and sources (e.g., family, friends, mentors or teachers, religious 
leaders, media) and through reflection on past experiences. Aspects of political common ground 
were obtained not by agreeing on a contentious issue, but by acknowledging that multiple sides 
of an argument could be valid. It’s about how we approach the problem rather than how we solve 
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“Facts are not decided by how many people believe them and truth is not  
determined by how loudly it is shouted.” 
 
– Jerry A. Rice 
 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, 
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” 
 
– The Declaration of Independence, 1776 
 
“We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,  
establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense,  
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of  
liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” 
 
 – United States Constitution, 1787 
 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the study of the current state of the American 
electorate’s increasingly polarized political zeitgeist through a social cognitive observational 
learning and experiential learning frame in order to examine how and why people shift their 
political views and perspectives. The chapter goes on to provide a background to the topic, 
discuss the problem and purpose, and offer a review of the study’s research questions and 
research design. It then continues with a discussion of the researcher’s perspectives and core 




Context and Background 
This study explores American political polarization and the search for common ground in 
order to evaluate 1) political orientation and potential associations with current and shifting 
political attitudes, perceptions, behaviors, and learning; 2) political efficacy and potential 
associations with political participation; 3) contributions of individual events, experiences, 
sources and/or social interactions to shifting political perspectives; and 4) the potential role of 
learning as it relates to shifting political attitudes. In today’s contentious and politically polarized 
landscape, Americans are becoming more and more alienated with one another, especially as it 
relates to the dichotomous portrayal of the political ideologies of liberal versus conservative and 
Democrat versus Republican. The complexity of political policies is often reduced to soundbites 
and memes on social media platforms and news networks, which diminishes the potential for 
both the politically efficacious and the politically disenfranchised to truly evaluate serious 
economic and social issues. In consideration of the recent and highly polarized 2020 U.S. 
presidential election, it was critical to elucidate the current and shifting political perspectives 
across ideological lines to understand why some people experience changes in their beliefs and 
to explore possible learning from these shifts. In sum, this study explored current and shifting 
political attitudes—and investigated how events and experiences contributed to the way people 
think and go about changing the way they think. This study also provided insight into how 
people shift their political perspectives through observational learning and experiential learning, 
which may help inform educators about the possibility of finding avenues towards common 
ground among polarized partisans in America today.  
In order to understand political polarization, it is first necessary to provide a brief 




citizens through elected representatives who govern according to the laws of the three co-equal 
branches of government. These three branches were created to distribute power across the 
executive branch, which carries out laws; the legislative branch, which creates the laws; and the 
judicial branch, which interprets the laws (Waldman, 2014). From the early days of the 
formation of the country (where the Federalist papers informed the Constitution) to today’s 
digital age, America is built upon the idea that diversity of thought enables the promotion of 
liberty. In fact, the First Amendment in 1791 provides Americans with freedom of speech, press, 
petition, assembly, and religion, all of which establish the cornerstone of the nation’s democracy. 
Together with the rest of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution serves to separate church from 
state—with a federal government rather than a monarchy, and states’ rights rather than strictly 
centralized powers.  
Although the Constitution set the stage for the American experiment of democracy, it is 
also full of contradictions, namely, that it originally only protected white male landowners. It 
wasn’t until after the Civil War and the abolishment of slavery that the 14th Amendment 
guaranteed all people—regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender—equal protection under the law 
(Foner, 2019). The 15th Amendment in 1870 guaranteed all men, regardless of race, the right to 
vote. Women were not guaranteed the right to vote until 1920 with the 19th Amendment, after a 
century of political action. This slow expansion towards voting rights did not result in equality at 
the polls. Jim Crow laws enacted by states in the American South systematically disenfranchised 
African Americans from voting through racial segregation and discrimination. It was not until 
after the Civil Rights Movement that discriminatory action at the polls was made illegal with the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Yet, even today in 2021, voter suppression remains a serious issue 




protecting elections from fraud, many states have implemented laws that create barriers to 
political access, such as voter-identification requirements, as well as restrictions to voter 
registration, which lead to continued marginalization.  
Even so, more Americans voted in the 2020 U.S. presidential election than any other 
presidential election in history, with more than 159 million votes cast for a 66.8% voter turnout 
(McDonald, 2020). This increased participation is likely driven in part by expanded mail-in 
voting options due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, approximately “six-in-ten people of 
voting age and nearly two-thirds of estimated eligible voters” turned up at the polls for the 2020 
U.S. presidential election, which was an almost 7% increase from the 2016 election (Pew 
Research Center, 2021a). In comparison, voter turnout for the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
included approximately 60% of eligible voters, while the 2018 midterm election included just 
50% of eligible voters (McDonald, 2016; 2018). Interestingly, among those who chose not to 
participate in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, tens of millions were registered voters, but 
decided to stay home, likely because they disliked the candidates or the campaign issues (Pew 
Research Center, 2017a). Importantly, “those who do not vote have little voice in legislative 
matters. By not exercising their political influence, the disaffected thus become accomplices to 
their own disempowerment” (Bandura, 1997, p. 497). The politically disenfranchised and the 
politically disengaged may be pushed away from politics by the divisive political climate in the 
United States—with liberals and conservatives and Democrats and Republicans—unwilling or 
unable to recognize each other’s viewpoints. As Bandura (1997) noted: 
   A low level of political participation has not only personal consequences but systemic 
consequences as well. It breeds growing public discontent and cynicism with the political 





Of those that are politically engaged and politically efficacious, it is important to note 
that political participation isn’t just about voting in local, state, or national elections—it’s also 
about engagement in protests, rallies, political donations, correspondence with political 
representatives, and persuading others to shift their views. It is important to note that the ways in 
which citizens and those in power engage in politics has drastically changed since the rise of the 
internet. This evolving and unprecedented consumption of media and social media through news 
websites and platforms like Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter is particularly important in relation 
to political efficacy among users, because it can lead to increased political participation. Social 
media enables more access to information than traditional media outlets like talk radio or cable 
television. Before the rise of social media: 
   Pollsters probe[d] the public likes, dislikes, fears, concerns, and hopes. With this 
information and that obtained from focus groups, political handlers cast their candidate in 
a marketable positive image and their opponents in a negative image through mass-
marketing techniques using TV ads, radio spots, and personalized mailers targeted to 
specific categories of voters….issues of substance converted to exercises in political spin. 
(Bandura, 1997, p. 494)  
 
Today, through social media platforms, political candidates can reach specific potential voters 
immediately through targeted ads, posts, or tweets that cater directly to the user’s unique likes, 
dislikes, fears, and concerns. Moreover, personal users of social media platforms are able to 
interact socially with countless numbers of people, where both personal generated content and 
collective interactions between individuals and their social networks may directly affect future 
political behavior. According to the Pew Research Center (2018a), up to 68% of American 
citizens receive their news through social media even though many don’t trust its accuracy. 
There is also an increasingly narrower political view that gets reinforced on social media though 
echo chambers or filter bubbles (Sunstein, 2001) depending on individual friend networks and 




The more that voters rely on these personalized sources of media for their information, “the more 
their voting decisions are influenced by candidates’ imaged qualities rather than by their position 
on issues” (Bandura, 1997, p. 495). Given the magnitude of political polarization in the United 
States and the complexity of information sharing in the age of social media, it is imperative to 
understand the ways American voters form their political attitudes to determine why some 
people are more open to shifting their political perspectives than others.  
Problem Statement 
 In a time of extreme political polarization in America, it is necessary to understand how 
political attitudes are shaped and formed. It is also important to investigate how and why 
political perspectives shift and what helps people to be open to changing their personal political 
frames. Knowing more about attitude formation and shifting views may help adult educators to 
determine if there are ways to decrease the extent of political polarization and begin to bring 
people together through shared values.  
Attitudes or beliefs can be focused individually or collectively, can be precise or general, 
and can be positive or negative. For example, attitudes impact the:  
   Person as a whole, in relation to values, broad goals, language, emotions, other 
attitudes, and the lifespan…the social context, including communicators, as well as social 
media and social networks; and…the broad context, particularly the sociohistorical 
context, in relation to the generational, cultural, and historical backdrop of attitudes. 
(Albarracin & Shavitt, 2018, p. 304) 
 
Political attitudes are often described as being part of a larger ideology or belief system. Political 
“ideology offers a sense of certainty, predictability, and control; a sense of safety, security, and 
reassurance; and a sense of identity, belongingness, and [a perceived] shared reality” (Jost, 2017, 
p. 168; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; 2013). Political orientations in the United States range 




Republican, although some subscribe to third parties, such as the Libertarian Party or the Green 
Party, while others remain independent or unaffiliated. Personal meanings regarding political 
worldviews and political orientation vary across individuals. That is, one person who self-
identifies as slightly liberal may appear to be slightly conservative to someone else or vice versa. 
Nevertheless, there are clear differences between liberals and conservatives. In general, liberals 
tend to value change and progress and conservatives tend to value tradition and the status quo 
(Kerlinger, 1984).  
More specifically, a review on the differences between liberals and conservatives 
reported that common values among liberals included change, progressive social issues, and 
equality, whereas common values among conservatives included law and order, foreign policy, 
and fiscal policy (Conover & Feldman, 1981). A more recent meta-analysis that reviewed 88 
studies from twelve countries on political orientation reported associations between conservatism 
and various cognitive and motivational needs (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2003b), specifically 
suggesting that conservatism was associated with resistance to change and acceptance of 
inequality. However, causality cannot be presumed since the findings were based on a meta-
analysis rather than a prediction study. In sum, liberals tend to advocate for change and support 
issues like the importance of gay marriage, universal health care, and climate change; however, 
not all liberals support these issues. Conservatives tend to resist change and support more 
traditional issues like the importance of pro-life, marriage between a man and a woman, and 
stricter immigration laws; however not all conservatives support these issues. If these 
assumptions are supported, it is also possible that liberals may be more open to shifting or 
changing their political attitudes than conservatives—thus, in turn, liberals may be more open to 




Given these differences in perspectives, it is important to discuss how political attitudes 
are formed. For example, an important developmental personality study (Block & Block, 2006) 
longitudinally followed participants as they grew up from the ages of three and four ([California 
Child Q-set]; Block & Block, 1980) to twenty-three ([California Adult Q-set]; Block, 1961). 
Results showed that political orientation was retroactively associated with certain childhood 
personality traits. That is, those who grew up to self-identify as liberals were resourceful, self-
reliant, energetic, dominating, under-controlled, resilient, and comfortable with initiating new 
activities as children; whereas those who grew up to self-identify as conservatives were more 
easily victimized, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, over-controlled, vulnerable, and 
uncomfortable with change as children. As adults, results showed that liberals continued to be 
rebellious, non-conformist, artistic, and interested in a wide variety of activities, whereas 
conservative adults continued to dislike uncertainty and change. Participants who went on to 
self-identify as liberals were more open than those who went on to self-identify as conservatives. 
These findings imply that properties of political orientation could be present before children are 
politically aware (Block & Block, 2006). Therefore, we may be predisposed towards liberalism 
or conservatism even before we make conscious decisions about specific political issues. Future 
longitudinal studies should replicate these findings since other variables may have influenced the 
results. Moreover, as open and closed parents may raise children in very different ways (McCrae, 
1996), parental influence may also contribute to the future political orientation of children.  
The formation and changes in political attitudes are also influenced by our own cognition 
and emotions (Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Kang, Burke, Tobler, & Hein, 2021; Lakoff, 2008; Marcus 
et al., 2000; Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 2014a; Van Boven, Judd, & Sherman, 2012; Valentino, 




that emotion is neglected in contemporary models of decision making, which instead assumes 
that people are rational actors. He is a proponent for the importance of considering emotion as it 
relates to the development of political attitudes, which can be positive or negative since it:   
motivate[s] us to behave in ways that are ultimately in our interest and the interest of 
those within our sphere of care or concern…Emotions provide a compass for guiding our 
attention and behavior… [but] they can motivate the worst in human nature, when people 
come to associate entire classes of people with emotions such as rage, contempt, and 
disgust. And as we have seen, emotions can distort the way we reason. (Westen, 2007, p. 
50)  
 
He goes on to describe that motivation and emotion are connected to two neural systems in the 
brain—the first leads to positive feelings (behavioral approach system), while the second leads to 
negative feelings (behavioral inhibition system) with both systems using different neural 
circuitry and neurotransmitters (p. 78).  
Since people are generally prone to view the world through positive or negative 
emotions, it is important to understand how this process may influence how political attitudes are 
formed and changed. For example, one study (Fridkin & Gershon, 2020) found that political 
attitudes shifted among participants that watched the 2016 presidential debates between Donald 
Trump and Hillary Clinton, but only when they experienced emotions of fear and sadness. 
Conversely, feelings of anger, disgust, and joy did not prompt changing attitudes about the 
candidates. Thus, negative emotions of anger and disgust and the positive emotion of joy may 
reduce people’s degree of openness for new information (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 
1994; Fridkin & Gershon, 2020; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000), whereas negative 
emotions of fear and sadness may increase openness for new information (Bodenhausen, 
Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Fridkin & Gershon, 2020; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). While the previous 




one’s ability to notice other perspectives (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2003b) since it activates 
the norepinephrine system in the brain (Lakoff, 2008).  
Additionally, “our behavior reflects the activation of emotion-laden networks of 
association, and…much of this activation occurs outside of our awareness” through Freudian 
concepts of “thoughts, memories, images, sounds, smells, and feelings that are linked to each 
other” (Westen, 2007, p. 83). Using these associations and attaching them to positive or negative 
images helps political campaigns to manipulate citizens through political persuasion, largely 
outside of voters’ awareness. With our brain’s networks of activation and inhibition, Westen 
(2007) believes that political differences between Democrats and Republicans are largely related 
to how “we approach and avoid ideas because of the feelings they elicit, just as we approach and 
avoid things in the world depending on their emotional associations” (p. 90). Our political 
judgments are impacted by both cognitive and emotional constraints that may be in competition 
with each other in our brains, which:   
gravitates toward solutions designed to match not only data but desire, by spreading 
activation to networks that lead to conclusions associated with positive emotions and 
inhibiting networks that lead to negative emotions…[thus] our brains have a remarkable 
capacity to find their way toward convenient truths—even if they’re not all that true. 
(Westen, 2007, p. 100) 
 
This means that people are more critical of evidence they don’t agree with than evidence with 
which they agree. Interestingly, even those who are more politically knowledgeable “create 
complex rationalizations for dismissing data they don’t want to believe” (p. 100). Thus, to find 
political common ground, it would be necessary to bridge these unconnected networks in the 
brain by looking for areas of mixed feelings to create new connections and associations.  
Voters’ best-interests have little correlation with voting patterns, since most people tend 




(beliefs on whether a candidate is good choice). Ultimately, according to Westen (2007), “people 
vote for the candidate who elicits the right feelings, not the candidate who presents the best 
arguments” (p. 125). When describing political ideologies, Westen (2007) emphasizes that they 
are “hierarchically organized, with principles at the highest level and attitudes toward policies at 
the lowest” (p. 150). This implies that political attitudes about specific issues are the least 
important, followed by values and morality, and culminating with political ideology as the most 
important. He believes that it is difficult to change the minds of partisans, stating:  
   Voters’ positions on issues of values, and their feelings toward the parties and their 
candidates, largely reflect ideological commitments formed by early adulthood. The 
greatest influences on these emotional commitments are their parents’ values and party 
identities, but salient events in adolescence and early adulthood (e.g., the Great 
Depression, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War) can lead to realignments in both partisan 
commitments and specific values and attitudes (e.g., regarding the appropriate use of 
military intervention). (Westen, 2007, p. 216) 
 
Although it may be difficult to shift one’s “moral and political worldviews at will [since] 
there are patterns of moral and political thought that are determined by how we function with our 
bodies in both the physical and social worlds” (Lakoff, 2008, pp. 10-11), it is indeed possible, 
perhaps through observation of role models or through reflection on our own experiences. When 
reflecting on how adults think about political attitudes, we are all connected to one another 
through our social networks via our family, friends, mentors/teachers, religious leaders, political 
influencers, or social media and/or news media. Yet, as individuals, we each think about politics 
unconsciously through our own individual cognitive frames. In fact, we are active observers of 
our political role models, utilizing the brain’s “mirror neuron circuity [system], which integrates 
action and perception…that fire when we either perform a given action or see someone else 
perform the same action” (p. 39). This means that we can be influenced by our role models or by 




words, as cognitive scientist George Lakoff (2008) stated, individual thinking about politics is 
anything but rational—instead:   
   Reason incorporating emotion [is] structured by frames and metaphors and images and 
symbols, with conscious thought shaped by the vast and invisible realm of neural 
circuitry not accessible to consciousness. (p. 14) 
 
Therefore, we need to “make the cognitive unconscious as conscious as possible, to make 
reflexive decisions reflective” (p. 34) and challenge the narrative that is being provided to us. In 
order to change political views, we need to:  
learn to think outside the Enlightenment [rationality]—in terms of worldviews, frames, 
metaphors, narratives, and so on. Learn to argue powerfully and emotionally from the 
moral perspective of empathy and responsibility, protection, and empowerment. (p. 60) 
 
Lakoff (2008) went on to discuss various frames, such as the nation as family metaphor 
(e.g., the strict father versus the nurturant parent), which he suggested mapped to the 
conservative concept of individualism and the liberal concept of empathy. Metaphors are defined 
as, “mental structures that are independent of language but that can be expressed through 
language. Metaphorical thought is ordinary, and mostly unconscious and automatic” (p. 82). 
Another common political frame is the hero versus villain metaphor, which creates the us-
versus-them narrative that is so common in politics today. According to Lakoff (2008), when this 
type of metaphor or similar metaphors are repeated by role models, through the media, or other 
sources, the brain makes automatic associations creating new neural pathways since “brains 
change when ideas are repeatedly activated” (p. 116). In order to shift an attitude, one must then 
utilize reflective cognition, which means that we must think and reflect upon our thinking, while 




As the previous research suggests, political attitudes are indeed shaped by personal, 
social, and environmental factors—but how are adults able to change their perspectives once 
they are formed? How are individuals able to change their frames? How do they get around it?  
Although political orientation (e.g., liberal, moderate, or conservative) is thought to remain 
relatively stable and consistent across time (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Sears & Funk, 1999), 
attitudes on specific political issues may shift and change with age, education, and political 
expertise (Jost, 2006; Knight, 1999) or other factors. Few studies have investigated these 
questions in the context of how adult learning may influence shifting political perspectives. This 
is a critical gap that the current study hoped to shed light on as this is something that every adult 
educator should be concerned with. As political scientist Roberta Sigel stated:  
   The adult is not only an individual; he or she is also a social being, and—more 
precisely—a social being functioning at a specific historical period, located in a social 
structure and a specific place therein… In addition to reacting to their environment, 
humans also have the capacity to generate changes in the environment itself… We change 
as we make these attempts, but so does society. (1989, p. 459) 
 
Even though the United States may be as divided today as it was during the Civil War, 
there are still ways that the country can unite through compromise and common ground. 
President Lincoln attempted to unify the North and South during the reconstruction period, 
stating that he had “malice toward none; with charity for all” (Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1865). 
During the Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. argued that: 
   Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already 
devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot 
drive out hate; only love can do that. (King, 1957) 
 
There is precedence for attempts at unity, but in today’s political climate, the spirit of 
compromise is exceedingly low, with bipartisan solutions becoming less achievable as 




to find common ground between liberals and conservatives and Democrats and Republicans. If 
people on both sides of the aisle are able to shift their political perspectives on specific issues, 
such as the importance of reducing police brutality on black and brown Americans or the 
importance of addressing climate change on a global scale, then it is crucial to determine how 
these shifts occur, since this would inform how pieces of common ground may be possible to 
replicate across other politically polarized issues. If democracy is worth protecting, then 
educators, politicians, the media, and individual American voters must find ways to support 
increased political participation despite a polarized electorate. Exploring how American political 
perspectives form and shift and how individuals can find commonalities with other voters despite 
political differences may help to understand how to reduce polarization across this political 
divide that has previously been largely hidden from view.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how political orientation relates to current and 
shifting political attitudes, perceptions, behaviors, and learning, how political efficacy relates to 
participation, how and why political attitudes shift, and how observational learning and 
experiential learning models may influence changing political attitudes, which was examined 
through four main areas:  
1. The evaluation of political polarization as grounded through the lens of political 
orientation to determine how liberalism and conservatism are associated with current 
and shifting political attitudes, political participation, cognitive perceptions and 
emotions, social media interactions and news media usage, and observational 
learning.  




3. The examination of how the contributions of individual events, experiences, sources, 
role models, and/or social interactions with others may lead to individual shifts in 
political perspectives. 
4. The potential role of learning as it relates to shifts in political perspectives as framed 
through a social cognitive and experiential learning lens, using Bandura’s 
observational learning factors of attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation 
(Bandura, 1976; Bandura, 1977) and Boud, Keogh, and Walker’s (1985) experiential 
learning model of reflection. It is expected that these adult learning models will help 
to understand how partisans learn, if at all, when they change their political views. 
This study is important because there is limited research on how changing political views 
may be informed through observational or experiential learning, and it may help to understand 
how family, friends, mentors/teachers, religious leaders, political influencers, the media, and 
other sources may influence shifts in political perspectives. Having more insight into how and 
why political attitudes shift helps future researchers determine if there are ways to decrease the 
extent of polarization and to find aspects of common ground. Conducting the present study about 
the underpinnings of American political polarization during the Trump presidency also helped to 
provide deeper understandings into how political attitudes were changing in the context of the 
times—during a global pandemic. The tendency to describe oneself as a liberal, conservative, 
Democrat, or Republican or the tendency to support progressive or traditional political issues 
may not be as much about political interest, age, or level of education but more about the 
formation of political ideology, which may be influenced by observational learning, role models, 
and experiential learning. Thus, this study explored how current and shifting polarized political 




experiences, sources, role models, and the environment through the lens of observational and 
experiential factors of learning. 
The Approach: Research Questions 
 To determine how political views shift and what influenced these changes, the following 
key research questions were developed.  
1. In what ways is political orientation associated with political polarization on a variety 
of current and shifting political attitudes, cognitive perceptions and emotions of 
ingroup and outgroup partisans, social media interactions and news media usage, and 
factors of observational learning?  
a. In what ways does political orientation relate to current and shifting political 
attitudes concerning various economic and social issues (e.g., racial equality, 
state of the economy) and political participation (e.g., voting patterns, 
participation in protests or rallies)? 
b. How does political orientation relate to cognitive perceptions and emotions of 
ingroup and outgroup partisans?  
c. In what ways does political orientation relate to political interactions and 
information seeking behavior on social media and the news media? 
d. How does political orientation relate to factors of observational learning 
(attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation)?  
2. In what ways is political efficacy associated with political participation, including 





3. How and why do political attitudes shift and what events or experiences lead to these 
shifts?  
a. In what ways do social interactions with others, such as family, friends, 
teachers/mentors, religious leaders, or media inform the formation and shifts 
of political attitudes, if at all? 
b. How do these shifts in political perspectives relate to cognitive political 
perceptions or emotions of partisan ingroups and outgroups, if at all?  
c. How rewarding or challenging is it to make these shifts?  
4. In what ways do shifts in political perspectives result in new learning, and what is the 
role of this learning?   
a. In what ways can these political shifts be understood through Bandura’s 
(1986) four modes of observational learning, including attention, retention, 
reproduction, and motivation? 
b. In what ways can these political shifts be understood through Boud, Keough, 
and Walker’s (1985) model of experiential learning, including returning to 
and replaying the experience, attending to feelings provoked by the 
experience, and re-evaluating the experience?  
Through a mixed-methods approach, the present study utilized a quantitative and 
qualitative research design. The study was conducted in two phases—first, in anticipation of the 
November 2020 U.S. presidential election, a self-reported online questionnaire was administered 
on Facebook, which solicited information on attitudes related to political orientation, political 
participation, cognitive perceptions and emotions, social media and news media interactions, 




Appendix A). The questionnaire itself was hosted in Qualtrics, but a link to the survey was 
shared on a Facebook page specifically set up for this study. A targeted advertising campaign to 
find the most representative sample possible was utilized through Facebook so that the survey 
was shared nationwide with adults who identified as conservative, moderate, or liberal, as well as 
those who identified as Republican, Democrat, Independent, or Libertarian. Most of the survey 
questions were informed by questions used in national political polls, such as American National 
Election Studies (ANES, 2020) and the Pew Research Center (2020) on a variety of political 
attitudes, such as immigration, economy, and diversity among elected politicians as well as 
questions regarding social media use for political interactions and questions on political 
participation and perceptions. The survey also included questions from a validated scale to 
measure perceived political efficacy (Sarieva, 2018). The second phase of the study included a 
small subset of participants that indicated that their political views had shifted during the Trump 
presidency. Utilizing semi-structured interviews, participants were asked to provide more in-
depth responses regarding both the formation and the shifts of their political ideologies and 
attitudes (see Appendix B for Interview Protocol).  
Assumptions 
When partisans shift their views—whether liberal or conservative, it was the researcher’s 
assumption that factors of observational learning and experiential learning would help to explain 
how and why this change was supported. That said, since liberals and Democrats tend to be more 
open than conservatives and Republicans (Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Caprara et al., 1999; Caprara 
et al., 2006; Rentfrow et al., 2009; Schoen & Schumann, 2007), it was assumed that as one 
became more liberal, the more likely they would be prone to shifting their political attitudes on 




influence the capacity for shifting political views. It was also assumed that those with higher 
political efficacy would be more likely to partake in political participation, such as voting or 
sharing political information on social media, among other activities. It was also assumed that 
despite the idea that political polarization reduces one’s willingness to understand other points of 
view—people might learn to “see” each other to some degree. With the potential to find new 
strategies for shared appreciation of one another, the American electorate may be able to find 
new ways to be considerate of political differences through adult learning. Moreover, it was 
assumed that the quantitative and qualitative data received would deepen the researcher’s 
understanding of political polarization so that American voters themselves could foster increased 
openness to learning and the potential for political common ground by listening and working 
with people that have politically disparate views.  
The researcher recognized that her own individual experiences, social interactions with 
others, and environmental influences all impacted how she approached the design and analysis of 
this study. It is important to note that at the time of this writing, the researcher identified as a 
liberal Democrat that is open-minded and respectful of other people’s perspectives. Although she 
often disagrees with conservative viewpoints, she also strives to understand why others hold 
different beliefs. She tries not to challenge other viewpoints unless she feels they are against her 
own values, which is that everyone is different but deserves to be free and equal. It is only during 
these moments that she shares her personal thoughts on social media, yet she recognizes that 
there are others who are much more engaged on these platforms and others who do not use them 
at all to discuss political ideas. The researcher believes that through collective social action, the 
American electorate can continue to make progress. As an educated woman, she values the 




in as many national, state, and local elections as possible. It is her strong belief that as humans, 
we are all different, but equal, and deserve to be given equal opportunities to be happy. The 
researcher believes that her experiences and background have enabled her to learn to be more 
empathetic to others, regardless of different political orientations and values. Conscious of her 
own biases and worldview, she strived to make consistent efforts to voice concerns over how her 
assumptions and biases may have influenced this study, including the research design and 
interpretation of the results.  
Rationale and Significance 
It is crucial to encourage engagement in a democratic society through commonality with 
individuals and groups with differing and perhaps even polarizing political views. This study is 
important because it helped to determine how and if learning was possible among polarized 
partisans. Understanding more about what informs shifting political attitudes of American voters 
helped to find ways to promote aspects of common ground and decrease polarization by bringing 
people together through shared human values. Recommendations from this study will be shared 
with educators, politicians, the media, community organizers, advocacy groups, and others about 
the way individuals can work together to encourage more informed civic participation in local, 
state, and national elections and to mitigate disparities between political polarization and 
common ground.  
The United States has a long and complicated history of contradictions, but the country is 
founded on the idea that everyone deserves life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—and 
through Constitutional amendments, that everyone deserves to be equal. Yet, nearly 250 years 
after the Declaration of Independence, there is still widespread racial, gender, sexual, and 




disproportionately benefitting the elite. There have been disagreements since the beginning, 
including among the Founding Fathers, some of whom argued that we should have a king. 
Democracy won then, but as the country continues to split along party lines and citizens continue 
to align their identities with their political orientation, the harder it will be to address systemic 
inequities thoughtfully and empathetically. Political polarization is a vital public health crisis for 
our society as we know it.  
Definitions 
Political polarization is defined as “the vast and growing gap between liberals and 
conservatives, Republicans and Democrats” (Pew Research Center, 2021b). Many partisans in 
the United States are polarized into dichotomous thinking in regard to political attitudes, 
attitudinal change, voting behavior, and through their political ideology (political party and 
political orientation), which creates an us-versus-them narrative through the perception of 
unaligned political identities. The present study conceptualized political polarization as sorting 
into three categories, including: 1) ideological consistency polarization; 2) emotional 
polarization; and 3) resistance to new information and attitudinal change polarization.  
1. Ideological consistency polarization: Liberals and conservatives as well as Democrats 
and Republicans are consistently and sharply differentiated on a variety of political 
issues, with Democrats more likely to be liberal and Republicans more likely to be 
conservative.  
2. Emotional polarization: The degree of positive emotions towards partisan ingroups 
and negative emotions towards partisan outgroups, with liberals and conservatives 
more likely to feel positively about perceived ingroups and negatively about 




3. Resistance to new information and attitudinal change polarization: The degree of 
resistance to acceptance of new information from models and sources (e.g., family, 
friends, mentors/teachers, religious leaders, media), as well as the degree of 
reluctance to shifting political attitudes.  
Chapter Summary  
It is essential to describe the context of the current moment in the United States. In 2021, 
we are experiencing a global pandemic that the world hasn’t seen the likes of in over 100 years. 
There was a deadly insurrection of the U.S. Capitol Building. A new president was elected, 
Democrat Joe Biden, which made Donald Trump a one-term president. Information, whether fact 
or fiction, remains equally available through social media, perhaps making it difficult for users to 
determine the truth. Globalization continues its march and technologies continue to advance at 
lightning speed. With all of this, it is even more critical that Americans, both citizens and elected 
politicians, learn how to work together to see some common ground, which must go beyond the 
labels of liberal, conservative, Democrat, and Republican. Thus, through an adult learning lens, 
this study explored the underpinnings of political polarization among American voters to 
examine how political attitudes, perceptions, behaviors, and learning may have shifted, and to 















“For too many of us, it’s become safer to retreat into our own bubbles, whether in our 
neighborhoods or college campuses or places of worship or our social media feeds, surrounded 
by people who look like us and share the same political outlook and never challenge our 
assumptions [and that we will] accept only information whether true or not that fits our opinions, 
instead of basing our opinions on the evidence that’s out there… [this is a] threat  
to our democracy.” 
 
- Barack Obama, Farewell Speech, January 10, 2017 
 
Introduction 
This chapter covers three primary sections as it relates to political polarization among 
American voters, including 1) an exploration of political attitudes, political efficacy, and political 
participation; 2) a discussion of cognitive perception and its relationship to political polarization; 
and 3) an exploration of political role models, observational learning, and experiential learning 
as each relates to openness in shifting political attitudes—all of which may help to find a path 
towards political common ground. These topics were important to investigate so that adult 
educators, political scientists, social psychologists, politicians, and others can become more 
informed in finding ways to encourage common ground among a deeply divided country.  
This study explored the underpinnings of political polarization among American voters 
by researching the relationship between political orientation and a variety of current and shifting 
social and economic attitudes, political participation, cognitive perceptions, social media 




relationship between political efficacy and political participation. This study also examined the 
underlying reasons of how and why political attitudes shift, what events or experiences 
contributed to these shifts, how hard it was to make these shifts, and how observation of models 
through observational learning and reflection through experiential learning provided insights into 
shifting views. Political polarization goes beyond the degree of political awareness or the 
preference one might have for a particular candidate—for example:  
   If we expect citizens to vote with their best interests, then “voting correctly” requires 
citizens validly to connect their preferences to the policy programs, ideologies, and 
character traits of candidates running for office… [Moreover] if we want a more 
informed electorate, then it is important to support critical thinking skills amongst voters 
to better understand nuanced political policies that will impact their individual 
circumstances. (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008, pp. 
247-248)  
 
Given the increasing divisiveness and polarization among the American electorate, it was critical 
to discover what influenced voter behavior and how partisans learned when forming and shifting 
their political attitudes.  
Sources for this section were selected through Google Scholar, which linked to databases 
such as ERIC, Dissertations Abstracts, and JSTOR. Information was solicited by searching for 
relevant materials mostly in the past decade, and by searching for terms such as political 
polarization, political orientation, liberalism, conservatism, political common ground, political 
attitudes, shifting political attitudes, cognitive perception, political perceptions, formation of 
political attitudes, emotions in politics, political participation, political efficacy, social learning, 
political role models, social cognitive learning, observational learning, experiential learning, and 





Political Polarization: Political Attitudes, Political Efficacy, and Political Participation 
As discussed in Chapter I, political polarization among American voters in this study is 
conceptualized as three broad categories, including ideological consistency polarization, 
emotional polarization, and resistance to new information and attitudinal change polarization. 
Political efficacy and resultant political participation are conceptualized as individual, collective, 
and external perceptions of political power.  
The first type of political polarization in the present study refers to ideological 
consistency, with liberals increasingly more likely to identify with and vote for Democrats, and 
conservatives increasingly more likely to identify with and vote for Republicans. This is perhaps 
not surprising since the United States is polarized into a predominantly two-party political 
system. Even so, Democrats may vote for Republicans or third-party candidates, and 
Republicans may vote for Democrats or third-party candidates. Independents may lean towards 
one of the two major parties and usually have similar views on current political issues of the 
party they favor (LaLoggia, 2019), or they may choose to align with third party affiliations, such 
as Libertarian, Democratic Socialist, or the Green Party. Regardless of party affiliation, some 
people vote for candidates based on particular issues (e.g., abortion or gun rights) rather than for 
candidates that align with their personal political orientation or partisanship. In the 1960s, 
political scientists argued that American voters were not sophisticated enough to be consistent in 
their political attitudes (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964), yet over time, both Democrats 
and Republicans have become more coherent in their views, perhaps due to influences from mass 
media and the political elite.  
In fact, an analysis of the American National Election Studies (ANES) reported that 




and Republican presidential voting ninety percent of the time (Jost, 2006). Political polarization 
in terms of ideological consistency and coherence is growing more and more prevalent and is a 
“defining feature of American politics today… [comprised of] a vast and growing gap between 
liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats,” with 94% of Democrats to the left of 
the median Republican and 92% of Republicans to the right of the median Democrat (Pew 
Research Center, 2014). Political polarization is creating a path for both American voters and 
their elected representatives to take sides based on opposing ideologies, rather than promoting 
the best interests and values of all of the people—whether on the left or right of an issue. As 
polarization continues to divide Americans as a nation, progress continues to be stifled while the 
electorate argues about their political attitudes and opinions, unless some common ground is 
found. In fact, elections of American presidents reveal extreme political polarization, with 
Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush as the most polarizing presidents in recent 
history. For example, according to Gallup Polls, these three presidents represent the largest gaps 
in Democratic versus Republican approval ratings since 1945, with Trump taking the top two 
spots, followed by Obama, and then Bush (Jones, 2020). In Trump’s third year as president, 
Gallup showed an 82% gap (Jones, 2020) between Republicans (89% approval rating) and 
Democrats (7% approval rating).  
The second type of political polarization in the present study refers to emotional 
polarization, which can create an us-versus-them sentiment, sometimes referred to as identity 
politics or tribalism (Hawkins et al., 2018). Emotional polarization anchors people of different 
groups against each other with liberals pitted against conservatives and Democrats pitted against 
Republicans, limiting the capacity for capturing facets of common ground. For example, 




to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or 
anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations,” creating an us-versus-them mentality. 
President Donald Trump frequently called the media the enemy of the American people, referred 
to undocumented immigrants as animals, and said that former NFL player, Colin Kaepernick 
should “stand proudly for the national anthem or [he] shouldn’t be playing, [he] shouldn’t be 
there, maybe [he] shouldn’t be in the country,” due to his decision to “take a knee” in protest of 
police brutality. These statements created powerful and emotional us-versus-them sentiments. 
More recently, this us-versus-them narrative led to a dangerous and deadly insurrection of the 
U.S. Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, where an armed mob of self-proclaimed Trump 
supporters and rioters attempted a coup of the federal government, claiming that the election 
results were fraudulent. Some people assert that this uprising was incited by the president 
himself earlier in the day at the Save America rally.  
Not surprisingly, emotional polarization escalated dramatically during the Trump 
presidency, with Republicans and Democrats moving even farther away from each other 
ideologically than they were in the past on a host of political issues, which has led to increasingly 
negative feelings towards the opposite party (Pew Research Center, 2017b). Moreover, the 2016 
U.S. presidential election revealed that white rural voters helped Trump to win the presidency, 
with concerns about jobs, immigrants, and the economy, whereas most Clinton supporters 
resided in urban areas (Morin, 2016). This rural-urban divide continued to be relevant more 
recently, with a national poll indicating strong support for Trump in rural areas with a 61% 
approval rating compared to only a 31% approval rating in urban areas (Rakich & Mehta, 2018). 




The final type of political polarization in the present study refers to resistance to new 
information and attitudinal change, which may present itself on social media through the 
embrace of misinformation among some partisans and the self-selection into likeminded friend 
groups and political news sources. This is important since the axis of power has shifted in recent 
years, giving American voters more participatory access to information through social media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter, giving voice to the voiceless. At the same time, there is 
increasingly more misinformation shared through social media, cable TV, and talk radio. In 
today’s digital age, information is more easily and widely shared, but so is misinformation, 
which may ultimately lead to an uninformed electorate and may increase the resistance of new 
information and attitudinal change between groups.  
Polarization may also stem from “whether social problems reflect personal failings or 
failings of the social system” (Bandura, 1997, p. 494), since government responses to issues 
either don’t go far enough or go too far, depending on the person’s own political preference. 
Citizens are prompted to political action for many reasons beyond political knowledge that may 
extend from a variety of factors, including political efficacy, cognitive political perception, or 
social interactions with models and sources—all of which may help to explain how and why 
political attitudes form and change. Regarding political attitudes and participation, it is first 
necessary to explore the question of political efficacy, namely whether the level of one’s 
perceived political power impacts the degree of one’s participation in political activities.  
Research shows that increased levels of political efficacy correlate with higher political 
participation across various activities (Bandura, 1997). Political efficacy may affect our 
activities, such as how often we vote, whether we join protests or rallies, the likelihood that we 




others through social media. In order for the American electorate to feel empowered to engage in 
political participation, it is vital for citizens to feel efficacious. Political efficacy is defined as “an 
individual’s perceived ability to influence political processes” (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; 
Sarieva, 2018, p. 478). There are three types of political efficacy, including 1) personal political 
efficacy (individual’s perceived ability to influence political processes); 2) collective political 
efficacy (individual’s evaluation of group’s ability to influence political processes; and 3) 
external political efficacy (individual’s evaluation of how responsive the political system is for 
the citizens at large). Both personal and collective political efficacy may decrease due to the vast 
systemic racial, gender, and class inequities that continue to exist within the United States today, 
thus further reducing political engagement and reducing overall external political efficacy. Yet, 
“few studies take all three [of these political efficacy] components into account” (Sarieva, 2018, 
p. 478), which the present study addressed.  
Political efficacy is derived from the concept of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1976), which is 
defined as a person’s belief or perception of how competent they feel they will be in a particular 
environment (Lefrancois, 1999; Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 2007). Self-efficacy is 
closely tied to self-regulation, or a sense of agency—a person’s ability to control their own 
behavior by imagining possible outcomes (Bandura, 1976). There are three modes of agency: 1) 
direct personal agency (self); 2) proxy agency (others); and 3) collective agency (interdependent 
efforts between self and others). Essentially, through agency—people are active participants of 
their experiences, rather than just the result of their experiences. This cognitive and 
determinative process (Bandura, 2001) encompasses intentionality (a person’s ability to actively 
choose to participate in certain activities), forethought (a person’s ability to foresee and envision 




motivate one’s behavior), and self-reflectiveness (a person’s ability to reflect on their thoughts 
and behaviors), which is closely tied to self-efficacy. In fact, self-efficacy “influence[s] whether 
people think pessimistically or optimistically and in ways that are self-enhancing or self-
hindering,” which plays “a central role in the self-regulation of motivation through goal 
challenges and outcome expectations” (2001, p. 10). This, in turn, leads people to decide how 
much effort to use, how long to persist when facing difficulties, and whether to view letdowns as 
motivating or disheartening, as a reward or as a challenge.  
Similar to self-efficacy, the concept of political efficacy (Bandura, 1977) examines how 
the perceptions that one can influence the political system helps to explain internal personal 
efficacy (individual), internal collective efficacy (group), and external efficacy (society). 
Moreover, how changeable external societal systems are to personal and collective influence 
directly relates to political participation. Individuals will weigh their opportunities, ease of access 
to opportunities, and the level of barriers imposed to them by the system before deciding to 
participate. Is the system responsive to social action? Is the system difficult to change? Context 
always matters since political systems are not fixed. Different leaders “shape the form of 
governmental functioning” and “human behavior is governed largely by beliefs about personal 
efficacy and the controllability of social systems rather than simply by their objective properties” 
(Bandura, 1997, p. 483).  
For example, personal political efficacy is defined as a person’s beliefs that they can 
“affect different governmental policies, to carry out different types of political tactics, and to 
sway office holders…” and that impediments to change can be surmounted (Bandura, 1997, p. 
485). Those who have low personal political efficacy view societal progress as impossible, while 




higher efficacy will feel like they have more control to change society than those with low 
efficacy. Collective political efficacy is defined as “a group’s shared belief in its conjoint 
capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of 
attainment” (Bandura, 1997, p. 477). Moreover, a sense of personal agency plays a large part in 
collective efficacy. For example:   
   People do not live in social isolation, nor can they exercise control over major aspects 
of their lives entirely on their own. Many of the challenges of life center on common 
problems that require people to work together with a collective voice to change their lives 
for the better. The strength of families, communities, organizations, social institutions, 
and even nations lie partly in people’s sense of collective efficacy that they can solve the 
problems they face and improve their lives through unified effort. (Bandura, 1997, p. 
477) 
 
And finally, external political efficacy is the perceived system responsiveness of the government 
and other institutions in society that meet the needs of all citizens. 
One experimental study evaluated how political efficacy was related to political 
participation (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009) in Italy through the framework of 
social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977). The authors stated: 
   Social cognitive theory may represent a guide for both assessment and interventions 
that may be crucial to recruit and train people capable to meet efficaciously the 
challenges of political life, and to contrast the current decline of political participation in 
modern established democracies. (Caprara et al., 2009, p. 1018; Mair, 2007) 
 
Using three sub-studies, the Perceived Political Self-Efficacy (P-PSE) scale was tested for its 
effectiveness. Through a convenience sample, the first study administered a face-to-face survey 
to undergraduate students in Rome (n = 1,673). The P-PSE scale included ten items that intended 
to measure individual’s capabilities to engage in politics using short phrases that ranged from 
“not at all” to “completely.” Through statistical analysis, results showed good internal validity 
and internal consistency. The second sub-study also utilized a convenience sample of 




participants were asked about the frequency of their political participation. Again, the scale 
showed good internal and external consistency. The third sub-study was comprised of a 
convenience sample of three groups (n = 1,451), including unaffiliated voters, partisan voters, 
and politicians. In addition to completing the P-PSE scale, participants were asked questions 
about their political identification.  
Results (Caprara et al., 2009) showed that politicians were more politically efficacious 
than the other two groups of students, but that partisan voters were more efficacious than 
unaffiliated voters. Moreover, perceived political efficacy was higher among extremists at both 
ends of the political spectrum, and lower among moderates. Implications of this research 
suggests that to encourage citizens to vote and to be more politically engaged, they must also be 
more politically efficacious. This indicates that educators can help people learn how to better 
engage in politics through growth in political efficacy. Although the P-PSE scale is well 
validated, it only considered the role of personal self-efficacy as it related to political 
participation and did not measure collective efficacy or external efficacy, so it wasn’t best suited 
for use in the present study. Limitations included unrepresentative samples and the fact that the 
scale was intended for use in the Italian context of politics, limiting generalizability. The authors 
suggested that future research should “explore how perceived political self-efficacy develops, 
and its links with social affiliation and social identities, as well as with perceived collective 
political efficacy” (Caprara et al., 2009, p. 1017). Indeed, learning more about the how political 
efficacy develops may help to inform ways to reduce polarization and encourage common 




As noted above, political participation is more than just voting. For example, it can also 
include sharing political perspectives with others on social media. The more frequently a 
message or meme is seen or shared, the more likely it will be accepted as valid. In fact: 
   People are prone to believe messages that affirm their political viewpoint or identity 
regardless of the strength of evidence, which suggests that partisan falsehoods are 
particularly likely to take root. (Garret, 2019, p. 2) 
 
On the other hand, social networking sites like Facebook can increase perceived social support, 
making it:  
easier to mobilize and exert collective influence in close-knit communities where people 
support one another than in communities where they feel disconnected or alienated from 
one another in their social system. (Bandura, 1997, p. 487) 
 
The question is whether social media contributes to the polarization of resistance to new 
information and attitudinal change or helps to mitigate it through exposure to diverse 
perspectives. One study found that increased exposure to partisan outgroups on Twitter actually 
made conservatives more polarized than when they only viewed their typical content of partisan 
ingroups (Bail et al., 2018). This query is very much alive in the context of the times, given the 
prevalence of fake news on social media platforms.  
According to one study, fake news was widely shared and heavily pro-Trump during the 
2016 U.S. presidential election, with “115 pro-Trump fake stories that were shared on Facebook 
a total of 30 million times, and 41 pro-Clinton fake stories shared a total of 7.6 million times” 
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 213). More recently, there was evidence of widespread pro-
Trump fake news stories circulating social media regarding the worldwide protests against police 
brutality and the murder of George Floyd, an African American man who was killed by a white 
police officer in Minneapolis. For example, one study showed that as of June 5, 2020, fake news 




million times on Facebook and Twitter (Alba, 2020). Escalating nationwide racial tensions, 
combined with the recent political polarization of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to 
dramatically increased prevalence of misinformation on social media, which may have led to 
changes in voting preferences in the November 2020 election.  
For example, one recent study reported that “visits to Facebook appear to be much more 
common than other platforms [for] visits to fake news articles in web consumption data, 
suggesting a powerful role for the social network” (Guess, Nagler, & Tucker, 2019, p. 1; Guess 
Nyhan, & Reifler, 2016). Individual-level characteristics related to sharing misinformation 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign were explored through an observational survey 
analysis that was matched to actual Facebook behavioral data (Guess et al., 2019). Although 
3,500 participants were originally identified, only 1,191 agreed to share their Facebook data. 
Results suggested that while sharing of fake news stories was low across all users, conservatives 
were significantly more likely than liberals to share fake news, which was mostly pro-Trump in 
content—with the strongest correlation among those that identified as very conservative. Age 
was also a significant factor, with users over 65 years old almost seven times as likely than 
younger age groups to share fake news content on Facebook, regardless of political orientation or 
party affiliation. This finding suggested that older Americans may lack media literacy or digital 
literacy and thus may mistake fake political information as credible. The authors suggested that 
educational programs on media and digital literacy be made more widely available to these 
populations, perhaps even through Facebook itself to decrease the spread of political 
misinformation. Limitations included correlational data, which could not determine causality. 
Additionally, the authors of the study (Guess, et al., 2019) did not know what news sites the 




exposed to more fake news then what they chose to share. Interestingly, the participants that 
agreed to share their Facebook data were more likely to vote in elections than the portion of the 
sample that did not share their Facebook data, which suggests that political participation on 
social media increases the likelihood of voting, and perhaps increases political efficacy.  
The number of Americans that obtain political news on Facebook is rapidly growing, 
which is concerning due to the prevalence of misinformation that is shared by users, including 
falsehoods that were part of the Russian propaganda effort during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election (Garret, 2019; Issac & Wakabayashi, 2017). To explore this spread of untrue stories on 
social media, one study (Garrett, 2019) analyzed several representative and large-scale, multi-
wave panel surveys conducted during the 2012 and 2016 elections. Results showed that social 
media had a small, but significant effect on misperceptions of President Obama during the 2012 
U.S. presidential election, but that there was no effect on perceptions of Mitt Romney. Like the 
previous study concluded (Guess et al., 2019), this effect was most significant among 
conservatives. However, an analysis of the 2016 election did not find any correlation between 
social media use and political belief accuracy. Although the panel surveys included large sample 
sizes, there were limitations due to the use of different questions across elections and the fact that 
the political contexts were different between the two elections, reducing generalizability of the 
findings. Implications of this study suggest that since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
Americans may be better able to distinguish fake news from real news, indicating that although 
the spread of misinformation remains widespread, there may be other factors that influence 





Political Polarization: Cognitive Political Perceptions 
In regard to cognition, the main question is—how do people think about thinking? Recent 
research has explored how individual cognitive differences may help to explain how perceptions 
and thought processes may impact political polarization. Political orientation as it relates to 
individual cognition may affect the type of information we seek, the people we interact with, and 
the type of knowledge to which we are willing to listen. For example, one study researched how 
people perceived political information, which revealed that Democrats and Republicans in the 
United States have higher preferences for information that aligns with their personal ideological 
worldviews (Jerit & Barabas, 2012). This is described by the authors as perceptual bias, which is 
“individual-level motivation or the tendency for partisans to see the world in a manner that is 
consistent with their political views” (p. 673). Although exposure to mass media can help to 
lower gaps in knowledge between socioeconomic classes (Curran et al., 2009; Jerit, Barabas, & 
Bolsen, 2006), perceptual bias remains strong among the politically polarized. Similarly, people 
tend to “seek out attitude-confirming, rather than attitude-disconfirming information” (Ditto et 
al., 1998; Jerit & Barabas, 2012, p. 674), usually because it is easier than being challenged, 
which can be uncomfortable.  
The authors (Jerit & Barabas, 2012) conducted two studies to determine if there were 
barriers or incentives to learning political information among Democrats and Republicans, 
including an observational study and an experimental study. The first study utilized an 
observational data review by coding 43 national public opinion polls on political attitudes and 
knowledge, and corresponding media coverage in the 1990s and 2000s. The second study 
utilized an experimental design. A total of 417 adults were randomly assigned to one of five 




group was given a short factual news story to read. Each story fell into one category—positive 
for Democrats, positive for Republicans, negative for Democrats, or negative for Republicans—
to determine if there was evidence of perceptual bias and partisanship as related to media 
coverage on real-world events. Results from both studies showed that both Democrats and 
Republicans exhibited higher degrees of knowledge on topics that were in alignment with items 
that were consistent with party policy and “cast a person’s party in a positive light” (p. 676) and 
exhibited lower degrees of knowledge on topics that cast a person’s party in a negative light. 
Likewise, regarding media coverage, topics that were negative to the Democratic Party did not 
increase levels of knowledge among Democrats, even when the topic was widely covered on the 
news, and this was the same for the Republicans. Perceptual bias led partisans to learn 
selectively while increased media coverage only intensified this pattern. For Democrats and 
Republicans to learn more about the opposing party, or even about their own party, it is 
important to find new ways of helping the polarized listen, without automatically disregarding 
information that doesn’t align with existing political views.  
An interesting mixed-methods study (Van Boven, Judd, & Sherman, 2012) investigated 
the distribution of partisan attitudes among participants and their perceptions of others in 
relationship to political polarization. A total of four sub-studies using various methods to 
evaluate multiple cognitive concepts was explored, such as polarization projection—the 
tendency for those with “more extreme partisan attitudes to perceive greater polarization than do 
people with more moderate attitudes” (p. 84). Other concepts included simple projection 
(tendency to assume that other people also share one’s political views), social categorization 
(individual selection into groups, e.g., Republican Party or Democratic Party), self-categorization 




Democratic Party or liberal or conservative), and naive realism (tendency to view oneself as 
unbiased and rational, while viewing others as biased and ideological). The authors noted that a 
previous study found that people who held positive views towards a presidential candidate 
overestimated similarities among their own attitudes with the candidate’s positions (Ottati, 
Fishbein, & Middlestadt, 1988; Van Boven et al., 2012, p. 1163).  
The first sub-study analyzed survey data from a nationally representative sample of 1,000 
participants, which elicited information on political attitudes before the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election (Van Boven et al., 2012). Results from the analysis showed that extreme support for 
presidential candidates (Barack Obama or John McCain) was strongly and significantly related to 
higher polarization projection and simple projection, independent of party affiliation. Voting 
behavior was predicted by both personal extreme political attitudes and by the perception of 
other people’s attitudes. Extreme attitudes can be brought on by multiple factors, such as self-
interest, extensive thought, upbringing and values, and ideas of fairness. The second sub-study 
distributed a survey to 129 participants in 2009 regarding political attitudes on health care 
reform. Results suggested that people tended to project their own perceptions onto others in 
relation to political issues. The third sub-study used an experimental approach by presenting a 
fictional issue to 28 undergraduate students within naturally occurring partisan groups to 
determine if polarization projection and simple projection occurred. The students were given a 
story to read that asked them to take sides on a fictional issue. Results were similar to studies 1 
and 2, with higher political projection among those with more extreme attitudes, even when 
controlling for party affiliation; however, there was no evidence of simple projection. This 
means that the group did not assume that other people also shared their views. The final sub-




and an introspection group to measure whether reflection impacted polarization. A total of 101 
undergraduates were included in the sample. Results suggested that introspection significantly 
increased both polarization projection and simple projection.  
Implications for Van Boven et al.’s (2012) study are vast, as it suggests that those with 
extreme attitudes are more likely to think everyone else is also extreme in their attitudes. 
Viewing the world as polarized may reduce “others” to unworthy or even hostile. If others can’t 
be understood, then people with extreme attitudes may feel entitled to confrontational or 
defensive behaviors that may lead to political extremism. Yet, the findings could also lead to 
deeper understandings about the political mind, which was described as a: 
powerful, versatile tool for social perception… [that can enable] people to estimate the 
outputs (i.e., political attitudes) of those who have different attitudinal inputs (e.g., 
backgrounds, information, and interests). (Van Boven et al., 2012, p. 97) 
 
One limitation was that political orientation was not evaluated since polarization was defined in 
terms of political party affiliation—Democrat or Republican. Since partisanship is less stable 
than political orientation, future studies should consider including liberal and conservative 
scales. 
For instance, one study that included political orientation (Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 
2014a), examined the phenomenon that people tend to seek out politically like-minded 
individuals that agree with them to receive social support and validation for their beliefs and 
worldviews (Allport, 1954; Festinger, 1954). The authors hypothesized that conservatives were 
“more motivated to perceive and maintain consensus among fellow ideologues” (Stern et al., 
2014a, p. 1162). The theoretical model proposed an interaction among political orientation, 
perceived ingroup consensus, and the desire for shared reality. Research has shown that 




motivated to perceive their beliefs as relatively unique” (Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014b), with 
conservatives overestimating how similar their beliefs were to other conservatives, and liberals 
underestimating how similar their beliefs were to other liberals (Stern et al., 2014a, p. 1174). 
Using an experimental study design, three quantitative sub-studies were conducted to examine 
whether conservatives and liberals desired to share consensus with politically like-minded others 
for both political and non-political judgments, as well as to determine if motivated perceptions of 
consensus was stronger among conservatives than liberals. The study also investigated if 
collective efficacy determined political engagement, since “Bandura (1997) proposed that ‘most 
political participation is channeled through membership in various groups that unite shared 
interests into common goals’ (p. 484), suggesting that feelings of group efficacy might likewise 
predict intentions to participate in politics” (Stern et al., 2014a, p. 1169).  
The first sub-study (Stern et al., 2014a) hypothesized that conservatives would perceive 
stronger ingroup consensus on both political and non-political issues and possess a stronger 
motivation to share reality with their conservative ingroup. Using an online survey, participants 
(n = 107) were asked to view pictures of men’s faces and indicate whether each person was gay 
or straight (political issue) and to indicate what month they were likely born (non-political issue), 
using a scale from “not at all likely” to “very likely.” To determine ingroup consensus, 
participants were asked if they believed that those with similar political beliefs made similar 
judgements as they did. Alternatively, participants were asked if they believed that those with 
different political beliefs made similar judgments as they did. Desire to share reality was 
measured by asking participants how important it was for them to see the world in a similar way 
as people who share their beliefs, using a scale from “not at all important” to “very important.” 




share ingroup reality with other conservatives, regardless of political or non-political 
judgements. The second sub-study (Stern et al., 2014a) asked politically active participants (n = 
150) to complete an online survey regarding the same issues from the first sub-study, but with 
the addition of questions related to collective efficacy. Results were replicated from the first sub-
study, with the addition that perceived ingroup consensus was correlated with collective efficacy 
in the 2012 U.S. presidential election. This suggests that conservatives may be more successful 
in achieving collective political goals, since “perceiving consensus within one’s group should 
lead individuals to view it as more cohesive, confident, and capable of accomplishing shared 
goals” (Bandura, 2000; Gibson et al., 2000; Stern et al., 2014a, p. 1169). The final sub-study 
(Stern et al., 2014a) asked Republican and Democratic participants (n = 311) to complete an 
online survey identical to the second sub-study, plus the addition of questions related to voting 
intentions and an experimental manipulation of motivations. Results showed that perceived 
collective efficacy of one’s own political party predicted political participation, such as voting in 
a major election—and conservatives perceived more ingroup collective efficacy than liberals.  
Implications from this study (Stern et al., 2014a) are immense as perceptions of ingroup 
shared reality and perceptions of ingroup consensus may help to explain ideological differences 
among liberals and conservatives. Moreover, since perceived ingroup consensus predicted 
feelings of collective efficacy—when considered in terms of political engagement—
conservatives felt more efficacious than liberals. Conservatives were also less likely than liberals 
to perceive consensus with outgroups. These findings were consistent with previous research 
(Robbins & Krueger, 2005), which found that “individuals perceive[d] ingroup (versus outgroup) 
members as more likely to share their goals, values, and emotional experiences in general” (Stern 




representation, and the lack of qualitative interviews that would have provided deeper insights. 
The authors recommended that future studies should “observe individuals’ feelings of collective 
efficacy and actual political behavior” (2014, p. 1175).  
Interestingly, a recent experimental study utilized neuroimaging and computational 
modeling to examine the ways in which people learn through the observation of perceived 
political ingroups and outgroups (Kang, Burke, Tobler, & Hein, 2021). Although the authors 
noted that there was documented evidence of ingroup political bias “it remained unclear how 
important social factors, such as group membership, shape observational learning mechanisms 
and the underlying neural networks” (p. 145). A total of 29 politically active and left-wing 
participants from the University of Zurich were included in the study. The study design utilized 
an experimental group and a control group, including an fMRI pre-scanning procedure, where 
participants were asked to answer questions about their political orientation and various political 
attitudes as well as a post-survey debrief. Those who were part of the experimental group were 
placed in an observational learning task group, wherein participants were asked to “learn about 
the reward probability of two fractal images through observation” (p. 145) of actions or 
outcomes. Results revealed that “participants learn[ed] similarly well from observing ingroup 
and outgroup outcomes [emphasis added] but learn[ed] less well from observing outgroup 
actions [emphasis added]” (p. 150), which may indicate why some people have trouble learning 
from perceived outgroup members even though the fMRI showed activation of “similar neural 
circuitries while learning from the observation of ingroup and outgroup outcomes and actions” 
(p. 150). However, Kang et al.’s (2021) findings did indicate stronger activation of the inferior 
frontal gyrus, which is “involved in action observation and imitation processes (Caspers et al., 




study also found that correct choices were reduced among participants when they observed an 
outgroup compared to an ingroup. Limitations included the fact that only left-wing participants 
were included. Remarkably, and relevant to the goals of the present study, the authors concluded 
that future studies should consider the extent to which participants like or dislike outgroups, 
stating that:  
   It is conceivable that the individual impressions and/or emotions toward the respective 
outgroup might modulate the outgroup-related observational learning deficits observed in 
our study… this should be investigated in future studies. (Kang et al., 2021, p. 152) 
 
Thus, there are clearly differences between liberals and conservatives as it relates to cognitive 
perceptions of partisan ingroups and outgroups. The question is, how do we prevent the 
automatic disregard for information that is perceived to be outside of our political worldviews? 
Research on how role models, observational learning, and experiential learning impact the 
formation and shifts of political views may help to understand this important question.  
Political Polarization: Role Models and Learning 
The following section covers how role models may influence political ideology as well as 
two forms of learning, including observational learning and experiential learning, which may 
help to explain how and why people shift their political attitudes.  
Role Models 
Building on the influence of role models at large, one interesting study investigated how 
social influences helped to shape individual political ideology over the course of the life cycle 
(Lyons, 2017). The study was based on the concept of political socialization, which is defined in 
the field of political science as the “process through which an individual acquires…particular 
political orientations…knowledge, feelings and evaluations about the political world” (Sigel, 




expectations, and taking on the basic standards of society or a group related to a particular role” 
(p. 60). Although political orientation tends to be stable over time (Conover & Feldman, 1981; 
Sears & Funk, 1999), Lyons (2017) argued that political ideology could indeed evolve over the 
lifespan, which is relevant to the field of adult learning, stating that:   
  Individuals are reasonably dynamic through their lives and political attitudes and 
behaviors respond to the changes in influences or environments that occur. (p. 297; 
Miller & Sears, 1986) 
 
That is, people can be influenced by both early role models as well as by their environment later 
in life, which could reinforce or conflict with each other.  
Early socialization in childhood was defined as being influenced through social cohesion 
(e.g., parents; strong bonds/more intimate) or through structural equivalence (e.g., peers; similar 
social and structural positions/less intimate). Thus, early political socialization may be 
influenced by families and close friends, as well as by genetics. Later in life, political 
socialization may be less influenced by parents and more influenced by spouses or significant 
others through the generation of “frequent exchanges of information with a trusted source” 
(Lyons, 2017, p. 299). Another source of socialization may include the geographic region one 
chooses to live and the corresponding distribution of political attitudes among the people that 
live in neighborhoods, communities, and cities. The author described reinforcing environmental 
influence as when someone socialized as a Republican by their parents grew up to reside in a 
Republican-leaning environment or vice versa for a Democrat. In these circumstances “dissonant 
information is relatively uncommon, and even when confronted, it is easy for the individual to 
avoid or reject it in the presence of an abundance of agreeable influence” (p. 300).  
 The study’s (Lyon, 2017) design was based on the review of a longitudinal Youth-Parent 




participant political preference, parental political preference, as well as measures of spousal 
political preference. Partisanship was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from strong Democrat 
to strong Republican. Survey data was compared to the corresponding political environment by 
region at the county level for the years 1965, 1982, and 1997 through presidential voting returns. 
Cross-sectional regression analysis revealed that when social influences aligned with early 
parental socialization as adults, political perspectives remained stable; however, when social 
influences differed with early parental socialization as adults, political perspectives were more 
apt to shift, “presumably initiating a detachment from predispositions and opening the door to 
partisan change” (p. 298). For example, in 1965, among 18-year-olds, only parental influence 
was significantly related to the direction of partisanship. By 1982 among 35-year-olds, parental 
influence was still significantly related to the direction of partisanship, but the magnitude was 
much smaller. Additionally, region of residence (e.g., those living in Republican counties were 
more likely to be Republican and vice versa) and spousal partisanship (note: the magnitude was 
much stronger for spouses than it was for parents) was significantly related to the direction of 
partisanship. In 1997, among 50-year-olds, spousal partisanship had an even stronger effect on 
the direction of partisanship, while region of residence remained steady, and parental influence 
was only significant from the father but not the mother, which supported the social cohesion 
perspective that suggests who we spend the most time with may influence us the most through 
longer and closer exposure. Yet since region of residence also continued to influence 
participants, the concept of structural equivalence was also supported. Additional analysis 
investigating this effect showed that:  
   Broader environments do not simply serve as a source of direct social influence…but 
[also]…have the potential to create cross-pressures which negate the effects of early 
parental socialization and reduce the powerful effect of contemporaneous spousal 





In other words, where we live later in life may eliminate the influence of parental partisanship 
and moderate the effect of the influence of spousal partisanship. For example, per Lyons (2017):  
   Later social environments throughout life can nullify early forces (whether they are 
produced by genes or social pressures), suggest[ing] that social influences deserve a 
prominent seat at the table when explaining partisanship and that social forces may be 
able to overrule biological ones. A predisposed citizen can still be a dynamic one, and we 
should look to the rich variation in influences and stimuli that are supplied by the people 
who surround us as one explanation for these dynamics… Considering the effects of 
various socializing agents in isolation misses much of the story regarding how these 
various influences interact over time, producing a socialized partisan, or not… When 
socialized reinforcement occurs, parental influence persists over the course of the panel. 
However, when environments challenge early influence, parental pressures are negated 
once the citizen has left the home, presumably opening the door for other influence and 
instability. (pp. 309-310) 
 
These findings are important in that they indicate that political learning can evolve over the 
lifespan, and that there are a variety of social and environmental influences that may impact 
these changes. Indeed, political learning may be dependent on: 
the threats or rewards one anticipates from resocialization. Those who stand to benefit 
most from the status quo might be most hesitant, understandably, to exchange old 
patterns for new ones. (Sigel, 1989, p. 268) 
 
Building on the importance of role models and social influences, observational learning may help 
to explain how people shift their political attitudes over the course of their lifespan. 
Observational Learning 
Albert Bandura (1977), the founder of social cognitive learning theory (SCLT) argued 
that learning is an interactive, cognitive, self-directed, and internal process that is based in a 
social context, which may lead to changes in behavior. In the 1960s, Bandura’s interpretation of 
social learning broke from the behaviorist tradition (e.g., B.F. Skinner) by emphasizing cognitive 
perspectives rather than the environment alone, arguing that “one can learn from observation… 




“combines elements from both behaviorist and cognitive orientations [and] posits that people 
learn from observing others,” in a social setting (Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 2007, p. 
287). For example, Bandura stated:  
   Virtually all learning phenomena resulting from direct experiences can occur on a 
vicarious basis through observation of other people’s behavior and its consequences for 
the observer. (Bandura, 1976, p. 392) 
 
Moreover, through observation, people gain: 
   Knowledge, rules, skills, strategies, beliefs, and attitudes. Individuals also learn about 
the usefulness and appropriateness of behaviors by observing models and the 
consequences of modeled behaviors, and they act in accordance with their beliefs 
concerning the expected outcomes of actions. (Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 
2007; Schunk, 1996, p. 102) 
 
In essence, we learn by observing others and then impersonating what we observed either 
directly or vicariously, which can be applied to political learning. When thinking of American 
voters as learners themselves, it becomes clear that observational learning is a useful lens for 
actively exploring new and evolving political views from observed role models. More than 
simple imitation, “modeling influences can produce three separate types of effects” (Bandura, 
2017, pp. 5-7), including 1) acquisition of new behavior through the observation of others; 2) 
reinforcement or abatement of prior learned responses brought on by rewarding (disinhibitory) or 
challenging (inhibitory) outcomes; and 3) response effects (outcomes) determined by socially 
acceptable behaviors. For example:  
   Behavior is learned symbolically through central processing of response information 
before it is performed. By observing a model of the desired behavior, an individual forms 
an idea of how response components must be combined and sequenced to produce a new 
behavior. In other words, people guide their actions by prior notions rather than by 





Thus, we can learn what is socially appropriate through the observation of political role models, 
such as family, friends, teachers/mentors, religious leaders, political influencers, or through 
social media and news media consumption. 
Learning through observation is influenced by one’s own cognition, environment, and 
behavioral interactions as described by Bandura’s (1986) Triadic Reciprocal Determinism Model 
(see Figure 1). Therefore, both individual cognitive differences and the context of the situation 
matter when changing one’s behavior. As Merriam et al. (2007) described, Bandura’s SCLT 
model: 
accounts for both the learner and the environment in which he or she operates. Behavior 
is a function of the interaction of the person with the environment. This is a reciprocal 
concept in that people influence their environment, which in turn influences the way they 
behave. This three-way interactive model of the learning, the individual, and the 
environment is pictured by Bandura (1986) as a triangle in which learning is solidly in 
the social context. (Merriam et al., 2007, p. 293) 
 
In fact, modeling is “acknowledged to be one of the most powerful means of transmitting values, 
attitudes, and patterns of thought and behavior” (Bandura, 1986, pp. 47-48). Through 
observational learning, it is assumed that “modeling influences operate principally through their 
informative function, and that observers acquire mainly symbolic representations of modeled 
events” (Bandura, 2017, p. 16). Moreover, social learning theory is a type of active learning 
since: 
   Observers function as active agents who transform, classify, and organize modeling 
stimuli into easily remembered schemes [that] can be enhanced through practice or overt 
rehearsal of modeled response sequences. (Bandura, 2017, p. 21) 
 
Individuals learn from modeled events that are later matched to their own performance by going 
through four steps of observational learning, including attention, retention, reproduction, and 










Source: Modeled from Bandura, 1986, p. 24 
 
 
The first two steps (attention and retention) are cognitive in nature and require mental 
rehearsal, while the last two steps (reproduction and motivation) are active in nature that may 
lead to behavior change. The attention subprocess of observational learning is described as the 
ability to “attend to, recognize, and differentiate the distinctive features of the model’s 
responses” (Bandura, 2017, pp. 16-17). The retention subprocess of observational learning, 
which Bandura argued had been overlooked in imitation theories is described as the memory of 
“the original observational inputs in some symbolic form,” which can be “retained over extended 
periods” by using either imaginal or verbal representations (Bandura, 2017, pp. 17-18). Bandura 
goes on to state that “after modeled responses have been transformed into images and readily 
utilizable verbal symbols, these memory codes serve as guides for subsequent reproduction of 




defined as “the utilization of symbolic representations of modeled patterns to guide overt 
performances” (p. 22). And finally, the motivation subprocess of observational learning posits 
that once someone has paid attention to, retained, and reproduced a behavior, it is now possible 
to imitate the behavior through motivation or reinforcement. Per Bandura (2017): 
   The introduction of positive incentives promptly translates observational learning into 
action…[and] reinforcement variables not only regulate the overt expression of matching 
behavior, but they can also affect observational learning by exerting selective control 
over the types of modeled events to which people are most likely to attend. (pp. 22-23)  
 
However, it is important to note that observational learning may result in teaching positive or 
negative behavior. For instance, when “observing others we not only learn from their behavior 
but also from the reactions of other people to the role model’s behavior” (Horsburgh & Ippolito, 
2018, p. 6). This could result in learning how to avoid other people’s mistakes or could 
potentially result in learning how to repeat other people’s mistakes.  
According to Gibson (2004), role models are traditionally described as people that others 
want to emulate or imitate since they are “in an influential role position, such as a parent, 
teacher, supervisor, or mentor, who provides an example for individuals to imitate” (p. 135; 
Erikson, 1985). When viewed through a social cognitive learning perspective, role models 
emerge as a: 
cognitive construction based on the attributes of people in social roles an individual 
perceives to be similar to him or herself to some extent and desires to increase perceived 
similarity by emulating those attributes… [in order to] be helpful in learning new tasks, 
skills, and norms. (Bandura, 1977; Gibson, 2004, p. 136; Miller & Dollard, 1941; Wood 
& Bandura, 1989) 
 
Taken together, the application of these observational subprocesses of attention, retention, 
reproduction, and motivation to the context of the present study helped to guide how political 
orientation and shifting political attitudes may be informed by political role models, such as 




Figure 2). This framework helped to contextualize how shifts in political attitudes could be 
understood through an observational learning lens.  
It is currently believed that there are no studies that have investigated how observational 
learning may help adult educators understand shifting political attitudes. Although the following 
exploratory qualitative study did not examine shifting political attitudes, social learning theory 
was used to explore the concept of learning from role models in clinical settings (Horsburgh & 
Ippolito, 2018). Through social learning, it was assumed that “individuals pay attention to role 
models because they believe they can learn skills and accepted ways of behaving in a particular 
context” (p. 2). The purpose of their study was to determine ways in which learning could be 
enhanced among medical students by asking how rather than what they learned from role 
models. Semi-structured interviews were individually conducted with six final-year medical 
students and five clinical teachers. Data was analyzed through open coding, which showed that 
for attention, the following themes emerged—being present and involved, lack of continuity of 
an exposure to role models, and sharing aligned values. This meant that those who had the 
opportunity to be more involved and those who were surrounded by role models with perceived 
shared values paid more attention, while lack of continuous exposure to the same role model was 
perceived as a barrier and resulted in lower attention. Next, results revealed that for retention, the 
following themes emerged: learning the language, understanding thought processes, and 
meaningful reflection. In other words, participants were able to remember more when they 1) 
understood clinical language spoken by their role models; 2) felt aligned with role models and 
understood the reasoning behind their thought processes; 3) were able to reflect on what they had 
learned; and 4) were able to write down questions to aid in reflection. Through reproduction, 




Figure 2. Observational Learning and Political Role Models  
 
students appreciated receiving feedback that reinforced their development as well as the hands-
on clinical-based learning by putting “into practice the behaviors and strategies that they had 
observed in their role models” (p. 6). And finally, through motivation, the following themes 
emerged—feedback, vicarious reinforcement and punishment, and reciprocation. Thus, 
participants were motivated by direct reinforcement through feedback, through modeling 
perceived positive behavior (vicarious reinforcement), by avoiding negative behavior (vicarious 
punishment), and through reciprocal peer support. Interestingly, one student commented that “the 
less desirable behaviors observed in clinical settings can have a powerful influence,” which 
indicated that people could learn from both positive and negative traits of role models (Gibson, 
2004; Horsburgh & Ippolito, 2018, p. 6). 
The authors of the study also noted that although the students all learned from their role 
models, “there appeared to be limited awareness of underlying cognitive processes supporting 
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observational learning” (Horsburgh & Ippolito, 2018, p. 7). For future recommendations, it was 
suggested that Bandura’s observational learning model be utilized to not only observe role 
models, but also to uncover more information about cognitive thought processes of role models 
so that observers could learn about their insights, and that observers should be given the 
opportunity to reflect on and practice their learning. Even though their study had an extremely 
small sample size, the insights that surfaced were intriguing to the goals of the present study, 
namely regarding how people may learn from political role models as framed through 
observational learning. 
Another study explored observational learning (Yoon, Scopelliti, & Morewedge, 2021) to 
determine if decision making could be improved. Again, although shifting political attitudes 
were not discussed, the experimental study helped to provide insights into cognitive perception 
as it related to observational learning. Using a convenience sample of 277 university students in 
Boston, MA, participants partook in several tests and training interventions. The authors of the 
study suggested that “observational learning is a route through which cognitive biases are 
inculcated and exacerbated” (Yoon, et al., 2021, p. 156) meaning that like the preceding study 
discovered (Horsburgh & Ippolito, 2018) people can learn both positive and negative behavior 
through the observation of other group members. The study’s design included a pretest and 
posttest that measured three forms of biases (anchoring—the tendency to place more emphasis 
on initial information when making a judgment; social projection—the tendency to place more 
emphasis on one’s own perspectives when inferring the beliefs of others, and representativeness, 
which is the tendency to hold inappropriate biased beliefs), as well as personality and cognitive 
reflection. Participants were then sorted into one of four interventions, including a control group, 




condition). Results showed that the observational learning training condition (observe-gameplay 
group) “had a large and immediate debiasing effect on the extent to which participants exhibited 
three cognitive biases” (p. 161). Furthermore, observational learning was more effective than the 
instructional-video intervention. A second experiment within the same study recruited 
participants (Experiment A: n = 980; Experiment B: n = 494) through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
to determine if a shorter observational learning intervention (5 minutes) would improve decision 
making more than an information-based intervention. Results in Experiment A showed that 
observational learning was significantly more effective than practice alone at improving advice 
taking. Results in Experiment B indicated that observational learning taught participants to 
“make more accurate judgments by using advice” (p. 166) but that its effects were additive to the 
information condition. The authors of the study contended that based on their findings, 
“observational learning may be a scalable and effective way to debias people” but that the 
“characteristics of the actor-observer relationship may modulate the effectiveness of 
observational learning” (p. 167). These actor-observer characteristics were explored in the 
present study through semi-structured interviews about how role models may influence shifting 
political attitudes and learning. Future studies should expand upon these findings to explore how 
these observational training interventions could be applied to other fields. 
As echoed in one of the preceding studies (Horsburgh & Ippolito, 2018), Bandura (2017) 
noted that continuous exposure to the same role models produced simultaneous changes in 
behavior within the observer, as well as “emotional responsiveness, valuation of objects involved 
in the modeled activities, and in self-evaluation” (2017, p. 5). Moreover, per Bandura:  
   Observers are easily aroused by the emotional expressions of others …. fears and 
inhibitions can be reduced as well as acquired through the observation of response 





This ties nicely to Boud, Keogh, and Walker’s (1985) model of experiential learning described 
below, which incorporates reflection on experiences in regard to positive and negative emotions 
into its framework.  
Experiential Learning 
John Dewey, the pioneer of experiential learning, believed that “all genuine education 
comes about through experience” (1938, p. 13), yet not all experience is educative and may 
distort growth. In Dewey’s (1938) view, students are not empty vessels waiting to be filled with 
knowledge—rather they learn from experience through continuity and interaction with others. 
Continuity refers to the idea that learning isn’t isolated in time, meaning that learners connect 
what they have learned from current experiences with past experiences, which then informs 
future experiences. Interaction refers to learning transactions that take place between an 
individual and the environment (Merriam et al., 2007).  
According to Fenwick (2000), experiential learning can be viewed through five 
distinctive perspectives: 1) constructivist learning through cognitive reflection on experience; 2) 
situative learning through participation and collaboration; 3) psychoanalytic learning by 
overcoming resistance to knowledge due to unconscious desires and fears; 4) critical cultural 
learning through resistance of existing social norms and power dynamics; and 5) enactivist 
learning through relationships and interactions within interconnected, complex, and changing 
systems. Again, when thinking of American voters as learners themselves, it becomes clear that 
experiential learning—in addition to observational learning is a useful lens for exploring 
evolving political views, especially as it relates to constructivist and situated learning 
perspectives through reflection, participation, and collaboration. Experiential learning through 




access to experience through rational reflection” (Fenwick, 2003; Merriam et al., 2007, p. 183), 
while the lens of the situative perspective assumes that learning is collaborative, which is a 
central component of democracy. Through cognitive reflection, participation, and collaboration 
with one another, American voters may be more equipped to determine the best path forward 
towards aspects of common ground.  
Kolb (1984; 2014) claimed that learning from experience should be viewed as a holistic 
process that combines reflection with other factors of experience. Kolb’s learning cycle model 
outlines four stages and abilities of individual learners that evolve over time: 1) concrete 
experience/inquiry: learning through the ability to be open to new experiences; 2) reflective 
observation/critical thinking: learning through the ability to observe and reflect on varying 
perspectives; 3) abstract conceptualization/analysis: learning through the ability to create 
concepts based on observations; and 4) active experimentation/problem solving action: learning 
through the ability to use new concepts, ideas, and knowledge towards the establishment of 
theories. Building on Dewey’s principle of continuity, Kolb’s framework is constructivist and 
relativist in nature, viewing experience as an object on which people can continuously reflect. 
Critics (Boud et al., 1985) of Kolb’s model argue that there is too much emphasis on process and 
insufficient attention given to reflection and that the complexity of experience is discounted. 
Moreover, the strong emphasis on rationality and cognition ignores the impact of emotions and 
discounts the emphasis on human interactions.  
Through reflective practice, Schon (1987) supports the idea that people are aware of their 
own tacit knowledge and learn through “knowing in action.” He described two forms of 
reflection: reflection in action (e.g., knowing during action and reflecting on behavior while it is 




an experience occurs). He posited that reflection leads to on-the-spot experimentation. Schon 
argued that people should question their assumptions of knowing-in-action through purposeful 
reflection. If we respond to an action with a routine response, then is that response the best 
possible reaction? This approach would be useful for American voters that are open to rethinking 
their political attitudes, especially when interacting with people with opposing political views.  
Whereas the previous models were more constructivist in nature, Boud, Keogh, and 
Walker (1985) built on Dewey and Kolb’s concepts as well as Schon’s reflective practice theory 
to create a new model of experiential learning. It was more situative and interactive in nature, 
meaning that learning was intertwined with the situation at hand through behaviors, thoughts, 
and actions with reflection and emotion at the center. Since difficult and challenging experiences 
may inhibit developmental growth, the use of this experiential learning model may help adults to 
overcome potential emotional blocks to political learning. Reflection within this model was 
described as: 
an important human activity in which people recapture their experience, think about it, 
mull it over and evaluate it…The capacity to reflect is developed to different stages in 
different people and it may be this ability which characterizes those who learn effectively 
from experience. (Boud et al., 2013, p. 19) 
 
The model goes on to explain that active reflection can be triggered by a host of events, which 
could be negative or positive in nature. The focus of learning in the model is on 1) the individual 
learner; 2) the learner’s intent; and 3) the promotion of reflection, which taken together 
addresses:  
how the learner works on the experience, links new knowledge with old, re-examines the 
initial experience in the light of his or her own goals, integrates learning into his or her 
existing framework, and rehearses it with a view to subsequent activity. (Boud et al., 





The capacity of the individual learner to reflect is central to the model since “our 
perceptions of events are conditioned by past experience, which has shaped our response to the 
world around us” (p. 22). Moreover, the model suggests that new learning may be blocked if 
there are unresolved emotions attached to these experiences, which is related to Freudian 
concepts. The learner’s intent “can be directed towards exploring organized knowledge, towards 
self-exploration, or examining the natural and human environment or context in which the 
learner is operating” (p. 24). And finally, the promotion of reflection ties learning experiences to 
reflective practice. Boud et al.’s (1985) model of experiential learning (see Figure 3) includes 
three stages of socioemotional learning, including 1) returning to the experience; 2) attention to 
the feelings triggered by the experience; and 3) the reevaluation of the experience that leads to 
new behavior and learning.  
The first stage is described as “the recollection of the salient events, the replaying of the 
initial experience in the mind of the learner or the recounting others of the features of the  
experience” (Boud et al., 2013, p. 26). When replaying an experience, additional details may 
come to light that were not noticed during the actual experience. It requires the learner to notice, 
to recollect, to share it with others, and begin to “view the experience from other perspectives” 
and to address possible false perceptions. The second stage is described as “utilizing positive 
feelings and removing obstructing feelings” (p. 29), wherein learning cannot proceed unless 
 
barriers are addressed through expression either individually or with others. The final and most 
important stage of reevaluation: 
involves re-examining experience in the light of the learner’s intent, associating  
new knowledge with that which is already possessed and integrating this new knowledge 













Source: Boud, Keogh, and Walker, 1985, p. 36 
 
 
This occurs through association (relating new data to old data), integration (finding associations 
among the data), validation (examining authenticity of new insights), and appropriation 
(internalizing new knowledge as one’s own). Finally, and related to the present study’s 
evaluation of shifting political views, the outcome of Boud et al.’s (1985) model of experiential 
learning: 
has the objective of making us ready for new experience. The outcomes of reflection may 
include a new way of doing something, the clarification of an issue, the development of a 
skill or the resolution of a problem. A new cognitive map may emerge, or a new set of 
ideas may be identified. The changes may be quite small, or they may be large. They 
could involve the development of new perspectives on experience or changes in behavior. 
(Boud et al., 2013, p. 34) 
 
Applying Boud et al.’s (1985) experiential learning model to the context of the present 
study helped to guide the exploration of how shifting political attitudes were shaped through 
cognitive reflection (see Figure 4), which included the return to the experience of the shifting 




emotions related to the shifting political view, and the reevaluation of the experience that led to 
the ultimately shifted political view. This experiential learning framework helped the primary 
researcher to understand how shifts in political attitudes resulted in new learning. Although a 
search did not return any specific studies on Boud et al.’s (1985) model of experiential learning 
and shifting political attitudes, the present study investigated whether framing shifting political 
views through reflection could help to improve learning outcomes among the politically divided. 
 
 
Figure 4. Experiential Learning for Political Reflection 
 
Source: Modeled after Experiential Learning Model, Boud et al., 1985 
 
While the following study did not specifically investigate experiential learning, it 
explored whether perceived discrepancy or similarity in political views impeded a person’s 
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ability to learn from others (Marks, Copland, Loh, Sunstein, & Sharot, 2019). Using a complex 
experimental design, participants (n = 154) recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
completed multiple phases of online tests on how to sort shapes, as well as rating the political 
opinions of others and completing a survey on political attitudes. Participants were rewarded 
for accuracy on tasks and were given an economic incentive to get help from participants that 
could provide correct answers. Results showed that differences in personal political views 
impeded the ability of participants to make an accurate assessment of the expertise of others that 
they believed held different political beliefs. Instead, participants preferred to hear from people 
that were politically likeminded, even when they were not good at the task. As the authors noted:  
   If people have an automatic preference for those who share their political convictions, 
their positive feelings may spill over into the evaluation of other, unrelated 
characteristics…This is one consequence of political tribalism. (Marks et al., 2019, p. 83) 
 
Limitations included a relatively small sample size, the use of a convenience sample, and the 
lack of analysis on how political orientation may have impacted these results. The authors 
concluded that: 
   Among [the] politically like-minded, false news will spread even if it has little or 
nothing to do with politics, or even if the connection to politics is indirect or elusive. 
Suppose, for example, that someone with congenial political convictions spreads a rumor 
about a coming collapse in the stock market, a new product that supposedly cures cancer 
or baldness, cheating in sports, an incipient epidemic, or a celebrity who has shown some 
terrible moral failure. Even if the rumor is false, and even if those who hear it have 
reason to believe it is false, they may well find it credible, and perhaps spread it. (Marks 
et al., 2019, p. 84) 
 
This sentiment is certainly evident in the United States today, with rampant misinformation 
circulating about the COVID-19 pandemic, as it has been politically polarized in its spread 
through social media platforms. If the American electorate only trusts those who are like-minded 
on both political and non-political issues—political divisiveness is only going to continue to 




Another study (Alesina, Stantcheva, & Teso, 2018) examined if political attitudes could 
shift or change—to see if learning was possible regarding the issue of social mobility. For 
example, participants were asked if they believed that the American dream was still alive. 
Participants were solicited from five countries to ensure a nationally representative sample 
within each country, including France (2,148 respondents), Italy (2,143 respondents), Sweden 
(1,494 respondents), the UK (2,148 respondents), and the US (4,705 respondents). Looking 
across the five countries, Americans were more optimistic than Europeans regarding social 
mobility. Those who already believed that social mobility was possible were more likely to 
believe that it would also be possible for others. Within the United States, those who resided in 
the American South and Southeast were the most optimistic, despite living in areas that were the 
least likely to realize social mobility. This phenomenon may have been due to system 
justification (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), which is a theory that “particularly bad social and 
economic situations tend to be self-justified by respondents to avoid cognitive dissonance and to 
lend some legitimacy to the suffering it causes” (Alesina et al., 2018, p. 538). Moreover, across 
all countries in the sample, women, African Americans, parents, those in lower-income brackets, 
and people without a college degree were more optimistic about social mobility than other 
demographic groups. Another common finding across countries in the sample was that 
conservatives were less likely to support redistribution of wealth for immigrants, even when 
there were more minorities and immigrants in their commuting zone. Through an experimental 
design, the researchers randomly placed participants into two groups: an experimental group 
(exposure to pessimistic but factual information about social mobility, showing that most 
children born into poor families were unlikely to rise to the top in the United States) and a 




evidence). Results showed that both liberals and conservatives in the experimental group became 
more pessimistic, but that only liberals significantly shifted their political attitudes to be more 
supportive of equality and redistribution of wealth, while conservatives did not change their 
views, despite feeling more pessimistic. This suggested that ideological beliefs may have 
prevented shifts among conservatives through resistance to new information and attitudinal 
change polarization. Interestingly, the shifted views among liberals remained persistent even one 
week after the original survey. Liberals were also more in support of equality of opportunities, 
such as health care spending and public education, rather than equality of outcomes, such as 
safety net policies. Overall, the study suggested that political information seeking was impacted 
by prior beliefs, and that to change perspectives, one must be open to receiving new information 
that may be in violation of pre-existing beliefs.  
Although the two studies reviewed above did not specifically address experiential 
learning (Boud et al., 1985), they both inferred that the capacity for reflection on current political 
attitudes was necessary to even begin to consider shifting political views. For example, if people 
only trust information from the politically like-minded, then reflection on political attitudes is 
unlikely (Marks et al., 2019). Moreover, reflection on emotions is necessary to shift political 
views, with liberals more likely than conservatives to change their attitudes on social mobility 
when presented with negative and pessimistic information (Alesina et al., 2018). However, it is 
important to note that liberals are already more likely than conservatives to support issues of 
equality over individual freedom.  
Summary of Learning Models 
The attention and retention steps in observational learning are somewhat aligned with the 




the mind’s eye, to observe the event [or pay attention as in observational learning] as it has 
happened and to notice [or retain as in observational learning] exactly what occurred and one’s 
reactions to it in all its elements” (Boud, et al., 2013, p. 27). Although the observational learning 
subprocesses don’t specifically address emotions, Bandura (1977) assumed that observers would 
be impacted by the emotions of others that were being modeled, which relates in part to Boud et 
al.’s (1985) stage of attention to emotions provoked by an experience. Next, the reproduction and 
motivation subprocesses in observational learning and the reevaluation of experience stage in 
experiential learning both emphasize the intent of the learner—whether it be through sharing 
new perspectives with others, motivation to learn through positive or negative reinforcement, or 
by one’s “desire to process our experience and to extract consciously some learning outcomes 
from it” (p. 31). Both models are tied to cognition and action in the sense that as one goes 
through the cognitive steps or stages of the models—one may in turn change their behavior 
through associated learning. This was relevant to the present study’s goal—to determine how and 
why political attitudes shift and how these shifts might be associated with learning, if at all.  
Conclusion 
It is clear from the preceding literature that the desire to learn from people that are 
politically similar may preclude some liberals and conservatives from learning more fully. 
Political polarization (e.g., ideological consistency polarization, emotional polarization, and 
resistance to new information and attitudinal change) impedes partisans from learning both 
political and non-political issues. When people prefer to hear from politically similar people, 
then experts that are politically dissimilar may be ignored. If experts are ignored, then facts may 
no longer matter, media won’t be trusted, and education won’t be valued. Yet, people do not 




conceptual framework, the models of observational learning, and experiential learning helped to 
guide both data collection and analysis to explore the underpinnings of American political 
polarization and the possibilities of discovering the building blocks towards common ground. 
Connections to Design of Study  
The literature reviewed above supported the mixed-methods methodological approach as 
utilized for this current study. A survey informed data about a wide range of current and shifting 
political attitudes, diverse representation and equal rights, political participation, cognitive 
perceptions and emotions, social media and news media usage, political efficacy, and 
observational learning. Given the complexity of cognitive thought processes, the qualitative 
interviews provided an opportunity to determine how American voters are “thinking about 
thinking” regarding shifts in political attitudes in relation to observational learning and 
experiential learning. The interviews also helped to elicit deeper understandings about what 
informed individual shifts in perspectives and to determine ways in which American voters may 
be able to capture common ground with those who are politically different. 
Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework for this mixed-methods study drew upon the theoretical adult 
learning and social cognitive concepts of observational learning (Bandura, 1986) and experiential 
learning (Boud et al., 1985). Observational learning was envisioned as having a more cognitive 
focus, whereas experiential learning was envisioned as having a more emotional focus. Together, 
both models helped to address important aspects that are common across political learning, 
including cognition and emotion. Visualized as a cyclical and continuous process (see Figure 5), 
it was expected that 1) American voters learn how to behave in regard to political participation 




perceive alignment or opposition with partisan ingroups and outgroups, depending upon an 
individual’s own political ideology (cognitive political perception); 3) American voters 
cognitively reflect on their political attitudes and emotions (experiential learning); and 4) 
American voters change their political attitudes based on new insights obtained as a result of 
their learning (shifting political attitudes). It was expected that both political orientation and 
political efficacy would be important factors when weighing how partisans went through this 
model. Understandings found through this conceptual framework may help provide adult 
educators, social psychologists, political scientists, political strategists, and others to find new 
ways to unite a deeply polarized electorate through utilization of steps that capture facets of 
common ground.   
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A mixed-methods design was used to examine political polarization, shifting political 
attitudes, and the role of associated learning. This chapter provides greater detail into how the 
present study was structured to answer the main research questions across both the quantitative 
and qualitative studies. It also includes information on the research design, information needed 
and sources of data, the quantitative and qualitative study samples, methods of data collection, 
and methods for data analysis and synthesis. The chapter goes on to cover the rationale for the 
methods section, including ethical considerations and validity and reliability. It concludes with 
the study’s limitations. The main research questions for the study are reiterated below.  
1. In what ways is political orientation associated with political polarization on a variety 
of current and shifting political attitudes, cognitive perceptions and emotions of 
ingroup and outgroup partisans, social media interactions and news media usage, and 
factors of observational learning?  
a. In what ways does political orientation relate to current and shifting political 
attitudes concerning various economic and social issues (e.g., racial equality, 
state of the economy) and political participation (e.g., voting patterns, 




b. How does political orientation relate to cognitive perceptions and emotions of 
ingroup and outgroup partisans?  
c. In what ways does political orientation relate to political interactions and 
information seeking behavior on social media and the news media?  
d. How does political orientation relate to factors of observational learning 
(attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation)?  
2. In what ways is political efficacy associated with political participation, including 
voting, political protest, political rally, political donations, contacting Congress, and 
political persuasion? 
3. How and why do political attitudes shift and what events or experiences lead to these 
shifts?  
a. In what ways do social interactions with others, such as family, friends, 
teachers/mentors, religious leaders, or media inform the formation and shifts 
of political attitudes, if at all? 
b. How do these shifts in political perspectives relate to cognitive political 
perceptions or emotions of partisan ingroups and outgroups, if at all?  
c. How rewarding or challenging is it to make these shifts?  
4. In what ways do shifts in political perspectives result in new learning, and what is the 
role of this learning?   
a. In what ways can these political shifts be understood through Bandura’s 
(1986) four modes of observational learning, including attention, retention, 




b. In what ways can these political shifts be understood through Boud, Keough, 
and Walker’s (1985) model of experiential learning, including returning to 
and replaying the experience, attending to feelings provoked by the 
experience, and re-evaluating the experience? 
Research Design  
With the November 2020 U.S. presidential election in mind, this study utilized a mixed-
methods approach, including a quantitative and qualitative research design. The main difference 
between these two research approaches is that:  
   Qualitative research…uses words as data…collected and analyzed in all sorts of ways. 
Quantitative research, in contrast, uses numbers as data and analyzes them using 
statistical techniques. (Braun & Clarke, 2013, pp. 3-4; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 42) 
 
The rationale for the use of mixed-methods in this study was twofold—first, since part of the 
study was based on how American political attitudes may be informed by political participation 
and interactions on social media, it was important to conduct a portion of the study quantitatively 
through a survey circulated on Facebook via a targeted advertising campaign. In addition, the 
quantitative portion of the study helped to provide information related to the cognitive attitudes 
among participants. This approach helped the researcher reach the largest possible number of 
participants for the convenience sample, which helped to ensure that a range of political 
perspectives across the United States were represented. Second, since the study was an 
investigation into adult learning, it was also important to glean deeper understandings about 
polarization, cognitive perceptions, shifting political attitudes, and possible learning through 
qualitative interviews. In addition, the qualitative portion of the study provided important 
insights into the emotional perspectives of participants, which could not have been garnered 




observations, journaling, case studies, or reflection. The present study utilized semi-structured 
interviews with a subset of respondents from the quantitative survey. As Merriam & Tisdell 
(2015) described:  
   Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have 
constructed; that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have 
in the world. (p. 61) 
 
Thus, using mixed-methods in this study enabled both the analysis of broader survey data, as 
well as the analysis of more personal views among a subset of participants through interview 
data (see Figure 6). The use of mixed-methods was critical so that a deeper understanding of 
shifting political attitudes could be understood by the researcher to inform future  
 
 




recommendations for how learning may or may not be possible when individuals change their 
political attitudes. Through mixed-methods, quantitative and qualitative measures were used 
together to inform the research process and expand the potential generalizability of the results. 
Semi-Structured 

















Information Needed and Sources of Data 
Given that the purpose of this study was to examine American political polarization 
within a deeply divided nation, it was vitally important to find a sample that included voters from 
across the United States, including adults 18 years or older. As noted above, to address each of 
the research questions effectively, information was gathered through both an online survey and 
through follow-up semi-structured interviews (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Overview of Information Needed and Sources of Data  
Research Question Information Needed Information Sources and 
Methods 
Political Orientation and 
Political Attitudes, 
Participation, Cognitive 
Perceptions and Emotions, 
Social Media/News Media, and 
Observational Learning 
 
1. In what ways is political 
orientation associated 
with political 
polarization on a variety 
of current and shifting 
political attitudes, 
political participation, 
cognitive perceptions and 
emotions of ingroup and 
outgroup partisans, social 
media interactions and 
news media usage, and 
observational learning?  
   
Participant responses were 
gathered through an online 
survey posted on Facebook to 
obtain information on political 
orientation and associations with 
current and shifting political 





Online survey hosted through 








Political party  





Shifts: Diversity/equal rights 
Political attitudes: Current 
issues 
Shifts: Political attitudes on 
current issues 
Facebook interactions 
News media usage 
Observational learning 
 
Relationships and predictions 
were analyzed through SPSS. 
Short-answer questions were 





Political Efficacy and Political 
Participation 
 
2. In what ways is political 
efficacy associated with 
political participation, 
including voting, 
political protest, political 
rally, political donations, 
contacting Congress, and 
political persuasion? 
 
Participant responses were 
gathered through an online 
survey posted on Facebook to 
obtain information on political 




Online survey hosted through 









Relationships and predictions 
were analyzed through SPSS. 
Shifts in Political Attitudes 
and Related Events or 
Experiences 
 
3. How and why do 
political attitudes shift 
and what events or 
experiences lead to these 
shifts, such as social 
interactions with others, 
cognitive perceptions or 
emotions, and associated 
barriers or rewards? 
Participant description was 
gathered through semi-
structured interviews about how 
and why political attitudes shift. 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews were 
transcribed, coded, and analyzed 
through the Framework Method. 
 
 
Shifting Political Attitudes 
and Learning 
 
4. In what ways do shifts in 
political perspectives 
result in new learning, 
and what is the role of 
this learning?   
Participant description was 
gathered through semi-
structured interviews about 
shifting political attitudes and 
associated learning.  
Semi-structured interviews were 
transcribed, coded, and analyzed 
through the Framework Method. 
 
 
Demographics: How do 
demographics of race, gender, 
education, age, income, religion, 
and region/density of residence 
relate to political orientation and 
political efficacy? 
Participant responses were 
gathered through an online 
survey posted on Facebook to 
obtain information on 
demographics. 
Online survey hosted through 
Qualtrics asked questions about 
demographics.  
 
Relationships were analyzed 
through SPSS.  
 
 
The Study Sample 
  The present study was comprised of two convenience samples—one for the quantitative 
sample and one for the qualitative sample—described below. Inclusion criteria for both samples 




indicated a willingness to be contacted through the first sample were potentially selected to 
participate as part of the second sample.  
Quantitative Study Sample  
 A total of 1,580 participants were included in the quantitative portion of the study, two of 
whom declined to take the survey as they were not yet eighteen years old. Of the 1,578 
respondents that remained, 23 more entries were excluded as they were duplicate responses 
flagged by Qualtrics from the same IP address, leaving 1,555 participants. An additional 242 
partial responses were excluded from final analysis among those that completed less than the 
first 28 questions of the 84-question survey, many of whom only completed the first few 
questions. The remaining partial responses among those that completed the questions past 
question 28 were left in the dataset for final analysis (n = 101 entries). This decision was made 
since the first 28 questions included both of independent variables and several dependent 
variables, which the researcher deemed to be valuable information. Consequently, the final 
sample included 1,313 participants of which 1,212 were complete responses. Of the remaining 
101 partial responses, an average of 45% of questions were finished, ranging from the 
completion of 28 to 74 questions across participants. Response rates were well distributed across 
the final sample, as described below.  
  For example, political ideology was fairly well represented across political orientation 
and political party affiliation (see Table 2), although the sample skewed liberal. For example, 
regarding overall political orientation, 49% identified as liberal, 14% as moderate, and 37% as 
conservative. In addition, political party affiliation was distributed as follows: 30.9% as 
Democrat, 21.9% as Republican, 30.1% as Independent, 8.8% as Libertarian, and 8.3% as 




Table 2. Online Survey Participants: Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic N % Characteristic N % 
 




































































































Race and Ethnicity 1266 100% Education 1212 100% 
White 
Mixed race or origin 
Black or African American 
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish  
Asian or Asian American 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 
Other 

















Less than high school 



















Income 1212 100% Employment Status 1212 100% 





$200,000 or more 















Employed full time 
Employed part time 
Unemployed looking for work 
Unemployed not looking 
Retired 
Student 
Disabled, not able to work 

















Importance of Religion/Spirituality 1212 100%    
Not at all 
Very little  
A fair amount  
Quite a bit  
A large amount   













   




Based on the four U.S. Census regions (see Figure 7), 22.6% of the sample resided in the 
Northeast, 26.1% in the Midwest, 29.7% in the South, and 21.6% in the West. Moreover, the 
sample consisted of 18.9% residing in an urban community, 47.2% in a suburban community, 
33.1% in a rural community, and less than 1% not sure.  
 
Figure 7. Census Regions and Divisions of the United States 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Regions and Divisions (2010) 
 
  As age and education may affect political understanding (Jost, 2006; Knight, 1999), 
participants were recruited across the United States through Facebook to ensure the largest 
possible sample with varying ages and education levels. Age skewed older with just 5.1% of 




whereas there were 34.1% between the ages of 50 to 64, 30.6% between the ages of 65 to 79, and 
3.6% aged 80 and older. The sample was very well educated, with less than 1% without a high 
school degree, 3.1% with a high school degree, 17.3% with some college, 10.2% with an 
associate degree, 31% with a bachelor’s degree, and 38% with a post-graduate degree. Females 
represented 47.4% of the sample. Most participants in the sample identified as White comprising 
79% of the sample, while 8% identified as mixed race or origin, less than 1% identified as Black 
or African American, 5% identified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, less than 1% Asian or Asian 
American, less than 1% American Indian or Alaskan Native, and 5% identified as other 
ethnicities (note: an additional 117 people chose not to disclose their race or ethnicity, which is 
not included in this distribution).  
  Income was distributed with 7.3% earning less than $20,000, 19.4% earning between 
$20,000 to $49,999, 32.8% earning between $50,000 and $99,999, 16.9% earning between 
$100,000 to $149,999, 10.6% earning more than $150,000, and 12.9% choosing not to disclose. 
The sample was inclusive of 35.6% employed full-time, 7.9% employed part-time, 4.5% 
unemployed, but looking for work, 3.1% unemployed and not looking for work, 38.3% retired, 
4.7% as students, 2.7% disabled and not able to work (note: an additional 3% did not disclose 
their income, which is not included in this distribution).  
 Among the survey sample, response rates across the demographics of race (see Figure 8), 
gender, age, and education, as well as presidential voting preferences for the 2020 election (see 
Figure 9) were compared to exit polling data to determine generalizability (National Exit Polls, 
2021). Comparisons revealed some discrepancies between the survey sample and national exit 
polls, particularly regarding race, education, and age. For example, the survey sample was 




overrepresented (12% gap) compared to the national exit poll. Mixed race or origin was not 
reflected in national polling data so comparisons of the 8% of the sample that identified their 
race in this category were unable to be made. The survey sample was strongly underrepresented 
for Black or African Americans (12% gap), Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Americans (8% gap), 
and Asian or Asian Americans (3% gap). This meant that the survey results could not be 
generalized beyond White voters, which is clearly not representative of the American electorate. 
The results of the quantitative portion of the study may have changed if more diverse voices 
from these underrepresented racial groups had been included.  
 
Figure 8. Survey Sample Data Compared to 2020 Voting Population: Race 
 
Source: National Exit Polls (2021) 
 
The survey sample was also underrepresented in terms of age, education, and voting 
preferences for the 2020 presidential election as compared to national polling data. For example, 
79%


























respondents aged 49 and younger were underrepresented while those 50 years and older were 
overrepresented (8% gap). This meant that the survey results were not generalizable for younger  
voters. The survey sample was also underrepresented among those without a college degree 
while those with at least a college degree or higher were overrepresented (28% gap), which 
meant that the survey results were not generalizable to less educated voters. Moreover, the  
survey sample was slightly underrepresented in terms of 2020 presidential voting preferences as  
 
Figure 9. Survey Sample Data Compared to 2020 Voting Population: Presidential Voting 
Preference, Gender, Education, and Age 
 
Source: National Exit Polls (2021) 
 
compared to national polling data among those who planned to vote for Democratic candidate, 
Joe Biden (2% gap) and those who planned to vote for Republican candidate, Donald Trump (5% 
























Voted for Biden Voted for Trump Women Men No college degree College degree 49 and younger 50 and older




party candidate or more strongly supported Biden over Trump. This further limited 
generalizability among the survey sample to the American electorate. Future studies should 
obtain a less skewed and more representative survey sample inclusive of Black or African 
American voters, Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish voters, Asian or Asian American voters, and other 
underrepresented racial groups. Moreover, future studies should obtain a more representative 
sample among less educated voters, as well as more supporters of Republican presidential 
candidates to improve generalizability with national exit polls.  
Qualitative Study Sample 
For the qualitative study sample, in order to understand shifting political views, cognitive 
perceptions, and potential associated learning more fully, a subset of online survey participants 
was selected to individually participate in semi-structured interviews. Of the 1,212 respondents 
that completed the entire survey, 559 (46% of quantitative sample) agreed to be contacted for a 
potential interview. A limitation to this approach was that only those who agreed to be contacted 
from the online survey were among the pool of possible candidates to be interviewed. Thus, 
those that were not willing to provide their contact information may have had different traits than 
those who were willing to be contacted. Of this group, the list was narrowed down to include 
only those who had shifted their views on a variety of political issues, such as the state of the 
economy, immigration conditions, US/Russia and US/China relationship, access to affordable 
healthcare, conditions for African Americans when dealing with police, government response to 
COVID-19, identification with attitudes of Trump; as well as the importance of gun control, 
climate change, K-12 public education, college education, American news media, diverse 
representation in government, and equality for racial minorities, women, and the LGBTQ 




amount, changed quite a bit, or changed a large amount) in their political views since the 2016 
election were included, which further narrowed down the list of potential participants to 153 
people, which was 27% of the sample that agreed to be contacted. Since the majority of those 
who had shifted their political views were liberal (e.g., 99 liberals, 23 moderates, 25 
conservatives, 4 other/not sure), the researcher attempted to balance the sample by political 
orientation and political party affiliation, as well as by gender to the extent possible, with the 
goal of interviewing participants across the political ideological spectrum. Thus, a total of 46 of 
these potential participants were emailed, of which 19 people (10 liberals, 3 moderates, and 6 
conservatives) agreed to be interviewed. Out of this group, one potential participant 
(conservative) did not join two of their scheduled interviews, a second potential participant 
(moderate) cancelled and did not reschedule, and a third potential participant (conservative) did 
not provide consent to participate, leaving a total of 16 final participants (10 liberals, 2 
moderates, and 4 conservatives) for the semi-structured interview portion of the study.  
Demographics of the participants were reviewed comparatively to understand the 
findings more fully. Table 3 includes the names of participants (pseudonyms) as well as their 
political orientation (PO), political party, presidential voting preference (2020 vote), age, gender, 
education, region/density of residence (region), and race/ethnicity. Most of the participants voted 
for Biden, with only 3 people who voted for Trump (one conservative Libertarian/leans 
Republican, one liberal Democrat/leans Libertarian, and one conservative Republican). On a 
broader scale, overall demographic characteristics revealed that the final interview sample leaned 
liberal (see Table 4), with 62.4% identifying as either liberal or very liberal, while 25.1%  






Table 3. Interview Participants: Demographics by Political Orientation, Political Party,  
and 2020 Vote  





Age Gender Education Region Race 







Marc Con Libertarian/ 
Lean Republican 






Emma Lib Democratic 
Socialist/Lean  
Democrat  













Aleena Lib Green/Lean 
Democrat  









Paul Lib Democrat  
 
 





Daniel Lib Democrat/ 
Lean Libertarian 
 










Harper Lib Democratic 
Socialist  












Diana Con Republican  
 





Shawna Con Republican 
 
 





Jonathan Lib Independent 
 







Julia Mod Independent 
 








Betty Mod Independent 
 
 





Ava Lib Democrat 
 










Political party affiliation was distributed with 31.2% as Democrat, 12.5% as Republican, 30.2% 
as Independent, 6.3% as Libertarian, and 18.8% as something else (one Green Party and two 
Democratic Socialists). Age was more equally distributed amongst the interview sample than the 
survey sample with half of the participants under age 50 and half aged 50 and older. Interview 
participants were even more educated than the survey sample with nearly 94% of participants 
holding a bachelor’s degree or higher. Females represented 56.3% of the interview sample.  
 
 
Table 4. Interview Participants: Overall Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic N % Characteristic N % 
 



























































































Race and Ethnicity* 16 100% Education 16 100% 
Race 
White 
Mixed race or origin 
Black or African American 
Asian or Asian American 
White/Native American 
Ethnicity 


















Less than high school 




















Characteristic N % Characteristic N % 
 
Income 16 100% Employment Status 16 100% 





$200,000 or more 















Employed full time 
Employed part time 
Unemployed looking for work 
Unemployed not looking 
Retired 
Student 
Disabled, not able to work 

















Importance of Religion/Spirituality 16 100%    
Not at all 
Very little 
A fair amount 
Quite a bit  











   
 
 
Race was slightly more representative than the survey sample, but still critically 
unrepresentative of Blacks or African Americans. The sample included 68.8% as White, 18.8% 
mixed race or origin, and 12.4 as other races, including Asian American and White/Native 
American. In terms of ethnicity, 12.5% of the sample identified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. 
Based on the four U.S. Census regions (see Figure 7), the South was most represented with 
37.5% of the sample, 25% in the Midwest, 25% in the Northeast, and 12.5% in the West. 
Moreover, the sample consisted of mostly those who resided in a suburban community with 
almost 70% of the total participants. Income was distributed with 31.3% earning less than 
$50,000, 25% earning between $50,000 and $99,999, and 25% earning $100,000 or more. 
Among the interview sample, response rates across the demographics of race (Figure 10), 
gender, age, education, as well as 2020 presidential voting preference (Figure 11) were also 
compared to exit polling data to determine generalizability (National Exit Polls, 2021). 
Comparisons revealed extensive discrepancies between the interview sample and exit polling 
data. For example, the interview sample was critically underrepresented among Black or African 




Figure 10. Interview Sample Data Compared to 2020 Voting Population: Race 
 
Source: National Exit Polls (2021) 
 
 
of the study may have been different if a more representative sample across racial groups had 
been included. Since the racial category of mixed race or origin was not reflected in national 
polling data, the researcher was unable to compare the nearly 19% of the interview sample that 
identified as part of this group. Although other racial groups, including Asian or Asian American 
and Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish were more equally comparable to national polling data, it is 
important to note that the sample size was very small, with only 16 participants, thus not 
generalizable to the larger voting population. Future studies should include a more racially 
diverse and representative sample. 
  The interview sample was also underrepresented in terms of presidential voting 
preference, gender, education, and age as compared to exit polling data from the 2020 U.S. 































overrepresented (30% gap) while those that voted for Donald Trump were underrepresented 
(28% gap). This meant that the results of the qualitative portion of the study were not 
representative of Trump supporters. Females were overrepresented in the sample compared to 
exit polling data while men were underrepresented (8% gap). The interview sample was 
overrepresented among those under 50 years old compared to national polling data and 
underrepresented among those over 50 years old (10% gap). The interview sample was also 
underrepresented among those without a college degree while those with a college degree or 
higher were overrepresented (53% gap), which meant that the interview results were not  
 
Figure 11. Interview Sample Data Compared to 2020 Voting Population: Presidential Voting 
Preference, Gender, Education, and Age 
 




























Voted for Biden Voted for Trump Women Men No college degree College degree 49 and younger 50 and older




generalizable to less educated voters. Future studies should obtain a less skewed and more 
representative interview sample across Black or African American voters, supporters of 
Republican candidates, male voters, older voters, and less educated voters. The interview sample 
was selected from the survey portion of the study, but only among those who had shifted their 
views during the Trump presidency, which created selection bias. Therefore, the interview 
sample was not generalizable to the survey sample nor the broader American electorate.  
Methods for Data Collection 
 Data collection was conducted in two phases: 1) through the quantitative portion of the 
study utilizing an online survey; and 2) through the qualitative portion of the survey utilizing 
semi-structured interviews with a subset of participants from the online survey (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Data Collection Methods 
Information Needed Method Example 
 
Timeline 
• Political orientation 
and political 
polarization on a 
variety of current 
and shifting political 
attitudes. 
• Political efficacy and 







hosted on Qualtrics and 
posted to Facebook 




emotions, social media 
and news usage, factors 
of learning, and 
demographic 
information (n=1,313). 
Survey was open 
from July 23, 2020 
to August 31, 2020. 
• Influences of 




• Shifting political 
perceptions and 









participants (n=16) who 
indicated that they had 
shifted their political 
views between the 2016 
and 2020 U.S. 
presidential election.  
Interviews were 
conducted from 
October 15, 2020 






Quantitative Study Data Collection 
 Approval to launch the study was received by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
Columbia University’s Teachers College (protocol number: 20-386) on July 15, 2020. In 
addition, it was determined that the study was exempt from committee review. In advance of 
launching the survey, a minor modification was submitted to the IRB, which was approved on 
July 22, 2020. This modification addressed concerns that were revealed through a pilot study, 
discussed below. Later, a second modification request was submitted to the IRB to increase the 
maximum total survey population from 1,000 participants to 2,000 participants, given the 
unexpected number of respondents. This exemption was approved by the IRB on September 15, 
2020.  
Survey pilot.  The online survey was first informed by a pilot. A total of four participants 
(two women and two men) completed a pilot survey hosted on Qualtrics between the dates of 
July 16 to July 19, 2020. Participants ranged in age from 25 to 49 and were comprised of three 
liberals and one conservative, while political party affiliation included one Democrat and three 
Independents (two leaned Democrat and one leaned Republican). Feedback from pilot 
participants revealed that the survey in its original form was too long and that there were too 
many open-ended questions that felt overly burdensome to complete. Based on this critique and 
to increase potential response rates, a total of 23 questions were removed from the survey. 
Several other questions were reworded for clarity and the order of items were adjusted slightly to 
improve the overall flow of the survey. Thus, after all of the modifications were incorporated, the 
survey was reduced from 107 questions to 84 questions. Although it was originally estimated 
that the entire survey would take 30 minutes to complete, the pilot revealed that it actually took 




completion time was reduced to an average of 28 minutes across pilot participants. The final 
survey was officially launched for the present study on July 23, 2020 and remained open through 
August 31, 2020.  
Survey scales for data collection.   The final online survey (see Appendix A) presented 
participants with the same questions, although depending on individual answers, some people 
were directed to answer follow-up questions. In addition to demographic data, information on the 
following variables were collected through self-report measures that were combined into one 
online survey titled Political Attitudes 2020.  
Independent variables.   Independent variables were tested through the use of two scales, 
including overall political orientation and perceived political efficacy. Scales for independent 
variables exhibited good reliabilities (see Table 6) for political orientation (a = .953) and 
political efficacy (a = .849). Although attitudes about social and economic issues can be distinct 
from each other (Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Everett, 2013), self-placement on 
the political orientation scales for general, social, and economic political orientation were highly 
correlated in the present study. In addition, the high reliability for political efficacy was 
consistent with another study that showed Cronbach alpha reliabilities that ranged from .81 to .93 
across the three subscales of personal, collective, and external political efficacy (Sarieva, 2018).  
Overall political orientation scale.   Information on political orientation was collected 
through three, single item/eight-point scales as modeled after the ANES (2020) format (Knight, 
1999). Participants were asked to place their general, economic, and social political orientation 
preferences ranging from “very liberal” to “liberal” to “slightly liberal” to “moderate/middle of 





Table 6. Scale Reliabilities for Independent Variables 
Measure M SD Range N a Items in 
Scale 
Overall Political Orientation 1-7* 1231 .953 3 
General Political Orientation 
Economic Political Orientation 









Very liberal (1) 
Liberal (2) 
Slightly liberal (3) 
Moderate (4) 
Slightly conservative (5) 
Conservative (6) 
Very conservative (7) 
   
Perceived Political Efficacy 1-5*  










Completely disagree (1) 
Slightly disagree (2) 
Neither agree/disagree (3) 
Slightly agree (4) 










*Not sure / Don’t know responses excluded from analysis in table. 
 
Multiple studies have shown that political orientation scales are reliable, with evidence 
suggesting that self-placement on a single-item scale is coherent, accurate, and stable across time 
(Conover & Feldman, 1981; Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996; Jost, 2006; Kerlinger, 1984; Knight, 
1999).  
Perceived political efficacy scale.   The Perceived Political Efficacy (PPE) Scale 
(Sarieva, 2018) is a nine-item self-report scale that is designed to measure political efficacy 
among adults and takes less than five minutes to complete. Three types of political efficacy were 
measured on this scale, including personal political efficacy, collective political efficacy, and 
external political efficacy. Items were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
“completely disagree” to “slightly disagree” to neither agree or disagree” to “slightly agree” to 
“completely agree.” The scale consisted of short descriptive statements, based on three abilities 
related to political efficacy, including 1) the ability to influence the enactment of new laws and 




demand that existing laws and political decisions can be observed (2018). For example, one of 
the statements under the personal efficacy subscale stated, “I can demand that existing laws and 
political decisions be observed.” Likewise, one of the statements under the collective efficacy 
subscale stated, “Together, citizens of my country can demand that existing laws and political 
decisions be observed.” Finally, one of the statements under the external efficacy subscale stated, 
“The people in charge of government are interested in carrying out the lawful demands of the 
citizens.” These statements have good face validity and are easy to translate into other languages. 
Although there are many different instruments available to measure political efficacy, the PPE 
Scale was the most suitable for use in the present study since it measured all three factors of 
political efficacy. To present knowledge, other political efficacy scales only measure one of the 
three political efficacy components, such as personal efficacy (Caprara et al., 2009; Morell, 
2005), while other studies (Schulz, 2005) define personal efficacy as political knowledge and 
awareness rather than perceived ability, which has deviated from Bandura’s political efficacy 
perspective (Bandura, 1997). One possible limitation of the PPE scale is that since their study 
was originally conducted in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the reliabilities may not be 
replicable in other countries, however, the study suggested that the instrument is reliable and 
stable for measuring political efficacy in any country. For purposes of the present study, the 
language in the statements from the subscales was changed from “my country” to “the United 
States.”  
Dependent variables.   Dependent variables were tested through the use of twelve scales, 
including political party affiliation, presidential voting preferences, political participation, 
cognitive perceptions and political polarization, emotions towards political parties, diverse 




attitudes on current issues, shifts in political attitudes on current issues, social media and political 
exposure, number and type of political news sources, and observational learning. Most 
dependent variables in the survey used five-point Likert-style responses, while several items 
were in a short-answer format. Scales for most of the dependent variables exhibited good 
reliabilities (see Table 7) for presidential voting (a = .821), political participation (a = .721), 
cognitive perceptions and political polarization for Republicans and conservatives (a = .884) and 
Democrats and liberals (a = .897), diverse representation and equal rights (a = .899), shifting 
diverse representation and equal rights (a = .883), political attitudes on favorability of current 
issues (a = .891) and importance of issues (a = .831), shifting political attitudes of current 
issues (a = .809), and observational learning (a = .774). Slightly lower reliabilities were found 
for positive emotions for Democrats (a = .618), positive emotions for Republicans (a = .739), 
negative emotions for Democrats (a = .583), and negative emotions for Republicans (a = .681). 
The lowest reliabilities were found for the type of political news sources (a = .514) and social 
media interactions amongst friend groups (a = .333), which suggests that these factors were not 
measuring the same underlying concepts and were analyzed individually. Political party 
affiliation was analyzed individually since it was a categorical single-item question.  
Political party affiliation.   Political party affiliation was ascertained through a single-
item/five-point scale. Participants were asked to indicate their political party (e.g., Democrat, 
Republican, Independent, Libertarian, or something else). Those who selected “Independent” 
“Libertarian” or “something else” were asked if they leaned Democrat, Republican, or neither. 
Another single item/seven-point scale asked about the importance of the participant’s selected 
party identification ranging from extremely important to extremely unimportant. All of these 




Table 7. Scale Reliabilities for Dependent Variables 
Measure M SD Range N a Items  
US Presidential Voting 1-3*  











Democratic (1)  
Republican (2) 
Third-Party (3) 
   
Political Participation 1-5*  
























   
Cognitive Perception and Political Polarization 1-4*  














Almost no good ideas (1)  
A few good ideas (2)  
Some good ideas (3) 










Emotions and Political Parties 0-1*  
   





















































































































Not at all important (1)  
Slightly important (2) 
Moderately important (3)  
Very important (4) 
Extremely important (5) 




Measure M SD Range N a Items  

























Not changed at all (1)  
Changed very little (2) 
Changed a fair amount (3)  
Changed quite a bit (4) 
Changed a large amount (5) 
   
Political Attitudes on Current Issues 1-5*  





Access to Healthcare 
Police Brutality 
COVID-19 Response 
Attitudes towards Trump 
 
Importance of Issues 
Gun Control 
Climate Change 
K-12 Education  
Higher Education 

































Very poor (1)  
Poor (2)  




Not at all (1)  
Very little (2)  
Fair amount (3)  
Quite a bit (4) 
Large Amount (5) 
 
Not at all important (1)  
Slightly important (2) 
Moderately important (3)  
Very important (4) 








































Access to Healthcare 
Police Brutality 
COVID-19 Response 
American News Media 
Gun Control 
Climate Change 
K-12 Education  
Higher Education 



























Not changed at all (1)  
Changed very little (2) 
Changed a fair amount (3)  
Changed quite a bit (4) 
Changed a large amount (5) 
   
Social Media Interactions    



























None (1)  
Just a few (2) 
Some (3)  









Measure M SD Range N a Items  



















No (0)  
Yes (1) 
   




















Not at all (1) 
Very little (2)  
Fair amount (3) 
Quite a bit (4) 
Large amount (5) 
 
   
*Not sure / Don’t know responses excluded from analysis in table. 
 
Presidential voting preferences.   Presidential voting preferences for the past three 
presidential elections in the United States was determined through a single item/four-point scale. 
For example, the question for the 2020 presidential election was worded as follows: “If the 
November 2020 election for President of the United States was held today, who would you vote 
for? If you are not eligible to vote, who do you have a preference for?” Participants were directed 
to select one of the following options: Joe Biden, Donald Trump, someone else, or not sure. 
Presidential preference for the 2016 and 2012 elections were also solicited through single 
item/four-point scales. One of the questions was worded as follows: “Did you vote or have a 
preference for a candidate in the November 2016 election for President of the United States.” 
Participants were asked to select one of the following options: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, 
third-party candidate/other, or did not vote. All questions were modeled after the ANES (2020) 
format.  
Political participation.   Political participation was ascertained through a seven-item 




participation, please select how often you engage in the following activities.” The first six items 
were rated on a six-point Likert scale ranging from “never” to “rarely” to “sometimes” to “often” 
to “always” to “other/not applicable.” For example, the first question asked, “How often do you 
vote in local, state, or national elections?” Other questions asked about frequency in participating 
in political protests, political rallies, donating money to political organizations, contacting 
Congress or another political representative regarding a political issue, and political persuasion. 
The seventh item was in a short-answer format, which asked “What does political participation 
mean to you? Please briefly describe.” All items were modeled on various national polling 
questions (ANES, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2020).  
Cognitive perceptions and political polarization.   To determine cognitive perceptions 
about political orientation and political parties, this four-item, five-point Likert response scale 
evaluated how respondent’s thought about conservatives, liberals, Republicans, and Democrats. 
Each question asked, “Would you say [conservatives, liberals, Republican Party, Democratic 
Party] have” one of the following choices: “almost no good ideas” to “a few good ideas” to 
“some good ideas” to “a lot of good ideas” to “other/not sure.” Items on this scale were based on 
various national polling questions (ANES, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2020).  
Emotions toward political parties.   To determine if emotions were related to feelings 
about political parties, this two-item scale evaluated how respondent’s felt about the Republican 
Party and Democratic Party. For example, the first question asked, “How does the Democratic 
Party make you feel? Check all that apply.” The second question asked, “How does the 
Republican Party make you feel? Check all that apply.” There were seven options for each 




(frustrated, angry, afraid) or “none of these.” Items on this scale were modeled from various 
national polling questions (ANES, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2020).  
Diverse representation and equal rights.   Attitudes on the importance of seeing more 
diversity among elected politicians in the US government and the importance of equal rights for 
marginalized groups were determined by asking participants to answer six questions, including 
six-point Likert responses modeled after survey questions used by ANES (2020). For example, 
the first three questions about diverse representation asked: “Thinking about diversity in our 
elected officials in the United States government, how important is it for the country to elect 
politicians that identify as [racial minorities, females, or LGBTQ]?” The remaining three 
questions were comprised of the importance of equal rights for the same marginalized groups. 
For example, one of the questions asked, “Thinking about gender equality, how important is it 
for women to have equal rights in the United States?” Participants were asked to select from six 
choices from “not at all important” to “slightly important” to “moderately important” to “very 
important” to “extremely important” to “other/not sure.”  
Shifts in diverse representation and equal rights.   Shifting attitudes on diverse 
representation and equality were determined by asking participants to answer eight questions, 
including six single item/six-point Likert scales and two short-answer questions, modeled after 
survey questions used through ANES (2020). Questions asked whether the participants’ attitudes 
had changed on each diversity and equality question since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
with options ranging from “not changed at all” to “changed very little” to “changed a fair 
amount” to changed quite a bit” to “changed a large amount” or “don’t know/no opinion.” The 




   In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or experiences led 
you to change your views on the diversity of elected officials (racial minorities, women, 
LGBTQ) in the United States government? 
 
The second open-ended question asked:  
   In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or experiences led 
you to change your views on equal rights for racial minorities, women, or the LGBTQ 
community? 
 
 Political attitudes on current issues.   To determine current American political attitudes 
on a variety of current issues, questions on this scale were modeled from various national polling 
questions (ANES, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2020). Questions were also partly informed by a 
formative doctoral student group project (Eldaly, Pelzer, Starmer, & Tuber, 2019). This scale 
included a total of 13 items, which was separated into two sections, including favorability (8 
items) and importance (5 items). For example, one of the favorability items asked about the 
economy: “Thinking about the nation's economy, how would you rate economic conditions in 
the United States today,” with a 6-point Likert scale ranging with responses from “very poor” to 
“poor” to “fair/average” to “good” to “excellent” to “other/not sure.” Other items in this scale 
included immigration conditions, US/Russia relationship, US/China relationship, access to 
healthcare, conditions for African Americans when dealing with police brutality, government 
response to COVID-19, and attitudes towards Trump. One of the importance items asked about 
climate change: “When thinking about the environment, how important do you think the issue of 
climate change is,” with a 6-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all important,” to “slightly 
important,” to “moderately important,” to “very important,” to “extremely important” to 
“other/not sure.” Other items included gun control, K-12 education, higher education, and 




 Shifts in political attitudes on current issues.   To determine whether American political 
attitudes had shifted during the Trump presidency, questions on this scale were also partly 
informed by a formative doctoral student group project (Eldaly, Pelzer, Starmer, & Tuber, 2019). 
This scale was comprised of fifteen items, including thirteen 5-point Likert questions and two 
short-answer questions. For example, one of questions asked: “In the time since President Trump 
was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward restricting access to guns have…” with the following 
options: “not changed at all” to “changed very little” to “changed a fair amount” to “changed 
quite a bit” to “changed a large amount.” Other items included shifting views on the economy, 
immigration conditions, US/Russia relationship, US/China relationship, access to healthcare, 
conditions for African Americans when dealing with police brutality, government response to 
COVID-19, attitudes towards Trump, climate change, gun control, K-12 education, higher 
education, and the American news media. The first short-answer question asked:  
   In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or experiences led 
you to change your views on a political issue? For example, you could think of a specific 
issue, such as police brutality, immigration, or something else. (If you did not shift your 
views, please skip to the next question). 
 
The second short-answer question was only shown to participants that had indicated that they 
had shifted their views on President Trump since 2016. The questions asked, “What events or 
experiences led you to change your views on President Trump?” 
Social media political exposure.   To determine the degree of political exposure to 
different political ideologies on social media, this scale measured how many friends each user 
perceived they had on Facebook across various political orientations and political parties. For 
example, participants were asked to share how many of their friends on Facebook were 
perceived to be liberal, conservative, or moderate for political orientation—and Democrat, 




in this scale with 5-point Likert responses ranging from “none” to “just a few” to “some” to “a 
lot” to “other/not sure.” This scale was self-designed by the researcher.  
Political news.   To determine the number and type of political news sources used, a total 
of three single-item questions were included. For example, the first question asked, “How many 
news sources do you typically read each day?” A six-point Likert response ranged from “none,” 
to “one,” to “two,” to “three,” to “four,” or “five” or more. To determine the type of news 
sources consulted by participants, the second question asked, “What is the most common ways 
you get your political news? Check all that apply.” The responses included categorical responses 
such as “newspapers or magazines,” “radio,” “local TV,” “cable TV,” “social media,” “news 
websites,” and “other.” Finally, a short-answer question, asked, “What are your primary sources 
for political news?” This scale was self-designed by the researcher.  
Observational learning.   The Observational Learning Scale is a self-designed, seven-
item self-report scale based on Bandura’s (1977) subprocesses of attention, retention, 
reproduction, motivation to learn, feeling rewarded, and feeling challenged—in relation to shifts 
in political perspectives among adults. The directions for completing the scale stated:  
   When answering the following set of questions, think about a time when you shifted 
your perspective on a political issue that is important to you. For example, think about a 
time when you have felt more positive or negative about an economic or social concern 
(e.g., trade, immigration, gun rights, or something else).  
 
The first six items consisted of short descriptive statements with a six-point Likert response scale 
ranging from “not at all” to “very little” to “a fair amount” to “quite a bit” to “a large amount” to 
“not applicable.” The first question on attention asked, “To what extent did you notice or pay 
attention to the views of your family, friends, mentors, or teachers when you were considering 
shifting your perspective on this political issue?” The second question on retention asked, “To 




when you were considering shifting your perspective on this political issue?” The third question 
on reproduction asked, “To what extent did you repeat or share your shifted perspective on this 
political issue with others?” The fourth question on motivation to learn asked, “To what extent 
were you motivated to learn about this personal shift in your shift in your political view?” The 
fifth and sixth questions asked about feeling rewarded or feeling challenged when sharing shifts 
in political perspectives with others. Finally, the last item on the scale included an open-ended 
question, which asked participants to briefly describe the political issue that they changed their 
perspective on. To present knowledge, there are no validated scales available to measure 
observational learning factors in relation to shifting political attitudes, thus the primary 
researcher created this scale based on the factors of Bandura’s observational learning theory.  
Missing items. Several single-item questions in the survey (see Appendix A) were not 
included in final statistical analysis, as they were deemed redundant to other questions and didn’t 
help address the study’s hypotheses. For example, a question about the direction of the country 
was not included in final analysis (Q30), as well as five questions (Q 35.1 to Q 35.5) about how 
politics were related to the role of government, political infighting, and political compromise 
(modeled from Hawkins et al., 2018). In addition, three questions (Q 69 to Q 71) about social 
media use and interactions were removed. Moreover, although two questions about political 
party (Q 10.1 and Q 11) were not included in final statistical analysis, they were analyzed 
through qualitative analysis, including 1) whether independents or third-party participants leaned 
Republican or Democrat; and 2) the level of importance of participants’ political parties.  
Procedures for survey.   About four in ten or 43% of US adults get their news from 
Facebook (Gramlich, 2019), thus, Facebook was selected as the social media platform to be used 




survey was hosted in Qualtrics, but a link to the survey was shared on a Facebook page 
specifically created as the landing page for direct advertising. Participants directed to the page by 
Facebook algorithms were targeted by their social media profiles regarding their political 
ideology by political orientation (e.g., liberal, conservative, moderate) and by political party 
affiliation (e.g., Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, Independent), age (e.g., 18 years or older), 
and residence within the United States. The campaign aimed to reach as many participants as 
possible across the United States that identified as liberals, moderates, or conservatives.  
This targeted advertising approach enabled the survey to reach more adults around the 
country than would have been possible through a personal convenience sample or through other 
methods. The Facebook page was entitled, “Shifting Political Attitudes” and included a single 
post that stated:  
   Please consider participating in a Teachers College, Columbia University sponsored 
research study examining political attitudes and how they may have shifted in recent 
years. Please take the survey here [hyperlinked to the Qualtrics survey]. 
  
The cover photo on the Facebook page included the words, “Shifting Political Attitudes & 
Observational Learning: American Political Polarization.” The link to the survey was not shared 
on the researcher’s personal Facebook page, since the study was strictly shared through targeted 
advertising as described above. The post itself resulted in over 1,500 survey participants. The 
single post also attracted 520 likes, 127 comments, and was shared 32 times among participants 
on their own Facebook pages. The targeted advertising campaign resulted in 2,017 Qualtrics link 
clicks, of which over 1,500 people participated in the online survey. The survey was active for 
40 days from July 23, 2020 through August 31, 2020. Respondents had up to one week to 




Once participants clicked on the Qualtrics link, they were provided information about 
informed consent (See Appendix C), which was required before a participant could access the 
survey questions. The consent form outlined the potential risks and benefits of voluntary 
participation. Names and contact information of the researcher as well as a copy of IRB approval 
was provided. Qualtrics provided secure online survey software that automatically removed all 
identifying information (e.g., name, email address) associated with participants to ensure 
anonymity, unless the respondent chose to write in their contact information for qualitative 
interviews on the last survey question. Participants were also able to request a copy of their 
responses at the end of the survey. Those who did not provide consent were automatically 
directed to the end of the survey and denied access to any of the survey questions. Once 
participants started the survey, it took approximately 30 minutes to complete.  
Qualitative Study Data Collection  
 As discussed above, IRB approval to launch the study (protocol number: 20-386) was 
received on July 15, 2020. A modification memo to the IRB was later submitted regarding the 
study dates and revised interview questions, which was approved on September 27, 2020. This 
change enabled interviews to take place between October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020. Since 
the study was conducted in two phases, the interviews did not begin until after the quantitative 
portion of the study was complete. The qualitative portion of the study, which was comprised of 
semi-structured interviews was first informed by a pilot, as described below. 
Interview pilot.  Utilizing the same participants from the survey pilot, a total of two 
women and two men participated in the semi-structured interviews in August 2020. The 
consensus across pilot participants was that the initial questions were not conversational enough 




based on topic area to improve the flow of the protocol. The researcher noticed that there was 
one prompt about the level of openness one had to changing their political views that did not 
elicit deeper discussion but rather produced yes or no answers among the pilot participants, 
which ended the discussion on that topic. Thus, it was decided to remove the question from the 
final protocol. The interview, which was originally estimated to take one hour actually took up to 
1.5 hours in the pilot, therefore it was important to find ways to cut down the wordiness of the 
original questions. The researcher’s advisors also suggested that questions that were already 
included in the survey portion of the study should not be reiterated in the interview, thus 
questions about political participation were deleted. Given the context of the moment, two 
additional questions were added near the end of the protocol about specific political issues that 
had emerged after the survey had originally been circulated, including attitudes towards mail-in 
voting and attitudes towards a possible third term for the United States presidency. More specific 
prompts about role models, factors of observational learning, and experiential learning were also 
added to the protocol in order to glean a deeper understanding of possible associated learning as 
it related to shifting political attitudes. Finally, one of the questions that had asked about whether 
changing political views had been challenging or rewarding, was moved to the end of the survey 
as one of the final questions. All sixteen interviews were conducted by the primary researcher 
between October 15, 2020 and October 31, 2020. 
 Overview of interview protocol.  The semi-structured interviews utilized an interview 
protocol (see Appendix B) that included a total of eleven main questions, along with several 
follow-up prompts. The protocol was designed to be used as a source of data for future studies to 
understand how learning might inform shifts in political perspectives—particularly how 




influenced these changes. The questions were formulated and informed by both the literature 
review and research questions, as well as by interview questions that were used in a study that 
explored the relationship between social learning theory and learning from role models in 
clinical settings (Horsburgh & Ippolito, 2018).  
Procedures for interviews.  In the qualitative phase of the study, participants were 
interviewed individually for approximately 60 minutes each after completion of the interview 
consent form (see Appendix D). An email was sent to participants which stated: 
   This past summer, you may remember participating in a Teachers College, Columbia 
University online survey on Facebook about “Shifting Political Attitudes and 
Observational Learning: An Examination of American Political Polarization. In your 
responses, you indicated that you would be willing to speak with the primary researcher 
to further discuss your perspectives. Would you be willing to have a conversation with 
me via Zoom (a video conferencing platform) at a time that is convenient for you? I 
anticipate our conversation should take approximately 6o minutes and I would be happy 
to accommodate your schedule.  
 
The email also included a link to a website called Calendly, an online scheduling software 
platform that enabled those who agreed to take part in the interview to easily see the availability 
of the primary researcher, which helped to speed up the process of finding mutually convenient 
times. The email also included a link to the study’s consent form, which stated: “Please also 
review and complete the following two-question consent survey in advance of our discussion.” 
The consent form itself was hosted on Qualtrics. Once participants clicked on the Qualtrics link, 
they were required to answer two questions attesting to 1) their consent to participate in the 
study; and 2) their consent that they were at least eighteen years old, agreed to have the interview 
audio or visually recorded, and to allow written materials to be viewed at an educational setting 
or at a conference outside of Teachers College, Columbia University. Those who did not provide 




The remaining participants were individually interviewed via Zoom. Each participant was read 
the following script before the interview began:  
   Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. I am hoping to learn more 
about your political attitudes and shifting political perspectives. With my findings, I hope 
to share ways that people learn in relation to political views and changing perspectives. I 
am going to record our interview so that I can focus on what you are saying and will use 
the recording to develop a transcript of our conversation. I will be the only person 
listening to the recording. Only the transcript from the interview will be shared with my 
research advisors to check the validity of the conclusions I draw. I will keep your 
particular experience confidential and will use an alias to describe you. I plan to compile 
the information from all the interviews I conduct and will ensure that no one is identified. 
We can pick a name as your pseudonym if you would like. Do you have any questions or 
concerns before we begin? 
 
 Although the interview questions were semi-structured, the researcher allowed the 
participants to expand on their answers and move in different directions when deemed necessary. 
Interview participants were encouraged to ask questions as needed and were provided with 
contact information through the consent form and through email correspondence. All participants 
were offered a copy of their interview transcript, although several people declined.  
 The flow of the interview began with an open-ended question, which asked participants 
to tell the story of how they arrived at their current political orientation or political party. A 
follow-up prompt asked what had influenced this choice. The interview moved on to a series of 
questions about what had influenced their shifting political perspectives, their cognitive 
perceptions, and their sources for political information. Next, the emphasis shifted to asking 
participants to provide a specific example of a time when they had run into somebody with a 
different political perspective and to describe what happened. Moving into the learning phase of 
the interview, the next series of questions asked if they had ever helped or taught somebody else 
to think differently about a political issue, whether models or sources had influenced them, and 




observational learning and experiential learning lens. Next, the interview asked what it took 
mentally or emotionally to find common ground with politically disparate individuals and again 
asked about potential role models and how they helped them learn about their political shifts. 
Near the end of the interview, participants were asked a summarizing question about what had 
been challenging or rewarding when making their individual shifts in their political attitudes. 
Finally, the last question asked about their ideas on two specific political issues, including mail-
in voting and changing the 22nd Amendment of the Constitution to allow a president to serve 
more than two terms. At the end of the interview, all participants were given a final opportunity 
to share any other thoughts. For example, participants were asked if they felt the researcher had 
neglected to ask them anything about their political attitudes that they wanted to share.  
Methods for Analysis and Synthesis of Data  
To explore the present study’s research questions, eleven hypotheses and four 
assumptions were formulated to be tested through quantitative or qualitative analyses. The 
hypotheses and assumptions were developed based on the review of literature and on the study’s 
conceptual framework.  
Quantitative Method for Analysis and Synthesis 
Quantitative hypotheses.  To explore political polarization in America, the following 
hypotheses were tested statistically for the quantitative portion of the study. Although there was 
a total of eleven individual hypotheses (see Appendix E), the two primary predictions included: 
1) political orientation (independent variable) is associated with current and shifting political 
attitudes, participation, cognitive perceptions and emotions, social media interactions and news 
usage, and observational learning (dependent variables); and 2) perceived political efficacy 




primary hypothesis attempted to address the first research question of the study and predicted 
that political orientation would be associated with party affiliation, presidential voting 
preferences, a variety of current and shifting attitudes on diverse representation and equality, a 
variety of current and shifting attitudes on political issues, social media and news media usage, 
and factors of observational learning. The second primary hypothesis attempted to answer the 
second research question of the study and predicted that factors of political efficacy would be 
associated with factors of political participation. 
Procedures for analysis of hypotheses.  Data received from the online survey was used 
to test each individual hypothesis. Before each hypothesis was tested, preliminary analyses were 
conducted to determine if any of the demographic variables were related to any of the 
independent variables, detailed in Chapter IV. Quantitative data was analyzed through SPSS 27, 
a statistical software platform using primarily the following tests: one-way analysis of variance, 
Pearson’s r bivariate correlational analysis, multinomial regression analysis, binomial logistic 
regression analysis, and simple linear regression analyses to determine relevant associations as 
well as the extent that each independent variable was related to each dependent variable. Before 
statistical analysis, items in the survey were recoded from low-to-high (e.g., never to always; 
very poor to excellent, etc.) to ensure consistency in the direction of potential relationships (see 
Appendix A for recoded questions).  
Qualitative Method for Analysis and Synthesis 
To explore the third and fourth research questions of this study, the following two 
inquiries were addressed, including: 1) how and why political attitudes shift, what events or 
experiences lead to these shifts, and how rewarding or challenging it is to make these shifts; and 




to structure the findings, which were framed in relation to the literature review and the 
conceptual framework of the present study.  
Qualitative assumptions. 
1. Models and Sources: Interactions with family, friends, teachers/mentors, religious 
leaders, or exposure to media or political influencers will influence shifts in political 
attitudes.  
2. Observational Learning: Shifts in political attitudes will be understood through 
Bandura’s (1986) four modes of observational learning, including attention, retention, 
reproduction, and motivation.  
3. Cognitive Political Perception: Shifts in political attitudes will be understood through 
individual cognitive perceptions of partisan ingroups and outgroups.  
4. Experiential Learning: Shifts in political perspectives will be understood through 
Boud, Keough, and Walker’s (1985) three stages of experiential learning through 
reflection, including returning to and replaying the experience, attending to emotions 
provoked by the experience, and re-evaluating the experience.   
Procedures for analysis of interviews.  Data from the qualitative interviews were 
transcribed, coded, and analyzed to determine emerging themes. Each interview was carefully 
transcribed and de-identified between November 2020 and February 2021. The data was then 
examined by the researcher using the Framework Method (Ritchie et al., 2013), which enabled a 
systematic approach for categorizing and sorting common patterns and insights across 
interviews. This type of analysis was selected because it allowed for both inductive and 




identify commonalities and differences in qualitative data, before focusing on 
relationships between different parts of the data, thereby seeking to draw description 
and/or explanatory conclusions clustered around themes. (Gale et al., 2013, p. 2) 
 
Analysis of the interviews took place after all interviews were completed beginning in November 
2020 through March 2021. Specific steps taken for data analysis included the following seven 
tasks, including transcription, interview familiarization, coding, developing a working analytical 
framework, applying the analytical framework application, charting data into the framework 
matrix, and interpreting the data (2013). Each step undertaken in this process is documented 
below.  
Transcription review.   Interviews were first examined iteratively to ensure both 
accuracy and deeper understandings as it related to the emerging coding scheme, which was 
informed by the study’s research questions and assumptions. Relevant quotes from the 
interviews were selected for additional review. Demographic information was later coded as part 
of the transcriptions.  
Interview familiarization.   Audio recordings of individual Zoom interviews were 
listened to while simultaneously reviewing the transcripts for a second time in order to correct 
any errors from the written text, which was very fruitful due to the relatively high number of 
inaccuracies found. Next, once the transcripts were cleaned up, the researcher continued to 
familiarize herself with each interview and began to identify key words and phrases under key 
categories that related to the research questions and study assumptions. Initial impressions were 
recorded as annotations in the margins of the transcripts within NVivo 12.  
Initial coding.   Coding was informed by theoretical analysis of concepts derived from 
the study’s literature review as it related to political polarization and learning, such as cognitive 




ideology, role models, shifts on political ideology, shifts on political issues, social media usage, 
volume of shifts, and demographics, along with dozens of sub-codes under each category 
heading. Increasing familiarity with the interviews helped to further refine these main codes and 
subcodes. All coding was done electronically through NVivo 12, which enabled the researcher to 
flag particular words and statements that were in alignment with the research questions and 
assumptions, while also writing additional notes via annotations.  
 Coding for analytical framework.   Revisiting all sixteen interviews, the researcher 
reevaluated each coded section to ensure appropriateness and accuracy. Once this was complete, 
an initial analytical framework was established. The researcher attempted to keep the coding as 
simple as possible to avoid redundancies of sub-coding. For example, in earlier iterations, the 
subcodes of positive and negative were under multiple categories. Instead, the researcher decided 
to remove these subcodes that dealt with the direction of changing perspectives—and subsumed 
these codes into a broader theme called attitude shifts, under which the subcodes of moved 
center/moved left/moved right, positive/negative, barriers/rewards, and stronger 
opposition/stronger support were placed. As Gale et al. (2013) recommended, “the process of 
refining, applying, and refining the analytical framework was repeated until no new codes were 
generated” (additional file 1). 
In addition, the categories of emotions, news media usage, shifts on political ideology, 
and social media usage were removed, since they were already being addressed as sub-codes 
under other categories. Moreover, the category of role models was changed to models and 
sources, in order to include both role models and media sources. By the end of this process, the 
completed analytical framework was comprised of eleven main categories and 24 sub-codes. 




questions and assumptions. This coding scheme for the analytical framework is exhibited in table 
form (see Appendix F). Moreover, demographics were also tracked on the Framework Matrix 
(see Appendix H).  
 Analytical framework application.   Next, the analytical framework was applied to each 
individual transcript using NVivo 12 by going through each interview and applying the relevant 
categorical codes and subcodes to corresponding words and phrases. An excerpt of a coded 
transcript is attached from one of the interviews, which used the final analytical framework (see 
Appendix G). Coding the larger patterns enabled the comparison of common themes and 
perspectives across the sixteen interviews before categorizing additional predefined subcodes 
within each broader theme as they emerged within each individual interview. Each interview was 
read and re-read several times to ensure that the experiences shared by the participants were 
adequately captured within the coding scheme. 
 Framework matrix chart.   After the coding was complete, a matrix was created for each 
participant (see Appendix H) that described key themes that emerged. As recommended by Gale 
et al. (2013), the matrix was organized with one row per participant and one column per code (8 
columns). Emerging themes were indicated in the notes per row. This considerably reduced the 
data into a more concise form, which enabled the discovery of potential patterns and themes. 
Using NVivo 12, the researcher was able to highlight relevant quotes and index data by each 
code and subcode. Text that was underlined in the matrix indicated quoted text from the 
interviews. This matrix was very useful when comparing data within and across participants and 
was the most enriching part of the Framework Method process for the primary researcher. She 
went back to this matrix again and again to finetune her summaries and to ensure the most 




 Data interpretation.  Finally, using all collected data and taking into consideration the 
study’s research questions and assumptions—new broad analytical themes were created 
inductively by “reviewing the matrix and making connections within and between participant 
and categories” (Gale et al., 2013, additional file 1). In this section, the researcher attempted to 
answer the study’s key assumptions, namely that role models, observational learning, cognitive 
political perceptions, and experiential learning would influence or help to frame shifting political 
views. This was documented through analytical memos (see Appendix I) that helped to 
summarize the data thematically. Modeled after the memos used by Gale et al. (2013), each 
document included the following sections: 1) thematic definitions; 2) relevant codes; 3) brief 
data summary; 4) discussion of outliers; and 5) points for further consideration.  
Rationale for Methods Selection 
The mixed-methods approach in this study was derived from a constructivist paradigm 
and assumed that there were “multiple…and sometimes conflicting social realities that are the 
products of human intellects, but that may change as their constructors become more informed 
and sophisticated” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111). This meant that reality was viewed as a 
social construct that didn’t exist outside of the individual in the same way as others. That is, 
everyone’s experience in the world is unique and individually interpreted. For example, Guba 
describes “relativism [as] the key to openness and the continuing search for ever-more informed 
and sophisticated constructions. Realities are multiple, and they exist in people’s minds” (1990, 
p. 26). Likewise, as Guba and Lincoln (1994) stated, realities are:  
in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, 
local and specific in nature (although elements are often shared among many individuals 
and even across cultures), and dependent for their form and content on the individual 





In other words, the assumption of constructivism is that reality is a construct and is only real 
within the minds of individuals that can be tested subjectively through interaction, interpretation, 
and discourse. Although quantitative methods are typically conducted through a post-positivist 
paradigm, which assumes that reality is real and tested objectively although not absolutely 
(Guba, 1990), the present study utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods to uncover 
richer understandings through survey and interview data.  
Trustworthiness refers to the reliability and validity of research findings in qualitative 
research. Reliability is about the stability of research and replication of findings. Validity is 
about whether the instruments used in the research measure what it is said to measure (internal 
validity) and whether the results are generalizable (external validity). Rigor and relevance refer 
to internal and external validity, therefore the greater the control to achieve internal validity, the 
less generalizable the results become. To ensure that the present study was reliable and valid, 
triangulation was addressed using mixed-methods (quantitative and qualitative), the collection of 
data through a large sample (n = 1,313 from survey; n = 16 from interviews), and through the 
theoretical and conceptual framework. Since precision and richness refers to the difference 
between quantitative and qualitative research—this study strived for both. Quantitatively, the 
present study sought to obtain a large sample size that was representative of the US voting 
population. Although self-reported data was used, which is considered a limitation from a 
quantitative perspective, this was mitigated through semi-structured interviews to ensure deeper 
learning and to discover emergent themes.  
Limitations 
There were several limitations to this study’s choice of methodological framework. This 




to minimize their impact. The strongest limitation in the study was selection bias, which occurred 
across both samples. First, only those on Facebook and those who were interested or hostile 
towards a study framed in terms of attitudinal change were likely attracted to participate in the 
study. Participants in the quantitative sample were alerted to the survey through the study’s 
Facebook landing page, which was titled, “Shifting Political Attitudes and Observational 
Learning,” which clearly indicates that the study was about attitudinal change. Moreover, the 
study was associated with Teachers College Columbia University as well as the researcher’s 
tc.edu email address, which may have further motivated people to participate related to their 
views on higher education. For example, some participants shared hostile comments about liberal 
indoctrination and political outgroups, which highlighted the degree of polarization among the 
sample. These comments are reviewed in more detail in the quantitative findings section below. 
Second, only those who had shifted their views on the survey were potentially selected to 
participate in the qualitative interviews, which means they were likely already more open to 
change than participants that did not shift their views. Given that the study took place in the 
months preceding the contentious 2020 U.S. presidential election, participants may have been 
more likely to express shifting views across both samples. Thus, the context of the moment may 
have influenced the findings. Future studies should potentially compare voters who are open to 
attitudinal change with those who are not in advance of a different political election or another 
context. Another limitation included theory selection bias across both the quantitative and 
qualitative samples. For instance, the conceptual framework was already weighted towards 
finding people more open to change since the study was theorized in terms of shifting political 




Researcher bias was another limitation in the study particularly as it related to the 
researcher’s own personal political ideology. The very nature of the context of this study is that 
there is a high level of political polarization in the United States, of which the researcher was not 
immune. As a liberal Democrat her own personal political views may have influenced the design 
and interpretation of the data collected. In order to mitigate this potential bias, she conducted two 
pilot studies—one for the quantitative study and one for the qualitative study to refine the 
wording of questions. Furthermore, regarding the semi-structured interviews, she shared her 
initial coding scheme with a colleague to garner their opinion on the appropriateness of the 
coding structure. She also kept written notes about her understandings and perspectives after 
each interview and reviewed these notes iteratively to ensure that she was as objective as 
possible.  
Additionally, since the present study utilized convenience samples for both the 
quantitative and qualitative studies, findings may limit generalizability—however, the researcher 
used the Facebook advertisement feature that enabled the social-media platform to target 
Americans through an algorithm that searched for people across the United States that identified 
as liberal, moderate, conservative, Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, or Independent. Another 
limitation is that only those who used Facebook potentially saw the survey, which means that 
individuals without access to the social media platform did not have the opportunity to 
participate. Moreover, those without access to the Internet did not have the opportunity to 
participate, thus this study cannot be generalized beyond those who use Facebook.  
Another potential limitation of this study’s methodology included the use of self-reported 
survey questions, which may have increased social desirability (the tendency to represent oneself 




degree by the addition of semi-structured interviews so that deeper insights could be discussed, 
however it is important to note that of the total survey participants (n = 1,313), a very small 
subset of participants were included in the qualitative study (n = 16). Moreover, some of the 
dependent variable scales were created by the researcher and were not validated, thus it is 
unclear if the questions held internal validity. Retrospective recall is another limitation of this 
study, especially in regard to the interviews, which required participants to recall their past 
experiences with shifting political attitude in more detail than the survey. As Elizabeth Loftus 
has affirmed, memory is not infallible (Loftus, 1996). To mitigate this potential limitation, all 
participants were offered a copy of their transcripts and were given the option to reach out to the 
primary researcher if they wanted to change or add to anything they said, of which two 
participants responded.  
Quantitative Study Limitations 
In regard to the survey data, there were several limitations in the present study. First, 
given this was a study on American political attitudes, it was important to potentially find a 
sample that was representative of the general voting population. To reiterate the comparisons as 
noted earlier, although presidential voting preferences and gender were fairly well represented as 
compared to NY Times exit polling data (National Exit Polls, 2021) for the 2020 U.S. presidential 
election—race, education, and age were not (see Figure 8 and Figure 9). Although the survey 
sample was inclusive of 8% that identified as mixed race or origin, other races and ethnicities 
were not representative. For example, Black or African American voters, Hispanic, Latino, or 
Spanish voters, and Asian or Asian American voters were widely underrepresented in 
comparison to the 2020 voting population, with less than 1% as Black or African American 




to 4% in exit poll), 5% identified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (compared to 13% in exit poll), 
and 6% as other ethnicities (compared to 4% in exit poll). Next, the sample was very well 
educated, thus it did not represent those with less education. This may have impacted the study’s 
findings since people who are educated may be more open to learning about how and why their 
political views have shifted. And finally, the sample was much older than the voting population 
in 2020. This may be partly because younger people tend to use different social media platforms 
other than Facebook, such as Instagram or Snapchat (Perrin & Anderson, 2019), among others. 
Therefore, the sample was not representative of race, particularly among Black, Hispanic, and 
Asian voters; it was not representative of less educated voters; and it was not representative of 
younger voters, limiting generalizability to the broader voting population.  
Qualitative Study Limitations  
 A limitation of the qualitative study was that the sample was selected from the larger 
survey sample, which meant that the same limitations discussed for the quantitative study also 
applied to the qualitative study. As noted earlier, only those who shifted their views were 
potentially contacted by the researcher, which increased selection bias and the likelihood that 
participants would already be more open to change than those who did not shift their views. 
Moreover, those who were open to being contacted by the primary researcher may have been 
different than those who did not agree to be contacted, again limiting generalizability. As in the 
quantitative study, it was important to have a sample that was as representative as possible of the 
general voting population. To reiterate comparisons as noted earlier, although age was slightly 
more represented as compared to NY Times exit polling data (National Exit Polls, 2021) for the 
2020 U.S. presidential election—race, education, gender, as well as presidential voting 




of nearly 19% that identified as mixed race or origin, other races and ethnicities were not 
representative. For example, there were no Black or African Americans in the sample and the 
majority of the sample voted for Biden (only 3 individuals voted for Trump). In addition, the 
interview sample was mostly female and was highly skewed toward more educated participants, 
with nearly 96% holding at least a bachelor’s degree. Future studies should include a more 
diverse and representative interview sample.  
Combined Study Limitations 
Finally, it is important to note that this study across both the quantitative and qualitative 
samples were limited to questions about political orientation, political efficacy, political 
attitudes, perceptions, behaviors, and learning. It is possible that other factors of political 
ideology or other adult learning models or sociocultural models besides observational learning 
and experiential learning may better explain shifting political views. Additionally, political 
orientation and political efficacy, cannot account for all of the variance among political attitudes 
or learning. Therefore, future research should further clarify the potential impact of other factors, 
such as race, age, gender, region/density of residence, and education on political orientation and 


























The purpose of this study was to investigate how political orientation related to current 
and shifting political attitudes, how political efficacy related to political participation, how 
political attitudes shifted and what influenced these shifts, and how shifting political attitudes 
were understood through observational learning and experiential learning models. This chapter 
provides an overview of both quantitative and qualitative results. A summary of the study’s 
statistical survey findings derived from the individual hypotheses and the first two research 
questions is presented first, followed by an analysis of the study’s semi-structured interview 
findings derived from the third and fourth research questions and associated assumptions. These 
findings were important because there is limited research on how changing political views may 
be informed by learning. These results also helped to provide deeper understandings into how 
family, friends, mentors/teachers, religious leaders, political influencers, the media and other role 
models, events, or experiences influenced shifts in political perspectives. Having more insight 
into how and why political attitudes shift will help future researchers determine if there are ways 
to decrease the extent of political polarization and to find aspects of common ground.  
Quantitative Research Findings 
As noted in Chapter III, there were two primary hypotheses addressed quantitatively by 




attitudes and factors of observational learning (first research question); and 2) perceived political 
efficacy is associated with political participation (second research question). Both primary 
hypotheses were strongly and significantly supported (see Table 8 for findings), although there 
were several sub-hypotheses that were not supported (see Appendix E for complete list of 
individual hypotheses).  
Before discussing each individual hypothesis in more detail below, it is first important to 
note that the researcher received many polarizing comments on the Facebook landing page 
where the survey was linked to Qualtrics. As mentioned in Chapter III, the single post resulted in 
127 comments, which ranged from peaceful to belligerent, highlighting the extreme political 
polarization of the study itself as well as the timing of the survey, which was active in the 
summer months in advance of the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Since the study’s Facebook 
landing page was linked to the primary researcher’s Teachers College email address and 
advertised as a Columbia University Teachers College study, some respondents shared that they 
were mistrustful of teachers and education at large and concerned with liberal indoctrination. 
Examples of some of these comments are included below. 
• “Columbia produces globalist criminals.” 
• “There should never be political indoctrination in the classroom. That’s what today’s 
teachers are all about.”  
• “Having no platform or merit, childhood indoctrination is how the left will take over 
and destroy our free country.” 
• “Columbia, isn’t that where Obama attended school as a foreign student?” 
• “Columbia University’s anti-American attitudes are well known and guarantee a 




• “Anyone that trusts Teachers College is seriously lacking in the ability to think for 
themselves.” 
• “Considering the bias that teachers unions have and what they support, people would 
be better off reading 1984 and any of Ayn Rands books.” 
• “Oh Columbia! Turning out anti-American gender fluid intersectional snowflake nut 
bars for decades!”  
• “There are no shifting political attitudes at most universities, it’s not allowed. It’s the 
American sucks way or the highway. Almost every NEA member probably has a 
tattoo of Marx on their ass.”  
Other comments showed negative feelings towards their political outgroups. For example:  
• “A vote for Democrats is a vote for deception, corruption, and tyranny.” 
• “All of you Trump 2020 people have your retirement and retirement health insurance 
all set right? Under Trump, it will be permanently defunded by 2023… Sheep that 
listen to Fox and do no research for yourselves.” 
• “I’m voting for Trump. The Democrats obviously HATE the working class. They are 
the party of the wealthy elites, Hollywood, and tech oligarchs.”  
• “Only weak people compromise. President Trump is NOT as conservative as I want. I 
would have had federal law enforcement arresting and using overwhelming force 
with no quarter given against the rioters starting the first night. As well ANTIFA and 
BLM would be designated as domestic terrorists to be eradicated on sight.”  
Taken together, these negative comments set the stage for data analysis of the quantitative 





Table 8. Hypotheses Results Overview 
 
Individual Hypotheses Statistical Test 
H1. Political orientation is associated with political party. 
 
H1-1.    Liberals (general, economic, social) are more likely to be Democrats than Independents.***  






See Table 9 
H2. Political orientation is associated with presidential voting. 
 
H2-1.    Liberals are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates in 2020, 2016, and 2012 
elections.*** 






See Table 10 
H3. Political orientation is associated with political participation. 
 
H3-1.     Liberals are more likely to participate in voting than conservatives.  
H3-2.     Liberals are more likely to participate in protests than conservatives.***  
H3-3.     Conservatives are more likely to participate in rallies than liberals.*** OD (liberals 
participated more than conservatives) 
H3-4.     Liberals are more likely to donate to political organizations than conservatives.*** 
H3-5.     Liberals are more likely to contact Congress than conservatives. 





See Table 11 
H4. Political orientation is associated with polarizing cognitive perceptions. 
 
H4-1.     Liberals are less likely than conservatives to think conservatives have good ideas.*** 
H4-2.     Liberals are less likely than conservatives to think Republicans have good ideas.***   
H4-3.     Conservatives are less likely than liberals to think liberals have good ideas.*** 




See Table 12 
H5. Political orientation is associated with polarizing emotions. 
 
H5-1.     Liberals are more likely than conservatives to hold positive emotions for the Democratic 
Party (hopeful, enthusiastic, proud).*** 
H5-2.     Conservatives are more likely than liberals to hold positive emotions for the Republican 
Party (hopeful, enthusiastic, proud).*** 
H5-3.     Conservatives are more likely than liberals to hold negative emotions for the Democratic 
Party (frustrated,* angry,*** afraid***). 
H5-4.     Liberals are more likely than conservatives to hold negative emotions for the Republican 





See Table 13 
H6. Political orientation is associated with diverse representation and equal rights. 
 
H6-1.     Liberals are more likely than conservatives to place higher importance on electing diverse 
government representatives. 
a. Racial minorities.*** 
b. Women.*** 
c. LGBTQ.*** 
H6-2.     Liberals are more likely than conservatives to place higher importance on the need for 
equal rights for marginalized groups. 
a. Racial minorities.*** 
b. Women.*** 
c. LGBTQ.*** 
H6-3.     Liberals are more likely than conservatives to have shifted their views on the level of 
importance for diverse representation and equal rights.  
a. Diverse representation (racial minorities).*** 
b. Diverse representation (women).*** 
c. Diverse representation (LGBTQ).*** 
d. Equality (racial minorities).*** 
e. Equality (women).*** 




See Table 14 




Individual Hypotheses Statistical Test 
H7. Political orientation is associated with a variety of current and shifting political attitudes.   
 
H7-1.     Conservatives are more likely than liberals to favorably rate the following issues:  
a. State of the economy*** 
b. Immigration conditions*** 
c. US/Russia relationship*** 
d. US/China relationship*** 
e. Access to affordable healthcare*** 
f. Conditions for African Americans when dealing with police brutality*** 
g. Government response to COVID-19*** 
h. Identification with Trump*** 
H7-2.     Liberals are more likely than conservatives to favorably rate the importance of the 
following issues:  
a. Gun control*** 
b. Climate change*** 
c. K-12 public education*** 
d. College degree*** 
e. American news media*** 
H7-3.     Liberals are more likely than conservatives to have shifted their political attitudes on the 
following issues:  
a. State of the economy** 
b. Immigration conditions*** 
c. US/Russia relationship*** 
d. US/China relationship*** 
e. Access to affordable healthcare*** 
f. Conditions for African Americans when dealing with police brutality*** 
g. Gun control*** 
h. Government response to COVID-19*** 
i. Climate change*** 
H7-4.     Conservatives are more likely than liberals to have shifted their political attitudes on the 
following issues:  
a. Identification with Trump*** 
b. K-12 public education*** OD (liberals more likely to shift than conservatives) 
c. College degree 





See Table 16 
and Table 17 
 
H8. Political orientation is associated with political interactions on Facebook. 
 
H8-1.   Liberals are less likely to interact with conservatives on Facebook.*** 
H8-2.   Conservatives are less likely to interact with liberals on Facebook.*** 
H8-3.   Liberals are less likely to interact with Republicans on Facebook.*** 
H8-4.   Conservatives are less likely to interact with Democrats on Facebook.*** 




See Table 18 
H9. Political orientation is associated with news media usage.  
 
H9-1.    Liberals are more likely than conservatives to consult a higher number of news sources for 
political information.  
H9-2.    Liberals are more likely than conservatives to consult the following types of news sources 
for political information:  
a. Newspapers/Magazines** 
b. News Websites 
        H9-3.    Conservatives are more likely than liberals to consult the following                 
                     types of news sources for political information:  
a. Local TV* 
b. Cable TV*** 
c. Talk Radio*** 











See Table 19 
H10. Political orientation is associated with observational learning.  
 
H10-a.   Liberals are more likely than conservatives to pay attention to views of family, friends, 








Individual Hypotheses Statistical Test 
H10-b.   Liberals are more likely than conservatives to retain views of family, friends, 
mentors/teachers when shifting political attitudes.*** 
H10-c.   Liberals are more likely than conservatives to pay reproduce or share shifting political 
attitudes with others.*** 
H10-d.   Liberals are more likely than conservatives to be motivated to learn about their own 
personal shifting political attitudes. *** 
H10-e.   Liberals are more likely than conservatives to feel rewarded by sharing shifting political 
attitudes.*** 
H10-f.   Liberals are more likely than conservatives to feel challenged by sharing shifting political 
attitudes.* 
H11. Political efficacy is associated with political participation.  
 
H11-1.   Personal political efficacy is associated with higher political participation.*** 
H11-2.   Collective political efficacy is associated with higher political participation.*** 





See Table 21 
NOTE. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  OD=other direction. 
 
 
Preliminary Analysis for Hypotheses 
Before testing each individual hypothesis, preliminary analyses were conducted to 
determine if any of the demographic variables (DV) were associated with any of the independent 
variables (IV), including political orientation and political efficacy. 
Political orientation and demographic variables.   One-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to see if gender, age, or education was related to economic or social 
political orientation (note: very liberal = 1; moderate = 4; very conservative = 7). Results showed 
that people aged 50 and older (M = 4.52, SD = 2.021) were more economically conservative than 
people aged 49 and younger (M = 3.48, SD =2.132), F (1, 1168) = 63.803, p < .001, while 
younger people (M = 2.61, SD = 1.893) were more socially liberal than older people (M = 3.72, 
SD = 2.131) F (1, 1179) = 73.520, p < .001. Women were more economically liberal (M = 3.91, 
SD = 2.089; M = 4.44, SD = 2.081), F (1, 1103) = 17.379, p < .001, and socially liberal than men 
(M = 3.11, SD = 2.085; M = 3.58, SD = 2.118), F (1, 1113) = 13.888, p < .001. Results also 
revealed that those with higher levels of education, such as a graduate degree (M = 2.95, SD = 




1175) = 8.290, p < .001, than those with lower levels of education, such as a high school degree 
(M = 4.27, SD = 2.023).  
Next, Pearson’s r bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to see if general 
political orientation was related to economic political orientation and social political orientation. 
Results showed that general political orientation did not have discriminant validity, as it was 
strongly correlated with economic political orientation (r = .909, p < .01) and social political 
orientation (r = .895, p < .01) among the sample (n = 1245). Because of this, it was decided to 
combine all three scales into one predictor scale called overall political orientation.  
To determine if the combined overall political orientation scale was related to any of the 
demographic variables, ANOVA analyses were conducted (note: very liberal = 1; moderate = 4; 
very conservative = 7). Results showed significant relationships among political party, age, 
education, gender, race, geographic region, residential density, income, employment status, and 
importance of religion or spirituality. For example, as expected, Democrats (M = 2.00, SD = .89) 
were significantly more liberal than Republicans (M = 5.92, SD = .83), Libertarians (M = 4.75, 
SD = 1.14) and Independents (M = 3.98, SD = 1.76) F (3, 1185) = 579.673, p < .001. A Tukey 
post-hoc test revealed that these differences remained significant between each political party 
affiliation. Age differences indicated that younger voters were more liberal than older voters, 
including those aged 18 to 24 (M = 2.14, SD = 1.76), 25 to 34 (M = 3.04, SD = 1.91), 35 to 49 (M 
= 3.32, SD = 1.79), 50 to 64 (M = 4.19, SD = 1.92), 65 to 79 (M = 4.07, SD = 1.76), and 80 and 
older (M = 4.04, SD = 2.04), F (3, 1181) = 19.429, p < .001, however those over 65 were slightly 
more liberal than those between the ages of 50 to 64. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed statistically 
significant differences between some of the age groups, but only those between the ages of 18 to 




The sample was very well educated, which indicated that those with higher levels of 
education were significantly more liberal than those with less education. For example, those 
holding a graduate degree (M = 3.37, SD = 1.90) or a bachelor’s degree (M = 3.89, SD = 2.04) 
were more liberal than those with an associate degree (M = 4.39, SD = 1.89), some college (M = 
4.06, SD = 2.02), high school degree (M = 4.64, SD = 1.70), or less than high school (M = 4.00, 
SD = 4.24), F (5, 1181) = 8.811, p < .001. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that significant 
differences emerged between those with a graduate degree compared to all other levels of 
education. No other significant differences between groups were found.  
Demographic differences for overall political orientation also showed that women (M = 
3.52, SD = 1.98) were significantly more liberal than men (M = 4.01, SD = 1.96) F (2, 1136) = 
14.201, p < .001. Non-binary individuals (M = 2.31, SD = 1.86) were significantly more liberal 
than both women and men. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that these differences remained 
significant between each group. Race revealed that those who self-identified as Black or African 
American (M = 2.48, SD = 1.39) or Asian or Asian American (M = 2.74, SD = 1.18) were 
significantly more liberal than those who identified as White (M = 3.57, SD = 1.98), mixed race 
or origin (M = 4.07, SD = 2.09), American Indian or Alaskan Native (M = 4.81, SD = 1.75), or 
other (M = 4.43, SD = 1.99), F (5, 1066) = 4.661, p < .001. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that 
the only significant difference among racial groups was between those who identified as White 
and those who identified as other (p < .05). Ethnicity revealed that those who identified as 
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (M = 4.07, SD = 1.96) were more conservative than those 
who did not (M = 3.67, SD = 1.99) although the difference was not significant, F (2, 1096) = 




Geographic region of residence indicated that those who resided in the Northeast (M = 
3.48, SD = 1.96) were significantly more liberal than those who resided in the West (M = 3.79, 
SD = 2.00), Midwest (M = 3.76, SD = 2.07), or South (M = 4.07, SD = 1.92), F (3, 1184) = 
4.516, p < .01. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that the only significant difference among 
geographic groups was between the Northeast and the South (p = .001). Likewise, residential 
density showed that those who resided in urban communities (M = 3.16, SD = 1.99) were 
significantly more liberal than those who resided in suburban (M = 3.69, SD = 1.94) or rural (M 
= 4.29, SD = 1.95) communities, F (2, 1174) = 25.187, p < .001. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed 
that these differences remained significant between each group. 
Employment status also showed significant differences among overall political 
orientation, with students as the most liberal group (M = 2.27, SD = 1.79), followed by those 
employed part-time (M = 3.23, SD = 1.88), unemployed looking for work (M = 3.36, SD = 1.90), 
unemployed not looking for work (M = 3.45, SD = 1.81), and employed full time (M = 3.68, SD 
= 1.95). Those who indicated that they were retired (M = 4.16, SD = 1.97) or disabled and not 
able to work (M = 4.45, SD = 2.12) were the most conservative among the sample, F (6, 1143) = 
10.963, p < .001. Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed significant differences across the different 
employment groups. Finally, 2019 annual income revealed that those who made over $200,000 
(M = 3.13, SD = 1.96) and those who made less than $20,000 (M = 3.17, SD = 2.08) were more 
liberal than other income brackets as follows: $20,000 - $49,999 (M = 3.48, SD = 2.05); $50-
$99,999 (M = 3.80, SD = 2.03); $100,000 - $149,999 (M = 3.89, SD = 1.94); and $150,000-
$199,999 (M = 4.04, SD = 1.72), F (5, 1029) = 3.609, p < .01. Tukey post-hoc analysis did not 
indicate any other significant differences between income brackets. And finally, the importance 




variable were more conservative (M = 4.91, SD = 1.81) than those who placed less importance 
(M = 2.39, SD = 1.57), F (4, 1174) = 90.707, p < .001. 
Perceived political efficacy and demographic variables.   ANOVA analyses were also 
conducted to determine if perceived political efficacy was related to any of the demographic 
variables (note: completely disagree = 1 (low efficacy); neither agree nor disagree = 3 (moderate 
efficacy); completely agree = 5 (high efficacy)). Results showed that there were significant 
relationships between personal political efficacy and political party, age, gender, geographic 
region, employment status, and importance of religion or spirituality. Collective political efficacy 
was associated with political party, age, gender, race, geographic region, and employment status. 
And finally, external political efficacy was associated with political party and importance of 
religion or spirituality. No other significant relationships were found.  
For example, Democrats (M = 3.51, SD = .95) and Republicans (M = 3.50, SD = 1.01) 
held significantly higher personal political efficacy than Independents (M = 3.13, SD = 1.09) or 
Libertarians (M = 2.83, SD = 1.10), F (3, 1200) = 20.386, p < .001. Likewise, Democrats (M = 
4.11, SD = .87) and Republicans (M = 3.94, SD = 1.02) held significantly higher collective 
political efficacy than Independents (M = 3.72, SD = 1.05) and Libertarians (M = 3.41, SD = 
1.09), F (3, 1200) = 19.522, p < .001. Conversely, Republicans (M = 2.26, SD = 1.10) held 
significantly higher external political efficacy than Democrats (M = 1.78, SD = .79), 
Independents (M = 1.75, SD = .83) and Libertarians (M = 1.56, SD = .73), F (3, 1200) = 27.114, 
p < .001, which may be related to the timing of the survey, since President Trump was still in 
office and held a high approval rating among Republicans.  
Age differences showed that people 50 years and older (M = 3.40, SD = 1.042) held 




1.092), F (1, 1210) = 25.106, p < .001. Likewise, older people (M = 3.91, SD = 1.019) held 
higher collective political efficacy than younger people (M = 3.724, SD = 1.081), F (1, 1210) = 
8.752, p = .003. Statistical significance was just missed between age and external political 
efficacy, although the trend held that older people (M = 1.86, SD = .95) were more externally 
efficacious than younger people (M = 1.75, SD = .80), F (1, 1210) = 3.618, p = .057. Results also 
showed that women (M = 3.42, SD = .94) held significantly higher personal political efficacy 
than men (M = 3.20, SD = 1.14, F (2, 1136) = 14.201, p < .001. Likewise, women (M = 3.99, SD 
= .92) held significantly higher collective political efficacy than men (M = 3.76, SD = 1.08, F (2, 
1136) = 14.201, p < .001. No significant differences were found between gender and external 
political efficacy. Those who self-identified as Black or African American (M = 3.55, SD = .95) 
or mixed race or origin (M = 3.55, SD = 1.20) held lower collective political efficacy than those 
who identified as White (M = 3.93, SD = .99), Asian or Asian American (M = 3.96 SD = .86), or 
American Indian or Alaskan Native (M = 3.74, SD = 1.16), F (5, 1088) = 3.512, p = .004. 
Personal and external political efficacy were not related to race.  
Geographic region of residence indicated that those who resided in the South (M = 3.39, 
SD = 1.04) and Midwest (M = 3.37, SD = 1.03) held significantly higher personal political 
efficacy than those who resided in the Northeast (M = 3.22, SD = 1.08) or West (M = 3.15, SD = 
1.11), F (3, 1209) = 3.474, p = .016. Similarly, geographic region of residence showed that those 
who resided in the South (M = 3.97, SD = .96) and Midwest (M = 3.90, SD = 1.00) held 
significantly higher collective political efficacy than those who lived in the Northeast (M = 3.83, 
SD = 1.03) or West (M = 3.65, SD = 1.15), F (3, 1209) = 5.023, p = .002. There was no 




Employment status showed that personal political efficacy was lower among groups that 
were unemployed but looking for work (M = 3.03, SD = 1.21) or unemployed and not looking 
for work (M = 3.01, SD = 1.19) than those who were retired (M = 3.50, SD = .98), F (6, 1168) = 
5.878, p < .001. Similarly, collective political efficacy was also lower among groups that were 
unemployed but looking for work (M = 3.41, SD = 1.15) or unemployed and not looking for 
work as (M = 3.66, SD = 1.14) compared to those who were retired, who held much higher 
collective efficacy (M = 4.06, SD = .91), F (6, 1168) = 6.280, p < .001. There were no 
differences found between external political efficacy and employment status.  
Finally, personal political efficacy was highest among those who most strongly valued 
the importance of religion or spirituality in their life (M = 3.43, SD = 1.03) than those who 
placed no value on this variable (M = 3.12, SD = 1.09), F (4, 1199) = 3.075, p = .016. Likewise, 
those who indicated that religion or spirituality was of the highest importance (M = 1.93, SD = 
1.01) also held higher external political efficacy than those who placed no importance on this 
variable (M = 1.58, SD = .68), F (4, 1199) = 7.991, p < .001. 
Final Data Set 
Preliminary analyses across all participants (n = 1,313) did not reveal any outliers for 
overall political orientation. A few outliers did indicate low levels of collective political efficacy 
and high levels of external efficacy, although there were no outliers found for personal political 
efficacy. However, it was determined to leave in all outliers for final analysis as it was expected 
that varying levels of political efficacy would be found across participants. To test all 
hypotheses, scores on the remaining scales were analyzed through multinomial regression, 
binomial logistic regression, or simple linear regression to determine the extent that the 




standard alpha set at .05, however results were reported using .05, .01, or .001. Since p values are 
impacted by the sample size, effect sizes were also reported in each individual statistical table to 
show the importance and magnitude of the effect.  
Finding 1 – First Primary Hypothesis 
In the first primary hypothesis section, a total of ten hypotheses were tested (see 
Appendix E for complete list of individual hypotheses), including the relationship between 
political orientation and a variety of current and shifting political attitudes and behaviors, 
political perceptions and emotions, political interactions on social media, political news usage, 
and factors of observational learning. 
H1 – Political orientation (IV) and political party (DV).   It was expected that political 
orientation (social, economic, general) would be associated with political party (H1-1 to H1-2). 
Multinomial logistic regression analysis was selected to test this hypothesis because the 
independent variables were treated as continuous, whereas the outcome variable was a 
categorical, single-item political party affiliation scale. The predictor variables included three 
political orientation scales to see if there were differences among general political orientation, 
economic political orientation, and social political orientation (seven-point scales ranging from 
very liberal to very conservative). All three predictor variables were found to significantly 
contribute to the model (see Table 9).  
H1-1.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 
identifying as a member of the Democratic Party would increase compared to Independents.  
Democratic Party.  Among Democrats, the estimated odds ratio (Exp (B) = .434, 95% CI 




as one became more conservative, the likelihood of identification with the Democratic Party 
decreased by 56.6% compared to identification as an Independent (B = -.834, SE = .060, Wald χ2 
= 191.472, p <.001). Similarly, the estimated odds ratio for the Democratic Party (Exp (B) = 
.485, 95% CI [.438, .536]) showed that as one became more conservative economically, with 
every one-unit increase in economic political orientation, the likelihood of identifying with the 
Democratic Party than as an Independent decreased by 51.5% (B = -.724, SE = .052, Wald χ2 = 
197.651, p <.001). And the estimated odds ratio for the Democratic Party (Exp (B) = .424, 95% 
CI [.374, .481]) also showed that as one became more conservative socially, with every one-unit 
increase in social political orientation, the likelihood of identification with the Democratic Party 
decreased by 57.6% (B = -.858, SE = .065, Wald χ2 = 176.853, p <.001). Thus, Democrats tended 
to be more liberal across all three scales than Independents and were more socially liberal than 
economically liberal.  
H1-2.   It was expected that as political orientation became more conservative, the 
likelihood of identifying as a member of the Republican Party would increase compared to 
Independents.  
Republican Party.  Among Republicans, the estimated odds ratio (Exp (B) = 2.78, 95% 
CI [2.381, 3.257]) showed that for every one-unit increase in general political orientation, that 
is, as one became more conservative, the likelihood of identification with the Republican Party 
increased by 278% (or 2.78 times as likely) compared to identification as an Independent (B = 
1.024, SE = .080, Wald χ2 = 163.914, p < .001). Similarly, the estimated odds ratio for the 
Republican Party (Exp (B) = 2.361, 95% CI [2.033, 2.741]) showed that as one became more 
conservative economically, with every one-unit increase in economic political orientation, the 




compared to identification as an Independent (B = .859, SE = .076, Wald χ2 = 126.958, p < .001). 
And the estimated odds ratio for the Republican Party (Exp (B) = 1.901, 95% CI [1.713, 2.110]) 
showed that for every one-unit increase in social political orientation, that is, as one became 
more conservative, the likelihood of identification with the Republican Party increased by 90.1% 
compared to identification as an Independent (B = -.858, SE = .065, Wald χ2 = 176.853, p < 
.001). Thus, Republicans in the sample were more conservative across all three sub-scales than 
Independents and were more economically conservative than socially conservative.  
 
 
Table 9. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Political Party   
 
Variable Democrats vs. Independents Republicans vs. Independents 
Political Orientation B SE Wald Exp 
(B) OR 



































































         
NOTE. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  OR = Odds Ratio. 
 
 
Libertarian Party.  Although not hypothesized, the estimated odds ratio for the 
Libertarian Party (Exp (B) = 1.405, 95% CI [1.214, 1.628]) showed that for every one-unit 
increase in general political orientation, that is, as one became more conservative, the likelihood 
of identification with the Libertarian Party increased by 40.5% compared to identification as an 
Independent (B = .340, SE = .075, Wald χ2 = 20.635, p < .001). Similarly, the estimated odds 




became more conservative economically, with every one-unit increase in economic political 
orientation, the likelihood of identifying with the Libertarian Party increased by 79.2% 
compared to independents (B = .583, SE = .088, Wald χ2 = 44.035, p < .001). There was no 
relationship found between social political orientation and Libertarian when compared to 
Independents. Thus, Libertarians in the sample were more economically conservative than 
socially conservative.  
H2 – Political orientation (IV) and presidential voting (DV).   It was expected that 
political orientation would be associated with U.S. presidential voting preferences (H2-1 to H2-
3) across the last three general elections. Multinomial logistic regression analysis was selected to 
test this hypothesis because the independent variables were treated as continuous, whereas the 
outcome variables were categorical, single-item presidential voting scales. The predictor 
variables of general political orientation, economic political orientation, and social political 
orientation (seven-point scales ranging from very liberal to very conservative) were averaged and 
combined into one single overall political orientation predictor scale, which exhibited a very high 
reliability (a = .953). This overall political orientation predictor scale was used in the remaining 
tests within this primary hypothesis group. The outcome variables of presidential voting 
preferences also showed a high reliability across the last three U.S. elections in 2020, 2016, and 
2012 (a = .821). Analysis revealed that political orientation significantly and strongly 
contributed to the model (see Table 10).  
H2-1.  It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 
supporting the 2020 Democratic candidate Joe Biden would increase, whereas political 
orientation became more conservative, the likelihood of supporting the 2020 Republican 




Table 10. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and  
Presidential Voting 
 
Variable Democratic Candidate vs.  
Third Party 
Republican Candidate vs.  
Third Party 
Voting Preferences B SE Wald Exp 
(B) OR 






























































































         




2020 presidential election preference.  Regarding the 2020 U.S. presidential election, the 
estimated odds ratio (Exp (B) = .389, 95% CI [.328, .461]) showed that for every one-unit 
increase in overall political orientation, that is, as one became more conservative, the likelihood 
of voting for Joe Biden (Democrat) decreased by 61.1% compared to voting for a third-party 
candidate (B = -.944, SE = .087, Wald χ2 = 117.660, p <.001); while the estimated odds ratio 
(Exp (B) = 3.031, 95% CI [2.493, 3.684]) for voting for Donald Trump (Republican) in 2020 
increased by 303% (or 3.03 times as likely) compared to voting for a third-party candidate (B = 
1.109, SE = .100, Wald χ2 = 123.958, p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely to vote for Joe 
Biden while conservatives were much more likely to vote for Donald Trump. 
H2-2.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 




orientation became more conservative, the likelihood of supporting the 2016 Republican 
candidate Donald Trump would increase.  
2016 presidential election preference.  Regarding the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the 
estimated odds ratio (Exp (B) = .436, 95% CI [.384, .495]) showed that for every one-unit 
increase in overall political orientation, that is, as one became more conservative, the likelihood 
of voting for Hillary Clinton (Democrat) decreased by 56.4% compared to voting for a third-
party candidate (B = -.831, SE = .065, Wald χ2 = 163.989, p < .001); while the estimated odds 
ratio (Exp (B) = 2.723, 95% CI [2.340, 3.169]) for voting for Donald Trump (Republican) in 
2016 increased by 272% (or 2.72 times as likely) compared to voting for a third-party candidate 
(B = 1.002, SE = .077, Wald χ2 = 167.746, p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely to vote for 
Hillary Clinton while conservatives were much more likely to vote for Donald Trump. 
H2-3.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 
supporting the 2012 Democratic candidate Barack Obama would increase, whereas political 
orientation became more conservative, the likelihood of supporting Republican candidate Mitt 
Romney would increase. 
2012 presidential election preference.   Regarding the 2012 U.S. presidential election, the 
estimated odds ratio (Exp (B) = .423, 95% CI [.372, .480]) showed that for every one-unit 
increase in overall political orientation, that is, as one became more conservative, the likelihood 
of voting for Barack Obama (Democrat) decreased by 57.7% compared to voting for a third-
party candidate (B = -.862, SE = .065, Wald χ2 = 176.849, p <.001); while the estimated odds 
ratio (Exp (B) = 1.675, 95% CI [1.463, 1.917]) for voting for Mitt Romney (Republican) in 2012 
increased by 168% (or 1.68 times as likely) compared to voting for a third-party candidate (B = 




Obama while conservatives were more likely to vote for Mitt Romney. Interestingly, across the 
three elections, results suggest that conservatives steadily grew in their support for the 
Republican candidates, while liberals remained relatively steady in their support for the 
Democratic candidates. 
H3 – Political orientation (IV) and political participation (DV).   It was expected that 
political orientation would be associated with factors of political participation. Simple linear 
regression analysis was selected to assess the linearity, direction, and magnitude of the predicted 
relationship. Overall political orientation served as the predictor variable while the outcome 
variables comprised of a variety of political participation activities evaluated separately, 
including 1) voting; 2) political protest; 3) political rally; 4) political donations; 5) contacting 
Congress; and 6) political persuasion (a = .721). Analyses showed that political orientation 
significantly contributed to the model for four of the six factors, including political protests, 
political rallies (although more likely for liberals than conservatives), political donations, and 
political persuasion (see Table 11). Only voting frequency and contacting Congress were not 
associated with political orientation.   
 
Table 11. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Political Participation 
 
Variable B SE(B) β 
 










































H3-1.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, participation in 
voting would increase, whereas political orientation became more conservative, participation in 
voting would decrease.  
Voting.  Overall political orientation was not related to the frequency of voting in local, 
state, or national elections (R2 = .000, F(1, 1267) = .191). Thus, political orientation was not 
associated with voting frequency (B = .004, t(.437), p = .662).  
H3-2.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, participation in 
political protests (e.g., political marches, political demonstrations) would increase, whereas 
political orientation became more conservative, participation would decrease.  
Political protests.  Overall political orientation explained 20.1% of the variance of 
political participation in regard to frequency of participating in a political protest (R2 = .201, F(1, 
1264) = 317.582). As one became more liberal, participation in political protests increased; 
whereas one becomes more conservative, participation in political protests decreased (B = -.234, 
t(-17.821), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely to participate in protests than conservatives.  
H3-3.   It was expected that as political orientation became more conservative, 
participation in political rallies for political figures would increase, whereas political orientation 
became more liberal, participation would decrease.  
Political rallies.  Overall political orientation explained 1.9% of the variance of political 
participation in regard to frequency of participation in a political rallies (R2 = .019, F(1, 1267) = 
24.016). Contrary to the hypothesis, those who were more liberal had increased participation in 
political rallies, whereas those who were more conservative had decreased participation (B =  





H3-4.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, participation in 
donating money to political organizations would increase, whereas political orientation became 
more conservative, participation would decrease.  
Political donations.  Overall political orientation explained 2.7% of the variance of 
political participation in regard to frequency of donating money to a political organization (R2 = 
.027, F(1, 1267) = 34.695). As one became more liberal, donating money increased, whereas one 
became more conservative, donating money decreased (B = -.094, t(-5.890), p < .001). Thus, 
liberals were more likely to donate money to political organizations than conservatives.  
H3-5.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, participation in 
contacting Congress or another political representative would increase, whereas political 
orientation became more conservative, participation would decrease.  
Contacting Congress.  Overall political orientation was not associated with frequency of 
contacting Congress or another political representative (R2 = .001, F(1, 1270) = .702). Thus, the 
hypothesis was not supported (B = -.012, t(-.838), p = .402) and political orientation was not 
associated with contacting Congress.  
H3-6.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, participation in 
political persuasion would increase, whereas political orientation became more conservative, 
participation would decrease. 
Political persuasion.  Overall political orientation explained 2% of the variance of 
political participation in regard to frequency one tried to persuade anyone to vote one way or 
another (R2 = .020, F(1, 1263) = 25.812). As one became more liberal, political persuasion 




p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely to participate in political persuasion than 
conservatives. 
H4 – Political orientation (IV) and cognitive perceptions (DV).   It was expected that 
political orientation would be associated with polarizing cognitive perceptions of political 
ingroups and outgroups (H4-1 to H4-4). Simple linear regression analysis was selected to test 
this hypothesis to assess the linearity, direction, and magnitude of the predicted relationship. The 
predictor variable was overall political orientation, while the outcome variables were comprised 
of perception of good ideas among conservatives and Republicans (a = .884) and liberals and 
Democrats (a = .897). Analysis revealed that political orientation significantly and strongly 
contributed to the model (see Table 12). 
 
Table 12. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Polarizing  
Cognitive Perceptions 
 
Variable B SE(B) β 
 
t        R2 
Conservative Ideas 
Republican Party Ideas 
Liberal Ideas 

























H4-1.   It was expected that as overall political orientation became more liberal, the 
likelihood of believing that conservatives had good ideas would decrease.   
Conservative ideas.  Overall political orientation explained 65.3% of the variance in 




conservative, the perception that conservatives had good ideas increased and as one becomes 
more liberal, the perception that conservatives had good ideas decreased (B = .444, t(49.013), p < 
.001). Thus, the sample was polarized—with conservatives who perceived that ingroup 
conservatives had good ideas, while liberals perceived that outgroup conservatives had bad ideas.  
H4-2.   It was expected that as overall political orientation became more liberal, the 
likelihood of believing that Republicans had good ideas would decrease.  
Republican Party ideas.  Overall political orientation explained 56.3% of the variance in 
perceptions of Republican Party ideas (R2 = .563, F(1, 1278) = 1646.736). As one became more 
conservative, the perception that the Republican Party had good ideas increased and as one 
became more liberal, the perception that the Republican Party had good ideas decreased (B = 
.414, t(40.580), p < .001). Thus, the sample was polarized—with conservatives who perceived 
that ingroup Republicans had good ideas, while liberals perceived that outgroup Republicans had 
bad ideas. 
H4-3.   It was expected that as overall political orientation became more conservative, the 
likelihood of believing that liberals had good ideas would decrease.   
Liberal ideas.  Overall political orientation explained 56.7% of the variance in 
perceptions of liberal ideas (R2 = .567, F(1, 1280) = 1677.032). As one became more 
conservative, the perception that liberals had good ideas decreased and as one became more 
liberal, the perception that liberals had good ideas increased (B = -.398, t(-40.952), p < .001). 
Thus, the sample was polarized—with liberals who perceived that ingroup liberals had good 
ideas, while conservatives perceived that outgroup liberals had bad ideas. 
H4-4.   It was expected that as overall political orientation became more conservative, the 




Democratic Party ideas.  Finally, overall political orientation explained 50.2% of 
variance in perceptions of Democratic Party ideas (R2 = .502, F(1, 1280) = 1290.302). As one 
became more conservative, the perception that Democrats had good ideas decreased and as one 
became more liberal, the perception that Democrats had good ideas increased (B = -.365, t(-
35.921), p < .001). Thus, the sample was polarized—with liberals who perceived that ingroup 
Democrats had good ideas, while conservatives perceived that outgroup Democrats had bad 
ideas. 
H5 – Political orientation (IV) and emotions towards political parties (DV).   It was 
expected that political orientation would be associated with positive (hopeful, enthusiastic, 
proud) and negative emotions (frustrated, angry, afraid) towards political parties (H5-1 to H5-4). 
Binomial logistic regression analysis was selected because the predictor variable of overall 
political orientation was continuous, whereas the outcome variable was dichotomous for each 
emotion (yes or no). The outcome variables of emotions were evaluated separately with fair 
reliability, including positive emotions towards the Democratic Party (a = .618), positive 
emotions toward the Republican Party (a = .739), negative emotions towards the Democratic 
Party (a = .583), and negative emotions towards the Republican Party (a = .681). Analyses 
revealed that political orientation significantly and strongly contributed to the model (see Table 
13). 
H5-1.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 
feeling positive emotions (hopeful, enthusiastic, proud) about the Democratic Party would 
increase; whereas political orientation became more conservative, the likelihood of feeling 





Table 13. Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Emotions  
Towards Political Parties 



























































  76.590*** 
  61.781*** 
 



































Positive emotions: Democratic Party.  Results showed that as one became more 
conservative, it was 53.2% less likely than liberals to feel hopeful toward Democrats (B = -.760, 
SE = .045, Wald χ2 = 281.227, p < .001, OR = .468); 48.1% less likely to feel enthusiastic (B = -
.657, SE = .075, Wald χ2 = 76.590, p < .001, OR = .519); and 47.6% less likely to feel proud (B = 
-.646, SE = .082, Wald χ2 = 61.781, p < .001, OR = .524). Thus, the sample was polarized—with 
conservatives less hopeful, enthusiastic, and proud of outgroup Democrats than liberals.  
H5-2.   It was expected that as political orientation became more conservative, the 




would increase; whereas political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of feeling 
positive emotions would decrease. 
Positive emotions: Republican Party.  As one became more conservative, it was 2.7 times 
as likely than liberals to feel hopeful toward Republicans (B = .998, SE = .058, Wald χ2 = 
293.780, p < .001, OR = 2.713); 2.5 times as likely to feel enthusiastic (B = .923, SE = .083, 
Wald χ2 = 122.839, p < .001, OR = 2.516); and 2.4 times as likely to feel proud (B = .890, SE = 
.081, Wald χ2 = 119.410, p < .001, OR = 2.435). Thus, the sample was polarized—with 
conservatives more hopeful, enthusiastic, and proud of ingroup Republicans than liberals.  
H5-3.   It was expected that as political orientation became more conservative, the 
likelihood of feeling negative emotions (frustrated, angry, afraid) about the Democratic Party 
would increase; whereas political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of feeling 
negative emotions would decrease.  
Negative emotions: Democratic Party.  As one became more conservative, it was 6.9% 
more likely than liberals to feel frustrated toward Democrats (B = .067, SE = .028, Wald χ2 = 
5.570, p < .05, OR = 1.069); 92.7% more likely to feel angry (B = .656, SE = .038, Wald χ2 = 
292.695, p < .001, OR = 1.927); and 90% more likely to feel afraid (B = .642, SE = .040, Wald χ2 
= 254.977, p < .001, OR = 1.900). Thus, the sample was extremely polarized—with 
conservatives more likely than liberals to feel frustrated, angry, and afraid of outgroup 
Democrats.  
H5-4.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 
feeling negative emotions (frustrated, angry, afraid) towards the Republican Party would 
increase; whereas political orientation became more conservative, the likelihood of feeling 




Negative emotions: Republican Party.  As one became more conservative, it was 18.2% 
less likely than liberals to feel frustrated toward Republicans (B = -.201, SE = .029, Wald χ2 = 
48.466, p < .001, OR = .818); 59.5% less likely to feel angry (B = -.904, SE = .046, Wald χ2 = 
390.441, p < .001, OR = .405); and 54.3% less likely to feel afraid (B = -.783, SE = .044, Wald χ2 
= 310.304, p < .001, OR = .457). Thus, the sample was polarized—with conservatives less likely 
than liberals to feel frustrated, angry, and afraid of ingroup Republicans.  
H6 – Political orientation (IV) and diverse representation/equal rights (DV).   It was 
expected that political orientation would be associated with the importance of diverse 
representation (H6-1) and equal rights (H6-2), as well as shifting views on diverse representation 
and equal rights (H6-3). Simple linear regression analysis was selected to test this hypothesis to 
assess the linearity, direction, and magnitude of the predicted relationship. Overall political 
orientation served as the predictor variable, while the outcome variables, which were evaluated 
separately, included the importance for diverse representation and equal rights for racial 
minorities, women, and the LGBTQ community (a = .899), as well as shifting views on diverse 
representation and equal rights (a = .883). Analysis revealed that political orientation 
significantly and strongly contributed to the model. 
H6-1. Importance of diverse representation.   It was expected that as political orientation 
became more liberal, the degree of importance of a) electing racial minorities; b) women; and c) 
LGBTQ politicians would increase, whereas political orientation became more conservative, the 






Table 14. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Importance of Diverse 
Representation and Equal Rights 
Variable B SE(B) β 
 



























































H6-1a. Diverse representation: Racial minorities.  Overall political orientation explained 
54.9% of the variance in support for racial minority representation among elected officials (R2 = 
.549, F(1, 1248) = 1530.273). As one became more conservative, support for racial minority 
representation decreased, whereas one became more liberal, support increased (B =  
-.567, t(-39.119), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the 
importance of electing politicians that identified as racial minorities.  
H6-1b. Diverse representation: Women.  Overall political orientation explained 56.2% of 
the variance in support for female representation among elected officials (R2 = .562, F(1, 1257) = 
1610.396). As one became more conservative, support for female representation decreased, 
whereas one becomes more liberal, support increased (B = -.601, t(-40.130), p < .001). Thus, 
liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the importance of electing politicians that 
identified as women. 
H6-1c. Diverse representation: LGBTQ.  Overall political orientation explained 58.2% of 




= 1742.968). That is, as one became more conservative, support for LGBTQ representation 
decreased, whereas one became more liberal, support increased (B = -.583,  
t(-41.749), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the 
importance of electing politicians that identified as LGBTQ. 
H6-2. Importance of equal rights.   It was expected that as political orientation became 
more liberal, the degree of importance of equal rights for marginalized groups would increase; 
whereas political orientation became more conservative, the degree of importance of equal rights 
for marginalized groups would decrease, including a) equal rights for racial minorities; b) equal 
rights for women; and c) equal rights for LGBTQ (see Table 14).  
H6-2a. Equal rights: racial minorities.  Overall political orientation explained 19.7% of 
the variance in the degree of importance of equal rights for racial minorities (R2 = .197, F(1, 
1250) = 307.580). As one became more conservative, the degree of importance of equal rights 
for racial minorities decreased; whereas one becomes more liberal, the degree of importance of 
equal rights increased (B= -.199, t(-17.538), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than 
conservatives to support the importance of racial equality. 
H6-2b. Equal rights: women.  Overall political orientation explained 21.1% of the 
variance in the degree of importance of equal rights for women (R2 = .211, F(1, 1248) = 
334.224). As one became more conservative, the degree of importance of equal rights for women 
decreased; whereas one becomes more liberal, the degree of importance of equal rights increased 
(B = -.216, t(-18.282), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support 
the importance of gender equality. 
H6-2c. Equal rights: LGBTQ.  Overall political orientation explained 40.6% of the 




1214) = 831.205). As one became more conservative, the degree of importance of equal rights 
for the LGBTQ community decreased; whereas one becomes more liberal, the degree of 
importance of equal rights increased (B = -.451, t(-28.831), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more 
likely than conservatives to support the importance of LGBTQ equality. 
H6-3. Shifting views on diverse representation and equal rights.   It was expected that 
as political orientation became more liberal, the more likely one would shift their attitudes on the 
following issues during the Trump presidency; whereas political orientation became more 
conservative, the less likely one would shift their views (see Table 15), including a) electing 
politicians that identify as racial minorities; b) electing politicians that identify as females; c) 
electing politicians that identify LGBTQ; d) equal rights importance for racial minorities; e) 
equal rights importance for women; and f) equal rights importance for LGBTQ community (see 
Table 15). The model was significantly and strongly supported.  
 
Table 15. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Shifting Views on  
Diverse Representation and Equal Rights  
Variable B SE(B) β t        R2 
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H6-3a. Shifts in diverse representation: racial minorities.  Overall political orientation 
explained 8.7% of the variance in shifting views on diverse representation of racial minority 
elected officials (R2 = .087, F(1, 1263) = 120.988). The more liberal someone was, the more 
likely they shifted their views in the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas 
the more conservative someone was, the less likely they changed their views (B = -.176,  
t(-10.999), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to shift their views by 
placing more importance on the need to elect politicians that identified as racial minorities. 
H6-3b. Shifts in diverse representation: women.  Overall political orientation explained 
5.4% of the variance in shifting views on diverse representation of female elected officials (R2 = 
.054, F(1, 1266) = 72.686). The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their 
views in the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative 
someone was, the less likely they changed their views (B = -.127, t(-8.526), p < .001). Thus, 
liberals were more likely than conservatives to shift their views by placing more importance on 
the need to elect politicians that identified as women. 
H6-3c. Shifts in diverse representation: LGBTQ.  Overall political orientation explained 
6.2% of the variance in shifting views on diverse representation of LGBTQ elected officials (R2 
= .062, F(1, 1263) = 83.723). The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their 
views in the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative 
someone was, the less likely they changed their views (B = -.132, t(-9.150), p < .001). Thus, 
liberals were more likely than conservatives to shift their views by placing more importance on 
the need to elect politicians that identified as LGBTQ. 
H6-3d. Shifts in equal rights: racial minorities.  Overall political orientation explained 




= 27.900). The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time 
since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the 
less likely they changed their views (B = -.071, t(-5.282), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more 
likely than conservatives to shift their views by placing more importance on the need for racial 
equality. 
H6-3e. Shifts in equal rights: women.  Overall political orientation explained just 1% of 
the variance in shifting views on equal rights for women (R2 = .010, F(1, 1276) = 13.023). The 
more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time since President 
Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the less likely they 
changed their views (B = -.042, t(-3.609), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than 
conservatives to shift their views by placing more importance on the need for gender equality. 
H6-3f. Shifts in equal rights: LGBTQ.  Overall political orientation explained less than 
1% of the variance in shifting views on equal rights for LGBTQ (R2 = .006, F(1, 1273) = 7.402). 
The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time since 
President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the less 
likely they changed their views (B = -.035, t(-2.721), p < .01). Thus, liberals were more likely 
than conservatives to shift their views by placing more importance on the need for LGBTQ 
equality. 
H7 – Political orientation (IV) and political attitudes (DV).   It was expected that 
political orientation would be associated with favorability of current political issues (H7-1), 
importance of current political issues (H7-2) and shifting political attitudes during the Trump 
presidency (H7-3 and H7-4). Simple linear regression analysis was selected to test this 




political orientation served as the predictor variable, while the outcome variables, which were 
evaluated separately, included favorability towards various political issues (a = .891), 
importance of various political issues (a = .831), as well as shifting political attitudes during the 
Trump presidency (a = .809). Linear regression analysis revealed that political orientation 
significantly and strongly contributed to the model.  
H7-1. Favorability of current political issues.   It was expected that as political 
orientation became more conservative, the likelihood of favorably rating the following issues 
would increase; whereas political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of favorably 
rating these issues would decrease, including a) state of the economy; b) immigration conditions; 
c) US/Russia relationship; d) US/China relationship; e) access to affordable healthcare; f) 
conditions for African Americans when dealing with police; g) government response to COVID-
19; and h) identification with attitudes of Trump (see Table 16).   
H7-1a. Economy.  Overall political orientation explained 45.8% of the variance in 
favorability of the state of the economy (R2 = .458, F(1, 1221) = 1032.239). As one became more 
conservative, favorability ratings on the state of the economy increased, whereas one became 
more liberal, favorability decreased (B = .424, t(32.128, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were 
more likely than liberals to favorably rate the state of the economy.  
H7-1b. Immigration conditions.  Overall political orientation explained 27.2% of the 
variance in favorability of immigration conditions in this country (R2 = .272, F(1, 1206) = 
451.525). As one became more conservative, favorability ratings on the state of immigration 
conditions increased, whereas one became more liberal, favorability decreased (B = .299, 
t(21.249, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were more likely than liberals to favorably rate the state 




Table 16. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Political Attitudes  
on Current Issues 
Variable B SE(B) β 
 








































































































H7-1c. Relationship between US and Russia.  Overall political orientation explained 
20.5% of the variance in favorability for the relationship between US and Russia (R2 = .205, F(1, 
1085) = 279.420). As one became more conservative, favorability ratings for the US/Russia 
relationship increased; whereas one became more liberal, favorability decreased (B = .212, 
t(16.716, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were more likely than liberals to favorably rate the state 
of the relationship between US and Russia.  
H7-1d. Relationship between US and China.  Overall political orientation explained just 
2% of the variance in favorability for the relationship between US and China (R2 = .020, F(1, 
1173) = 23.526). As one became more conservative, favorability ratings for the US/China 




t(4.850, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were more likely than liberals to favorably rate the state 
of the relationship between US and China.  
H7-1e. Access to affordable healthcare.  Overall political orientation explained 41.3% of 
the variance in favorability for access to affordable healthcare in the United States (R2 = .413, 
F(1, 1215) = 855.808). As one became more conservative, favorability ratings on access to 
affordable healthcare increased, whereas one became more liberal, favorability decreased (B = 
.396, t(29.254, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were more likely than liberals to favorably rate the 
state of access to affordable healthcare.  
H7-1f. Conditions for African Americans when dealing with police.  Overall political 
orientation explained 55.3% of the variance in favorability of conditions for African Americans 
when dealing with police (R2 = .553, F(1, 1204) = 1491.945). As one became more conservative, 
favorability ratings of these conditions increased, whereas one became more liberal, favorability 
decreased (B = .480, t(38.626, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were more likely than liberals to 
favorably rate conditions for African Americans when dealing with police.  
H7-1g. Government response to COVID-19.  Overall political orientation explained 
57.9% of the variance in favorability of the state of the government’s response to COVID-19 (R2 
= .579, F(1, 1212) = 1669.825). As one became more conservative, favorability ratings on the 
government’s response to COVID-19 increased, whereas one became more liberal, favorability 
decreased (B = .575, t(40.863, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were more likely than liberals to 
favorably rate the government’s response to COVID-19.  
H7-1h. Identification with attitudes of Trump.  Overall political orientation explained 
63.6% of the variance in identification with the attitudes of Trump (R2 = .636, F(1, 1209) = 




attitudes of Trump increased, whereas one became more liberal, favorability decreased (B = .586, 
t(45.993, p < .001). Thus, conservatives were more likely than liberals to favorably identify with 
the attitudes of President Trump.  
H7-2. Importance of current political issues.   It was expected that as political 
orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of supporting the importance of the following 
issues would increase; whereas political orientation became more conservative, the likelihood of 
supporting the importance of the following issues would decrease a) gun control; b) climate 
change; c) K-12 public education; d) college education; and e) American news media (see Table 
16). 
H7-2a. Importance of gun control.  Overall political orientation explained 57.4% of the 
variance in the importance of gun control (R2 = .574, F(1, 1193) = 1606.573). As one became 
more liberal, favorability ratings on the importance of gun control increased, whereas one 
became more conservative, the level of importance decreased (B = -.642, t(-40.082, p < .001). 
Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the importance of gun control.   
H7-2b. Importance of addressing climate change.  Overall political orientation explained 
69.5% of the variance in the importance of addressing climate change (R2 = .695, F(1, 1222) = 
2779.441). As one became more liberal, favorability ratings on the importance of climate change 
increased, whereas one became more conservative, the level of importance decreased (B = -.702, 
t(-52.720, p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the importance 
of addressing climate change.  
H7-2c. Importance of K-12 public education.  Overall political orientation explained 
5.9% of the variance in the importance of K-12 public education (R2 = .059 F(1, 1222) = 




education increased, whereas one becomes more conservative, the level of importance decreased 
(B = -.096, t(-8.780, p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the 
importance of K-12 public education.  
H7-2d. Importance of obtaining a college degree.  Overall political orientation explained 
26.7% of the variance in the importance of obtaining a college degree (R2 = .267, F(1, 1211) = 
441.374). As one became more liberal, importance of higher education increased, whereas one 
becomes more conservative, the level of importance decreased (B = -.293,  
t(-21.009, p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the importance 
of obtaining a college degree.  
H7-2e. American news media.  Overall political orientation explained 40.9% of the 
variance in the importance of the American news media (R2 = .409, F(1, 1219) = 843.639). As 
one became more liberal, importance of the American news media increased, whereas one 
became more conservative, the level of importance decreased (B = -.386, t(-29.045, p < .001).  
Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to support the importance of the American 
news media.  
H7-3. Shifting views on current political issues.   It was expected that as political 
orientation became more liberal, the more likely one would shift their attitudes on the following 
issues during the Trump presidency; whereas political orientation became more conservative, the 
less likely one would shift their views on: a) state of the economy; b) immigration conditions; c) 
US/Russia relationship; d) US/China relationship; e) access to affordable healthcare; f) 
conditions for African Americans when dealing with police; g) gun control; h) government 
response to COVID-19; and i) climate change (see Table 17). The model was strongly and 




H7-3a. Shifting views on economy.  Overall political orientation explained less than 1% 
of the variance in shifting views on the state of the economy (R2 = .006, F(1, 1207) = 7.581). The 
more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time since President 
Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the less likely they 
changed their views (B = -.052, t(-2.753), p < .01). Thus, liberals were more likely than 
conservatives to have shifted their views on the state of the economy during the Trump 
presidency.  
H7-3b. Shifting views on immigration conditions.  Overall political orientation explained 
16.9% of the variance in shifting views on immigration conditions (R2 = .169, F(1, 1216) = 
246.771). The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time 
since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the 
less likely they changed their views (B = -.308, t(-15.709), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more 
likely than conservatives to have shifted their views on immigration conditions during the Trump 
presidency.  
H7-3c. Shifting views on US and Russia.  Overall political orientation explained 25.7% of 
the variance in shifting views on the relationship between US and Russia (R2 = .257, F(1, 1171) 
= 405.620). The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time 
since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the 
less likely they changed their views (B = -.363, t(-20.140), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more 
likely than conservatives to have shifted their views on the US/Russia relationship during the 
Trump presidency. 
H7-3d. Shifting views on US and China.  Overall political orientation explained 3.8% of 




46.241). The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time since 
President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the less 
likely they changed their views (B = -.133, t(-6.800), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely 
than conservatives to have shifted their views on the US/China relationship during the Trump 
presidency.  
H7-3e. Shifting views on access to affordable healthcare.  Overall political orientation 
explained 5.7% of the variance in shifting views on affordable healthcare (R2 = .057, F(1, 1222) 
= 73.234). The more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time 
since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the 
less likely they changed their views (B = -.144, t(-8.558), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more 
likely than conservatives to have shifted their views on access to affordable healthcare during the 
Trump presidency.  
H7-3f. Shifting views on conditions for African Americans when dealing with police.  
Overall political orientation explained 19.3% of the variance in shifting views on the conditions 
for African Americans when dealing with police (R2 = .193, F(1, 1216) = 290.003). The more 
liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time since President Trump 
was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the less likely they changed 
their views (B = -.299, t(-17.029), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives 
to have shifted their views on the state of conditions for African Americans when dealing with 
police during the Trump presidency.  
H7-3g. Shifting views on gun control.  Overall political orientation explained 4.8% of the 
variance in shifting views on gun control (R2 = .048, F(1, 1221) = 61.072). The more liberal 




elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the less likely they changed their 
views (B = -.119, t(-7.815), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to have 
shifted their views on importance of gun control during the Trump presidency.  
H7-3h. Shifting views on government response to COVID-19.  Overall political 
orientation explained 12.8% of the variance in shifting views on governmental response to 
COVID-19 (R2 = .128, F(1, 1214) = 177.471). The more liberal someone was, the more likely 
they shifted their views in the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more 
conservative someone was, the less likely they changed their views (B = -.255, t(-13.322), p < 
.001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to have shifted their views on 
governmental response to COVID-19 during the Trump presidency.  
H7-3i. Shifting views on climate change.  Overall political orientation explained 3.5% of 
the variance in shifting views on climate change (R2 = .035, F(1, 1222) = 43.852). The more 
liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the time since President Trump 
was elected in 2016, whereas the more conservative someone was, the less likely they changed 
their views (B = -.088, t(-6.622), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to 
have shifted their views on climate change during the Trump presidency.  
H7-4.   It was expected that as political orientation became more conservative, the more 
likely one would shift their attitudes on the following issues during the Trump presidency, 
whereas political orientation became more liberal, the less likely one would shift their views, 
including a) identification with attitudes of Trump; b) K-12 public education; c) college 
education; and d) American news media. The model was significantly, but moderately supported. 
No relationship was found between political orientation and shifting views on the importance of 




Table 17. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Shifting Views on  
Current Issues 
Variable B SE β 
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NOTE. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001; OD = other direction 
 
 
H7-4a. Shifting views on identification with attitudes of Trump.   Overall political 
orientation explained just 1% of the variance in shifting views on identification with attitudes of 
Trump (R2 = .010, F(1, 1216) = 12.667). The more conservative someone was, the more likely 
they shifted their views in the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more 
liberal someone was, the less likely they changed their views (B = .069, t(3.559), p < .001). A 
follow-up question, which asked respondents what experiences led them to change their views on 
President Trump revealed polarizing answers based on political orientation. Broad themes 
emerged as expected, with liberals more likely than conservatives to have shifted their views 
more negatively in regard to Trump—citing their belief that he was a racist that had radicalized 




parents, that he poorly handled the COVID-19 pandemic, and that he was a liar that could not be 
trusted; while conservatives were more likely than liberals to have shifted their views more 
positively in regard to Trump—citing their belief that Trump did a good job as president, that he 
loved our country, showed strength to foreign adversaries, improved the economy, and followed 
through on campaign promises despite relentless media bias and attacks by the Democrats and 
far left. Thus, conservatives were slightly more likely than liberals to have shifted their views on 
their identification with the attitudes of President Trump during his presidency.  
H7-4b. Shifting views on K-12 public education.   Overall political orientation explained 
less than 1% of the variance in shifting views on the importance of K-12 public education (R2 = 
.009, F(1, 1227) = 11.012). Contrary to the hypothesis that conservatives would have shifted, the 
results showed that the more liberal someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the 
time since President Trump was elected in 2016 (B = -.053, t(-3.318), p = .001), although the 
effect was quite small. Thus, liberals were slightly more likely than conservatives to have shifted 
their views on the importance of K-12 public education during the Trump presidency.  
H7-4c. Shifting views on college degree.   There was no relationship between political 
orientation and shifting views on the importance higher education (R2 = .000, F(1, 1221) = .003). 
Thus, the hypothesis was not supported (B = .001, t(.056), p = .955) and political orientation was 
not related to shifting views on the importance of obtaining a college degree.  
H7-4d. Shifting views on American news media.  Overall political orientation explained 
3.1% of the variance in shifting views on the American news media (R2 = .031, F(1, 1215) = 
38.986). The more conservative someone was, the more likely they shifted their views in the 
time since President Trump was elected in 2016, whereas the more liberal someone was, the less 




likely than liberals to have shifted their views on the American news media during the Trump 
presidency.  
H8 – Political orientation (IV) and Facebook interactions (DV).   It was expected that 
political orientation would be associated with interactions with politically like-minded friends on 
Facebook. Simple linear regression analysis was selected to test this hypothesis to assess the 
linearity, direction, and magnitude of the predicted relationship. The predictor variable was 
overall political orientation, while the outcome variables included interactions with conservatives 
(H8-1), liberals (H8-2), Republicans (H8-3) Democrats (H8-4), and Libertarians (H8-5) on the 
social media platform (a = .333). No relationship was expected between political orientation and 
interactions with moderates or independents. As mentioned earlier, low internal consistency 
suggested that social media interactions in this scale were not tapping an underlying concept and 
were evaluated separately. Analysis revealed that political orientation significantly and strongly 
contributed to the model (see Table 18).  
 
Table 18. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Political Interactions  
on Facebook 
Variable B SE(B) β 
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H8-1.  It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 
interacting with conservatives on Facebook would decrease; whereas political orientation 
became more conservative, engagement with fellow conservatives would increase.  
Facebook interactions with conservatives.  Overall political orientation explained 29.5% 
of the variance in interactions with conservatives on Facebook (R2 = .295, F(1, 1124) = 
469.215). As one became more liberal, engagement with conservatives on Facebook decreased, 
while as one became more conservative, engagement with fellow conservatives increased (B = 
.215, t(21.661), p < .001). Thus, liberals were less likely to engage with outgroup conservatives 
on Facebook, while conservatives were more likely to engage with ingroup conservatives.  
H8-2.  It was expected that as overall political orientation became more conservative, the 
likelihood of interacting with liberals on Facebook would decrease; whereas political orientation 
became more liberal, engagement with fellow liberals would increase.  
Facebook interactions with liberals.  Overall political orientation explained 25.9% of the 
variance in interactions with liberals on Facebook (R2 = .259, F(1, 1109) = 386.692). As one 
became more conservative, engagement with liberals decreased and as one became more liberal, 
engagement with fellow liberals increased (B = -.193, t(-19.664), p < .001). Thus, conservatives 
were less likely to engage with outgroup liberals on Facebook, while liberals were more likely to 
engage with ingroup liberals.  
H8-3.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, the likelihood of 
interacting with Republicans on Facebook would decrease; whereas political orientation became 
more conservative, engagement with Republicans would increase.  
Facebook interactions with Republicans.  Overall political orientation explained 24.4% 




As one became more liberal, engagement with Republicans decreased and as one became more 
conservative, engagement with Republicans increased (B = .192, t(18.834), p < .001). Thus, 
liberals were less likely to engage with outgroup Republicans on Facebook, while conservatives 
were more likely to engage with ingroup Republicans.  
H8-4.   It was expected that as political orientation became more conservative, the 
likelihood of interacting with Democrats on Facebook would decrease; whereas political 
orientation became more liberal, engagement with Democrats would increase.  
Facebook interactions with Democrats.  Overall political orientation explained 22.8% of 
the variance in interactions with Democrats on Facebook (R2 = .227, F(1, 1090) = 321.926). As 
one became more conservative, the engagement with Democrats decreased and as one became 
more liberal, engagement with Democrats increased (B = -.172, t(-17.942), p < .001). Thus, 
conservatives were less likely to engage with outgroup Democrats on Facebook, while liberals 
were more likely to engage with ingroup Democrats.  
H8-5.   It was expected that as political orientation became more conservative, the 
likelihood of interacting with Libertarians on Facebook would increase; whereas political 
orientation became more liberal, engagement with Libertarians would decrease.  
Facebook interactions with Libertarians.  Overall political orientation explained 7.6% of 
the variance in interactions with Libertarians on Facebook (R2 = .076, F(1, 897) = 73.563). As 
one became more conservative, engagement with Libertarians increased and as one became more 
liberal, engagement with Libertarians decreased (B = .102, t(8.577), p < .001). Thus, 
conservatives were more likely to engage with ingroup Libertarians on Facebook, while liberals 




H9 – Political orientation (IV) and news media usage (DV).   It was expected that 
political orientation would be associated with number (H9-1) and types (H9-2 and H9-3) of 
political news sources. Overall political orientation served as the predictor variable, while the 
outcome variables included the number of political news sources (single-item scale) and the type 
of political news sources (a = .514). As mentioned earlier, low internal consistency suggested 
that types of political news sources in this scale were not tapping an underlying concept and were 
evaluated separately. Analyses revealed that political orientation only moderately contributed to 
the model (see Table 19). 
 
Table 19. Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Political  
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NOTE. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.   
 
 
H9-1. Number of political news sources.   It was expected that as political orientation 
became more liberal, the number of news sources for political information would increase, 
whereas political orientation became more conservative, the number of news sources for political 
information would decrease. Simple linear regression analysis was selected to test this 




Overall political orientation explained less than 1% of the variance of the number of political 
news sources (R2 = .003, F(1, 1191) = 3.826). As one became more liberal, the number of news 
sources consulted each day increased; whereas one became more conservative, the number of 
news sources consulted decreased (B = -.042, t(-1.956), p = .051), although the effect size was 
quite low and just missed statistical significance. Thus, the hypothesis was not supported. 
H9-2. Type of political news sources.  It was expected that as political orientation 
became more liberal, the likelihood of consulting the following news sources for political 
information would increase, including a) newspapers or magazines; and b) news websites. 
Binomial logistic regression analysis was selected because the predictor variable of overall 
political orientation was continuous, whereas the outcome variable was dichotomous for each 
news source (yes or no). This model was partially supported with liberals more likely than 
conservatives to consult newspapers or magazines. However, no relationship was found between 
political orientation and obtaining political news from news websites.  
H9-2a. Newspapers/magazines.  As one became more liberal, it was 9.1% more likely 
than conservatives to obtain political information from newspapers or magazines (B = -.095, SE 
= .029, Wald χ2 = 10.630, p = .001, OR = .909). Thus, liberals were more likely to consult 
newspapers or magazines for political news than conservatives.  
H9-2b. News websites.  There was no significant relationship among political orientation 
and consulting news websites for political information (B = -.040, SE = .031, Wald χ2 = 1.602, p 
= .206, OR = .961). Thus, the hypothesis was not supported.  
H9-3. Type of political news sources.  It was expected that as political orientation 
became more conservative, the likelihood of consulting the following news sources for political 




Binomial logistic regression analysis was selected because the predictor variable of overall 
political orientation was continuous, whereas the outcome variable was dichotomous for each 
news source (yes or no). This model was supported with conservatives more likely than liberals 
to consult local TV, cable TV, and talk radio. However, no relationship was found between 
political orientation and obtaining political news from social media.  
H9-3a. Local TV.  As one became more conservative, it was 7.4% more likely than 
liberals to obtain political information from local TV (B = .071, SE = .030, Wald χ2 = 5.595, p = 
.018, OR = 1.074). Thus, conservatives were more likely to consult local TV for political news 
than liberals.  
H9-3b. Cable TV.  As one became more conservative, it was 11.9% more likely than 
liberals to use cable TV for political information (B = .113, SE = .029, Wald χ2 = 14.616, p < 
.001, OR = 1.119). Thus, conservatives were more likely to consult cable TV for political news 
than liberals.  
H9-3c. Radio.  As one becomes more conservative, it was 15.4% more likely than liberals 
to obtain political news from talk radio (B = .143, SE = .30, Wald χ2 = 22.035, p < .001, OR = 
1.154). Thus, conservatives were more likely to consult the radio for political news than liberals.  
H9-3d. Social media.  There was no significant relationship among political orientation 
and obtaining political information on social media (B = -.036, SE = .028, Wald χ2 = 1.640, p = 
.200, OR = .965). Thus, the hypothesis was not supported. 
H10 – Political orientation (IV) and observational learning (DV).   It was expected 
that political orientation would be associated with factors of observational learning. Linear 
regression analysis was selected to assess the linearity, direction, and magnitude of the predicted 




variables included subprocesses of observational learning (a = .849)., including: a) attention; b) 
retention; c) reproduction; d) motivation; e) reward; and f) challenge. Analysis revealed that 
political orientation significantly and strongly contributed to the model (see Table 20).  
 
Table 20. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Orientation and Observational Learning 
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NOTE. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.   
 
 
H10.   It was expected that as political orientation became more liberal, factors of 
observational learning would also increase, whereas political orientation became more 
conservative, factors of observational learning would decrease.  
H10-a. Attention.  Overall political orientation explained 4.5% of the variance of 
observational learning in regard to the extent one noticed or paid attention to the views of family, 
friends, mentors, or teachers when shifting their own political views (R2 = .045, F(1, 1143) = 
53.988). As one became more liberal, attention increased, whereas one became more 
conservative, attention decreased (B = -.119, t(-7.348), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely 
than conservatives to pay attention to their family, friends, mentors, or teachers when shifting 
their political views.  
H10-b. Retention.  Overall political orientation explained 4.2% of the variance of 




friends, mentors, or teachers when shifting political views (R2 = .042, F(1, 1143) = 49.804). As 
one became more liberal, retention increased, whereas one became more conservative, retention 
decreased (B = -.121, t(-7.057), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to 
retain the views of their family, friends, mentors, or teachers when shifting their political views.  
H10-c. Reproduction.  Overall political orientation explained 4.1% of the variance of 
observational learning in regard to the extent one repeated or shared their shifted perspectives 
with others (R2 = .041, F(1, 1132) = 48.411). As one became more liberal, reproduction 
increased, whereas one became more conservative, reproduction decreased (B = -.117, t(-6.958), 
p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to share their shifted views with 
others.  
H10-d. Motivation to learn.  Overall political orientation explained 4.6% of the variance 
of observational learning in regard to the extent one was motivated to learn about their personal 
shift in political views (R2 = .046, F(1, 1113) = 65.582). As one became more liberal, motivation 
to learn increased; whereas one became more conservative, motivation to learn decreased (B =  
-.151, t(-8.098), p < .001). Thus, liberals were more likely than conservatives to be motivated to 
learn about their shifted views.   
H10-e. Reward.  Overall political orientation explained 2.8% of the variance of 
observational learning in regard to the extent one felt rewarded by sharing shifts in political 
views (R2 = .028, F(1, 1052) = 30.327). As one became more liberal, feeling rewarded increased, 
whereas one becomes more conservative, feeling rewarded decreased (B = -.096, t(-5.507), p < 





H10-f. Challenge.  Overall political orientation explained less than 1% of the variance of 
observational learning in regard to the extent one felt challenged by sharing their shifts in 
political views (R2 = .009, F(1, 1072) = 9.414). As one became more liberal, feeling challenged 
increased, whereas one becomes more conservative, feeling challenged decreased (B = -.060,  
t(-3.068), p < .01), although the effect size was quite small. Thus, liberals were slightly more 
likely than conservatives to feel challenged when shifting their views.  
Finding 2 – Second Primary Hypothesis 
In the second primary hypothesis section, just one hypothesis was evaluated to explore if 
political efficacy predicted the likelihood of participation in political activities (see Appendix E 
for complete list of hypotheses). Simple linear regression analysis was selected to test this 
hypothesis to assess the linearity, direction, and magnitude of the predicted relationship. The 
predictor variables of political efficacy exhibited good reliabilities (5-point scales ranging from 
completely disagree to completely agree), including personal political efficacy (a = .791), 
collective efficacy (a = .865), and external efficacy (a = .819). The dependent variable, which 
included various political participation items on voting, political protest, political rally, political 
donations, contacting Congress, and political persuasion (5-point scales ranging from never to 
always) were averaged and combined into one single outcome variable, which exhibited good 
reliability (a = .721). Analysis revealed that two factors of political efficacy (personal and 
collective) significantly and strongly contributed to the model, but there was no relationship 







Table 21. Linear Regression Analysis: Political Efficacy and Political Participation 
 
Variable B SE(B) β 
 
t        R2 
Political Efficacy and Political 
Participation 
Personal Political Efficacy 
Collective Political Efficacy 































H11 – Political efficacy (IV) and political participation (DV).   It was expected that 
political efficacy (personal, collective, and external) would be associated with political 
participation, with higher political efficacy related to higher political participation.  
H11-1. Personal political efficacy.  Personal political efficacy explained 4.9% of the 
variance of political participation (R2 = .049, F(1, 1299) = 66.806). As one became more 
personally efficacious, political participation increased, whereas one became more personally 
inefficacious, political participation decreased (B = .133, t(8.173), p < .001). Thus, personal 
political efficacy was associated with more frequent political participation.  
H11-2. Collective political efficacy.  Collective political efficacy explained 1.8% of the 
variance of political participation (R2 = .018, F(1, 1299) = 23.221). As one became more 
collectively efficacious, political participation increased, whereas one became more collectively 
inefficacious, political participation decreased (B = .082, t(4.819), p < .001). Thus, collective 
political efficacy was associated with more frequent political participation.  
H11-3. External political efficacy.  External political efficacy was not associated with 
political participation (R2 = .001, F(1, 1299) = 1.951). Thus, the hypothesis was not supported (B 





Summary of Quantitative Findings 
Interestingly, almost all of the individual hypotheses were supported, which strongly 
implies that the United States is indeed highly polarized across ideological lines. However, there 
were several sub-hypotheses that were not supported. For example, simple linear regression 
analysis (H3-3) revealed that liberals were more likely to attend political rallies than 
conservatives, which was the opposite of what was predicted. No relationship was found 
between political orientation and the frequency of voting (H3-1) or contacting Congress or 
another representative (H3-5) about a political issue. Analysis also revealed that liberals rather 
than conservatives were more likely to have shifted their views on the importance of K-12 public 
education (H7-2c), which was opposite of what was predicted; while there was no relationship 
found (H7-2d) between political orientation and shifting views on the importance of a college 
degree. Political orientation was not associated with the number of news sources consulted, 
although it just missed statistical significance with liberals more likely to consult more news 
sources than conservatives (H9-1). Likewise, political orientation was not associated with 
consulting news websites (H9-2b) or social media (H9-2f) for political information. Finally. 
external political efficacy was not associated with political participation (H11-3). All other 
hypotheses were significantly supported.  
Qualitative Research Findings 
To restate the study’s qualitative assumptions and conceptual framework for qualitative 
analysis, it was important to understand how and why political attitudes shifted, what events or 
experiences led to these shifts, how rewarding or challenging it was to make these shifts, and 




A-1.  Models and Sources: Interactions with role models and sources, such as family, 
friends, teachers/mentors, religious leaders, political influencers, or the media will 
inform shifts in political attitudes.  
A-2.  Observational Learning: Shifts in political attitudes will be understood through 
Bandura’s (1986) four modes of observational learning, including attention, 
retention, reproduction, and motivation.  
A-3.  Cognitive Political Perception: Shifts in political attitudes will relate to cognitive 
perceptions of partisan ingroups and outgroups.  
A-4.  Experiential Learning: Shifts in political perspectives will be understood through 
Boud, Keough, and Walker’s (1985) three stages of experiential learning and 
reflection, including returning to and replaying the experience, attending to 
emotions provoked by the experience, and re-evaluating the experience.   
Preliminary Analysis for Interviews 
Before sharing details about the main findings from the qualitative analysis, the primary 
researcher ran a one-way ANOVA to see if willingness to be contacted for an interview was 
associated with the study’s independent variables of political orientation and political efficacy. 
Interestingly, results showed that political orientation was indeed significantly related to the 
willingness to be interviewed. For example, those who provided their contact information (M = 
3.42, SD = 1.94) in the online survey were significantly more liberal than those who did not (M = 
4.16, SD = 1.98), F (1, 1185) = 42.170, p < .001 (note: very liberal = 1; moderate = 4; very 
conservative = 7). Moreover, results showed that collective political efficacy was significantly 
related to the willingness to be interviewed. For example, those who provided their contact 




(M = 3.77, SD = 1.06), F (1, 1210) = 7.89, p < .01 (note: completely disagree = 1 (low efficacy); 
neither agree nor disagree = 3 (moderate efficacy); completely agree = 5 (high efficacy)). No 
relationships were found between agreeing to be contacted with personal or external political 
efficacy.  
Participant Profile and Shifting Political Attitudes 
All sixteen participants shared stories about their shifting political views, which ranged 
from shifted nuances on political policies to shifted political orientations and/or political parties 
(see Table 22). Ten of the sixteen (62.5%) interview participants changed their political 
ideologies, of which two shifted to the right, and eight shifted to the left. Political party 
importance (PI) is also noted in Table 22, which ranged from unimportant to very important. To 
compare these findings to other demographic variables among participants, please see Table 3.  
For example, Daniel changed his political ideology from a liberal Democrat to leaning 
towards libertarianism. He was primarily motivated to make these shifts due to his disagreement 
with the “defund the police” movement and his strong support for President Trump. Although he 
voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and thought she would have done a better job, he is:  
against socialism for the country at this time. The strength of the Democratic Party 
started making me think, well, maybe the Republicans have something to offer. The woke 
attitudes really disturbed me because… I mean, people like me are targets to woke 
people…. [going on to say] typically, I think of going forward with Democrats, so it's 
kind of like the train is moving, and I'm just, you know, dropping back behind it and 
walking along while it’s pulling out. 
 
Daniel also shared that he planned to vote for Trump in 2020, which would be the first 
Republican that he ever voted for in his life. Likewise, Shawna also moved to the right, changing 
from a moderate Democrat to a conservative Republican. She shared that her shift was 
influenced in part by her strong support for President Trump, who she described as “America’s 




Table 22. Shifted Political Issues among Interview Participants  
 
Participant Current Political 
Ideology 
Shifted Political Issues Direction of Attitude 
Shift 
Justin Liberal Democrat 
(PI: neutral) 
Immigration 















Emma Very Liberal Democratic 
Socialist 
(PI: slightly important) 
Political ideology 
Universal healthcare 
Welfare drug testing 
Black Lives Matter 





Stronger opposition  
 
Jenny Liberal Democrat 
(PI: slightly important) 
 
Black Lives Matter 
 
Stronger support 
Aleena Very Liberal Green 








Paul Liberal Democrat 
(PI: important)  
Trump 
LGBTQ rights 







Daniel Liberal/Leans Libertarian 
(previously Democrat) 
(PI: very important)  
Political ideology 
Trump 
Defund the police 
 
Moved right  
Stronger support 
Stronger opposition 










Harper Very Liberal  
Democratic Socialist 





Moved left  
Stronger support 
Stronger support 
Samantha Very Liberal Independent 
(PI: neutral) 
Political ideology 






Diana Conservative Republican 











Participant Current Political 
Ideology 
Shifted Political Issues Direction of Attitude 
Shift 
Shawna Conservative Republican 








Jonathan Liberal Independent 
(PI: slightly important) 
Political ideology 
Police brutality 





Julia Moderate Independent 




Moved left (cannot 
support Trump’s record 
on human rights) 
Moved right (appreciates 
Trump’s work on the 
economy) 
Betty Moderate Independent 
(PI: very important) 











Ava Very Liberal Democrat 








mean, if you’ve watched his rallies. I haven’t been to one… He has reached like rock star status.” 
Shawna (conservative Republican) also shared her concerns that the 2020 election was: 
a choice between freedom and communism.... I don't agree with everything on the 
Republican side, but there's no way I want to associate myself with how far left the dark 
Democrats have gone. I'm not willing to take that chance. I think they're taking away our 
freedoms. I think that this is the path to socialism and communism and it's very, very 
scary. 
 
Conversely, William changed his political party from a Republican to an Independent and voted 
for Biden in 2020. His shift to the left was influenced in part by his concern for racial injustice 
and his unhappiness with President Trump, stating that it:  
disturbs me very much as a veteran. And I could see a tyranny starting and I'm just very 
upset with the current one, so I've already voted, and I've already voted pretty much a 





Diana also moved to the left. Although she still identified as a conservative Republican, she was 
extremely opposed to President Trump and was planning to vote for Joe Biden in 2020. She 
discussed how political labels didn’t work for her and that she had been on her own island for 
quite some time as an anti-gun, pro-universal healthcare, pro-capitalist that was in favor of lower 
taxes. Likewise, Julia moved to the left. She explained that she was previously a Republican, 
then moved to a Democrat, and was now politically unaffiliated. She explained how she didn’t 
align with extremes, preferred to stay in the middle, and didn’t want to be stuck in one political 
view. She was influenced to shift her views partly due to her opposition to Trump’s record on 
human rights—and as a survivor of the Cuban Revolution, noting that: 
   The 2016 election shifted everything… I have seen things in this country that I never 
envisioned as a young woman when I became an American citizen. I've seen a loss of 
respect for each other. A lack of caring for each other. And I see it on both sides. There 
are extremes. And how do we come back to the middle?  
 
Another participant named Betty also moved to the left, shifting her political party from 
Republican to an Independent. She was influenced to make this shift primarily due to her anger 
at President Trump. Although she voted third-party in 2016, she and her husband were planning 
to vote for Biden in 2020, noting:  
   Trump is the most disgusting divisive—I hate to say it, non-intelligent president that 
we've ever had. I'm horrified by the things he comes out with… [going on to say] I've 
changed. I've changed dramatically. And I can't see me going back to the Republicans for 
a while.  
 
In addition, Samantha shifted to the left, primarily influenced by her college education. She 
noted that while she was growing up, she was taught that Christian values were Republican 
values. She now identifies as a liberal Independent, but shared that her shifts in perspectives have 
been challenging in some ways in regard to policing and the Black Lives Matter movement:  
   My dad was a police officer, so...you're sort of put into this artificial box of... if you 




movement… It wasn't until really George Floyd that I was like okay this is like, there's no 
doubt in my mind at all that George Floyd, Breonna Taylor… this is a problem that needs 
to be changed. I don't know what the solution is, but to say that it isn't a problem just isn't 
correct. 
 
Jonathan also moved to the left from a moderate to a liberal. His shift was influenced, in part, by 
police brutality. He described how he was previously pro-police but changed to be in support of 
police reform, stating that it needed to be:  
completely dismantled and reconstructed from the ground up with a focus on making sure 
they're meeting the needs of the community they serve…. [particularly regarding the] 
rights of Black and Indigenous people of color… there is severe systemic problems that 
we as a society should probably consider fixing because again, I consider the rights of a 
person to be number one. 
 
And finally, Harper moved to the left to become a Democratic Socialist. She was previously 
economically conservative and socially liberal. Her shift was influenced by her experiences 
attending college in Europe. She shared that she didn’t understand why medical care was so 
expensive in the United States and believed it should be covered for everyone. She recently had 
to make a choice to either keep or stop taking a prescription that cost $300 per month. She 
stopped taking it since she recently lost her health care coverage and could no longer afford it.  
Finding 1 – Role Models and Sources. Interactions with role models and sources informed 
shifts in political attitudes. 
Most of the participants in the sample were strongly influenced by role models and other 
sources when shifting their political views. In alignment with the study’s third research question 
(3-a), which was about role models and the media, the following interview protocol (IP) 
questions were analyzed (see Appendix B). For example, the first question in the IP asked 
participants to describe their political story, while the second question in the IP asked what 
sources informed their shifts. The third question in the IP asked participants to discuss how they 




personal or political influencers. Results suggested that models and sources—both past and 
present and positive and negative—impacted shifting political views, including from family 
members (parents, children, siblings, partners), friends, mentors/teachers, religious leaders, 
political influencers, and through media sources.  
Family.  Family was cited as the most common influence for shifting political attitudes 
amongst the interview sample and was frequently part of how political orientations were formed, 
either by ultimately maintaining their parent’s political ideologies or shifting from them. Results 
showed that the theme of shared values emerged for family as political role models.  
Three of the participants rejected the negatively perceived ideologies of their parents and 
shifted to the left. For example, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) was raised by her mom 
who was a very conservative Republican and devout Catholic in an extremely conservative 
district in a Midwestern state. Her stepdad was also described as extremely conservative. Her 
mom's right-leaning perspectives pushed her more left because it didn't align with her own 
values. After she left home for college, she ended up moving to the South and became influenced 
by her dad's side of the family through the Cherokee Nation, which was very community based. 
She explained how her current experiences were finally aligned with her own values. Likewise, 
Jenny, a liberal Democrat was raised by conservative parents with opposing opinions than hers. 
Although she considered herself to be a Democrat since high school, it wasn’t until college when 
she became more politically attentive. She later moved further to the left when she met her 
husband and his left-leaning and politically active family, including her mother-in-law who 
served on town council. Jenny explained that as a Black woman that was raised by a white 
family who were racist, it was important to finally be in a place where her values were both 




and a Libertarian dad in a Christian household. Although she adamantly opposed her mom’s 
political attitudes and disagreed with most of her dad’s political opinions, she considered her dad 
to be a role model when trying to find political common ground.  
Shawna (conservative Republican) who shifted to the right and switched parties to 
become a Republican in 2009, stated that she still shared values and morals with her Democratic 
mom but believed that her mom’s values were actually more aligned with the Republican Party. 
Shawna also mentioned that she was strongly influenced by her Democratic dad, who taught her 
to do research growing up. In addition, she shared that her husband, who she frequently 
discussed political issues with had always been a Republican and they used to cancel each 
other’s votes. Likewise, Daniel, who recently shifted towards libertarianism (used to be a 
Democrat) was raised by a Republican mother and a Democratic father who served in the Army. 
He talked about how he was strongly influenced by his father, but also met a lot of Republicans 
through his mother. 
Betty, a recently converted moderate Independent (who used to be a Republican) was 
raised by parents that voted for both Democrats and Republicans and were positive role models 
to her. She also discussed how she was influenced by her son, who was more progressive than 
her, as well as by her sister who was more conservative than her, and her nieces who were more 
progressive. Betty went on to share that “listening to them, hearing what they say has, you know, 
again made me think, okay—let me, let me think through this stuff a little bit more. It's not as 
black and white as you want to make it.” 
The rest of the participants shared either positive or neutral remarks about their parent’s 
political ideologies. For example, Aleena (liberal Green) shared that her liberal mom taught her 




influence her because he wasn’t around and didn’t raise her. Marc (conservative Libertarian) 
shared that he was raised by working-class Democrats, but that they were completely different 
than the Democratic Party of today, stating “everybody’s got to work. You only get what you 
pay for.” Jonathan (liberal Independent) shared that his conservative parents had not been models 
for his political views, recalling how they “just tried to convince me all year that I should move 
back to Canada because of the protesting,” and that “they’ve been completely unhelpful in this, 
but to be fair, they don’t have to be informed, they live in a different country.”  
Other participants discussed their partners, children, or siblings. For example, William 
(conservative Independent) shared that he and his wife had shifted to the left, stating “My wife 
and I… have become, are leaning more liberal and I believe that our forefathers founded a liberal 
democracy or a liberal republic.” Likewise, Diana (conservative Republican) talked about her 
husband and three daughters, sharing that her daughters were more liberal than she was. While 
Diana described herself as strongly pro-life, she believed that her daughters were likely pro-
choice. However, she said despite these political differences, she and her daughters were still so 
close in terms of agreeing on the systemic approach to abortion, such as providing economic 
support, jobs, childcare, etc. to women and their families. Julia (moderate Independent) said that 
both of her parents, her sister, and her fiancé were all Republicans:  
   We're a split family. We have [some on the] right and some on the left, and we try not 
to focus on that. I've had some pretty intense discussions with my sister, but I can see 
where she's coming from and why her life experiences have made her shift to that side. 
She's more of a typical Cuban than I am, politically.  
 
When asked who she aligned with or opposed when shifting her political views, she stated, “I 
just didn't bond with anybody. So, it became a choice of what's the least of the evils.” And lastly, 
Ava (liberal Democrat) mentioned that her children and her husband were influences on her 




help her mom understand the importance of voting “blue” to help support her child because 
“trans rights, LGBTQ, and women's reproductive rights are really a big deal right now.” 
Friends.  Less emphasis was placed on friends than family as role models among the 
sample, although several people shared strong connections. Again, the common theme that 
emerged among friends that were considered as a model was shared values. For example, 
Jonathan (liberal Independent) discussed how his peers of color were educating him and moving 
him to the left because they were helping him to understand what their community was facing 
through their lived experiences. Likewise, Harper (liberal Democratic Socialist) was influenced 
to move left by her college friends in Europe who were already more left leaning than American 
liberals. She described how this experience opened her eyes to how things could be improved in 
the United States. In addition, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) described how one of her 
close friends who was a Bernie Sanders supporter pushed her more to the left once she realized 
that her own values aligned with his policies, which was something that she hadn’t considered 
previously. Diana (conservative Republican) expressed how she had friends with both similar 
and different political perspectives as herself. William (conservative Independent) shared that 
most of his friends were conservative and that a barrier he had faced in shifting his views was 
that it was hard to explain his journey to people: “You can’t be a traveler and not become a 
world citizen and learn and live about how others are doing and get along.” Several others shared 
that they had deleted friends or had been deleted by their friends on social media because of 
polarizing political ideologies (e.g., Aleena, Paul, Daniel, William).  
Teachers/mentors.  Multiple people talked about how teachers and mentors were 
positive role models—in fact there were very few negative comments on this topic among the 




For example, Justin (liberal Democrat) shared that professors were ideal models and that he 
appreciated it when they asked him why he thought in a particular way, stating “the more I 
learned, the more I realized I understood their reasoning.” Likewise, Emma (liberal Democratic 
Socialist) enjoyed how one of her professors played devil’s advocate. Others credited education 
for their political views and/or success (e.g., Paul, William, Samantha, Diana). For example, 
William (conservative Independent) shared that he had a professor in college that taught the 
American Revolution from the English side, and the Civil War from the perspective of the 
American South. This influenced his political thinking.  
Religious leaders.  Four participants credited religious leaders or religion as a model 
(e.g., Paul, William, Shawna, Julia). William shared a powerful story about how in his youth, he 
evolved his attitudes towards racial segregation due to his negative experiences at his church. He 
supported ending segregation, but his pastor did not. He stated that he: 
was just seeing too much of the, what I'll call the Pentecostal Evangelical white syndrome 
intervening with it. That started my search for a better process or a better life and a better 
understanding.  
 
Julia (moderate Independent) said that she tried to be a good Christian by modeling her stories 
after Jesus’s parables, stating, “I try to do that with my own history with my stories. Ask 
reflective questions. I'm an educator.” And as a devout Christian, Shawna (conservative 
Republican) shared that she tried to be non-judgmental and not to be:  
too quick to judge or make assumptions and I think without knowing what people have 
gone through in their personal experience... that's a really hard thing to do.... you have no 
clue what's been going on in their life or what they've experienced. 
 
Thus, a common theme that emerged from religious models was the need for compassion.  
Political influencers.  A wide range of positive political influencers were shared 




Michelle Obama, Hillary Clinton, Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, 
Malala Yousafzai, Greta Thunberg, Amy Klobuchar, Mike Pence, John Oliver, Stephen Colbert, 
Seth Meyers, Trevor Noah, Bernie Sanders, Oprah Winfrey, Rachel Maddow, Kayleigh 
McEnany, and Candace Owens. Diana (conservative Republican) indicated that she admired 
John Kasich, stating that "I think he's a commonsense person, and I think that he understands 
systemic problems. If you want to solve individual problems, you always have to look at the 
context.” Jonathan (liberal Independent) expressed that he admired Pete Buttigieg and “the way 
he frames things as well as the way he is able to kind of just keep moving past someone trying to 
interrupt him or try to derail a conversation.” Several participants also discussed negative 
models, such as Donald Trump, Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, and Kamala 
Harris.  
Media.  Regarding media as a model, most participants mentioned that they were aware 
of political bias in their sources and their exposure to echo chambers. Common themes that 
emerged from media as a model included bias and distrust. To counter political bias, participants 
shared how they checked multiple sources. For example, Justin (liberal Democrat) confided that 
he noticed his mom was listening to a third-party Chinese media outlet about American politics, 
which he described as “like someone reading the Bible for you. It’s a really bad idea.” Marc 
(conservative Libertarian) noted that if he saw something that was outside of his own political 
views, he would “have to do a lot of research to validate it,” whereas if it was consistent, he 
didn’t need to, “because it feels right.” Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) complained that she 
was exposed to listening to Rush Limbaugh every day from the time she was six or seven years 
old by her stepdad. Looking back, these prior experiences in her childhood prompted her to 




currently prefers to look for primary sources rather than think pieces. Likewise, Jonathan (liberal 
Independent) described how if he didn’t have enough information, he would:   
try to go to two or three news sources that I trust the opinion of, and then I would ask my 
partner what he thought about that as well, and we’d try to come to some kind of 
consensus and then we would make that decision. 
 
Jenny (liberal Democrat) shared that she only read the news and didn’t watch it on TV because 
“you’d have to watch four channels and stick it together to get the real truth.” Specific political 
sources listed by the sample included social media, podcasts, newspapers, talk radio, local news, 
and cable news, such as the NY Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles 
Times, BBC, NPR, Politico, The Hill, New Yorker, Axios, Vice, AP, NBC, CNN, Fox News, 
and MSNBC, among others. 
Distrust of mainstream media was also cited. For example, Daniel (liberal/leans 
Libertarian) thought that the media was treating Trump unfairly, while Shawna (conservative 
Republican) stopped watching mainstream media entirely. Instead, she was compelled to do “a 
lot of [her] own fact checking” and checked multiple sources…. [going on to say] “I think that 
[some people] see the headline and it drives an emotional response, and then they make an 
assumption about what it is.” She now consults OAN, Parler, Dan Bongino, Blexit, and 
conservative talk radio (Ben Shapiro, Joe Pags, Sean Hannity). Julia (moderate Independent) 
shared that she didn’t watch any domestic news and preferred to read news from abroad, stating 
that “the outside world has a better view of what we are than us here.” Finally, Diana 
(conservative Republican) called Rush Limbaugh and Fox News “the outrage and persecution 
industrial complex that is designed to keep you in a perpetual state of upset.”  
Several people noted that memes were a problem (e.g., Marc, Jenny, Paul, Harper, 




real nor factual, rather “it is a picture that somebody has tried to use as a vehicle for an opinion 
of theirs,” which led him, in part, to quit Twitter. He also quit Twitter due to the troubling tone 
of political conversations online, however he still used Facebook. Harper (liberal Democratic 
Socialist) said she was “concerned about the commodification of meme culture by 
candidates…You’re reducing an issue to a quickly consumable bit. I don’t think that’s good for 
anybody.” Samantha (liberal Independent) shared that although she received some news through 
memes or cartoons, she acknowledged that they “are a little bit…oversimplified and meant to be 
inflammatory.”  
Finding 2 – Observational Learning. Deeper understandings of shifting political attitudes 
emerged when viewed through the observational learning subprocesses of attention, retention, 
reproduction, and motivation.  
In alignment with the study’s fourth research question (4-a) which was about 
observational learning, participants were asked to describe how they went about changing their 
mind on a political issue through the four subprocesses of the observational learning model 
(seventh question in IP; see Appendix B).  
Attention.   Participants began to notice their shifting political views as framed through 
the observational learning subprocess of attention with reason (facts, numbers, statistics, direct 
observation) and/or emotion (stories, metaphors, images, or symbols). For example, regarding 
reason, Justin (liberal Democrat) paid attention to political issues when he recognized facts 
because “the numbers are the numbers.” Similarly, Jenny (liberal Democrat) shared that “facts 
don’t lie. Facts don’t have a hidden agenda. Facts aren’t really prejudiced…It’s kind of like 
math, the rules don’t ever change. Science might evolve, but facts are facts.” Others were 




experience with a mass shooting at his workplace made him much more aware of gun control 
laws. In addition, Julia (moderate Independent) paid attention when the other person stayed calm 
and “base[d] their viewpoint, not just intellectually, but on their personal beliefs, their 
experiences, their stories,” which she believes could be very powerful. Given these findings, 
common themes that emerged from the observational subprocess of attention included the 
cognitive processes of reason and emotion.  
Retention.   Moving on to retention, most participants tended to remember what they 
noticed through comparison with their own lived experiences, through reflection on stories, 
images, sources, or symbols, and through direct observation or exposure. For instance, Jonathan 
(liberal Independent) shared how after a conversation with his Latino friend, he began paying 
attention to how people of color were policed differently than largely white communities in the 
United States. He was prompted to action through the sharing of their lived experiences, which 
were different than his own. When his Latino friend saw a police officer, he would hold his 
breath—his heart would race, he would put his head down and make sure he was unassuming; 
while when Jonathan saw police, as a white-passing individual, he would feel safe. This 
realization made a lasting impact on his shift in view. Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) 
talked about how her views on supporting welfare changed after seeing a social media post from 
a friend that pointed out that mandatory drug testing didn’t just impact the individual, it impacted 
the whole family. Now anytime the topic of welfare or poverty comes up, she stated that “the 
social media post is the first thing I think of. The absolute first thing. It’s like that always sticks 
in my mind because it’s not about just one thing. It’s about a lot of things.” Thus, the theme that 
emerged from the observational subprocess of retention was also reason and emotion—with 




Reproduction.   Shifting political views as framed through the observational learning 
subprocess of reproduction revealed that participants tended to share what they learned from 
shifting views with others actively through metaphors, images, and analogies. For example, 
Jenny (liberal Democrat) explained that before she met her role models, who encouraged her to 
be more active in political participation, she would only vote in presidential elections. Now she 
researches local candidates and frequently votes and remarked that “before I met them, I was 
just…silent.” Another participant, Marc (conservative Libertarian) shared that:  
   If I use a vehicle to convey ideas to people, it would primarily be analogies and I would 
get those analogies by talking to the person and finding out what their strengths are and 
what they're interested in. 
 
Likewise, Aleena (liberal Green) talked about how through the observation of her brother 
experiencing ADHD as a child, this translated to her own need to help others, specifically stating 
“I don’t want to hurt [or] help anybody struggle, especially students, young kids, when they’re 
just trying to figure things out.” Thus, a common theme that emerged through the observational 
subprocess of reproduction was action—in other words, putting into practice what was learned 
through the attention and retention stages of observational learning.  
Motivation.   Finally, exploring shifting views through the frame of motivation revealed 
that participants were promoted to action by their values—how things should or should not be 
(Westen, 2007). For example, Justin (liberal Democrat) shared that: 
   If your goal is to benefit humanity or our country...it keeps me committed and attentive 
because I want to see your reasoning and like you care. If you are just being mean and a 
jerk, I'm not going to listen as well because you're just not very nice, and the empathy 
element is definitely not there. Automatically... the more reasoned it is, the more engaged 
I am. 
 
Similarly, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) expressed that she wanted to give back to the 




reason to, it has to be that emotional connection.” Jenny (liberal Democrat) explained that now 
that she is prompted to political action, she has a women’s power shirt that she wears all the 
time, “because that’s how I feel. And I’ve been on marches [for racial justice] with it and I would 
not have done that before.” She wants justice for innocent Black people being murdered by 
police, like Breonna Taylor. On the other side of this issue, Shawna (conservative Republican) 
shared that she was motivated by the need to protect her family from Black Lives Matter, which 
she believed was a domestic terrorist organization. Betty (moderate Independent) was motivated 
to become more tolerant of the LGBTQ community once she found out two of her family 
members were gay. This prompted her to ask herself what was more important,  
this ideal or belief or whatever that you have over here—or this person that you care 
about? And that kind of answers it, it's like, well, it’s the person that I care about. That is 
more important so, I need to, I need to back up a little bit. 
 
Thus, the main themes that emerged from the observational subprocess of motivation included 
action and values. These themes helped to provide context for the reasons behind the actions that 
were reproduced in the previous stage of the model.  
Finding 3 – Cognitive Perceptions and Emotions: Partisan Alignment and Opposition. 
Shifting political attitudes were associated with cognitive perceptions and emotions of partisan 
ingroups and partisan outgroups.  
In alignment with the study’s third research question (3-b), which was about cognitive 
political perceptions and emotions—participants were asked to “think about their own thinking” 
in terms of their own personal shifts in political attitudes and how they aligned or opposed with 
others (third question in IP; see Appendix B). Results showed that shifting political attitudes and 




reason/emotion, and equality/individual freedom (see Appendix H for Framework Matrix and 
Appendix I for Analytical Memos by Theme).  
Open/closed.   Participants that were more open tended to express their interest in new 
perspectives, ideas, as well as their willingness to change, to engage in new experiences, and to 
value complexity in thought. For instance, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) was more open 
and noted that “a lot of the time I have found common ground, it’s been on accident… [it] 
entirely depends on the situation and the person.” She also discussed her interest in seeing things 
from different perspectives since she “grew up in an area where everyone was just kind of like 
me…and even as a Cherokee woman,” and as a person who is white-passing, she understood the 
privileges she had that other native people didn’t. Conversely, participants that were more closed 
tended to express more decisiveness in their decisions and held more long-term fixed beliefs with 
less interest in exploring alternatives or other explanations. For instance, Marc (conservative 
Libertarian) shared that “I don’t mean to be bitter about this, but I’m also not responsible for 
anybody else’s attitudes,” going on to say that he “figured out a long time ago that people who 
are not interested in changing their views are not interested in having a rational discussion.” And 
Aleena (liberal Green) stated that she didn’t see any way at all to find common ground with 
conservatives sharing that, “My brother, he and I no longer speak because he is a Trump 
supporter—he and his wife. And they’re…not nice people, you know?” going on to compare 
conservatives in general to Nazis. 
Reason/emotion.   Participants that valued reason, tended to express their need for logic, 
data, and facts. For instance, when finding political alignment, Justin (liberal Democrat) shared 
that he engaged in political discussions by asking others why they though what they thought. He 




what. Discussions with the politically aligned are easier. There’s a lot of nuances.” When he 
approached political disagreements, he tried to agree on certain points and probed into other 
perspectives to slowly gain commonality using sources and facts. He also revealed that numbers 
and statistics spoke to him most when forming a new political view, stating that “if the data 
points in that direction, I don’t have a choice.” On the other hand, participants that valued 
emotion, tended to express that feelings helped them to find common ground especially 
regarding emotional stories about lived experiences. For example, Jonathan (liberal Independent) 
shared a powerful story about the differences in health care between the United States and 
Canada, using a personal example about how his stepmom died of cancer while in the Canadian 
health system. When talking to a friend, he modeled his discussion by starting small, growing it 
bigger in relation to the individual (personal), collective (hospital), and environmental (societal) 
experiences. As he articulated, “people respond very well to humanizing experiences because if 
you're removed, you're not going to have remembered it as well.” Others shared how negative 
emotions like anger and fear decreased their ability to find common ground. For example, 
Shawna (conservative Republican) stated that:  
   Conservative Americans are sick of being...walked over… It's really disheartening, and 
we feel like we finally have somebody [Trump] who's standing up for us, whose standing 
up for what's right and for what America was founded on… If you can't treat people...like 
human beings and with respect, there's no place for that. And I don't care what your 
viewpoints are, whether you're liberal or conservative. 
 
She is fearful of expressing her beliefs and shared that her children didn’t want to put Trump 
signs in their yard “because they're afraid we'll get targeted.” 
Equality/individual freedom.   Participants that valued equality tended to express core 
values of human rights, compassion, and empathy. For instance, Julia (moderate Independent) 




socially, economically,” going on to say that her beliefs about human life and human rights 
would never change, affirming that “I won’t allow myself to change it.” Similarly, Jonathan 
(liberal Independent) shared that:  
   I believe that the rights of people should be respected and are non-negotiable....as in 
their right to live in a society freely and openly—by the way, relevant, actually I should 
have mentioned, I am gay—and that was also very much frowned upon in a Catholic 
school in a relatively religious household in a conservative part of the country. 
 
Alternatively, participants that placed more worth on individual freedom, tended to express 
values from the viewpoint of the individual and not the collective. For instance, Marc 
(conservative Libertarian) shared that:  
   The government shouldn't be involved in personal lives. The ultimate evolution at this 
moment on this planet is the individual human. Okay, so if I always start with that 
premise, and so when I look at something, what does this do for the life and self-
determination of an individual human in this country. That's my litmus test. 
 
Likewise, Daniel (liberal/leans Libertarian) believed that political views were personal and that it 
was not his job to change people’s minds. Aleena (liberal Green) similarly stated that “I’ve 
always thought that it’s not my business what other people do with their private lives…I don’t 
want them to get into mine and don’t want to get into theirs.”  
Finding 4 – Experiential Learning. Deeper understandings of shifting political attitudes 
emerged when viewed through the experiential learning stages of returning to the experience, 
attending to emotions, and re-evaluating the experience.  
In alignment with the study’s fourth research question (4-b), which was about 
experiential learning, participants were asked to describe what happened when they ran into 
someone that held a different political point of view (fifth question in IP), what events or 
experiences led to these shifts (second question in IP), whether they had a time where they 




IP), and what it took mentally and emotionally to find common ground with someone that 
thought differently (eighth question in IP) than them (see Appendix B).  
Return to experience.  When participants returned to an experience, it was typically in 
regard to a broader political issue they were reconsidering, a personal traumatic experience they 
endured, or through reflection on their own past thinking about a political issue. For example, 
Betty (moderate Independent) shared that she didn’t understand why people had to be either for 
or against the police. This made her upset because she viewed herself as patriotic and wanted to 
put a police flag next to her Biden flag. She was:  
disgusted by the fact that the Republicans [were] trying to take the American flag as 
theirs, it's not! I'm sorry, that is the American flag, and I don't care if you're Republican, 
Democrat, or whatever you are. 
 
Jonathan (liberal Independent) shared a personal traumatic experience regarding a super-charged 
and heated political discussion with a close family member that got so bad that he left their house 
abruptly to drive back home three hours away. In regard to reflection on past thinking, Marc 
(conservative Libertarian) shared that:  
   I grew up in the late 50s and early 60s in [a Southern state] and the KKK was a big deal 
and not in a bad way. It was a big deal in a, in a positive way, right?... And then I...get out 
of college and I go [out West and back to another Southern state], I go to other places and 
see how those places operate. And I come back to [my home state], and I see that there's 
still people putting KKK graffiti in the bathrooms and it pisses me off. And when I was 
14, it did not piss me off. 
 
Thus, emerging themes that arose for the experiential learning stage of returning to experience 
included remembering, noticing feelings, and observing new thinking.  
Attend to emotions.   Following these same three participants, Betty (moderate 
Independent) attended to her emotions by reflecting more deeply on her experience explaining, 




support...Black Lives Matter... So, I guess, who's really turned me was Trump.” Jonathan (liberal 
Independent) attended to his emotions and shared that he learned through reflection that:  
   If you're talking politics, things get personal, and there's a lot of emotions, it doesn't end 
super well, because I'm talking one thing, their talking another thing, someone's being 
called a fascist, someone's being called a damn commie and yeah, there's a lot of yelling 
and then there's a very tearful drive. 
 
Likewise, Marc (conservative Libertarian) attended to his emotions through reflection on why 
his attitudes changed:  
   So, I think the thing that changed my opinion about stuff like that [was] seeing that 
everybody [was] working together, because if you work for the Feds, you don't see 
color...and it don’t matter where you're from, it don’t matter what your accent is, if the 
inmates start to riot, you run to help each other. That's the way it works. 
 
A theme that arose from the experiential learning stage of attending to emotions included 
reflection on feelings. 
Reevaluate experience.   And finally, these three participants reflected on how they 
reevaluated their experience after they attended to their emotions. For instance, Betty (moderate 
Independent) reported that once she realized that her anger over the police debate was about 
Trump, she reflected on how in the past, she usually voted for Republicans, but could no longer 
support him or anyone else that supported him. She believed that he had agitated the “pro-police” 
or “defund the police” movements instead of building bridges to address the problem. Next, 
Jonathan (liberal Independent) shared that when he looked back again on the negative experience 
he had with his family member, he realized that he had used a tone that was perceived negatively 
and caused defensiveness. The experience reinforced in him the importance of establishing 
common ground before diving into a political discussion. Moreover, Marc (conservative 
Libertarian) acknowledged that he came to understand that “the system that [he] grew up under 




never moved back to [his home state].” Thus, the themes that emerged from the experiential 
learning stage of reevaluation of experience included motivation to action and learning.  
Finding 5 – Barriers and Rewards to Shifting Political Attitudes. Barriers to shifting political 
attitudes are related to the cognitive perceptions of reason and emotion, whereas rewards for 
shifting political attitudes are related to increased political participation and learning.  
In alignment with the study’s third research question (3-c), which was about how 
rewarding or challenging it was to make shifts in political perspectives (tenth question in IP), 
participants were asked, in what ways changing their political attitudes had been challenging and 
rewarding (see Appendix B).  
 Barriers.   Diana (conservative Republican) shared that changing her political attitudes 
was challenging because it required reflection on whether there was only one way to do 
something or multiple ways:  
   I think that's the point of change, when you see somebody living your shared values, 
but executing it in a different way. It makes you wonder. Oh, is there really only one 
way, my way, or the way that somebody else tells me to do this and to achieve that goal? 
Could there be more than one way? To me, that's where the common ground really starts 
to open up... You are supposed to find the one system....It's like there's people simply 
hardwired to gravitate to a single point or a single truth. But...I don't...Can't there be 
several truths that are compatible and equally compelling that you can buy into? 
 
Samantha (liberal Independent) shared that shifting a political view was hard in terms of how 
other people viewed her:  
   I've probably said and done things in the past that have really hurt people. And that's 
hard to think about, like, wow, I hope I wasn't that like white person in someone's life in 
high school who said or did something...really hostile, even though it wasn't intentional.... 
So, in some ways, it would be easier just to stay the same and never have to grapple with 
what you used to think and what you used to believe. 
 
Thus, the themes that emerged from barriers encountered when shifting political views included 




 Rewards. Ava (liberal Democrat) shared that shifting a political view was rewarding 
because she “loves being active in politics.” Her kids were also involved in politics, sharing that 
“they know what's going on. They have an opinion. And I think that it will probably guide them 
for life.” Julia (moderate Independent) said that shifting her political attitudes have made her “a 
better person, a more whole person. And not a fragmented person. I see a lot of fragmented 
people. So that's the reward you get.” And Shawna (conservative Republican) shared that it has 
been rewarding “knowing that you're doing what you feel is right and standing up for what you 
believe in. I'm teaching my children and being a role model for them and standing up for what's 
right.” Moreover, William (conservative Independent) shared that “It's been rewarding to me that 
I believe that I am a more egalitarian individual. But in having lived in a mixed neighborhood 
that I understand some of the challenges that others are facing.” And finally, Jenny (liberal 
Democrat) stated that she felt rewarded for “being active. Having a voice. Being heard. I 
definitely met a new community of people, which is nice. People I can share with, people I could 
talk to, people I can bring things to.” Thus, the themes that emerged from rewards experienced 
when shifting political views included learning and action.  
Finding 6 – Mail-in Voting and 22nd Amendment. Most respondents supported mail-in voting 
and were opposed to changing the 22nd Amendment of the Constitution.  
 Attitudes towards mail-in voting and the 22nd Amendment revealed the following ideas. 
Mail-in voting was widely supported with 13 people in support and one person against. 
Likewise, 13 people opposed changing the 22nd Amendment of the Constitution, which would 
allow a U.S. president to serve more than two terms in office, while one person was unsure. The 
remaining two answers for both questions were missing since the interview had run over time 




Summary of Qualitative Findings 
 Deeper understandings were found across all four assumptions discussed above through 
the application of the present study’s analytical framework. First, models and sources (A-1) were 
found to be influential to both the formation and shifts of political attitudes. Early role models 
and influences seemed to carry lasting weight, regardless of positive or negative experiences 
across time. Family was the biggest influence for most participants, frequently referring to 
parents, partners, children, or siblings. Second, it was determined that people actively observed 
models, whether it was family, friends, mentors/teachers, the media, or other sources, when 
shifting their political views as it applied to the observational learning (A-2) subprocesses of 
attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation. Third, shifts in political attitudes were 
associated with cognitive political perceptions (A-3) of partisan ingroups and outgroups with the 
themes of open and closed, reason and emotion, and the core values of equality and individual 
freedom. Next, it was determined that people actively reflected on their shifting political 
attitudes through the three stages of experiential learning (A-4), including returning to the 
experience, attending to emotions provoked by the experience, and reevaluating the experience. 
Other key findings included that shifting political attitudes required a lot of individual cognitive 
work and reflection to reconcile old perceptions and emotions with new ideas and beliefs, but it 
was also described as rewarding, which resulted in new learning and increased active political 
participation.  
Summary of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings 
The utilization of a mixed-methods approach to the present study was enriching since it 
provided both quantitative data that revealed wide-scale polarization, as well as qualitative data 




qualitative study helped lead to a deeper understanding of the study’s main research questions, 
hypotheses, assumptions, and conceptual framework. For example, it was determined that 
political orientation was associated with a wide variety of current and shifting political attitudes 
as well as political perceptions, behaviors, and the observational learning factors of attention, 
retention, reproduction, motivation, feeling rewarded, and feeling challenged, which helped to 
address the study’s first research question. Next, it was found that personal and collective 
political efficacy was related to higher political participation, which helped to address the study’s 
second research question. Knowing more about the nature and depth of political polarization was 
important when moving to the qualitative analysis portion of the study. Through the application 
of the Framework Method (Ritchie et al., 2013), the interview data was explored through 
iterative coding, the compilation of a framework matrix, and the creation of analytical memos 
and themes. Key findings revealed that role models were influential to changing political views 
particularly through family members, that feelings toward partisan ingroups and outgroups were 
strongly related to being open or closed to common ground, and that a more nuanced 
understanding of shifting political attitudes arose when visualized through observational learning 
and experiential learning models. Several themes emerged from the analytical process that 
helped to address the third and fourth research questions of the present study, including the 
differences between being open or closed, the tension between reason and emotion, and the 
variation in placing core values on equality or individual freedom (see Appendices H, I, and J) 










DISCUSSION, INTERPRETATION, SYNTHESIS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Discussion and Interpretation of Quantitative Results 
 
The quantitative findings reviewed in Chapter IV largely supported the first and second 
primary hypotheses. Since liberals tend to support more progressive issues and conservatives 
tend to support more traditional issues (Conover & Feldman, 1981), it was expected that political 
orientation would be related to a variety of polarizing political attitudes, perceptions, behaviors, 
and learning. Given the recent 2020 U.S. presidential election, it was critical and timely to 
explore how political orientation predicted shifting political attitudes as well as how political 
orientation was associated with other factors, including cognitive perceptions and feelings for 
partisan ingroups and outgroups, support for issues of diverse representation and equality, social 
media interactions, political news usage, and learning through observation. Due to the escalating 
climate of political polarization in the United States and the importance and impact of voting on 
society, it was also expected that political efficacy would be associated with political 
participation.  
There was strong support for the first primary hypothesis regarding the relationship 
between overall political orientation and a variety of current and shifting political attitudes, 
perceptions, behaviors, and learning. Many studies have investigated the relationship between 
political orientation and political participation (e.g., Jost, 2006; Lau & Redlawsk, 1997; 




Bodenhausen et al., 1994b; Fridkin & Gershon, 2020; Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Kang et al., 2021; 
Lakoff, 2008; Marcus et al., 2000; Stern et al., 2014a; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Valentino et al., 
2009; Van Boven et al., 2012; Westen, 2007). Moreover, other studies have examined the 
relationship between political orientation and diversity, equality, or inequality (e.g., Jost et al., 
2003a; Jost et al., 2003b; Knowles et al., 2009) and political interactions on Facebook and news 
usage (e.g., Bail et al., 2018; Garret, 2019). However, fewer studies have investigated the 
possible relationship between political orientation and shifting political attitudes, although many 
studies have investigated resistance towards change and extreme political conservatism (e.g., Jost 
et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2003b; Jost, 2006; Kerlinger, 1984).  
Lack of research on the relationship between political orientation and shifting political 
attitudes is perhaps due to the idea that political orientation is fixed and stable over time 
(Conover & Feldman, 1981; Sears & Funk, 1999), which the present study has put into question 
through the qualitative findings. This is an interesting new finding and suggests that the labels of 
liberalism and conservatism may not be as stable as once believed. It is important to note that 
while statistical analysis showed that liberals were more likely to change their views than 
conservatives, it is possible that these shifts were more pronounced in liberals since they were 
opposed to President Trump. Likewise, conservatives may not have shifted their views as much 
as liberals because they supported President Trump and his policies. Future studies should 
replicate the present study’s findings while a Democratic president is in office to see how this 
change in leadership may impact shifting views among liberals and conservatives.  
Consistent with the present study’s qualitative findings, Lyons (2017) found that political 
ideology could shift and evolve over the lifespan through the influences of early role models, 




Neel, 2019) that used an experimental and meta-analysis design investigated the malleability of 
political orientation as it related to the perception or belief that others could change or not. As 
expected, results indicated that conservatives were more fixed than liberals, while liberals were 
more malleable than conservatives, which is consistent with the present study’s findings. In 
addition, participants (2019) believed that certain groups were more capable of change than 
others. For example, prejudice against a perceived political outgroup (e.g., liberal, conservative) 
predicted that the outgroup would be perceived as more fixed and less able to change. Lassetter 
and Neel (2019) suggested that future studies:  
should examine both how people interpret different points on the political spectrum and 
how they more generally assess others’ political orientations and ideological 
extremities… Because malleability beliefs influence social perception and behavior, 
examining target-specific predictors of such beliefs will enable researchers to make 
nuanced predictions about how different targets will be treated. (p. 149) 
 
The present study attempted to address this recommendation, particularly regarding cognitive 
perceptions of partisan ingroups and outgroups, which revealed that there was wide-scale 
polarization among survey participants. However, the interviews suggested that the interpretation 
of conservative and liberal or Republican and Democrat political labels meant very different 
things to different people. That is, political labels did not represent the same ideas to each 
participant. This is an important insight and a reminder that political orientation is much more 
complex than the dichotomous portrayal of left versus right. Since extreme liberals and extreme 
conservatives tend to be the most politically active, their voices are also the loudest, which is in 
turn echoed by the media. This reinforces an us-versus-them narrative and reduces the potential 
for political common ground among the American electorate. Moreover, there is an entire group 
of people that are in the middle—the independents, the moderates, the unaffiliated, as well as 




understand their perspectives as well. Being in the middle does not necessarily mean that 
someone is less politically active, which the present study discovered.  
The findings from the quantitative analysis should be interpreted as supporting the 
polarization concept of ideological consistency since the survey asked questions about political 
attitudes and statistically tested for political extremes. Results showed that there was ideological 
coherence among the sample, with liberals supporting liberal and Democratic ideas and 
conservatives supporting conservative and Republican ideas. Future quantitative research should 
explore how polarizing emotions may also impact shifting political attitudes across political 
ideologies. The way the questions about emotion were worded on the survey were framed as  yes 
or no options per the negative feelings of being angry, afraid, or frustrated and the positive 
feelings of being proud, hopeful, or enthusiastic at political ingroups and outgroups. Thus, it is 
recommended that future studies instead ask how someone feels about Democrats, Republicans, 
liberals, and conservatives using a Likert scale ranging from “very little” to “very strong” to 
determine the extent of positive and negative polarizing emotions among partisans. Positive 
emotions should also be compared with negative emotions to explore the degree of emotional 
polarization in more depth. The survey questions about shifting political attitudes also supported 
the concept of resistance to new information and attitudinal change, with liberals more likely to 
have shifted their views on liberal issues and conservatives more likely to have shifted their 
views on conservative issues. Future quantitative studies should explore the polarization concept 
of resistance to new information and attitudinal change in more depth. Qualitative comments 
from the survey revealed widespread polarization across the quantitative sample. Future research 




uncover possible new scales for use in other studies. The interpretation of individual findings as 
they related to each of the present study’s research questions are discussed below.  
Research Question 1 – Political Orientation and Political Attitudes 
The first research question of the study asked if political orientation was associated with 
political polarization on a variety of current and shifting political attitudes, cognitive perceptions 
and emotions of ingroup and outgroup partisans, social media interactions and news media 
usage, and factors of observational learning.  
Research question 1a.   In what ways does political orientation relate to current and 
shifting political attitudes concerning various economic and social issues (e.g., racial equality, 
state of the economy) and political participation (e.g., voting patterns, participation in protests or 
rallies)? The following hypotheses (see Appendix E) were tested to answer this question (RQ: 
1a): H1 (political orientation and political party affiliation), H2 (political orientation and 
presidential voting preferences), H3 (political orientation and political participation), H6 
(political orientation and current and shifting attitudes on diverse representation and equal 
rights), and H7 (political orientation and current and shifting attitudes on current political issues).  
The first hypothesis (H1), which predicted that general, social, and economic political 
orientation would be associated with political party was strongly supported, namely that 
Democrats were more liberal and that Republicans were more conservative. This is consistent 
with findings reported elsewhere (Jost, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2014), which signified 
strong ideological consistency polarization among the sample. Likewise, the second hypothesis 
(H2), which predicted that overall political orientation would be associated with voting in the 
past three presidential elections was strongly supported. As expected, and consistent with 




Democrats were more likely to have voted for Biden (2020), Clinton (2016), and Obama (2012), 
while Republicans were more likely to have voted for Trump (2020), Trump (2016), and 
Romney (2016).  
The third hypothesis (H3), which predicted that overall political orientation would be 
associated with political participation was partially supported. For example, liberals were more 
likely than conservatives to participate in political protests, political rallies (contrary to 
hypothesis), political donations, and political persuasion—with protesting as the strongest effect. 
There was no relationship between political orientation and frequency of voting or contacting 
Congress. These findings are consistent with results reported by the Pew Research Center 
(2018b) that showed that liberal Democrats were more likely to participate in political rallies, 
events, or speeches than other ideological groups, stating:  
   About one-in-five liberal Democrats (19%) say they have attended a political rally, 
event, or speech in the past year, more than double the shares of conservative and 
moderate Democrats (8%), conservative Republicans (8%) or moderate and liberal 
Republicans (7%).  
 
In support of these quantitative findings, qualitative comments compiled from the short-answer 
question in the online survey echoed these sentiments regarding political participation among 
liberals and conservatives (see Appendix J for a sample of individual comments). Word 
frequency analysis conducted through NVivo 12 showed that the following words were most 
often applied across both Republicans and Democrats: voting, issues, candidates, politics, 
elections, informing, participation, support, representation, and people (see Figure 12 for the top 
50 words used). Not surprisingly, “voting” was by far the most frequently used word to describe 
political participation. Accordingly, both Democrats and Republicans described the importance 





Figure 12. Political Participation: Top 50 Words 
 
 
For example, among Democrats in the survey, political participation meant being 
informed, voting, being politically active and speaking out about political causes, learning about 
issues, and trying to persuade others to shift their political views. These short-answer comments 
reinforced the findings from the present hypothesis (H3). Among Republicans in the survey, 
political participation meant being informed, voting, and holding elected officials accountable. 
More polarizing comments among Democrats described that political participation meant 
standing up for their morals regarding equality despite ignorant Republican opposition, while 
Republicans described that political participation meant stopping liberal and Democratic 
viewpoints from being forced on them, decreasing the spread of socialism and communism, and 
fighting back against liberal indoctrination. Yet, others discussed the possibility of political 
common ground, with Democrats emphasizing the importance of listening and sharing 
information with others, and with Republicans emphasizing the importance of civility and 





















































































































conservative perspectives, but there were also commonalities regarding the importance of voting 
and being informed about the issues and candidates.  
Polarization in terms of ideological consistency between liberals and conservatives was 
further supported in the sixth hypothesis (H6), which predicted that overall political orientation 
would be associated with support for the importance of diverse representation and equal rights 
for racial minorities, women, and LGBTQ groups. Results showed that not only were liberals 
much more likely to support these issues than conservatives, but they were also more likely to 
have shifted on these issues during the Trump presidency by indicating it was even more 
important than in the past. This effect was much stronger regarding diverse representation than 
equal rights, which may indicate that views on the importance of equality may be more stable 
over time among liberals.  
This is an important new finding as the researcher was unable to find other studies that 
have addressed the relationship between political orientation and shifting views on the support 
for diverse representation in the U.S. government across all three of these marginalized groups. 
However, recent voting patterns support these findings. For example, the current 117th Congress 
is the “most racially and ethnically diverse in history” yet the “overwhelming majority of racial 
and ethnic minority members are Democrats (83%), while 17% are Republicans” (Schaeffer, 
2021). Likewise, Blazina and DeSilver (2021) reported that more women are serving in Congress 
than ever before in American history, although there are more Democratic women (38% of all 
Democrats) than Republican women (14% of all Republicans) in these roles. Democrats are also 
more likely than Republicans to support seeing more women in government positions and have 
also shifted their attitudes in stronger support of electing a female president (Igielnik & 




candidates that identify as part of the LGBTQ community—again mostly as part of the 
Democratic Party (Moreau, 2020). These recent voting patterns in the United States support the 
present study’s results that liberals are more likely than conservatives to support the importance 
of equality and diverse representation in American government. Future studies should expand 
upon these findings.   
Qualitative comments about diverse representation and equality from two short-answer 
questions on the online survey were also reviewed (see Appendix J for sample of individual 
quotes). The first question asked about what events or experiences led respondents to change 
their views on the importance of diversity of elected officials, while the second question asked 
about what events or experiences led respondents to change their views on the importance of 
equal rights for racial minorities, women, and the LGBTQ community. Word frequency analysis 
conducted through NVivo 12 showed that the following words were most often used across 
responses: rights, Trump, equality, people, minorities, groups, changed, women, election, and 
views (see Figure 13 for top 50 words used).  
For example, many Democrats and other left-leaning respondents in the online survey 
indicated how they were motivated to learn about their shifting views and expressed strong 
support for diversity and equality in order to give voice to the voiceless. The murders of George 
Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and other innocent African Americans by police were frequently cited as 
the impetus for shifting views. Other left-leaning respondents expressed anger with President 
Trump and his racist language. Many Republicans and right-leaning respondents spoke out 
against affirmative action and special privileges and argued for the importance of merit rather 




radical terrorism and expressed concerns about “cancel culture.” Although these comments 
supported the quantitative findings reviewed above for H6, it is important to note that qualitative 
 
 
Figure 13. Changing Views on Diverse Representation and Equal Rights: Top 50 Words 
 
 
analysis of the present study’s semi-structured interviews indicated that not all Democrats or 
Republicans agreed with these generalizations. For example, Daniel, a white man who leaned 
Libertarian and used to be a liberal Democrat was concerned with “cancel culture.” And 
William, a conservative Independent man who used to be a Republican was in strong support of 
addressing systemic racism. Likewise, Diana, a white conservative Republican woman 
recognized that racial minorities were marginalized, sharing an example of what her son-in-law 
experienced as a Black man. The interviews in the present study added more depth into 
individual differences on these issues, suggesting that political labels may hide more nuanced 









































































































Finally, the seventh hypothesis (H7), which predicted that overall political orientation 
would be associated with favorability and importance of current political issues was strongly 
supported, with conservatives supporting the economy, immigration conditions, US/Russia and 
US/China relationships, access to healthcare, conditions for African Americans when dealing 
with police, government response to COVID-19, and identification with the attitudes of Trump. 
Liberals supported gun control, climate change, K-12 public education, and the American news 
media. Interestingly, and as reported earlier in Chapter IV, liberals were much more likely to 
have shifted their views during the Trump presidency than conservatives on every issue 
presented in the survey apart from identification with Trump and the American news media. 
Among liberals, shifting political attitudes were strongest in their decreased favorability of the 
US/Russia relationship, conditions for African Americans when dealing with police, immigration 
conditions, and governmental response to COVID-19. Among conservatives, shifting political 
attitudes were strongest in their decreased favorability of the American news media, followed by 
their increased positive identification with the attitudes of Trump. Qualitative comments (see 
Appendix J for sample of individual quotes) from the short-answer question on the online survey 
were also reviewed, which asked about what events or experiences led to their shifting views on 
these political issues. Word frequency analysis conducted through NVivo 12 showed that the 
following words were most often applied across all responses: Trump, media, police, 
immigration, people, brutality, president, democrats, news, changed, and country (see Figure 14 
for top 50 words used).  
The top reason for shifting political views as indicated through the short-answer question 
was attributed to President Trump (2% of respondents with 243 mentions), however, the 




conservative. For example, many Democrats and left-leaning respondents wrote that they were 
moved to shift their views due to their anger at President Trump and his vilification of 
marginalized groups, treatment of illegal immigrants especially regarding children in cages, and 
his racist reaction to the George Floyd protests and police brutality. Conversely, many 
Republicans and right-leaning respondents wrote that they were moved to shift their views due to 
their anger with liberals, their fear of Democrats and Black Lives Matter, distrust of the 
American news media, and concern about racial riots. The preceding comments further illustrate 
the striking differences between liberal and conservative perspectives, especially as it related to 
positive or negative feelings toward Trump.  
 
Figure 14. Changing Views on Current Political Issues: Top 50 Words 
 
 
Research question 1b.  How does political orientation relate to cognitive perceptions 
and emotions of ingroup and outgroup partisans? The following hypotheses (see Appendix E) 


























































































































of partisan ingroups and outgroups) and H5 (political orientation and polarizing emotions of 
partisan ingroups and outgroups). Political polarization in terms of emotional polarization was 
further supported in the fourth hypothesis (H4), which predicted that overall political orientation 
would be associated with cognitive perceptions of partisan ingroups and partisan outgroups. For 
example, conservatives believed that liberals and Democrats had bad ideas, while liberals 
believed the conservatives and Republicans had bad ideas. These findings are consistent with the 
literature reviewed in Chapters I and II, which discussed cognitive perceptions of political 
ingroups and outgroups. The results are troubling as this polarization may decrease one’s ability 
to learn from perceived political outgroups, which is consistent with conclusions from Westen 
(2007) and Lakoff (2008). For example, as Jerit and Barabas (2012) found, partisans were prone 
to perceptual bias (also referred to as “simple projection” by Van Boven et al., 2012)—the 
tendency to see a world that is consistent with personal political views—which reduced learning 
from political outgroups. Likewise, Stern et al. (2014) reported that conservatives were more 
likely than liberals to seek and perceive ingroup consensus and to desire shared reality on both 
political and non-political issues, which would reduce the ability to learn from Democrats and 
liberals. Finally, another study (Kang et al., 2021) found that although MRI brain scans showed 
that liberals were capable of learning from ingroups and outgroups, participants in fact learned 
less from perceived political outgroup actions. Thus, if we are capable of learning, it is important 
to uncover approaches to prevent the automatic disregard for information that is perceived to be 
outside our political worldviews. The present study’s use of semi-structured interviews helped to 
provide strategies to address this critical problem.  
In addition, the fifth hypothesis (H5), which predicted that overall political orientation 




strongly supported. For example, conservatives felt much more positive about the Republican 
Party than liberals felt about the Democratic Party in regard to the emotions of hopefulness, 
enthusiasm, and feeling proud. In regard to negative emotions, conservatives were slightly 
frustrated with Democrats, but mostly angry and afraid, while liberals were moderately frustrated 
with Republicans, but also mostly angry and afraid of them. These negative emotions among 
partisans are supported elsewhere as reviewed in Chapter II. For example, other studies found 
that negative emotions reduced openness (Fridkin & Gershon, 2020) and the ability to 
understand political outgroups (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2003b; Lakoff, 2008; Westen, 
2007). Future studies should further explore emotional polarization as it relates to shifting 
political views.  
Research question 1c.  In what ways does political orientation relate to political 
interactions and information-seeking behavior on social media and the news? The following 
hypotheses (see Appendix E) were tested to answer this research question (RQ: 1c):  H8 
(political orientation and political interactions on Facebook) and H9 (political orientation and 
political news usage). The eighth hypothesis (H-8), which predicted that overall political 
orientation would be associated with the likelihood of interacting on Facebook with partisan 
ingroups and partisan outgroups was supported. Results showed that conservatives were more 
likely to engage with like-minded friends on Facebook (e.g., conservatives, Republicans, and 
Libertarians). Likewise, liberals were more likely to engage with like-minded friends on 
Facebook (e.g., liberals, Democrats). Conservatives were slightly less likely than liberals to 
interact with the perceived opposition. Similar findings are reported elsewhere. For example, a 
Pew Research Center report (Mitchell, Kiley, Gottfried, & Matsa, 2014) found that conservatives 




themselves, with “two-thirds (66%) say[ing] most of their close friends share their views on 
government and politics.” Moreover, liberals were more likely than conservatives to defriend 
people on social media or even “end a personal friendship – because of politics” (Mitchell et al., 
2014). Although no hypothesis was made in the present study, there was no relationship found 
between political orientation and interactions with moderates or Independents on Facebook, 
which likely suggests either these groups were either less likely to post political information or 
the political content they posted was perceived as either liberal or conservative.  
The ninth hypothesis (H9), which predicted that political orientation would be associated 
with the number and type of political news sources, revealed mixed support. For example, H9-1 
was not supported as there was no relationship between the number of news sources consulted 
with political orientation, although it just missed statistical significance with liberals more likely 
than conservatives to list more sources. This finding is inconsistent with another report (Mitchell 
et al., 2014) that found that conservatives were more likely than liberals to use a single news 
source (e.g., Fox News), while liberals were more likely than conservatives to use multiple news 
sources (e.g., NPR, MSNBC, New York Times). Results in the present study also revealed that 
liberals were more likely to obtain their political news through newspapers or magazines, while 
conservatives were more likely to obtain their political news through local TV, cable, and talk 
radio—with talk radio as the strongest source, followed by cable TV. These findings are 
supported elsewhere through a Pew Research Center report (Mitchell, Jurkowitz, Oliphant, & 
Shearer, 2020) that found Republicans were more likely than Democrats to get their political 
news from Fox News and talk radio, which influenced their concerns about mail-in voter fraud. 
No relationship was found between political orientation and sourcing political news through 




obtain their news in these ways. Qualitative comments about commonly used political news 
sources from the short-answer question in the online survey were also reviewed, which resulted 
in a wide range of responses (see Figure 15 for top 100 news sources). Word frequency analysis 
conducted through NVivo 12 showed that the following news sources were most often cited 
across participants: NPR, CNN, social media posts, NY Times, newspapers, Washington Post, 
BBC, media, internet, local news, MSNBC, and Fox News.  
 
Figure 15. Primary Sources for Political News: Top 100 News Sources 
 
 
Research question 1d.  How does political orientation relate to factors of observational 
learning (attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation)? The following hypothesis (see 
Appendix E) was tested to answer this research question (RQ: 1d): H10 (political orientation and 
observational learning). The tenth hypothesis (H-10), which predicted that overall political 
orientation would be associated with factors of observational learning was strongly supported. 
















































































































































retain their shifted political views, to repeat and share their shifted perspectives with others, and 
to feel motivated to learn about their shifts when thinking about a political issue. In addition, 
liberals were more likely to feel rewarded and challenged when sharing their shifts in views. 
These findings indicate that liberals are more open to thinking about and reflecting on their 
shifted political perspectives than conservatives. This is an important new finding since it is 
currently believed that there are no other studies that have investigated the relationship between 
political orientation and factors of observational learning as it relates to shifting political 
perspectives. However other studies have shown that liberals are more open to change 
(Barbaranelli et al., 2007; Block & Block, 2006; Caprara et al., 1999; Caprara et al., 2006; 
Rentfrow et al., 2009; Schoen & Schumann, 2007) than conservatives, who are more resistant to 
change (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2003b).  
Qualitative comments about observational learning from a short-answer question in the 
online survey were also reviewed (see Appendix J for sample of individual quotes). The question 
asked respondents to briefly describe the political issue(s) they had changed their perspectives 
on. Word frequency analysis conducted through NVivo 12 showed that the following words were 
most often used across responses from Democrats: gun control, changed issues, police brutality, 
people, rights, now, and immigration, while the following words were most often used across 
responses from Republicans: Democrats, changed, immigration, abortion, vote, country, now, 
and president (see Figure 16 for top 50 words used by party affiliation). The graphics revealed a 
difference in types of shifted issues by party affiliation, which aligned with issues that are 
typically important for liberals and conservatives. Of those that expanded on why they shifted 
their political attitudes in their short-answer responses, many people commented on the influence 




Republicans engaged in observational learning. However, statistical analysis revealed that 
liberals were much more likely than conservatives to be open to shifting their views.  
 
 
Figure 16. Observational Learning: Top 50 Shifted Issues by Political Party 
 
Democrats       Republicans 
 
 
Research Question 2 – Political Efficacy and Political Participation 
The second research question of the study asked if three types of political efficacy 
(personal, collective, and external) were associated with overall political participation. There was 
only one question and hypothesis that addressed this section. The research question (RQ: 2) 
specifically asked: In what ways is political efficacy associated with political participation? The 
eleventh and final hypothesis (H11) predicted that political efficacy would be associated with 
political participation. Results showed that only personal and collective efficacy were associated 
with political participation, while external political efficacy was not. The finding that personal 
efficacy was associated with increased participation is supported elsewhere. For example, one 













































































































































































































































who were extremely liberal or extremely conservative (Caprara et al., 2009), although a different 
measure of political efficacy was utilized than the present study. Thus, participants in the present 
study perceived that they had the power to influence political processes. Likewise, the finding 
that collective efficacy was related to political participation was supported in other studies. For 
instance, Stern et al. (2014) found that collective efficacy was related to perceived ingroup 
consensus, which led to increased participation in politics, with conservatives more likely to 
perceive ingroup consensus than liberals. The present study found that liberals were more likely 
to participate in political protests and rallies and were more likely to donate to political 
organizations and to engage in political persuasion. Future studies should examine how political 
orientation and political efficacy may work together to impact these types of political 
participation. As Bandura (1997) noted, people don’t live in isolation and must work together 
collectively with others to impact political change. Thus, political collective efficacy may also be 
related to the influence of role models through collective interactions. This is important as it 
suggests that those who are more personally and collectively efficacious may also be more open 
to change, such as learning about shifting political attitudes. 
It is important to note that since the present study was advertised as a political study, it is 
likely that anyone that took the time to take the survey was already highly politically efficacious, 
thus this study likely did not reach many people that were politically disenfranchised. However, 
the sample did not have strong external political efficacy, which is the perception that the 
government would be responsive to the needs of citizens at large. Also, these finding are context 
specific since the survey was completed during Trump’s presidency. That is, presumably, results 
may have been different in other settings depending on who is in political power at the time. As 




therefore future studies should continue to utilize it, as it helps to understand varying levels of 
political efficacy. 
Summary of Quantitative Discussion 
In sum, the results reviewed above strongly support the idea that political orientation is 
associated with political polarization through ideological consistency, emotional polarization, 
and resistance to new information and attitudinal change, but that openness to shifting one’s 
views and participation in factors of observational learning are more likely to be undertaken by 
liberals than conservatives. Moreover, people with higher personal and collective political 
efficacy were more likely to participate in a variety of political activities.  
Given the structure of the present study’s methodology, it was important to first establish 
how liberals and conservatives differed in the sample and to ascertain both the degree and nature 
of political polarization. It was also necessary to determine what types of political issues were 
shifting, if at all, before delving into the interviews that explored how these shifts may have 
resulted in new learning and how these shifts were influenced by role models, sources, and/or 
events. 
Discussion and Interpretation of Qualitative Results 
The qualitative findings reviewed in Chapter IV provided deeper insights into the study’s 
research questions and assumptions. Building on the results of the quantitative study, which 
indicated that the sample was polarized—with liberals frustrated, angry, and afraid of 
Republicans and with conservatives frustrated, angry, and afraid of Democrats—the qualitative 
portion of the study helped to understand the foundations of these ideological differences. Given 
the politically polarized quantitative findings, the primary researcher believed that the qualitative 




learn how and why political perspectives emerged and evolved, what events or experiences, 
barriers, or rewards were associated with it, and to learn more about how these political shifts 
contributed to learning.  
The completion of the semi-structured interviews was a timely and important endeavor 
that took place one month before the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Thus, participants were 
active, engaged, and ready to talk about their political perspectives. It is not currently believed 
that any other studies have investigated how shifting political attitudes may be associated with 
observational learning or experiential learning, thus the discussion below includes new findings. 
Although one neuroimaging study reviewed in Chapter II investigated how people learned 
through observation (Kang et al., 2021), they did not ask about shifting political attitudes, rather 
they investigated how well someone learned from ingroups or outgroups and found that people 
learned less well from the actions of outgroups. As noted earlier, Kang et al. (2021) believed that 
other factors could be driving this polarization, such as individual experiences or emotions 
towards political outgroups, which the present study sought to examine.  
Prior literature suggests that political ideology can evolve over time (Lyons, 2017) 
through the influences of early role models, changing regions of residence, and role models as 
adults—all of which may reinforce existing political attitudes or change one’s political attitudes 
depending on the associated risks or rewards. Moreover, there is evidence of political 
malleability, which is the perception or belief that others can change. For example, as noted 
above in the discussion of quantitative results, one study (Lassiter et al., 2019) recommended 
that future research investigate how people with different levels of political orientation perceived 
other people’s political beliefs. This was also investigated as part of the qualitative study as 




review of the framework matrix, and the review of analytical memos are detailed for each sub-
question below. See Table 23 for overarching themes that emerged from each research question 
as it related to influences for shifting views. For a list of qualitative assumptions, see page 111; 
for a list of this study’s research questions, see page 16.  
 
 
Table 23. Influences for Shifting Political Attitudes by Analytical Theme  
Influences for Shifting 
Political Attitudes 
Themes Research Question and 
Assumption 
Role models: Family, 
friends, teachers, religious 
leaders 
Shared values 
New perspectives  
Compassion 
RQ: 3-A  
A-1 
Region of residence Shared values  RQ: 3-A 
A-1 





alignment or opposition 
Open and Closed  
Reason and Emotion 
Equality and Individual Freedom 
RQ: 3-B 
A-3 
Barriers to shifting views Change 
Reason and Emotion 
RQ: 3-C 
A-3 
Rewards to shifting views Learning  
Action 
RQ: 3-C  
A-3  
OL: Attention and 
retention  
Reason and Emotion RQ: 4-A  
A-2 
OL: Reproduction Action RQ: 4-A  
A-2  
OL: Motivation Action  
Values 
RQ: 4-A  
A-2  
EL: Return to experience Remembering 
Noticing Feelings 
Observing New Thinking 
RQ: 4-B  
A-4  
EL: Attending to emotions Reflection on Feelings RQ: 4-B 
A-4 
EL: Reevaluation of 
experience 
Motivation to Action 
Learning 
 








Research Question 3 – Influences for Shifting Political Attitudes 
 
The third research question of the study asked about how and why political attitudes 
shifted, what events or experiences led to these shifts, and how rewarding or challenging it was 
to makes these shifts.  
Research question 3a.   In what ways do social interactions with others, such as family, 
friends, teachers, religious leaders, or media inform the formation and shifts of political attitudes, 
if at all? This question was associated with the first qualitative assumption (A-1).  
Family, friends, teachers, religious leaders, and political influencers.   As reported in 
Chapter IV, results showed that the following theme emerged among models that were family or 
friends: shared values—meaning that those who continued to share the values of their role 
models felt more in political alignment than those who did not. In other words, political attitudes 
and political ideologies were more likely to be in alignment with role models that were perceived 
to share the same values as themselves. Therefore, people were more likely to assume the 
political views of role models that aligned with their values. Shifting political attitudes may be 
partly influenced by the perception of negative parental role models. For example, Emma’s 
(liberal Democratic Socialist) values emerged as equality and empathy—values that she 
associated with her Catholic upbringing through “the way that Jesus treated people.” She did not 
believe that her conservative mom was living these values and began searching for new ways to 
apply her values. In her experience, she was able to learn by connecting emotions with facts, 
which enabled her to become “way more empathetic.” Emma was able to apply these values 
once she was around aligned role models that she perceived to hold similar shared values as 
herself. Her new role models taught her about the importance of community through the shared 




other participants who shifted their political views to a different ideology, all discussed how they 
had found new models who helped them to maintain their new perspectives that were more in 
alignment with their own core values.  
Shifting political attitudes were also influenced by positive parental role models. For 
example, Betty (moderate Independent) who had recently shifted from identifying as a 
Republican discussed how her parents had always voted for who they believed was the best 
candidate, despite the candidate’s political party, yet her parents became more Republican as she 
got older. Throughout the interview, it became clear that her parents were positive role models to 
her as she reflected on her own process of shifting her political ideology. At the same time, her 
son, who was progressive, also influenced her political shifts. Other participants felt more 
isolated by their shifts, which may partly be due to the geographic region they lived. For 
instance, William (conservative Independent), who was surrounded by conservative friends in a 
retirement community, shared that his challenge was explaining to others his political journey 
from the right to the left. Presumably, this was because the people around him didn’t share his 
same lived experiences or values, yet he still persevered and stuck with his new political 
perspectives. Likewise, as Diana (conservative Republican) shared, she felt that she had been 
living on her own little island for a really long time but that she hoped the Lincoln Project would 
finally put her island on the map.  
As noted earlier, these findings are consistent with another study (Lyons, 2017), which 
referred to two possible scenarios regarding attitude stability or attitude change. For example, 
someone who experiences a reinforcing environmental influence would likely experience attitude 
stability. As an example, if someone was raised as a Republican and later resided in a 




her lifespan. Yet, when environments and influences challenge early parental influences, people 
are more likely to be open to political attitudinal change. For example, although William 
(conservative Independent) discussed a conservative upbringing and living in a conservative 
region of the country in the Midwest, he also shared that he had learned about different 
perspectives through traveling and that he and his wife had both moved to the left as a result. 
Likewise, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) shared that she shifted further to the left after 
moving to a more liberal community through exposure to her Cherokee Nation culture and 
heritage.  
The theme of new perspectives emerged in regard to role models that were teachers or 
mentors. Almost all comments on this topic were positive, namely in regard to how influential 
teachers were to their own thinking and how their learning still applied to their day-to-day 
interactions. For example, Justin (liberal Democrat) explained that he had taken what he learned 
from his professor and applied it to daily life by being “more attentive and [trying] to go the 
extra distance because of [his teacher/mentor]” when having political discussions with people 
that he disagreed with politically. Other main ideas shared among participants included learning 
how to look at things in a different perspective and learning how to challenge their own views 
through reflection. The adult learning lens of transformational learning may help to put this 
finding into context. Mezirow (2000) defined it as a “process by which we transform our taken-
for-granted frames of reference (meaning perspectives, habits of mind, mind-sets) to make them 
more inclusive, discriminating, open, emotionally capable of change, and reflective so that they 
may generate beliefs and opinions that will prove more true or justified to guide action” 
(Mezirow, 2000, pp. 7-8). Transformational learning is a process that questions long-standing 




rational, cognitive, humanistic, and developmental. New insights about shifting political views 
may indeed be transformational, and interview participants largely agreed that new learnings 
emerged from role models that were teachers and mentors. However, there was one outlier. For 
example, Shawna (conservative Republican), who disagreed with her child’s school providing 
lessons on critical race theory, described it as being:  
based on the same things that white supremacy exists, white privilege exists, that we're 
inherently racist because we're White and we are privileged, and that Black people are 
victims. That they don't have any like, they don't have any say so in how they live their 
lives or to change your circumstances to better themselves. And it's, I just think it's a 
really divisive, scary way to look at things and I don't think it's helping anybody.  
 
Among role models that were religious leaders, compassion emerged as a prominent theme. 
Those who had positive models in this realm tried to follow their religion’s message of 
compassion and love. Those who held more negative views towards religion were still motivated 
by compassion to find a better life either for themselves or other groups that were perceived as 
being marginalized. No themes emerged in regard to political influencers as role models, likely 
since there wasn’t enough commonality among the participants. Although of note, several 
participants acknowledged that they wouldn’t want to actually meet their political influencers 
because they wouldn’t want to be let down by their idealized perceptions of who they 
represented.  
Media.   Results showed that for media, the following themes emerged: bias and distrust, 
meaning that there was a strong awareness among the participants that there was liberal or 
conservative bias in all forms of media and that it was their responsibility as individuals to get to 
the truth and decide what to trust. Although some people were so distrustful of the media that 
they stopped consulting mainstream media completely, others were still open to going through 




truth included checking primary sources, fact checking, and consulting multiple types of sources 
or alternative sources, while others shared that they avoided certain types of media altogether, 
such as TV news or even American news, preferring to get information from other countries. 
Moreover, there was a general distrust of memes that have been widely shared on social media. 
This finding is in support with results of another study (Garrett, 2019), which suggested that 
political belief accuracy may be improving among the American electorate—that is, we may be 
better able to distinguish fake news from real news than commonly believed even in the face of 
online misinformation, thus other factors may be influencing shifting political attitudes. For 
example, when people in the sample felt that they didn’t have enough information to make a 
decision, they tended to discuss the issue with a trusted source, typically a family member or 
friend. Despite being aware of bias, both liberals and conservatives admitted that even though 
they knew their news sources were either left-leaning or right-leaning, they still enjoyed reading 
or watching it, because it felt good to see their viewpoints being reinforced.  
Yet, even among the small interview sample, liberals and conservatives clearly consulted 
different sources of information, which likely influenced their political views. Several 
participants talked about how political outgroups had completely different information than 
themselves, which made it harder to find common ground when they didn’t even believe the 
same set of facts. The quantitative sample showed the liberals were more likely than 
conservatives to consult newspapers and magazines, while conservatives were more likely than 
liberals to consult local TV, cable TV, and talk radio for their political sources. Both groups used 
social media for political news, which supports the present study’s methodological approach of 




with political orientation to explore further how it may impact the formation and shifts of 
political attitudes.  
Research question 3b.   How do shifts in political perspectives relate to cognitive 
political perceptions or emotions of partisan ingroups and outgroups, if at all? This question was 
associated with the second qualitative assumption (A-3). As reported in Chapter IV, results 
showed that the following themes emerged for partisan alignment and opposition: open and 
closed, reason and emotion, and equality and individual freedom.  
Open and closed.   Although not anticipated, a significant new finding emerged through 
qualitative analysis. For example, even though the online survey indicated that liberals were 
more likely to be open to shifting their views than conservatives, the interview analysis did not 
align with that determination. In fact, several conservatives and moderates in the sample did 
exhibit high levels of openness and willingness to embrace change. This finding may help to 
uncover new ways of finding common ground. In essence, to find political common ground, one 
must be open to it. Open individuals may value change, new ideas, new perspectives, new 
experiences, unconventional attitudes, imagination, fantasy, intellectual curiosity, and artistic 
sensitivity, while closed individuals value tradition, common sense, routine, and practicality 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1993; John & Srivastava, 1999; McCrae, 1996; McCrae & 
Costa, 1990). This continuum of openness and closedness differed within individuals and 
participants in the sample, depending on the political issue.  
For example, Aleena (liberal Green) who was cut off from her brother due to their 
opposing political ideologies (closed) simultaneously paid attention to her own confirmation 




   I like my thinking being challenged. I get bored with just the day-to-day stuff, and so 
when I'm challenged with my beliefs and my biases and all that—I really like it. Even 
though I'm uncomfortable, but I'm glad it happens. 
 
Across the sample, all participants showed aspects of openness in regard to partisan alignment 
regardless of political orientation, however some participants were much more open than others. 
Ten interview participants shared higher levels of openness (6 liberals, 2 conservatives, and 2 
moderates) towards finding common ground, while four participants shared lower openness to 
finding common ground (1 liberal, 2 conservatives, and 1 liberal Libertarian)—with the 
remaining two in the middle. Thus, even though the survey results were in alignment with other 
studies that have found that liberals tend to be more open than conservatives (Barbaranelli et al., 
2007; Block & Block, 2006; Caprara et al., 1999; Caprara et al., 2006; Rentfrow et al., 2009; 
Schoen & Schumann, 2007), the results from the present study offers more nuance since both 
conservatives and moderates in the sample exhibited high levels of openness not only to shifting 
their views, but also an openness to finding political common ground. As discussed in Chapter 
IV, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) noted that she found common ground many times on 
accident. This statement indicates that shifting political views may also be understood through 
informal and incidental learning, which is defined as:  
   Learning outside of formally structured, institutionally sponsored, classroom-based 
activities (Marsick & Watkins, 1990, pp. 6-7)… leading to greater attention to, and 
awareness, of ‘tacit, hidden, taken-for-granted assumptions’ that may help learners 
rethink situations in which they find themselves and re-frame their understanding of the 
kind of learning they might need to undertake. (Marsick et al., 2008, p. 571) 
 
Using informal and incidental learning to understand political learning is recommended for 
future studies, especially since many of the interview participants discussed how their political 




Reason and emotion.   Another theme that emerged when finding common ground was 
reason and emotion. In other words, one must be able to process the data received and have the 
capacity to reflect on it. Building on the results of the quantitative study, which found that 
liberals and conservatives held negative perceptions and emotions for partisan outgroups, the 
interviews provided an opportunity to delve into this finding a bit more. Forming and shifting 
political attitudes requires us to use both cognitive reason (knowledge, rationality, logic, data) 
and emotion (feelings), yet most people tend to think of themselves as rational (Westen, 2007). 
And this was no exception in the qualitative sample.  
Given this complexity, it was important to determine how these two themes related to 
finding common ground and partisan alignment. Like openness and closedness, this continuum 
of reason and emotion differed within individuals and across participants in the sample, 
depending on the political issue. In alignment with Lakoff’s (2008) theory that partisans think 
they are making decisions based on reason, several participants remarked how they were partial 
to reason and avoided emotions when trying to find political common ground. Yet, both Lakoff 
(2008) and Westen (2007) argued that reason cannot occur without emotion and that in order to 
shift our views, we must change our frames through both emotion (reflection, sharing personal 
stories) and reason (critical thinking, openness).  
In fact, two participants explicitly utilized both emotion and reason when trying to find 
common ground, which could be used to create a model for how to reduce political polarization 
in future studies. For example, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) placed equal importance on 
reason and emotions, stating:  
   Common ground can be found through facts that then... mixed with emotions, mixed 
with those feelings, and then wanting to do more with that...[If] I'm presented with an 
argument that then makes sense, and even if it is emotional, I know that I will consider 




coming from. This is what this is.” She went on to say, “In order for us to really help each 
other, there has to be that reason to, it has to be that emotional connection…. Once 
people brought emotions in with the facts and then that's—I felt like I became way more 
empathetic....And with that, I feel like I learned so much more. 
 
Likewise, Paul (liberal Democrat) evolved in his thinking during the interview, reflecting-in-
action that changing minds should be approached from a logical angle, but that emotions could 
also impact shifts, even though he “would want to think that it would be the logical ones that 
work.” Finally, consistent with the findings of an earlier study (Fridkin & Gershon, 2020), 
certain negative emotions should be avoided when trying to find common ground, particularly 
anger, which only increased emotional polarization. Combining Emma and Paul’s approach with 
transformational listening (Welch, Marsick, & Holt, 2018) may help to increase the likelihood of 
finding political common ground since it requires people to be able to listen to opposing views 
while simultaneously holding strong views themselves.  
Equality and individual freedom.   The final broad themes that emerged was comprised 
of equality and individual freedom. Results indicated that political common ground was not 
typically possible in regard to these core values, which are defined as beliefs on how things 
should or should not be (Westen, 2007). For instance, Jonathan (liberal Independent) shared that:  
   It takes a lot of emotional labor to try to discuss [rights for immigrants or rights for 
same-sex marriage] because, often, if I'm finding someone who doesn't agree...they may 
also...not see me as human or as a lesser human. So, with those, that takes a lot of 
personal restraint. 
 
Likewise, Samantha (liberal Independent) stated that: “I can be fairly reasonable as long as we're 
talking about something that isn't just someone's like right to exist.” Jenny (liberal Democrat) 
shared that “when it comes to racism, then I'm drawing a line.” When this topic comes up, she 
will address it, but she also mentioned that: 
   If I'm your friend, or if you're my friend, like you're going to be my friend, like even if 




and there was an emergency, I will come get you. It is just who I am. So, I feel like that's 
the best. You just have to prove their stereotypes wrong. 
 
Marc (conservative Libertarian) felt strongly about individual freedom, a core value that was 
very important to him. For example, he shared that he was forced to change his view on abortion, 
an issue he wasn’t previously against because: 
   The people who are in favor of late-term abortion also hate me and my life. And so I 
kind of, they kind of make me against them even though it's not, that was not natural to 
me. That was not my native thought. So, my political thoughts have shifted on abortion 
my political attitudes have shifted on immigration.  
 
Since individual freedom is his core value, he had to shift his political views to be more 
consistent with the conservative friends he was around, which aligns with Lyons (2017) theory 
regarding reinforcing environmental influence. That is, since Marc grew up in a conservative 
environment and still lives in a conservative region, his political views have aligned with the 
influences that he is surrounded by. Conversely, he went on to share that he is in favor of 
legalizing drugs, which is “very inconsistent with the kind of conservative crowd that I find 
myself stuck with.” But he didn’t change his views on the issue of legalization of drugs because 
he feels more strongly about it than abortion, having had first-hand experience working in law 
enforcement and rehabilitation. Since this political view is lower risk in terms of conservative 
attitudes, it is likely easier for him to be out of alignment with his social and environmental 
influences.  
Research question 3c. How rewarding or challenging is it to make these shifts? As 
reported in Chapter IV, results showed that change, reason, and emotion emerged as themes for 
associated barriers when shifting one’s political attitudes, while learning and action emerged as 




Shifting one’s attitudes requires change—and change can be hard, frustrating, and 
challenging. Some participants shared barriers that were related to their perception of reason.  
For example, Betty (moderate Independent) shared that it is:  
hard when you realize you have changed views that you have held for a long time. [She 
realized that she has way more Republican elephants than she has Democrat donkeys.] 
It's not that it's bad or good. It's just, it just feels weird.... but so that's what makes it 
uncomfortable. It's kinda like, whoa. I’ve just kind of changed stuff that you know was 
kind of embedded. 
 
This example also included emotion, as Betty (moderate Independent) was reflecting on how her 
shift made her feel strange and uneasy. Likewise, Julia (moderate Independent) stated that “You 
may have a belief for just about your entire life and then you realize that it's no longer viable.” 
Similarly, Emma (liberal Democrat Socialist) shared that:  
   It took a lot of me having to say to myself, you're wrong... think of it from a different 
perspective, a lot of self-reflection. And it was hard...Shifting views takes a lot of 
unlearning...the implicit biases...but then it was also replacing it with something that was 
rewarding and something that I do truly believe in.   
 
Others argued that conservatives and liberals are receiving their information from different 
worlds, which was frustrating. For example, Paul (liberal Democrat) stated that: 
   We have different sources of information that make us comfortable, and it's just 
stunning to me how the same reality is reflected differently depending on which, you 
know, sources you're getting your information from. Even if it used to be that we had 
some, at least some common starting places, and then from there, we could disagree, but 
we're not starting from the same place. 
 
Likewise, Justin (liberal Democrat) shared that “our reasoning is completely different. We come 
to the conclusion from a completely different angle…each party just feels they are right and 
there is not really a discussion at all.” Samantha (liberal Independent) stated that “It’s hard to 
have a debate when we don’t even have the same information. It’s not even just like different 
perceptions of information.” Betty (moderate Independent) and Ava (liberal Democrat) both 




evidence. Moreover, Jenny (liberal Democrat) shared that “It’s difficult when people are 
stubborn and won't see reason or facts.” Others cited barriers to change as related to emotion. For 
example, Marc (conservative Libertarian) expressed that:  
   If I get somebody that starts screaming that…firearms…kill people. And that there’s no 
reason for people to have guns…I just walk away because if somebody is not going to be 
rational or somebody’s not willing to hear the other viewpoint, then there’s no use in me 
talking to them.  
 
As Justin (liberal Democrat) stated, “common ground becomes very difficult with a lot more 
emotions involved. There is pre-determined antagonism between the parties.” Others expressed 
concern with tone as well. For example, Paul (liberal Democrat) shared that he has been 
“troubled by the tone of conversation and sometimes the inability to have a conversation and the 
way that social media has amplified that.” Similarly, Jonathan (liberal Independent) said that if 
others are “hostile, he tends to withdraw from the conversation.” Julia (moderate Independent) 
shared that she didn’t understand why people don’t care about what other people are going 
through, and so must remind herself to calm down and ask, “What is it that we may have in 
common?” Others shared more charged emotions, including from Harper (liberal Democratic 
Socialist), who stated that she:  
used to try to be more diplomatic when discussing political perspectives, but that has 
changed. It's important to call people out when what they are saying is untrue. And of 
course, this always gets heated because people don't like being told their wrong, but 
unfortunately there's no good way to do it. There are studies that show that confronting 
someone with new information doesn't change their mind. But she feels that she has to do 
what is morally right so that she knows that she has done everything that she can. If 
you're so entrenched in your own beliefs that you can't allow any criticism of those 
beliefs, I can't do anything about that. 
 
Additionally, Ava (liberal Democrat) shared how COVID-19 and wearing masks had been 




displaying hateful signs in their yards, such as “Black Lives is a Terrorist Organization” and 
“Touch my Trump sign and I’ll kill you.” She was worried about her children’s safety, stating:  
   What if my kid is just riding his bike and he fell...in your yard exterior slightly....When 
are you going to misread a situation and you've got this Black kid that fell in your yard? 
It’s scary. 
 
Rewards to political change through learning and action.  Shifting one’s attitudes can 
also be rewarding, and participants in the present study discussed how they had learned from 
their shifts, which inspired increased political participation for some. For example, Emma 
(liberal Democratic Socialist) shared that:  
   I just feel so much more competent, and I just feel so much more empathetic and just 
loving towards everyone, including myself. And so, I feel like there's been so much that 
I've learned. And it's something that I'm so grateful for every single day. It's something 
that I want to practice in everything. 
 
Likewise, Justin (liberal Democrat) described how changing his view was rewarding because it 
forced him to think, “because I am curious. I do like learning why you came to your conclusion. 
I tend to probe a bit here and there.” While Marc (conservative Libertarian) was rewarded 
because he built “a consistent life view,” going on to say:  
   If you build what you think, and even though this piece doesn't look like it's going to 
fit, if you frame it right, it does. Again, that thing when I, when I decided that what I 
really am against is, I am against government overreach in personal, in individuals lives. 
 
Others discussed how changing their political views was rewarding because it increased their 
political participation in terms of persuasion. For example, Paul (liberal Democrat) shared that:  
   When you can have a personal conversation about an issue and... change a voter’s mind 
that's to me rewarding. And when it's, when it's someone that I know, I'm having the 
conversation because I have some sort of relationship with them, and I value that, and I 
want to continue to value that. 
 
And Samantha (liberal Independent) stated that she thinks she is a “better person now” due to her 




Strategies and approaches towards political common ground.   Importantly, a 
significant new finding emerged as it related to finding political common ground. Qualitative 
analysis revealed that regardless of political ideology, many participants were open to finding 
common ground through conversations inclusive of personal stories about lived experiences to 
build bonds and human connections between politically disparate outgroups. Moreover, 
participants emphasized the importance of openness and respect with those who were perceived 
as politically different. Thus, if political ideology is malleable (Lassetter & Neel, 2019) and we 
continue to be influenced by the models and sources we are surrounded by (Lyons, 2017) across 
the lifespan, then shifting political ideologies are indeed possible, but only if we are open to it. If 
political ideology is not as stable as once believed, then there is still room to reduce polarization 
and find common ground even though liberals, moderates, and conservatives view the world 
through very different cognitive frames (Lakoff, 2008) and may hold different values as it relates 
to equality and individual freedom. Through the balance of emotion and reason (Westen, 2007), 
we can share emotional personal stories about our experiences, but we must avoid pushing back 
with anger. Instead, we need to listen to each other through openness and civility. Contrary to 
previous studies that have found that conservatives are resistant to change (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost 
et al., 2003b), some conservatives and former Republicans in the present study were motivated to 
change not only their attitudes on specific political issues, but also their political ideologies. 
Moreover, one liberal participant and one moderate participant shifted to the right. However, it is 
important to note that there were no “very conservative” participants in the study, thus the 
conservatives in the study may have been more open to change than people who are more 





Potential approaches towards finding political common ground are summarized below, 
which includes aspects of listening, sharing personal stories and personal lived experiences, and 
recognizing that although we have different approaches towards political progress, we can 
discuss our differences with respect and civility. For example, Julia (moderate Independent) 
admitted that while: 
   I don't expect to change your opinion. It's pretty hard....I like to say, okay, here's my 
viewpoint, and this is how I—why I feel like that. I'll give personal examples, like Covid. 
People are saying, well, it's no big deal. Well, I come back, and I'll say, well, it's a big 
deal in certain people's lives. For example, my sister has had Covid. She has neurological 
issues now. Her husband was in the hospital for four weeks…. Bonding, I think is very 
important when you're trying to change somebody's mind. 
 
Likewise, Jonathan (liberal Independent) acknowledged that when he attempts to find common 
ground, he first tries to determine what they agree on. He does this to make sure there is some 
shared understanding and then determines what they “disagree on and why, and at the very least, 
we both walk away having learned something about what another person might believe.” Ava 
(liberal Democrat) believed that “one way to find common ground [was] to get down to a moral 
basis for your argument.” Shawna (conservative Republican) stated that she didn’t want to force 
her opinion on others but wanted to be sure they had the right information to make their opinion. 
Likewise, Daniel (liberal/Leans Libertarian) shared that although he didn’t think he should 
change people's minds, he was interested in what others thought and in turn shared what he 
thought, affirming:  
   If we agree on things, that's great....But I don't feel like I should be changing people's 
minds, and I should be listening to them. And I should be open, but I think...you make up 
your own mind, based on your own conscience in your own life, and people will affect it. 
 
Marc (conservative Libertarian) shared that “You cannot model a behavior that is not in line with 
what you're saying and expect people to take either one of those two things seriously.” Others 




ask, “Why is it this way, why do you think this?” And Julia (moderate Independent) explained 
that she tried to be more personal and less emotional. She listens even when she disagrees, but 
will ask, "Have you ever considered it this way?" Betty (moderate Independent) explained that 
we should approach political discourse with respect and shared that she received a compliment 
from a friend through social media about how she had framed her political posts with civility. 
And Paul (liberal Democrat) described how he and one of his conservative friends are a good 
check on each other via social media. His friend will ask him, “Does this post really move us 
forward in any way?” Paul described how “it takes personal conversation or some sort of 
personal communication in a way that isn’t typed in all caps…or lectured or corrected.” He also 
noted that you can’t just tell somebody they are wrong, and you are right. Justin (liberal 
Democrat) discussed how he moved his mom left on the issue of welfare explaining how she 
ultimately learned because “I am her son, and she knows I'm a good person and I don't do this 
without reason and—she learns because ultimately it's compassionate and it's right.” And finally, 
Samantha (liberal Independent) stated that:  
   I think fundamentally, just there are…core tenants that we both have to agree upon of 
like, we want this country to be better and it is okay to challenge what's happening and 
that we want people to be able to…pursue this American dream. So, I think a lot of it has 
to do with how it’s approached. I think that's sort of the core for me is knowing people's 
intentions. Like, do they really want to understand?... My dad and I... disagree on a lot of 
things, but I think I can understand sort of where he's coming from and we have sort of 
the same goal in mind. He just has a very different belief of how we get there. 
 
In sum, the potential reduction of all three types of political polarization seems to be through 
personal conversations, stories, openness, respect, civility, and patience with those who we 
perceive as politically different than ourselves. Once bonds are formed, it is easier for political 




Of course, these are all idealistic approaches. As Samantha (liberal Independent) stated, it 
is not always possible to remain civil and respectful, stating, “how can you be civil with someone 
who you feel…is threatening…your entire lifestyle?” In response to conversations about policing 
and Black Lives Matter, she went on to share how she used to believe that people should remain 
rationale during political conversations but understands now that “you can't expect people who 
are…hurting and threatened to be playing with kid gloves.” She explained how her mom was 
against the racial justice protests, the rioting, and looting, so she asked her mom, “what is the 
right way” because her mom had also opposed peaceful protests and marches as well as Colin 
Kaepernick, “and so it sort of led to the path of like it really isn’t the protests you were upset 
about; it really is the underlying message.” Thus, Samantha argued that “it’s unfortunate, but 
[some] people don’t listen until it comes to that.”   
Research Question 4 – Shifting Political Attitudes and Learning 
 
The final research question of the study asked about how shifts in political attitudes were 
associated with new learning and to explore the role of potential learning.  
Research question 4a.   In what ways can these shifts in political attitudes be understood 
through Bandura’s (1986) four modes of observational learning, including attention, retention, 
reproduction, and motivation? As reported in Chapter IV, results showed that the following 
themes emerged for observational learning, listed below. The findings below offer new insights 
to the field as the researcher was unable to find other studies that investigated the role of shifting 
political attitudes as framed through the model of observational learning (Bandura, 1986).  
Attention and retention: reason and emotion.   Attention refers to the images, 
metaphors, and practices that resonate from the observation of a model that may support the 




and practices from the observation of a model that may support the formation or shifts in 
political views. When framing shifting political attitudes into these two subprocesses, both 
reason and emotion emerged as key themes. Some participants were drawn in and later retained 
political information through facts and numbers, while others were drawn in and later retained 
political information through emotional stories. Others expressed how they applied both reason 
and emotion, while others mentioned only one or the other. However, reason can lead to political 
decisions and actions that are influenced through misinformation and emotion can distort one’s 
ability to understand the facts.  
Reproduction and motivation: action and values.   Reproduction refers to sharing what 
has been paid attention to and retained with others through the symbolic representations from the 
observation of a model that may support the formation or shifts of political views. When framing 
shifting political attitudes into this subprocess, action emerged as a key theme. Particularly, 
action referred to putting into practice what was learned from the attention and retention stages. 
As covered earlier, participants tended to move into political action at this stage, becoming more 
engaged in political activities. Motivation refers to learning through reinforcement that is either 
rewarding or challenging. This then translated observational learning into action that could 
support the formation or shifts of political views. When framing shifting political attitudes into 
this subprocess, both action and values emerged as key themes, helping to understand what 
prompted reproduction in the previous stage of the model. Interestingly, in nearly all cases, 
someone’s stated motivation to learn about their shifting political views was closely associated 
with their core values. Values were determined namely through the eighth question of the IP (see 
Appendix B), which asked about what it took mentally and emotionally to find political common 




included equality (e.g., equal rights, human rights) and individual freedom (e.g., government 
shouldn’t be in personal lives); emotion (e.g., compassion, empathy) and reason (e.g., logic and 
facts), openness (e.g., cognitive flexibility, listening to various viewpoints, adaptability), 
morality, and patriotism. Core values are harder to change and may never change. In the context 
of political ideology, core values may also distort or influence our political actions. Through 
collective agency and personal or collective political efficacy, American voters may be able to 
get to a point of at least understanding each other, even if they will never agree on core values. 
This ability to listen is critical for a functioning democracy. 
Thinking back to Bandura’s (1976) concepts of self-efficacy (a person’s perception of 
how competent they will be in a particular environment) and agency (a person’s ability to control 
their own behavior by envisioning possible outcomes), these findings shed light on how 
participants in the sample learned through motivation and were possibly more open to listening 
to those who were considered to be political outgroups. The notion of envisioning outcomes can 
be tied to collective agency, which is defined as the interdependent efforts between self and 
others. Through collective agency, American voters—together in a democracy, can be thought of 
as active participants of their experiences, rather than just the result of their experiences. This is 
because through political activities, we can collectively engage with one another in order to 
impact change. Self-efficacy and agency are cognitive and determinative processes, which means 
that one must be intentional, have forethought, be self-reactive, and self-reflective. Motivation to 
learn about shifting political attitudes revealed that participants had to be intentional by 
deliberately choosing to participate in political activities, such as voting, engaging in political 
discussions, and even speaking to the primary researcher of the present study. Next, participants 




For instance, if one can imagine that democracy could improve, they are more likely going to be 
engaged in various political activities than those who do not believe democracy can improve. 
Then participants had to exhibit the ability to control or regulate their own behavior, which in the 
present study was tied to core values, such as equality or individual freedom. And finally, 
participants were required to have the capacity for self-reflection, which is closely tied to self-
efficacy and agency because it impacts whether someone will think positively or negatively. 
Participants who felt more negatively (e.g., angry, afraid, frustrated) about perceived political 
outgroups may have had lower collective agency than those who felt more positively (e.g., 
hopeful, enthusiastic, proud) about perceived political outgroups. Thus, lower collective agency 
may lead to increased polarization due to negative emotional perceptions. Taken together, self-
efficacy and collective agency leads people to decide how much effort to put into political 
activities, how long to keep trying when challenges arise, and whether to view political 
disappointments as rewarding or challenging. In essence, believing in a political cause, idea, or 
candidate may lead to the feeling or perception of belonging to a particular group, such as the 
Democratic Party or the Republican Party or identifying with liberal or conservative platforms.  
Research question 4b.   In what ways can these shifts in political attitudes be understood 
through Boud, Keough, and Walker’s (1985) model of experiential learning, including returning 
to and replaying the experience, attending to feelings provoked by the experience, and 
reevaluating the experience? As reported in Chapter IV, results showed that the following themes 
emerged for experiential learning, noted below. The findings below offer new insights as the 
researcher was unable to find other studies that investigated the role of shifting political attitudes 




Return to experience.  Return to experience refers to cognitive recollection and replay of 
an event through reflection or by talking through an experience with others, which may support 
shifts in political views. When framing shifting political attitudes into this first stage of the 
model, the following themes emerged: remembering, noticing feelings, and observing new 
thinking. As noted in the results section, participants generally shared one of two experiences: 
personal (traumatic experience) or general (a political issue they changed their mind on).  
Attending to emotions.   Attending to emotions refers to cognitive attention and replay of 
an event to utilize positive emotions and remove negative emotions, which may support shifts in 
political views. When framing shifting political attitudes into this stage of the model, the 
following themes emerged: reflection on feelings.  
Reevaluation of experience.   Reevaluation refers to the re-examination of an event 
through the incorporation of new learning gained through association, integration, validation, and 
appropriation, which may support shifts in political views. When framing shifting political 
attitudes into this stage of the model, the following themes emerged: motivation to action and 
learning. Like the observational learning subprocess of motivation to learn, the experiential stage 
of reevaluating an experience also led people to take political action or experience attitudinal 
change through reinforcement that was rewarding or challenging. This then translated reflection 
on the past experience into action that could support the formation or shifts of political views. 
For example, looking back at Marc’s (conservative Libertarian) reflection on his own past 





• Association (relating new data to old data): Marc remembered, noticed, and observed 
his new thinking regarding his upbringing in a Southern state and how the KKK was 
not considered to be a bad thing—it was actually a positive influence.  
• Integration (finding associations among the data): He later remembered, noticed, and 
reflected on his new thinking. Marc explained that he left his home state for college 
and lived in two different states. The next time he was back in his home state and was 
confronted with KKK graffiti again, he realized that it made him angry, something 
that he had not felt when he was younger.  
• Validation (examining authenticity of new insights): Next, through validation, Marc 
described how he arrived at this change in his thinking. He described that it was 
through his experiences working with others that were different than him, where 
people did not see color, did not care where you were from, and did not care about 
how you talked. Instead, it was about working together and helping each other to be 
successful in their jobs at a prison.  
• Appropriation (internalizing new knowledge as one’s own): And lastly, Marc made 
this new knowledge his own by recognizing that the system he grew up in was 
abhorrent and that he could never live in a place like that again. He was thus 
motivated to action by not returning to his home state and learned that he no longer 
held the racist beliefs that he had as a child.  
 
As Boud et al. (2013) posited, once an individual has completed these four steps of the 
reevaluation stage, they should experience some degree of change and that through this reflection 
they should be ready for new experiences with new behaviors, better understandings of an idea, 




Summary of Qualitative Discussion 
 
Several new contributions to the field of adult learning, political science, political 
psychology, and other related fields emerged through the qualitative study. First, it seems that 
political ideology is less stable than once believed and can be malleable across the lifespan 
among those who are already open to change depending on early role models and their 
reinforcing or challenging models and sources later in life. Although liberals were more open to 
change, conservatives and former Republicans were too, which is contrary to prevailing 
assumptions. Moreover, the labels of conservatism and liberalism were not consistent, that is, 
individual meanings of political ideology varied across participants and what really mattered was 
shared values. The present study also shed light on the importance of paying more attention to 
the political middle, including moderates and Independents. In sum, people are strongly 
influenced by their role models, particularly their family—and when personal values don’t align 
with these role models, people tend to move to the right or the left, especially when they find 
new role models that are better aligned with their values. In the current sample, media wasn’t as 
big of an influence as was expected on attitudinal change, instead social interactions with others 
seemed to carry much more weight. Notably, the ability to find political common ground 
depended on several key strategies, including having conversations that were inclusive of 
personal stories about lived experiences, listening to each other, finding common bonds (political 
or non-political), and being open, respectful, and civil without anger. Despite political 
polarization, most liberals, moderates, and conservatives in the sample were open to trying to 






This mixed-methods study was an exploration of the underpinnings of American political 
polarization (e.g., ideological consistency, emotional polarization, and resistance to new 
information and attitudinal change) to understand how and why political attitudes change as 
framed by the adult learning lenses of observational learning (Bandura, 1986) and experiential 
learning (Boud, Keough, & Walker, 1985). Other adult learning models would also be useful to 
help explain new learning obtained from shifting political views, such as informal and incidental 
learning (Marsick & Watkins, 1990) as well as transformational learning (Mezirow, 2000). To 
reiterate the study’s conceptual framework, it was expected that people would learn about 
political ideas and attitudes through the observation of others; that people would cognitively 
perceive alignment or opposition with partisan ingroups and outgroups; that people would 
cognitively reflect on their political attitudes and emotions through experiential learning 
processes; and that people would potentially change their political attitudes and political 
participation based on new insights obtained as a result of their learning processes. It was also 
expected that political orientation and political efficacy would be important factors to consider 
when evaluating the process of this model. 
Quantitative analysis from a nationwide survey (n = 1,313) conducted through Facebook 
advertising revealed that 1) political orientation was significantly associated with a variety of 
current and shifting political attitudes and perceptions, social media interaction/news media 
usage, and factors of observational learning; and 2) personal political efficacy and collective 
political efficacy was significantly associated with increased political participation. More 
specifically, results showed that liberals were more likely than conservatives to be Democrats, 




political organizations, and engage in political persuasion. Liberals were also more likely than 
conservatives to support the need for equality and diverse representation in government for racial 
minorities, women, and LGBTQ communities. Moreover, liberals were more likely to have 
shifted their views on multiple issues during the Trump presidency, with their biggest shifts on 
the poor relationship with Russia, the poor conditions for African Americans when dealing with 
police, poor immigration conditions, and poor governmental response to COVID-19. Liberals 
also thought Republicans had bad ideas and were angry, afraid, and frustrated with them. 
Liberals were more likely to interact with like-minded liberal Democratic friends on Facebook 
and were also more likely than conservatives to get their news through newspapers or magazines. 
Most importantly to the context of this study, liberals were more likely than conservatives to 
engage in aspects of observational learning, including attention, retention, reproduction, and 
motivation. Conservatives, on the other hand, were more likely to be Republicans than liberals, 
were more likely to vote for Republican presidential candidates, to have shifted their views to be 
more favorable of President Trump and to be less favorable of the American news media, to 
think Democrats have bad ideas and were angry, afraid, and frustrated with them, were more 
likely to interact with like-minded conservative Republican or Libertarian friends on Facebook, 
and to get their news through local TV, cable, and talk radio. And finally, the more personally 
and collectively politically efficacious someone was, the more likely they were to participate in 
political activities, such as voting.  
Qualitative results further explored how shifting political attitudes were informed by 
learning with a subset of participants, which showed that role models, whether positive or 
negative, particularly family members and friends, were influential in forming and shifting 




Results also showed that there were particular strategies and approaches that could be utilized to 
find common ground among partisan ingroups and outgroups, such as through truly listening and 
finding something to bond on whether political or non-political. The biggest insight that emerged 
from qualitative analysis regarded the importance of finding shared values through role models, 
which participants uncovered through personal stories, reflection on their own experiences, and 
observation of others. With shared values, even when political ideologies differed, common 
ground was made possible. And finally, more nuanced understandings of shifting political views 
arose through models of learning, such as observational learning and experiential learning, 
among other concepts, such as informal and incidental learning, transformational learning, and 
sociocultural learning. This study is important because it may help provide educators, 
policymakers, and the polarized electorate to find new ways to unite through shared values.  
Conclusions 
The following conclusions should be considered in light of the skewed samples across 
both the quantitative and qualitative studies as reviewed above, which greatly limits the 
generalizability of the findings. Selection bias also somewhat geared the primary researcher 
towards finding respondents who were already open to change. However, among those who 
participated in the present study through the survey and those who were ultimately selected to 
participate in the semi-structured interviews, the following conclusions surfaced. Future studies 
should obtain a more representative sample to determine if the same conclusions are still 
supported. 
Conclusion 1 – The United States of America is Politically Polarized 
As the quantitative study revealed, the United States is deeply polarized across 




change. The study’s hostile Facebook comments are a clear indication of a strong political divide 
across the country, which are deeply ingrained and emotionally strong. The political polarization 
concept of ideological consistency was well supported among conservatives, as they grouped 
together to favor political issues such as the state of the economy, immigration conditions, 
US/Russia and US/China relationships, access to healthcare, conditions for African Americans 
when dealing with police, government response to COVID-19, and identification with attitudes 
of Trump. Interestingly, some of these positions were not previously conservative issues, like the 
favorability of the US/Russia relationship. This shift is a 180 degree turn and should be explored 
further as to why conservatives experienced such strong attitudinal change about Russia. 
Conservative support of the government response to COVID-19 may have reflected the fact that 
Trump was in office. Future studies should test whether conservatives remain in support of 
Biden’s response to the pandemic. Ideological consistency was also well supported among 
liberals, as they grouped together to favor political issues such as gun control, climate change, K-
12 public education, the importance of the American news media, the importance of equality for 
racial minorities, women, and LGBTQ, and the need for diversity among elected officials.  
In terms of political participation, the sample showed that liberals were more likely than 
conservatives to participate in political protests, rallies, donations to political organizations, and 
to engage in political persuasion. No differences by political orientation were found for voting 
frequency in local, state, or national election or for the likelihood of contacting Congress about a 
political issue. Comments from the survey indicated that Democrats thought that political 
participation was about listening and sharing, while Republicans thought that political 
participation was about civility and respect. These findings were supported in the qualitative 




liberals were more likely to vote for Democrats in the past three presidential elections, while 
conservatives were more likely to vote for Republicans in the past three presidential elections. 
And those with higher personal and collective political efficacy were more likely to participate in 
the political process at large.  
In support of emotional polarization, conservatives believed that liberals and Democrats 
had bad ideas and were significantly more likely to feel angry, afraid, and frustrated with them. 
Likewise, liberals believed that conservatives and Republicans had bad ideas and were also 
significantly more likely to feel afraid, angry, and frustrated with them. On social media, both 
conservatives and liberals tended to engage with like-minded political friends.  
In support of the polarization of resistance to new information and attitudinal change, 
news usage also differed politically, with liberals more likely to get their news through 
newspapers or magazines, and conservatives more likely to get their news through local TV, 
cable, and talk radio. No differences were found between liberals and conservatives on obtaining 
information through news websites or social media. The qualitative sample also showed that 
liberals and conservatives consulted different news sources, which may further increase 
polarization among the two groups.  
Conclusion 2 – Liberals are More Likely than Conservatives to Shift their Political 
Attitudes  
As the quantitative study supported, liberals were more likely to have shifted their 
political views during the Trump presidency. To put this finding in context, conservatives only 
shifted their views on two issues by identifying more strongly with the attitudes of Trump and 
feeling more negative about the American news media over the course of the Trump presidency. 




presidency on the remaining issues included in the survey. For example, they were more 
concerned about the state of the US/Russia relationship, conditions for African Americans when 
dealing with police, immigration conditions, governmental response to COVID-19, the state of 
the economy, US/China relationship, access to healthcare, gun control, climate change, and K-12 
public education.  
The clearest divide among liberals and conservatives regarding shifting political attitudes 
emerged from the questions regarding the need for diverse representation in the government and 
the need for equality among racial minorities, women, and the LGBTQ community. Liberals 
were much more likely to have shifted on the importance of these issues during the Trump 
presidency, citing that it was even more important now than in the past for them. For liberals, 
this urgency was put into the context of the divisiveness of President Trump’s rhetoric about race 
and how that related to police brutality and the resultant George Floyd protests. Conversely, 
conservatives were more likely to approach this same issue as being about special privileges 
rather than as about equality, claiming that it was about merit not the color of your skin, and it 
was about the law—since the Constitution says we already have equal rights. As Marc stated, 
“[Obama reignited] racial tensions that had been pretty much put to sleep since the 1970s, and he 
brings all this stuff back up and creates all this division.” 
Conclusion 3 – Openness to Learning Helps to Explain Shifting Political Views 
Per the quantitative study results, liberals were much more likely to utilize the factors of 
observational learning when shifting their political views. Per the survey results, they were more 
likely to have noticed or paid attention to the views of family, friends, mentors, or teachers when 
considering a shift in their own political views. Likewise, they were more likely to have 




political views. Next, liberals were more likely to repeat or share their shifted perspectives with 
others. And finally, liberals were more likely to be motivated to learn about their personal shifts 
in attitudes than conservatives. Even so, openness to learning about changes in political attitudes 
were not limited to liberals. In fact, all of the participants in the interview shared an openness to 
learning, reflection, and sharing their stories of political change. However, it is important to 
reiterate that the interview sample was already more likely to be open since they had indicated 
that they had shifted their views during the Trump presidency in the survey sample.  
Conclusion 4 – Shifting Political Views Results in New Learning 
 Building on the quantitative study’s results, how people learned through observational 
learning subprocesses of attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation was greatly expanded. 
For example, people utilized both reason and emotion when paying attention and remembering 
their changing attitudes. Reason was explained through facts, numbers, and images, which 
helped people to remember what they noticed. Emotion was explained through stories that were 
tied to the human experience and personal reflection on one’s own experience. Both reason and 
emotion helped people to retain new learnings. Since emotion can distort our reason, it is 
recommended that future studies further explore positive and negative emotions as it relates to 
the formation and shifts of political attitudes. People were motivated to act on their new insights 
based on their core values through the symbolic representations of their observations or through 
their attention to emotions through reflection, which in the political sense led to increased 
political participation. And finally, people were motivated to learn from their actions through 
reflection on how their new insights either reinforced or challenged their core values, such as 




 Although the quantitative study did not include questions about experiential learning, 
through the qualitative study this learning model was explored to determine how people may 
have learned through the experiential learning stages of returning to an experience, attending to 
feelings provoked by the experience, and the reevaluation of the experience (Boud et al., 2013). 
Analysis indicated that when people returned to an experience, they remembered the details, 
noticed their feelings, and observed their new thinking. The types of experiences recounted to the 
primary researcher ranged from something that was impersonal to something that was traumatic. 
People that attended to their emotions began the reflection process by focusing on their positive 
feelings and resolving the negative feelings that were previously held. People that reached the 
reevaluation stage were motivated to act and to learn about their experiences, taking deliberate 
steps to change their perspectives through reflection. Both of these models, including 
observational learning and experiential learning seemed to be appropriate ways to unpack and 
understand these shifts in political attitudes.  
 However, since people’s core values may never change, it is important to also understand 
collective agency among American voters, which is a person’s ability to envision possible 
political outcomes through individual and collective efforts. Since American voters are active 
participants in a democracy, collective agency may help determine how and why someone will 
participate in political activities through intention, forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-
reflection. Since efficacy and agency may lead people to decide how much effort to put into 
political activities, it will be important for future studies to explore these concepts further as it 





Conclusion 5 – Shifting Political Attitudes are Influenced by Role Models and Sources 
through Shared Values 
Although the quantitative study did not go into depth regarding questions about role 
models, through the qualitative study these types of influences were explored more thoroughly to 
determine how shifting political attitudes may be associated with the interactions of people close 
to us. People are greatly influenced by their family members, particularly their parents, 
especially as it relates to the formation of political attitudes. Some people rejected their parent’s 
political ideologies at young ages, later reflecting that the change was due to a difference in core 
values. Others who shifted their ideologies later in life reflected back to their parent’s ideologies 
to find that there were similarities between their current shifts and their memories of their 
parent’s core values. Those who switched political ideologies, but still felt aligned with their 
parent’s core values rationalized that the labels of Democrat and Republican must be inaccurate 
for their parents or other role models. Thus, the importance of shared values, despite political 
labels, was the biggest insight found through this analysis. People were more likely to shift their 
political views when they had a role model that aligned with their values. One study found that 
“values exist within a motivational structure that often links values to support for particular 
policies, although the influence of values is often tempered by other considerations” (Albarracin 
& Shavitt, 2018, p. 304; Schwartz et al., 2012). Future research should focus on the importance 
of individual values in political decision making to help to understand the relationship to political 
orientation and ultimately political participation.  
The region of residence among participants also impacted people’s willingness to shift 
their views. Some people who were more liberal were living in conservative areas and vice 




provided influence through finding new perspectives. Religious leaders provided influence 
through compassion. In regard to media, the people in the sample tended to engage with media 
that perpetuated their existing opinions and aligned with their core values. Some liberals 
acknowledged bias in their news but felt that they could tell fact from fiction. Some 
conservatives acknowledged bias in the mainstream media and discussed how they went to 
alternative news sources. While others shared that they didn’t trust any media or would only 
listen to the news from other countries. Thus, the varying levels of trust and bias regarding the 
media requires further study. Moreover, future studies should continue the investigation on the 
different sources of political news that are consulted between liberals and conservatives.  
Conclusion 6 – We are Not as Polarized as We Think  
Although the first conclusion stated that the United States is polarized, which was 
supported through the quantitative analysis, the findings that emerged from the qualitative 
analysis presented a slightly different story. Again, it is important to repeat that the qualitative 
findings are not representative of the American voting population, but rather only representative 
of those who shifted their views during the Trump presidency. With that in mind, it was found 
that common ground could be obtained not by agreeing on a contentious issue, but by 
acknowledging that multiple sides of an argument could be valid instead of discounting one idea 
or another. It’s about how we approach the problem rather than how we solve the problem. For 
example, the concept of systems thinking states that:  
   To dissolve a conflict is to discover new frames of reference in which opposing 
tendencies are treated as complementary in a new ensemble with a new logic of its own. 
It requires reformulation or, more precisely, reconceptualizing of the variable involved. 
Finally, to dissolve a conflict is to redesign the system, which contains the conflict, in its 





Thus, both liberal ideas and conservative ideas—as well as moderate ideas are part of the 
political system with different perceptions of how to approach and engage with society. This 
means that partisans must agree to listen, but they do not have to agree to change. It’s about 
acknowledging another perspective without immediately discounting it. Westen (2007) assumed 
that the only way to change someone’s mind was to find where the areas of mixed feelings were 
since the brain automatically associates positive and negative images to political ideas largely 
outside of our awareness. In order to connect these networks in the brain, new connections and 
associations need to be formed. Thus, future studies should address how we can better educate 
American voters about the value of being open to learning new perspectives. And although our 
core values will always differ between our views of equality and individual freedom, there is a 
“tie that bonds.” For example: 
   Collectivity at the expense of individuality leads to totalitarianism and suffocation. 
Individualism at the expense of collectivity leads to chaos and social Darwinism. In the 
long run, the society and the individual either stand together or fall separately. A win/win 
relationship is achieved not through zero-sum or even compromise. For both of them to 
win requires reconceptualization of the nature and the relationship of the whole and the 
parts. You cannot build a great society with belittled people just as you cannot build a 
great people in a belittled society. The greatness of each is preconditioned by the other. 
An environment should be created in which each help itself by helping the other. 
(Gharajedaghi, 1999, p. 164) 
 
Perhaps John Kasich, former Republican Governor of Ohio summarized the concept of systems 
thinking best. In fact, he has repeatedly shared his desire to find common ground, especially in 
regard to gun laws stating:  
   I’ve seen a number of seemingly unsolvable questions resolved by men and women of 
good will who were committed to respectfully hearing both sides of the debate. They 
admitted their differences but focused instead on discovering those more narrow areas 
where both sides agreed. Narrow areas soon widened into common ground, and common 
ground became bridges that blossomed into workable and enduring solutions….Our 
present dilemma with guns calls for a similar approach. That means bringing together 
reasonable people on both sides of the issue—and those in between—to sit down and find 




means retaining our respect for Second Amendment rights while finding reasonable, 




This study was conducted in advance of one of the most contentious elections in U.S. 
history. Both candidates received more votes than ever previously recorded, with over 80 million 
votes for Joe Biden and 74 million votes for Donald Trump (Sullivan & Agiesta, 2020). This 
confirms that polarization is indeed thriving. Yet, the primary researcher was moved to learn 
more about what drove political polarization and was incredibly curious about finding ways to 
approach common ground. Although liberals were found through quantitative analysis to be 
more open to shifting their views and learning about their views—through qualitative analysis, it 
was determined that it is much more complex than that. Contrary to prevailing literature 
(Conover & Feldman, 1981; Sears & Funk, 1999), it became clear that political ideology was not 
as stable over time as prominently believed, and that ideological change was possible at least at 
the moment in time that the study was conducted. It would have been interesting if the primary 
researcher could have revisited the qualitative sample after the election to see if their attitudes 
had evolved over time after the anticipation of the 2020 U.S. presidential election had faded. As 
mentioned earlier, context always matters.  
In the present study, political change was partially explained by role models, both 
positive and negative and by individual values and shared values. These findings were eye 
opening for the primary researcher, and through reflection, she realized that she was not always 
as open as she thought she was. The experience of interviewing 16 people from across the United 
was incredibly rewarding and she learned that it is important to continually challenge her own 




life-changing in terms of learning for the primary researcher. They were enlightening as she 
learned from both those who she agreed with but also those she did not. However, it is important 
to reiterate that the interview sample was skewed, with nearly all participants holding bachelor’s 
degrees or graduate degrees, which is not representative of the American voter. Future studies 
should include a more representative sample.  
Revisiting this study’s limitations, the primary researcher took every effort to limit her 
own biases in regard to her own personal political ideology. As noted in Chapter I, at the time of 
this writing, she viewed herself as a liberal Democrat. To mitigate this potential bias, she 
conducted pilot studies to ensure the wording of the survey and interview questions were 
appropriate prior to data collection, she kept written notes about her initial perspectives after 
each interview and revised these notes after she reflected on her initial impressions. She shared 
her coding scheme for the interviews with a colleague prior to data analysis and iteratively 
reviewed her framework matrix as she discovered key themes. It was a valuable learning process 
as she revisited her own biases as it related to perceived differences among liberals and 
conservatives. One interesting insight is that she found that the participants who were more 
moderate or had moved more toward the middle seemed to be the ones that valued common 
ground the most, perhaps since they did not hold extreme political perspectives. This prompted 
her to reconsider her emphasis on the political extremes and to spend more time reflecting on the 
political middle. Since the present study utilized a 7-point political ideology scale from “very 
liberal” to “very conservative,” it may have lessened the focus on the middle and acted to 
dichotomize the extremes. In fact, most studies in the fields of political science, political 
psychology, and the social sciences tend to focus on extremism rather than the middle, where the 




Although the present study used a convenience sample, the primary researcher used the 
Facebook advertising feature that targeted people who were deemed by Facebook to be liberal, 
moderate, and conservative, as well as Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, and Independent. 
Looking back on this approach, she is grateful that she included moderates and Independents as 
part of the algorithm, because if she hadn’t, she may not have learned about this key insight. 
Future studies should expand the population beyond Facebook to include other social media 
sites, especially since younger voters do not use this platform as much as older voters. Moreover, 
future studies should expand the sample beyond social media in order to better match the voting 
population in the United States. As discussed earlier, both the quantitative sample and the 
qualitative sample was not representative of the U.S. electorate, with mostly White, highly 
educated, or older voters. Future studies should utilize a more representative sample that is 
racially diverse and includes those with less education as well as younger voters.  
Revisiting this study’s main assumptions, the primary researcher acknowledges that 
although there was support that the participants in the qualitative sample learned through the 
models of observational learning and experiential learning, future studies should try to replicate 
these findings. It was also assumed that liberals would be more prone to shifting their political 
views than conservatives, which was supported, however it is possible that future studies may 
find alternative viewpoints if the survey questions were different. That is, the survey only asked 
about specific issues and is not generalizable to other issues. For example, the survey did not ask 
about abortion or the selection of supreme court justices, which may have changed the outcome 
of the results. Another assumption was that shifting political views would be influenced by 
individual, social, and environmental factors—all of which was supported through the 




finally, the assumption that common ground can be found was too idealistic. There is no magic 
solution or easy fix, rather in order for society to progress, we must recognize our differences, 
validate each other’s existence, and work together through shared values to reach our political 
goals. This study only scratches the surface on how shifting political views may be associated 
with new learning as explored through observational learning and experiential learning models. 
Future studies should investigate how other models of adult learning may influence changes in 
political thinking. 
Recommendations 
Recommendations for Fields of Adult Education, Political Science, Social Psychology, and 
Related Fields 
 
Understandings from this study may help to provide adult educators, political scientists, 
social psychologists, policymakers, and others to find new strategies to build bridges among a 
deeply polarized electorate through the utilization of steps and approaches that were suggested as 
a result of the qualitative analysis. However, given the varying demographics, such as 
educational levels, ages, and even interest in political activities among the American electorate, a 
one-size-fits-all approach will not work when finding new ways to find political common 
ground. It is clear that political learning happens informally every day through our social 
interactions with role models, such as family, friends, teachers/mentors, or through the media. 
Future studies should focus on other adult learning models that may better explain how and why 
political attitudes evolve and shift. For example, as discussed earlier, observational learning and 
experiential learning are not the only learning models that could be utilized. Informal or 
incidental learning, transformational learning, or sociocultural learning models, among others, 
may also help to describe how American voters go about changing their political views. It is 




future research because shifting political attitudes and resultant learning must be addressed from 
an interdisciplinary perspective, as it impacts multiple fields beyond adult learning.  
The findings from the present study have uncovered new and interesting contributions to 
the scholarship of adult learning and political polarization—in terms of ideological consistency, 
emotional polarization, and resistance to new information and attitudinal change—utilizing 
Facebook as the site for data collection. Facebook and other social media platforms should be 
considered as an ongoing and important vehicle for future research inquiries. The present study 
opened the door for the use of Facebook as a useful site for data. This is important because most 
Americans use social media to obtain their political news and interact with friends as well as 
strangers about their political views. Hence, social media platforms are an ideal testing site for 
future research on political views or other attitudes. Even though Facebook may not be as 
relevant in the future as it is today, the space of social media will likely remain prevalent for 
many years to come. Regardless of the specific type of social media platform, future researchers 
should utilize advertising options through various social media sites to reach a wide swarth of 
participants across the United States that may not have previously been contacted through other 
traditional research approaches.  
Future studies should also strongly consider using a mixed-methods approach to ensure 
the overall richness of data as it relates to adult learning and political polarization. The 
quantitative portion of the present study helped to elicit political attitudes related to cognition 
(e.g., reason), while the qualitative portion of the study helped to elicit political attitudes related 
to personal reflections (e.g., emotion). It is also optimal that surveys include short-answer 




could be coded through qualitative analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in 
the present study were extremely beneficial and necessary in regard to the overall findings.  
The present study also provided a unique contribution through the methodological 
approach that was used. For example, participants that participated in the second phase of the 
study through the qualitative sample were first found through the first phase of the study through 
the quantitative survey. Only those who indicated they had shifted their views during the Trump 
presidency in the nationwide survey were potentially asked to participate in the qualitative 
interview. Future research should also consider this distinctive approach when targeting specific 
populations while recognizing and mitigating the potential for selection bias. For example, one 
way the present study could have addressed this bias would have been to interview both those 
who changed their views and those who did not. Alternatively, the primary researcher could have 
statistically compared the survey data from the interview participants who had been open to 
attitudinal change to the survey data from participants that had resisted attitudinal change.  
Another unique contribution through the present study’s methodological approach was 
the application of the Framework Method (Ritchie et al., 2013) for qualitative analysis. Not 
many studies have utilized this method to present knowledge within the realm of adult learning. 
There are illustrative articles in the health research area that have adopted the Framework 
Method, but there are not many, and it is recommended that other fields, including adult 
learning, adopt this methodology as a useful contribution to qualitative analysis. Given its 
intuitiveness and logical step-by-step structure, it is highly suggested for future studies on adult 
learning and political attitudes through transcription, interview familiarization, coding, 
developing a working analytical framework, applying the analytical framework application, 




particular, the framework matrix chart provides a simple and easy way to look across the data to 
see potential differences and commonalities more clearly. Future articles should consider 
undertaking this framework due to its ease of use that enables a systematic approach for 
categorizing and sorting common patterns among interview data clustered around themes.   
All learning derives from experience regardless of what learning model is used to frame 
the experience. Future research should explore the creation of new measures based on what’s 
missing from political efficacy scales and its related concept of collective agency, as well as the 
lack of emotion scales in the experiential learning literature. Emotions and reason are strongly 
related to the formation and shifts of political views, which emerged as key themes through the 
attention and retention subprocesses of observational learning, the return to the emotions 
provoked by reflection stage of experiential learning, barriers and rewards from shifting political 
views, and cognitive partisan alignment and opposition.  
Given the emergent themes that were uncovered through qualitative analysis, it is 
believed that it would also be beneficial to create a workshop on political polarization and 
common ground for American voters that uses the tensions around openness, reason, emotion, 
and core values to explore how and why political attitudes are formed and change. Through the 
sharing of personal stories and lived experiences that impact political views, participants would 
be provided with new toolkits towards finding political common ground through reflection and 
bonding. It would be extremely important to keep self-efficacy and collective agency (Bandura, 
1976), as well as developmental levels and ways of knowing (Drago-Severson, 2008; Kegan, 
1982) in mind, since people will be at different stages in their capacity for reflection on their 




perceived political outgroups while still holding their own and potentially incompatible core 
values.  
Transformational listening, which is derived from transformational learning (Mezirow, 
2000), is described as the intentional listening of different perspectives that are outside of one’s 
own point of view through empathy and human connection (Welch, Marsick, & Holt, 2018). It 
would be powerful to interweave transformational listening protocols into the workshop on 
political polarization and common ground to help individuals truly listen to political attitudes 
outside of their own worldview. Participants would be taught how to utilize reason and emotion 
towards finding political common ground without changing their core values.  
Recommendations for Policy and Practice  
It has been widely assumed that political orientation is stagnant, fixed, and unmalleable. 
But in recent years, this assumption has been challenged. Conservatives, labeled as resistant to 
change, may still change their minds, perhaps through the strategies and approaches as 
summarized from the qualitative interviews. Liberals, who are labeled as open to change, might 
be resistant to change. However, given the small number of interview participants in the present 
study, it is recommended that future research increase the number of participants to ensure a 
more representative sample of the American voter.  
Given the present study's findings, it is recommended that lawmakers and politicians 
consider expanding beyond their base as traditionally prescribed and rather focus more on 
finding and highlighting shared values. Although the core values of equality and individual 
freedom seem less likely to bend, there are other ways to engage individual political policies 
through a systems thinking approach. Common ground can even be found on the extremely 




solution approach. As one participant shared, she believed in providing economic support, jobs, 
and childcare to women and their families. She believed that even though people who are pro-life 
would never agree with people who are pro-choice, there were ways to work together by helping 
women to have more economic opportunities to “save more babies,” in her words. And while 
those who are pro-choice would likely never agree that fetuses are babies, they would likely 
support more economic opportunities for women as long as they could still make their own 
choices regarding their own bodies. Even though liberals and conservatives have different 
perceptions of how to engage with democracy on a host of political issues, aspects of common 
ground can indeed be obtained not by agreeing on a contentious issue but by acknowledging that 
multiple sides of an argument may be valid. It’s about how we approach the problem rather than 
how we solve the problem.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Future studies should continue to reach out to American voters nationally to ensure 
representation across all four regions of the country through a mixed-method design. 
Additionally, future studies should seek better representation regarding race and ethnicity, age, 
and education, since the current study was mostly White, older, and highly educated. Therefore, 
it will be important to determine if more diverse, younger, or less educated individuals are also 
open to changing their political views and learning from their shifts. Likewise, future studies 
should obtain a more balanced sample in terms of political ideology since both the quantitative 
and qualitative samples included mostly liberal Democrats. This means that the voices of 
conservative Republicans were not as well represented, although conservative Libertarians were 
overrepresented in the quantitative sample. Since the present study only interviewed those who 




those who do not change their political attitudes to gain more insights into why some people are 
open to attitudinal change and others are not. Rich data could also be discovered through 
longitudinal research to learn more about how role models and sources, as well as the region of 
residence, may impact changing political perspectives. Future studies should also go beyond 
Facebook and utilize other social media platforms to reach a broader audience to determine how 
social media may impact changing political attitudes. Since social media platforms may come 
and go, it is important to understand how people interact and engage with these platforms rather 
than which platform they are using.  
Implications for future research are vast. For example, if shifting political attitudes are 
indeed influenced by both positive and negative role models, events, and sources—then future 
research should focus more on the day-to-day activities among voters to find out what other 
influences may be impacting shifting political views. It is clear that we are influenced by the 
people we spend the most time with, but we are also influenced by the location we live and the 
core values we hold. Future research should address what the role of learning is as it relates to 
open and closed political perspectives, reason and emotion, and fundamental core values, such as 
equality and individual freedom. Moreover, future research should address the more nuanced 
approaches to political attitudes so that moderates are not ignored—the country may seem 
polarized along ideological lines, but there are opportunities for alignment on some issues. 
Future studies should focus on how certain values align with political labels. Some of the 
participants felt that their loved ones who were different political parties or orientations than 
themselves were actually more like them in terms of values. Thus, if labels are removed or 
modified, people may be able to see other perspectives more clearly without being automatically 




among other factors, political polarization may be better understood so that facets of common 
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Q_1 Thank you for participating in this study on "Shifting Political Attitudes and Observational 
Learning: An Examination of American Political Polarization in the Age of Social Media." 
Please look over the procedures and terms of consent before proceeding, linked here: Consent 
Form.  
 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to answer multiple-choice and short-answer 
questions about your political attitudes and perspectives related to a variety of issues. The survey 
will take approximately 30 minutes of your time to complete. You can choose to list your email 
address to be contacted for a potential follow-up interview. You are not required to provide your 
name or any other personally identifiable data to participate.   
  
By checking the "Yes, I agree" box below, you agree to participate in this study.    
• Yes, I agree.  (1)  
• No, I do not agree.  (2)  
 
Q_2 You must also confirm you are 18 years or older and agree to allow written materials 
viewed at an educational setting or at a conference outside of Teachers College, Columbia 
University to participate in this study. To confirm, please check the "Yes, I confirm" box below 
and click next to participate in this study. 
• Yes, I confirm.  (1)  
• No, I do not confirm.  (2)  
 
Q_3 When it comes to politics in general, do you think of yourself as:  
• Very Liberal  (1)  
• Liberal  (2)  
• Slightly Liberal  (3)  
• Moderate / Middle of the Road  (4)  
• Slightly Conservative  (5)  
• Conservative  (6)  
• Very Conservative  (7)  
• Other / Not sure  (8)  
 
Q_4 Would you say conservatives have:  
• Almost no good ideas  (1)  
• A few good ideas  (2)  
• Some good ideas  (3)  
• A lot of good ideas  (4)  





Q_5 Would you say liberals have:  
• Almost no good ideas  (1)  
• A few good ideas  (2)  
• Some good ideas  (3)  
• A lot of good ideas  (4)  
• Other / Not sure  (5)  
 
Q_6 Would you say the Republican Party has:  
• Almost no good ideas  (1)  
• A few good ideas  (2)  
• Some good ideas  (3)  
• A lot of good ideas  (4)  
• Other / Not sure  (5)  
 
Q_7 Would you say the Democratic Party has:  
• Almost no good ideas  (1)  
• A few good ideas  (2)  
• Some good ideas  (3)  
• A lot of good ideas  (4)  
• Other / Not sure  (5)  
 
Q_8 When it comes to political views on economic issues, do you think of yourself as:  
• Very Liberal  (1)  
• Liberal  (2)  
• Slightly Liberal  (3)  
• Moderate / Middle of the Road  (4)  
• Slightly Conservative  (5)  
• Conservative  (6)  
• Very Conservative  (7)  
• Other / Not sure  (8)  
 
Q_9 When it comes to political views on social issues, do you think of yourself as:  
• Very Liberal  (1)  
• Liberal  (2)  
• Slightly Liberal  (3)  
• Moderate / Middle of the Road  (4)  
• Slightly Conservative  (5)  
• Conservative  (6)  
• Very Conservative  (7)  









Q_10 When it comes to your political party, do you think of yourself as:  
• Democrat  (1)  
• Republican  (2)  
• Independent  (3)  
• Libertarian  (4)  
• Something else (please specify)  (5)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Political Party = Independent 
Or Political Party = Libertarian 
Or Political Party = Something else (please specify) 
 
Q_10_LEAN Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or 
Republican Party? 
• Lean Democrat  (1)  
• Lean Republican  (2)  
• Neither  (3)  
 
Q_11 How important is your political party (Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, etc.) to you 
when it comes to voting?  
• Very unimportant  (1)  
• Unimportant  (2)  
• Slightly unimportant  (3)  
• Neither important nor unimportant  (4)  
• Slightly important  (5)  
• Important  (6)  
• Very Unimportant  (7)  
• Other / Not sure  (8)  
 
Q_12 If the November 2020 election for President of the United States was held today, who 
would you vote for? If you are not eligible to vote, who do you have a preference for?  
• Joe Biden (Democrat)  (1)  
• Donald Trump (Republican)  (2)  
• Someone else  (3)  
• Not sure  (4)  
 
Q_13 Did you vote or have a preference for a candidate in the November 2016 election for 
President of the United States? 
• Yes, for Hillary Clinton (Democrat)  (1)  
• Yes, for Donald Trump (Republican)  (2)  
• Yes, for third-party candidate / Other  (3)  





Q_14 Did you vote or have a preference for a candidate in the November 2012 election for 
President of the United States?  
• Yes, for Barack Obama (Democrat)  (1)  
• Yes, for Mitt Romney (Republican)  (2)  
• Yes, for a third-party candidate / Other  (3)  
• No, I did not vote or have a preference  (4)  
 
Q_15 Consider current events in the United States. Please read each statement below and 
indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement.  
• Completely disagree (1) 
• Slightly disagree (2)  
• Neither agree or disagree (3) 
• Slightly agree (4)  
• Completely agree (5)  
 
Q15.1:   I can influence the enactment of new laws and political decisions. 
 
Q15.2:  I can facilitate the election of a political leader whose views I share. 
 
Q15.3:  I can demand that existing laws and political decisions be observed.  
 
Q15.4:  Together, American citizens can influence the enactment of new laws and political 
decisions.  
 
Q15.5:  Together, American citizens can facilitate the election of a political leader whose views they 
share.  
 
Q15.6: Together, American citizens can demand that existing laws and political decisions be 
observed.   
 
Q15.7:  The people in charge of government are willing to provide information on how political 
decisions are made.  
 
Q15.8: The people in charge of government are interested in ensuring equal rights for all political 
parties and groups.  
 
Q15.9:  The people in charge of government are interested in carrying out the lawful demands of our 
citizens.  
 
Q16 Thinking about racial diversity in our elected officials in the United States government, how 
important is it for the country to elect politicians that identify as racial minorities?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 




Q_17 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward racial diversity 
in terms of racial minority representation in the United States government have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_18 Thinking about gender diversity in the United States government, how important is it for 
the country to elect politicians that identify as female?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_19 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward gender 
diversity in terms of female representation in the United States government have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_20 Thinking about sexual orientation diversity in our elected officials in the United States 
government, how important is it for the country to elect politicians that identify as LGBTQ?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_21 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward sexual 
orientation diversity in terms of LGBTQ representation in the United States government have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  





Q_22 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or experiences led you 
to change your views on the diversity of elected officials (racial minorities, women, LGBTQ) in 




Q_23 Thinking about sexual orientation equality, how important is it for the LGBTQ 
community to have equal rights in the United States?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_24 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward equal rights 
for the LGBTQ community have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_25 Thinking about gender equality, how important is it for women to have equal rights in 
the United States?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_26 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward equal rights 
for women in the United States government have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  






Q_27 Thinking about racial equality, how important is it for minorities to have equal rights in 
the United States?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_28 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward equal rights 
for racial minorities have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_29 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or experiences led you 
to change your views on equal rights for racial minorities, women, or the LGBTQ community? 




Q_30 What direction do you think that the United States is heading today? 
• Right direction  (1)  
• Wrong direction  (2)  
• Not sure  (3)  
 
Q_31 When thinking about your own political participation, please select how often you 
engage in the following activities:  
• Never (1) 
• Rarely (2) 
• Sometimes (3) 
• Often (4)  
• Always (5) 
• Other/Not applicable (6)  
 
Q.31.1:  How often do you vote in local, state, or national elections?  
Q.31.2:  How often have you joined in a political protest (e.g., political march, political 
demonstration)?  
Q.31.3:  How often have you joined in a political rally for a political figure?  
Q.31.4:  How often have you donated money to a political organization?  
Q.31.5:  How often have you contacted Congress or another political representative regarding a 
political issue?  








Q_33 How does the Democratic Party make you feel? Check all that apply. 
• Q_33.1 Frustrated  (1)  
• Q_33.2 Angry  (2)  
• Q_33.3 Afraid  (3)  
• Q_33.4 Hopeful  (4)  
• Q_33.5 Enthusiastic  (5)  
• Q_33.6 Proud  (6)  
• Q_33.7 None of these  (7)  
 
Q_34 How does the Republican Party make you feel? Check all that apply.  
• Q_34.1 Frustrated  (1)  
• Q_34.2 Angry  (2)  
• Q_34.3 Afraid (3)  
• Q_34.4 Hopeful  (4)  
• Q_34.5 Enthusiastic  (5)  
• Q_34.6 Proud  (6)  
• Q_34.7 None of these  (7)  
 
Q_35  To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
• Strongly disagree (1) 
• Somewhat disagree (2) 
• Neither agree or disagree (3) 
• Somewhat agree (4)  
• Strongly agree (5)  
• Other/Not sure (6) 
 
Q.35.1: How someone thinks about politics says a lot about the kind of person they are. 
Q.35.2: People I agree with politically need to stick to their beliefs and fight.  
Q.35.3:  People I agree with politically need to be willing to listen to others and compromise.  
Q.35.4: The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.  
Q35.5:  Individuals should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.  
 
Q_36 Thinking about the nation's economy, how would you rate economic conditions in the 
United States today? 
• Very Poor  (1) 
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5)  





Q_37 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward the state of the 
American economy have: 
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_38 When thinking about the nation's immigration policies, how would you rate immigration 
conditions in the United States today? 
• Very Poor  (1) 
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5)  
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_39 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward immigration 
conditions in the United States have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_40 When thinking about mass shootings, how important is it to restrict access to guns in the 
United States? 
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_41 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward restricting 
access to guns have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  





Q_42 How would you describe the relationship between the United States and Russia in this 
country today?  
• Very Poor  (1) 
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5)  
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_43 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward the 
relationship between US and Russia have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_44 How would you describe the relationship between US and China in this country today?  
• Very Poor  (1) 
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5)  
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_45 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward the 
relationship between US and China have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_46 When thinking about the environment, how important do you think the issue of climate 
change is:  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 





Q_47 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward climate 
change have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_48 When thinking about our nation's children, how important is the quality of public 
education (K-12)?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_49 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward the state of the 
public education system (K-12) in the United States have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_50 When thinking about higher education, how important is it to obtain a college education 
in the United States?  
• Not at all important  (1)  
• Slightly important (2)  
• Moderately important (3) 
• Very important (4) 
• Extremely important (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_51 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward the importance 
of obtaining a college education have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  





Q_52 How would you describe access to affordable healthcare in this country today? 
• Very Poor  (1)  
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_53 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward access to 
affordable healthcare in the United States have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_54 In general in our country these days, how would you describe the conditions for African 
Americans when dealing with police?   
• Very Poor  (1)  
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_55 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes on police brutality 
towards African Americans have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_56 In thinking about the federal government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, how 
would you rate its response to protecting the health of the American people?  
• Very Poor  (1)  
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5) 





Q_57 In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, my attitudes toward the federal government's 
responsibility for protecting the health of the American people have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_58 How would you describe the state of the American news media in this country today?  
• Very Poor  (1)  
• Poor (2) 
• Fair/Average (3) 
• Good (4) 
• Excellent (5) 
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_59 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward the American 
news media have:    
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Q_60 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or experiences led you 
to change your views on a political issue? For example, you could think of a specific issue, such 
as police brutality, immigration, or something else. (If you did not shift your views, please skip to 




Q_61 How much do you identify with the attitudes of President Trump? 
• Not at all  (1)  
• Very little  (2)  
• A fair amount  (3)  
• Quite a bit  (4)  
• A large amount  (5)  








Q_62 In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, my attitudes toward President 
Trump have:  
• Not changed at all  (1)  
• Changed very little  (2)  
• Changed a fair amount  (3)  
• Changed quite a bit  (4)  
• Changed a large amount  (5)  
• Don't know / No opinion  (6)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Shifts: Trump = Changed very little 
Or Shifts: Trump = Changed a fair amount 
Or Shifts: Trump = Changed quite a bit 
Or Shifts: Trump = Changed a large amount 
 




Q_64 When answering the following set of questions, think about a time when you shifted your 
perspective on a political issue that is important to you. For example, think about a time when 
you have felt more positive or negative about an economic or social concern (e.g., trade, 
immigration, gun rights, or something else).  
• Not at all (1) 
• Very little (2) 
• A fair amount (3)  
• Quite a bit (4)  
• A large amount (5) 
• Not applicable (6)  
 
Q.64.1:  To what extent did you notice or pay attention to the views of your family, friends, 
mentors, or teachers when you were considering shifting your perspective on this 
political issue?  
Q.64.2: To what extent do you remember or recall the views of your family, friends, mentors, or 
teachers when you were considering shifting your perspective on this political issue?  
Q.64.3: To what extent did you repeat or share your shifted perspective on this political issue 
with others?  
Q.64.4:  To what extent were you motivated to learn about this personal shift in your political 
view?  
Q.64.5: To what extent did you feel rewarded when you shared this shift in your political view 
with others?  
Q.64.6:  To what extent did you feel challenged when you shared this shift in your political view 
with others?  
 











Q_67 How many news sources do you typically read each day?  
• None  (1)  
• One (2)  
• Two  (3)  
• Three  (4)  
• Four  (5)  
• Five or more  (6)  
 
Q_68 What is the most common way you get your political news? Check all that apply.  
• Q_68.1  Newspapers or magazines  (1)  
• Q_68.2  Radio  (2)  
• Q_68.3  Local television  (3)  
• Q_68.4  Cable television  (4)  
• Q_68.5   Social media  (5)  
• Q_68.6   News websites  (6)  
• Q_68.7   Other / Please specify____  (7) 
• Q_68.8   Not sure  (8)  
 
Q_69 How often, if at all, do you get political news from social media sites (such as Facebook, 
Twitter, or Instagram)?  
• Never  (1)  
• Rarely  (2)  
• Sometimes  (3)  
• Often  (4)  
• Always  (5)  
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_70 How often, if at all, do you engage with others on Facebook on a political issue?  
• Never  (1)  
• Rarely  (2)  
• Sometimes  (3)  
• Often  (4)  
• Always  (5)  








Q_71 How often, if at all, are you exposed to other people's political disagreements through 
discussion threads on Facebook?  
• Never  (1)  
• Rarely  (2)  
• Sometimes  (3)  
• Often  (4)  
• Always  (5)  
• Other / Not sure  (6)  
 
Q_72 How many of your friends on Facebook are:  
• None (1) 
• Just a few (2)  
• Some (3) 
• A lot (4) 
• Other/Not sure (5) 
 
Q.72.1:  Democrat 
Q.72.2:  Republican 
Q.72.3:  Libertarian  
Q.72.4:  Independent 
 
Q_73 How many of your friends on Facebook are: 
• None (1) 
• Just a few (2)  
• Some (3) 
• A lot (4) 
• Other/Not sure (5) 
 
Q.73.1:  Liberal 
Q.73.2:  Conservative 
Q.73.3:  Moderate  
 
Q_74 Please indicate the geographic region in which you reside in the United States: 
• Northeast  (1)  
• Midwest  (2)  
• South  (3)  
• West  (4)  
• Puerto Rico / Other US Territory  (5)  
• I do not live in the United States  (6)  
 
Q_75 Do you live in an urban, suburban, or rural community? 
• Urban  (1)  
• Suburban  (2)  
• Rural  (3)  




Q_76 Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or 
Argentinian?  
• Yes  (1)  
• No  (2)  
• I choose not to disclose  (3)  
 
Q_77 What is your race or origin? Select all that apply. 
• Q_77.1 White  (1)  
• Q_77.2 Black or African American  (2)  
• Q_77.3 Asian or Asian American  (3)  
• Q_77.4 American Indian or Alaskan Native  (4)  
• Q_77.5 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  (5)  
• Q_77.6 Mixed race or origin  (6)  
• Q_77.7 Other / Please specify____ (7)  
• Q_77.8 I choose not to disclose  (8)  
 
Q_78 How important would you say religion or spirituality is in your own life?  
• Not at all  (1)  
• Very little  (2)  
• A fair amount  (3)  
• Quite a bit  (4)  
• A large amount  (5)  
• I choose not to disclose  (6)  
 
Q_79 What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received?  
• Did not graduate from high school  (1)  
• High school graduate or equivalent  (2)  
• Some college but no degree  (3)  
• Associate degree  (4)  
• Bachelor degree  (5)  
• Graduate degree  (6)  
 
Q_80 What is your age?  
• Under 18  (1)  
• 18 - 24  (2)  
• 25 - 34  (3)  
• 35 - 49  (4)  
• 50 - 64  (5)  
• 65 - 79  (6)  






Q_81 What is your gender?  
• Male  (1)  
• Female  (2)  
• Other / Please specify_____  (3)  
• I choose not to disclose  (4)  
 
Q_82 Which of the following categories best describes your employment status?  
• Employed full time  (1)  
• Employed part time  (2)  
• Unemployed looking for work  (3)  
• Unemployed not looking for work  (4)  
• Retired  (5)  
• Student  (6)  
• Disabled, not able to work  (7)  
• I choose not to disclose  (8)  
 
Q_83 What was your annual household income in 2019?  
• Less than $20,000  (1)  
• $20,000 - $49,999  (2)  
• $50,000 - $99,999  (3)  
• $100,000 - $149,999  (4)  
• $150,000 - $199,999  (5)  
• $200,000 or more  (6)  
• I prefer not to say  (7)  
 
Q_84 Would you be willing to speak with the researcher of this study to expand more on your 
answers?  
• Yes  (1)  
• No  (2)  
 
Display This Question: If Willing to Expand? = Yes 
 
Q_84_TEXT Please provide your name, email, and phone number. Your name and 
contact information will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you very much for taking the 




Display This Question: If Willing to Expand? = No 
 













Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. I am hoping to learn more about 
your political attitudes and shifting political perspectives. With my findings, I hope to share ways 
that people learn in relation to political views and changing perspectives. I am going to record 
our interview so that I can focus on what you are saying and will use the recording to develop a 
transcript of our conversation. I will be the only person listening to the recording. Only the 
transcript from the interview will be shared with my research advisors to check the validity of the 
conclusions I draw. I will keep your particular experience confidential and will use an alias to 
describe you. I plan to compile the information from all the interviews I conduct and will ensure 
that no one is identified. We can pick a name as your pseudonym if you would like. Do you have 
any questions or concerns before we begin?  
 
1. Can you tell me the story of how you arrived at your current political orientation or 
political party?  
• What or whom do you feel influenced your current political orientation or party 
affiliation?  
 
2. You indicated in the online survey that your views have shifted on various political 
issues. Upon reflection:  
• What events or experiences led to these shifts? 
• What sources informed these shifts? [Family, Friends, Mentors, Teachers, 
Religious Leaders, Social Media, New Media] 
• What other political views have shifted for you in the past, if any?  
• How do these shifts relate to other political issues, if at all?  
 
3. When “thinking about your own thinking” about your own personal shifts in political 
attitudes, can you tell me more about how you arrived at the change in your position?  
• Whom did you align with and or oppose?  
• What created strong impressions for you? 
• When you think about the people involved in sharing their ideas, what examples, 
images, metaphors, stories, or symbols come up for you?  
 
4. How do you source your political information? How do you know when you have enough 
information or have searched for enough information to form a new political view?  
• When did you stop looking?  
• What do you do when you know you don’t have enough information, but have to 
make a decision?  
 
5. What happens when you run into somebody who holds a different political point of view? 
Can you think of an example when this happened?  
• Who were they? 




• What did they do?  
• When did things break down—if they did? If they didn’t break down, why do you 
think that was the case? 
 
6. Have you ever had a time when you've helped or taught somebody else to think 
differently in regard to a political issue?  
• How did you go about doing that?  
• How did you model your teaching strategies after someone you have observed in 
your own life? What do you do to help others learn from you as a role model?  
• When you help others understand your own political views, how do you think 
they learn from you? What makes it difficult for others to learn from you?   
 
7. If someone were to change your mind on a political issue, how might they go about it? 
Think back to a time when maybe a person or approach changed your mind.  What did 
they say or do?  
• What images, metaphors, or practices resonate with you? Why did this resonate 
with you? 
• How well do you remember these images, metaphors, or practices in similar 
situations when you are asked to change your mind on a political issue?   
• With whom might you have shared your shifts, if anyone?  
§ Who did you share it with? [family, friends, mentors, teachers].  
§ How did you share it? [social media, 1:1 conversations, group 
conversations, etc.] 
• What motivated you to make these changes? What drove this change? What do 
you think enabled you to do that? How hard was it for you to do that? Did you 
make shifts in parallel areas?  
 
8. What does it take mentally and emotionally for you to find common ground with 
someone who thinks differently than you politically? Think about a time when you have 
found common ground on a political issue.  
• What emotions did you feel?  
• What helps you to hang in and try out different strategies or approaches in either 
how you approach this or how you seek common ground with them? 
• Are there any role models that come to mind who you seek to follow or imitate 
when in this territory? 
§ Personal role models 
§ Personalities in the media, politicians, or other well-known people as role 
models 
 
9. When thinking about key influencers that you value in regard to their political opinions, 
can you tell me more about how they impact your own political perspectives? For 
example, could you give me an example of a political influencer in your life—what made 
you notice them?  
• What do you think you are learning / have learned from your political 
influencers?  




• What do you do to help yourself learn from political influencers?  
• Have you put into practice what you have learned from political role models?  
• What do political role models do that help you to learn from them?  
• What makes it difficult to learn from political role models?  
 
10. In what ways has changing your views on a political issue been challenging? In what 
ways has it been rewarding?  
 
11. Finally—my last question is in regard to two additional political issues that have come to 
light since the time that you completed the online survey, including mail-in voting due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic and the idea of a third term for the United States presidency.   
• What are your thoughts on mail-in voting? What events or sources have 
influenced these views?  
• What are your thoughts on changing the 22nd Amendment of the Constitution, 
which prohibits a president from being elected more than two terms for no more 
than eight years? What events or sources have influenced these views?  
 
Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me today.  
 
Is there anything you feel I should have asked you about your political attitudes and affiliations 
that I neglected to?   
 
Thanks again. I will send you a copy of this transcript for your records in case you’d like to add 









Informed Consent for Survey 
 
 
Protocol Title: Shifting Political Attitudes and Observational Learning: An Examination of 
American Political Polarization in the Age of Social Media 
 





You are being invited to participate in this research study called “Shifting Political Attitudes and 
Observational Learning: An Examination of American Political Polarization in the Age of Social 
Media.” 
 
You may qualify to take part in this research study because you are at least 18 years old. 
Approximately 200 to 2,000 people will participate in the survey and it will take approximately 
30 minutes of your time to complete.  
 
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?  
This study is being done to determine how and why shifting political attitudes occur and to 
determine how observational learning may inform these shifts through an examination of 
American political polarization in the age of social media.  
 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a survey. You can choose to list your 
email address to be contacted for a follow-up interview.  
 
The survey includes multiple-choice and short-answer questions about your political attitudes 
and perspectives related to a variety of issues. You are not required to provide your name or any 
other personally identifiable data to participate.  
 
The survey will be available for at least 30 days beginning July 15, 2020.  
 
WHAT POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART 
IN THIS STUDY?  
This is a minimal risk study, which means the harms or discomforts that you may experience are 
not greater than you would ordinarily encounter in daily life, such as talking to friends or family 
about your political perspectives. You do not have to answer any questions or share anything you 
do not want to talk about. You can stop participating in the study at any time without penalty.  
 
Your information will be kept confidential. The primary researcher is taking precautions to keep 




such as using a pseudonym instead of your name and keeping all information on a password 
protected computer and locked in a file drawer.  
 
WHAT POSSIBLE BENEFITS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS 
STUDY?  
There is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. Participation may benefit the field 
of adult learning and social psychology to better understand how political views may shift or 
change.  
 
WILL I BE PAID FOR BEING IN THIS STUDY?  
You will not be paid to participate. There are no costs to you for taking part in this study.  
 
WHEN IS THE STUDY OVER? CAN I LEAVE THE STUDY BEFORE IT ENDS?  
The study is over when you have completed the survey. However, you can leave the study at any 
time even if you have not finished.  
 
PROTECTION OF YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY  
The primary researcher will keep all written materials locked in a desk drawer in a locked office. 
Any electronic or digital information will be stored on a computer that is password protected.  
 
For quality assurance, the study team, the study sponsor (grant agency), and/or members of the 
Teachers College Institutional Review Board (IRB) may review the data collected from you as 
part of this study. Otherwise, all information obtained from your participation in this study will 
be held strictly confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by 
U.S. or State law.  
 
HOW WILL THE RESULTS BE USED?  
The results of this study will be published in journals and presented at academic conferences. 
Your identity will be removed from any data you provide before publication or use for 
educational purposes. Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published. 
This study is being conducted as part of the dissertation of the primary researcher.  
 
WHO CAN ANSWER MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY? 
If you have any questions about taking part in this research study, you should contact the 
primary researcher, Melinda Starmer at ms5286@tc.columbia.edu.  
 
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) (the human research ethics committee) at 212-678-4105 or 
email IRB@tc.edu or you can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 
W. 120th Street, New York, NY 10027, Box 151. The IRB is the committee that oversees human 











• I have read the Informed Consent Form and have been offered the opportunity to 
discuss the form with the researcher.  
• I have had ample opportunity to ask questions about the purposes, procedures, risks 
and benefits regarding this research study.  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or 
withdraw participation at any time without penalty. 
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at the researcher’s professional 
discretion. 
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been 
developed becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue my 
participation, the researcher will provide this information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me will 
not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as 
specifically required by law.  
• Identifiers may be removed from the data. De-identified data may be used for future 
research studies or distributed to another researcher for future research without 
additional informed consent from you (the research participant or the research 
participant’s representative).  
• I should receive a copy of the Informed Consent Form document.  
 
 
By checking the “Yes, I agree” box below, you agree to participate in this study. 
 Yes, I agree.  No, I do not agree. 
 
You must also confirm you are 18 years or older and agree to allow written materials viewed at 
an educational setting or at a conference outside of Teachers College, Columbia University to 
participate in this study. To confirm, please check the “Yes, I confirm” box below and click next 
to participate in the study.  















Informed Consent for Interview 
 
 
Protocol Title: Shifting Political Attitudes and Observational Learning: An Examination of 
American Political Polarization in the Age of Social Media 
 





You are being invited to participate in this research study called “Shifting Political Attitudes and 
Observational Learning: An Examination of American Political Polarization in the Age of Social 
Media.”  
 
You qualify to participate in this study because you completed an online survey, and you are 
interested in engaging in an individual interview. If you agree to be interviewed, you will be 
asked to answer questions regarding your political attitudes and shifting political perspectives in 
more detail. Approximately 15 to 20 people will participate in an individual interview and it will 
take approximately 60 minutes of your time to complete.  
 
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?  
This study is being done to determine how and why shifting political attitudes occur and to 
determine how observational learning may inform these shifts through an examination of 
American political polarization in the age of social media.  
 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? 
If you agree to participate, you will be individually interviewed by the primary researcher of this 
study. You will be asked to answer questions about your political attitudes and shifting political 
perspectives in more detail.  
 
This interview will be audio-recorded if conducted by phone, or video-recorded if conducted by 
Zoom (an online platform for video conferencing). After the recording is written down 
(transcribed), the audio recording and/or video recording will be deleted. If you do not wish to be 
audio-recorded or video recorded, you will not be able to participate in this study. The individual 
interview will take approximately one hour. You will be given a pseudonym or false name in 
order to keep your identity confidential. The interview will take place either by phone or through 
Zoom at a time that is convenient to you prior to December 31, 2020.  
 
WHAT POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART 
IN THIS STUDY?  
This is a minimal risk study, which means the harms or discomforts that you may experience are 
not greater than you would ordinarily encounter in daily life, such as talking to friends or family 




do not want to talk about. You can stop participating in the study at any time without penalty.  
Your information will be kept confidential. The primary researcher is taking precautions to keep 
your information confidential and prevent anyone from discovering or guessing your identity, 
such as using a pseudonym instead of your name and keeping all information on a password 
protected computer and locked in a file drawer.  
 
WHAT POSSIBLE BENEFITS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS 
STUDY?  
There is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. Participation may benefit the field 
of adult learning and social psychology to better understand how political views may shift or 
change.  
 
WILL I BE PAID FOR BEING IN THIS STUDY?  
You will not be paid to participate. There are no costs to you for taking part in this study.  
 
WHEN IS THE STUDY OVER? CAN I LEAVE THE STUDY BEFORE IT ENDS?  
The study is over when you have completed the interview. However, you can leave the study at 
any time even if you have not finished.  
 
PROTECTION OF YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY  
The primary researcher will keep all written materials locked in a desk drawer in a locked office. 
Any electronic or digital information (including audio and/or video recordings) will be stored on 
a computer that is password protected. What is on the audio recording and/or video recording 
will be written down and the audio recording and/or video recording will then be destroyed. 
There will be no record matching your real name with your pseudonym. 
 
For quality assurance, the study team, the study sponsor (grant agency), and/or members of the 
Teachers College Institutional Review Board (IRB) may review the data collected from you as 
part of this study. Otherwise, all information obtained from your participation in this study will 
be held strictly confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by 
U.S. or State law.  
 
HOW WILL THE RESULTS BE USED?  
The results of this study will be published in journals and presented at academic conferences. 
Your identity will be removed from any data you provide before publication or use for 
educational purposes. Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published. 
This study is being conducted as part of the dissertation of the primary researcher.  
 
CONSENT FOR AUDIO AND OR VIDEO RECORDING   
Audio recording and/or video recording is part of this research study. You can choose whether to 
give permission to be recorded. If you decide that you don’t wish to be recorded, you will not be 
able to participate in this research study.   
 
WHO CAN ANSWER MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY? 
If you have any questions about taking part in this research study, you should contact the 




If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) (the human research ethics committee) at 212-678-4105 or 
email IRB@tc.edu or you can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 
W. 120th Street, New York, NY 10027, Box 151. The IRB is the committee that oversees human 





• I have read the Informed Consent Form and have been offered the opportunity to 
discuss the form with the researcher.  
• I have had ample opportunity to ask questions about the purposes, procedures, risks 
and benefits regarding this research study.  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or 
withdraw participation at any time without penalty. 
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at the researcher’s professional 
discretion. 
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been 
developed becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue my 
participation, the researcher will provide this information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me will 
not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as 
specifically required by law.  
• Identifiers may be removed from the data. De-identified data may be used for future 
research studies or distributed to another researcher for future research without 
additional informed consent from you (the research participant or the research 
participant’s representative).  
• I should receive a copy of the Informed Consent Form document.  
 
By checking the “Yes, I agree” box and typing your name below, you are electronically signing 
this consent form to participate in this study. You affirm that an electronic signature has the same 
effect as a written signature.  
 Yes, I agree  [Type Name]: 
________________.  
 No, I do not agree 
 
You must also confirm you are 18 years or older; confirm to give your consent to be audio or 
visual recorded; and agree to allow written materials viewed at an educational setting or at a 
conference outside of Teachers College, Columbia University to participate in this study. To 
confirm, please check the “Yes, I confirm” box below and click next to participate in the study.  






Hypotheses for Quantitative Study 
 
H1.  Political Orientation and Political Party: Political orientation (general,  
economic, and social) is associated with political party. 
 
H1-1.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of identifying 
as a member of the Democratic Party increases compared to Independents.   
 
H1-2.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of 
identifying as a member of the Republican Party increases compared to 
Independents.  
 
H2.  Political Orientation and Presidential Voting: Political orientation is associated 
with presidential voting preferences.  
 
H2-1.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of 
supporting the 2020 Democratic candidate Joe Biden increases, whereas 
political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of 
supporting the 2020 Republican candidate Donald Trump increases.  
 
H2-2.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of 
supporting the 2016 Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton increases, 
whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood 
of supporting the 2016 Republican candidate Donald Trump increases. 
 
H2-3.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of 
supporting the 2012 Democratic candidate Barack Obama increases, 
whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood 
of supporting Republican candidate Mitt Romney increases.  
 
H3.  Political Orientation and Political Participation: Political orientation is 
associated with factors of political participation. 
 
H3-1.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, participation in voting 
increases, whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, 
participation in voting decreases.  
 
H3-2.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, participation in political 
protests (e.g., political marches, political demonstrations) increases, 






H3-3.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, participation in 
political rallies for political figures increases, whereas political orientation 
becomes more liberal, participation decreases.  
 
H3-4.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, participation in donating 
money to political organizations increases, whereas political orientation 
becomes more conservative, participation decreases.  
 
H3-5.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, participation in contacting 
Congress or another political representative increases, whereas political 
orientation becomes more conservative, participation decreases.  
 
H3-6.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, participation in political 
persuasion increases, whereas political orientation becomes more 
conservative, participation decreases.  
 
H4.  Political Orientation and Polarizing Cognitive Perceptions: Political orientation 
is associated with cognitive perceptions of good ideas in relation to political 
polarization and common ground.  
 
H4-1.  As overall political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of 
believing that conservatives have good ideas decreases.   
 
H4-2.  As overall political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of 
believing that Republicans have good ideas decreases.  
 
H4-3.  As overall political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood 
of believing that liberals have good ideas decreases.   
 
H4-4.  As overall political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood 
of believing that Democrats have good ideas decreases.   
 
H5.  Political Orientation and Polarizing Emotions: Political orientation is associated 
with positive and negative emotions towards political parties in relation to 
political polarization and common ground.  
 
H5-1.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of feeling 
positive emotions (hopeful, enthusiastic, proud) about the Democratic 
Party increases; whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, 
the likelihood of feeling positive emotions decreases. 
 
H5-2.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of 
feeling positive emotions (hopeful, enthusiastic, proud) about the 
Republican Party increases; whereas political orientation becomes more 





H5-3.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of 
feeling negative emotions (frustrated, angry, afraid) with the Democratic 
Party increases; whereas political orientation becomes more liberal, the 
likelihood of feeling negative emotions decreases.  
 
H5-4.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of feeling 
negative emotions (frustrated, angry, afraid) towards the Republican Party 
increases; whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, the 
likelihood of feeling negative emotions decreases.  
 
H6.  Political Orientation and Diverse Representation/Equal Rights: Political 
orientation is associated with the importance of diverse representation and equal 
rights, as well as shifting views on diverse representation and equal rights.  
 
H6-1.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the degree of importance of 
electing racial minorities, women, and LGBTQ politicians increases; 
whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, the degree of 
importance for these issues decreases.  
a. Electing politicians that identify as racial minorities 
b. Electing politicians that identify as women 
c. Electing politicians that identify as LGBTQ 
 
H6-2:  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the degree of importance of 
equal rights for marginalized groups increases; whereas political 
orientation becomes more conservative, the degree of importance of equal 
rights for marginalized groups decreases.  
a. Equal rights for racial minorities 
b. Equal rights for women 
c. Equal rights for LGBTQ  
 
H6-3.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the more likely one will 
shift their attitudes on the following issues during the Trump presidency; 
whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, the less likely 
one will shift their views.  
a. Electing minority politicians 
b. Electing female politicians  
c. Electing LGBTQ politicians 
d. Equal rights importance for racial minorities 
e. Equal rights importance for women 
f. Equal rights importance for LGBTQ community 
 
H7.  Political Orientation and Political Attitudes: Political orientation is associated 
with favorability of current political issues, importance of current political issues, 





H7-1.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of 
favorably rating the following issues increases; whereas political 
orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of favorably rating these 
issues decreases.  
a. State of the economy 
b. Immigration conditions  
c. Relationship between US/Russia 
d. Relationship between US/China 
e. Access to affordable healthcare  
f. Police brutality/conditions for African Americans 
g. Government response to COVID-19 
h. Identification with attitudes of Trump 
 
H7-2.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of supporting 
the importance of the following issues increases; whereas political 
orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of supporting the 
importance of the following issues decreases.   
a. Gun control 
b. Climate change 
c. K-12 public education 
d. College education 
e. American news media 
 
H7-3.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the more likely one will 
shift their attitudes on the following issues during the Trump presidency; 
whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, the less likely 
one will shift their views.  
a. Shifting views on state of the economy 
b. Shifting views on immigration conditions  
c. Shifting views on relationship between US/Russia 
d. Shifting views on relationship between US/China 
e. Shifting views on access to affordable healthcare  
f. Shifting views on conditions for African Americans and police 
brutality 
g. Shifting views on gun control 
h. Shifting views on government response to COVID-19 
i. Shifting views on climate change 
 
H7-4.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, the more likely one 
will shift their attitudes on the following issues during the Trump 
presidency; whereas political orientation becomes more liberal, the less 
likely one will shift their views.  
a. Shifting views on identification with attitudes of Trump 
b. Shifting views on K-12 public education 
c. Shifting views on college education 




H8.  Political Orientation and Interactions on Facebook: Political orientation is 
associated with interactions with friends on Facebook.  
 
H8-1.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of interacting 
with conservatives on Facebook decreases; whereas political orientation 
becomes more conservative, engagement with fellow conservatives 
increases.  
 
H8-2.  As overall political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood 
of interacting with liberals on Facebook decreases; whereas political 
orientation becomes more liberal, engagement with fellow liberals 
increases.  
 
H8-3.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the likelihood of interacting 
with Republicans on Facebook decreases; whereas political orientation 
becomes more conservative, engagement with Republicans increases.  
 
H8-4.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of 
interacting with Democrats on Facebook decreases; whereas political 
orientation becomes more liberal, engagement with Democrats increases.  
 
H8-5.  As political orientation becomes more conservative, the likelihood of 
interacting with Libertarians on Facebook increases; whereas political 
orientation becomes more liberal, engagement with Libertarians decreases.  
 
H9.  Political Orientation and News Media Usage: Political orientation is associated 
with number and types of political news sources.  
 
H9-1.  As political orientation becomes more liberal, the number of news sources 
for political information increases, whereas political orientation becomes 
more conservative, the number of news sources for political information 
decreases.    
 
H9-2a. As political orientation becomes more liberal, using newspapers/ 
magazines as a political news sources is more likely; whereas political 
orientation becomes more conservative, use of this news source is less 
likely. 
 
H9-2b. As political orientation becomes more liberal, using news websites as a 
political news source is more likely; whereas political orientation becomes 
more conservative, use of this news is less likely. 
 
H9-3a. As political orientation becomes more conservative, using local TV as a 
political news source is more likely; whereas political orientation becomes 





H9-3b. As political orientation becomes more conservative, using cable TV as a 
political news source is more likely; whereas political orientation becomes 
more liberal, use of this news source is less likely.  
 
H9-3c. As political orientation becomes more conservative, using talk radio as a 
political news source is more likely; whereas political orientation becomes 
more liberal, use of this news source is less likely.  
 
H9-3d. As political orientation becomes more conservative, using social media as 
a political news source is more likely; whereas political orientation 
becomes more liberal, use of this news source is less likely.  
 
H10.  Political Orientation and Observational Learning: Political orientation is 
associated with observational learning.   
 
As political orientation becomes more liberal, factors of observational learning 
increases, whereas political orientation becomes more conservative, factors of 
observational learning decreases, including a) attention; b) retention; c) 
reproduction; d) motivation to learn; e) feeling rewarded; and f) feeling 
challenged.  
 
H11.  Political Efficacy and Political Participation: Political efficacy (personal, 
collective, and external) is associated with overall political participation. 
 
H11-1.  As personal political efficacy increases, the degree of  
 overall political participation increases.  
 
H11-2.  As collective political efficacy increases, the degree of  
 overall political participation increases.  
 
H11-3.  As external political efficacy increases, the degree of  













Attitude Shifts (AS) Direction of shift in attitudes, which can move left or right; can move 
positive or negative; can be perceived as a barrier or reward; or can be 
stronger opposition or stronger support.  
AS-Moved left Attitude shifts that become more liberal.  
 
AS-Moved center Attitude shifts that become more moderate.  
 
AS-Moved right Attitude shifts that become more conservative.  
 
AS-Positive Feeling more positive.  
 
AS-Negative Feeling more negative. 
 
AS-Barriers Experiences that are perceived as challenging when changing personal 
views on a political issue. 
AS-Rewards Experiences that are perceived as rewarding when changing personal 
views on a political issue. 
AS-Stronger 
opposition 
Attitude shifts that become more opposed. 
 




Cognitive perceptions on partisan ingroups and outgroups will lead to 
individual shifts in political perspectives. 
CP: Partisan 
Alignment 








Experiential learning model, which includes three aspects 1). returning 
to and replaying the experience, 2). attending to feelings provoked by 
the experience, and 3). reevaluating the experience (Boud, Keough, & 




Cognitive recollection and replay of an event through reflection or by 
talking through an experience with others, which may support shifts in 
political views.  
EL-Attend to 
Emotions 
Cognitive attention and replay of an event to utilize positive emotions 
and remove negative emotions, which may support shifts in political 
views.  
EL-Reevaluate Cognitive re-examination of an event through the integration of new 
learning gained through association, integration, validation, and 





Models & Sources (MS) Models (e.g., family, friends, teachers, political influencers, religious 
leaders) and sources (media) may lead to individual shifts in political 
perspectives and may lead related to other parallel shifts.  
MS: Family Family members that served as role models, including children, parents, 
siblings, cousins, aunts, uncles, or spouses or partners.  












Key influencers, such as personalities in the media, politicians, or other 
well-known people that served as role models.  
MS: Media Sources used for obtaining or sharing political information. 
 
Observational Learning Observational learning subprocesses of attention, retention, 
reproduction, and motivation to learn (Bandura, 1986) will help to 
explain changing political perspectives.  
OL-Attention Attention to images, metaphors, and practices that resonate from the 
observation of a model that may support the formation or shifts of 
political views.  
OL-Retention Retention or memory of images, metaphors, and practices from the 
observation of a model that may support the formation or shifts of 
political views. 
OL-Reproduction Reproduction and sharing with others the symbolic representations 
from the observation of a model that may support the formation or 
shifts of political views.  
OL-Motivation to 
Learn 
Motivation to learn through rewarding or challenging reinforcement that 
translates observational learning into action that may support the 
formation or shifts of political views.  
Political Ideology (PI) Political ideology is inclusive of political orientation (liberal, moderate, or 




Political participation may include voting, political protest, political rally, 
political donations, political persuasion, or contacting a representative, 
other related activities.  
Shifted Political Issue 
(SPI) 
Individual issues listed by participants that shifted during Trump 
presidency. 
Values  Emotional beliefs about how things should or should not be (Westen, 
2007). 
Mail-in Voting Attitudes on mail-in voting for the general election due to the COVID-19 
pandemic (support, against, neutral) 
22nd Amendment Attitudes on changing the 22nd Amendment of the Constitution, which 
prohibits a president from being elected more than two terms and no 
















Interviewer: Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. I am hoping to learn more 
about your political attitudes and shifting political perspectives. With my findings, I hope to share ways 
that people learn in relation to political views and changing perspectives. I am going to record our 
interview so that I can focus on what you are saying and will use the recording to develop a transcript of 
our conversation. I will be the only person listening to the recording. Only the transcript from the 
interview will be shared with my research advisors to check the validity of the conclusions I draw. I will 
keep your particular experience confidential and will use an alias to describe you. I plan to compile the 
information from all the interviews I conduct and will ensure that no one is identified. We can pick a 
name as your pseudonym if you would like. Do you have any questions or concerns before we begin?  
 
P-14: No.  
 
Interviewer: Okay, great. Alright, so I have a total of 11 questions. They're very broad and I have several 
follow up prompts under each topic area. So let's get started. Can you please tell me the story of how 
you arrived at your current political orientation or political party? 
 
P-14: I think I came to where I am right now because I was born in Cuba. I went through the Cuban 
Revolution as a very small child. I was sent to Spain for two years with my maternal grandmother. So I 
was separated from my parents for two years. We ended up in Los Angeles, California. And those 
experiences have made me very conscious about human rights. Women's rights—just rights of human 
beings. They have become very important to me. I would not want any child to go through what I went 
through and what I saw and what's happened to me. So that has led me to a more liberal but moderate 
stand. Um, Cubans for the most part, tend to be Republicans. I began as a Republican. I was very 
involved in the Republican Party as my parents were. We knew a lot of people in California that were 
very involved. I've done campaigns, and I saw a gradual shift right after Reagan was elected for me 
personally. I remember I was at a cocktail party for Ronald Reagan for his first campaign and the 
Chairperson of the California Republican Party at the time was a close family friend and he and I were 
talking and he told me that they were going to let in the [far] right religious side. That they were going to 
become closer within the Republican Party, which and I told him at that time, it was 1980 or whatever, I 
said, “you're crazy. You have no idea what you're about to unleash. Our party will be destroyed.” And he 
was like, “no, no, it's gonna be fine.” But then over time, I noticed this incredible shift to the right, 
whereas the Republican Party was always pretty much centered. I don't know if you've ever seen the 
graph of the great divide, where in 1994 we were like this [motioned with hands that the left and right 
were close together] and then we started going like this [motioned with hands that the left and right 
moved further apart]. Yeah, well, I sort of started going this way [motioned with hands that she moved 
to the left], the other way, and I pretty much have left the Republican Party even though I was a card 
carrying Republican. I was Democrat for a long time. Now, I'm not either one. But I'm not, I can't say I'm 
associated with any party. I'm now just voting for who I think would be the best for this country and 
who's going to help people who don't have a say in the process. That's my political philosophy. 
 
Interviewer: Thank you so much for sharing your story with me. I really appreciate it. You had also 
indicated in the online survey portion of the study that you've shifted your view on specific political 
issues since the 2016 election. Upon reflection, what events or experiences led to these shifts?  
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P-14: Well, I can just tell you that the 2016 election shifted everything. It pulled the rug from underneath 
my feet because I have seen things in this country that I never envisioned as a young woman when I 
became an American citizen. I've seen a loss of respect for each other. A lack of caring for each other. 
And I see it on both sides. There are extremes. And how do we come back to the middle? In my own 
family, I'm a widow and I'm getting remarried. And the man I'm marrying is totally the opposite of me 
politically. And he was very involved politically. And he's been told, what are you doing with her? You're, 
you know, you're with a lib-tard.  
 
Interviewer: Oh my gosh. 
 
P-14: And as he said, and as I have said to those—the opposite side, our relationship is not about 
politics. Our relationship is about the love that we have for each other as a man and a woman, and the 
shared values. So, we have had to try to meet in the middle. Do we always agree? No, we don't. But, we 
refuse to let it destroy ourselves and what we have built. So the fact that we had the election, I met 
Mark, and I've, I've had to—he sort of had to come this way [motioned with hands that he moved to the 
middle] and I've sort of come in this way [motioned with hands that she moved to the middle], so we 
can kind of meet in the middle. But we will never be 100% together politically, but we share a lot more. 
We have far more values in common than….imagine, for example, he believes in abortion just like I do, 
which is unheard of for somebody who's on the right. And I think that I've allowed him to see the 
importance of women's rights. Not just our bodies, but socially, economically, there's just so many 
things that tied—tie us together as human beings and we focus on that. 
 
Interviewer: That’s great. That's really great. Thank you so much for sharing that. Have any other people 
in your life influenced your shift in views? Your friends, family, mentors, teachers, religious leaders, or 
the media?  
 
P-14: One thing I don't do, I don't look at the news. I get everything from abroad. Seriously, I don't look 
at Fox. I don't look at CNN. I don't look at any of the networks. I'll look at BBC. I'll look at—I'm fluent in 
Spanish, so obviously I can read foreign newspapers. Because I think the outside world has a better view 
of what we are than us here. Because we can't see what we're doing and they can. 
 
Interviewer: Right. Mm hmm. 
 
P-14: So that—plus my sister. Uh, we're a split family. We have [some on the] right and some on the left, 
and we try not to focus on that. I've had some pretty intense discussions with my sister, but I can see 
where she's coming from and why her life experiences have made her shift to that side. She's more of a 
typical Cuban than I am, politically. And then, of course, I'm an Episcopalian, which is a very, um, I don't 
want to say liberal, but I think we focus more on true Christianity, which is the greatest commandment 
besides loving God, is to love one another as we should. So that also plays a big role in the way I shift.  
 
Interviewer: Thank you. And you mentioned how you source your political information, and that was 
another question of mine. How do you know when you have enough information or have searched for 
enough information to form a new a new political view?  
 
P-14: I don't think you ever do. I don't think that's possible, but I believe God has given us a brain. And 
we have higher levels of critical thinking, which somehow we're losing. And you just get to a point where 
you have to say either I accept this or I don't, but I'm going to have to move on because I'm not going to 
solve this.  
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Interviewer: That makes sense. Thank you. So when thinking about your own thinking about your 
personal shifts and political views over recent years, can you tell me a little bit more about how you 
arrived at the change in your position? For instance, who did you align with or oppose?  
 
P-14: Actually, I don't think I aligned or opposed. I just didn't bond with anybody. So it became a choice 
of what's the least of the evils. I don't see in this country a true leader from any side. I don't see 
someone who can step up, like say, you know, JFK did in the 60s. I think we have a lot of presidents that 
we have forgotten what they have offered us, like FDR. Um, just for me it's, I just can't align with 
someone that is an extreme. I can't do extremes. I want to stay in the middle. I want to be able to go 
right and I want to go left and shift. I don't want to be stuck in one political view. 
 
Interviewer: Are there any examples, images, metaphors, stories, or symbols that come up for you when 
thinking about that?  
 
P-14: I think of the civil unrest that we are seeing and how that's—just seeing how divided we are as a 
country. And it's frightening because it reminds me of Cuba, but not in a communist socialist way, 
more like a nationalist viewpoint. I'm on social media a lot. And I hear a lot about how we're going 
communist or socialist—and I always tell them, you have no idea what communism or socialism is until 
you live it. Please do not insult my intelligence. Because this is not—this doesn't look, it doesn't taste, it 
doesn't smell like communism or socialism. And I guess the other thing, the other image, the other thing 
that I see is on social media—all these attacks. You don't agree with me therefore I'm going to tell you 
what a horrible human being you are, you are a bad person. And I have now started just saying, “why do 
you feel the need to negate me as a human being?” And people can't answer that. And to me that's 
frightening. 
 
Interviewer: Yes. So when you’ve said that on social media, have you found that no one has responded, 
it just ends the conversation?  
 
P-14: Yeah. And that's a symbol to me that we are in big trouble. 
 
Interviewer: So you did touch upon this already in your example with social media, uh what happens 
when you run into somebody who holds a different political point of view, and even with your husband, 
can you think of an example when this happened. What did they do, what did you do?  
 
P-14: When I first started out before the 2016 election, I got caught up with the—my way or the 
highway—and [my fiancé] says that I’m BS’ing people on social media. And I think for the longest time, I 
thought it was for me, more like a mental game, a brain game. You know, how much information can I 




P-14: And then I realized I don't like this about myself. I don't. I just don’t. So I stopped. And now I try to 
be as polite and to the point as possible. Covid, I think is an excellent example. Um, people out there are 
saying, well, it doesn't exist. You're going to survive. The figures are wrong. I have had so many people 
tell me that the CDC has said that the numbers are inflated and I turn around and say, okay, show me. 
Show me where that is, because I've been on the website and it says 225,000 people have died as of 
today. Where are the inflated numbers? They can't answer that, they won't answer that. And one guy 
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said “well, you know, Trump owns the CDC.” And so I turned around and I said, “look, it doesn't behoove 
him [Trump] with his political viewpoint to say that he owns the CDC, because the numbers are going 
against him so he’s not that stupid.” So that's, I mean that's an example of what you see in social media. 
 
Interviewer: So do you find that when you ask them to show you where they found their source, and 
then if they can't find it, does that end the conversation?  
 
P-14: I would say 99% of the time. I mean one guy said that it was on the, he saw it on the news, and I 
just said, “okay, just show me the sources so I can change my viewpoint.” Nope. Because it's, it's all 
about—it's like children. This is what children do, they will start a little rumor and it gets bigger and 
bigger and someone said “so and so,” and “so and so,” said it's the same thing. We're acting like little 
babies.  
 
Interviewer: So have you ever had a time when you've taught or helped somebody else to think 
differently about a political issue? How did you go about doing that? 
 
P-14: I’d like to think that I do that all the time. I hope that I do that all the time. And I hope I do it with 
respect and with love. Right now at church, we're doing a Zoom class on how to be civil to each other. 
How do we as Christians relate to other people. I don't expect to change your opinion. It's pretty hard. 
Once you make up your mind, you make up your mind. But I like to say, okay, here's my viewpoint, and 
this is how I—why I feel like that. I'll give personal examples, like Covid. People are saying, well, it's no 
big deal. Well, I come back and I'll say, well, it's a big deal in certain people's lives. For example, my 
sister has had Covid. She has neurological issues now. Her husband was in the hospital for four weeks.  
 
Interviewer: Oh my goodness.  
 
P-14: Yeah. You know, I have a friend who lost their taste and smell for months. This is not the flu, it's 
not a common cold. I've had people come back and say, well, it's just part of life, it's part of life and 
death. You know, [someone told me] their relative had ALS. Well, this is not about, as I said, this is not 
about my tragedy is worse than your tragedy. They're all tragedies. They're all tragic but we just can't 
put Covid under the rug or put our heads in a, in a, you know, in the ground, just like an ostrich. And I 
said that. You know, you're fooling yourself. Usually the conversation ends. And I used to like that. You 
know, it's like, oh I upped you. But you know what? It's sad, because we should be able to go on into a 
deeper conversation, more reflection and it's not happening. 
 
Interviewer: In those cases, these specific people you've talked to about how Covid has impacted your 
own family, have they experienced it in their own family? 
 
P-14: Oh yeah, one woman said, “oh yeah, I’ve had several members who had Covid.” Okay, but again, 




P-14: I'm sorry you had seven family members that had Covid. And with seven family members, why do 
you persist in saying this is nothing? 
 
Interviewer: Wow. Yeah. 
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P-14: They can't, they can't answer it.  
 
Interviewer: How did you model your teaching strategies or how you helped someone after someone 
you have observed in your own life, if at all?  
 
P-14: I try to be a good Christian. And Christianity means you walk in the ways of Christ. How did he do 
that? He did it through parables, through stories. I try to do that with my own history with my stories. 
Ask reflective questions. I'm an educator. I'm a retired school administrator. And I was a teacher. I teach 
for UCLA online. And so for me, reflection is very important. So you don't want to just ask—who, what, 
when, where, how—you want to ask more reflective, well, why do you think, why do you say that?” So 
my education, and my background as an educator and my beliefs as a Christian form how I try to teach 
people. Am I successful? Sometimes. Not always. 
 
Interviewer: Well, building on that a little, when you help others understand your own political views, 
how do you think they learn from you?  
 
P-14: I think they learn from me by how I act. My reaction. At first, I was escalating situations, because I 
really do love a good argument. I really do. Especially intellectual. But for me, they're not personal. 
They're just brain games. And I know, I finally figured out, well, they're not, they're not playing these 
intellectual games. This is like for them, they really believe this. So I've had to totally change how I go 
about it and make it a little bit more personal and try not to be as emotional as I can be. Because I am 
Cuban. [laugher]. 
 
Interviewer: [laughter]. Thank you. And if someone were to change your mind on a political issue, how 
might they go about it?  
 
P-14: That's a good question. I don't like people that are in your face. I don't like confrontation. So if 
they could make it very logical, very intellectual, very brainy. [brief interruption]. So if someone can have 
like a teaching moment, that'll work for me. 
 
Interviewer: Mm hmm. Thank you. And are there any images, metaphors, or practices that resonate 
with you?  
 
P-14: In terms of what?  
 
Interviewer: In terms of a conversation with someone that has changed your mind on a political issue.  
 
P-14: I think someone who's calm, who will base their viewpoint, not just intellectually, but on their 
personal beliefs, their experiences, their stories. I think stories are very powerful.  
 
Interviewer: Do you think that when stories are used in those instances, it helps you remember, you 
know, what they're saying?  
 
P-14: Yes, yes. It makes them human. And one thing I do when I meet people, and I think this is because 
I was a school principal—if I don't like you, I always try to find something we have in common because 
that'll help me not to see the parts of you I don't like. And it'll give us some kind of bonding. Bonding, I 
think is very important when you're trying to change somebody's mind. 
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Interviewer: Yeah, yeah. So, going back to a political issue that you have made a shift on—with whom, 
might you have shared your shifts with, if anyone? 
 
P-14: Well, it would be [my fiancé], of course. We talk a lot. Uh, sometimes it gets a little too intense. So 
we back off. It's sort of like a rule between us that one of us can say, “okay, this is going south. Stop,” 
and then we'll just back off. So he would be the number one person that I would share that with. 
Probably the next person would be my sister, my best friend. So it would be my inner circle.  
 
Interviewer: Yeah, and I guess at what point did you decided to share your perspective on social media, 
if at all?  
 
P-14: Pretty quickly. I'll take quite a while to think, to reflect, to make a decision, but once I make it, I'm 
behind it, until, until I change my mind, which I found since 2016, my mind's been going back and forth. 
 
Interviewer: Can you tell me a little bit more about that?  
 
P-14: I don't know what to believe anymore. And to me, that's scary. It used to be, you could go on the 
news, it's seven o'clock every night—you're too young, you won't remember this, you weren't around 
probably—and Walter Cronkite was on and the world was just right. I mean he just reported the news. 
Now you go on five different channels and you're going to get five different viewpoints. And who's right? 
And who's wrong? Maybe they're all right and maybe they're all wrong. I mean, I don't know. So that's 
something I've struggled with. Trying to make sense of what's going on. 
 
Interviewer: So you touched upon this earlier as well, but going back to an issue that you've shifted on, 
what motivated you to make those changes, what drove that change, what do you think enabled that 
change? 
 
P-14: It changed because I grew as a person. I gave it a lot of reflection. I talked it over with someone I 
trust, who had an opposing viewpoint. Did I shift completely to that side? No, but it brought me a little 




P-14: So those are just some of the things for me. 
 
Interviewer: Thank you for sharing. So what does it take for you mentally and emotionally for you to find 
common ground with someone who thinks differently than you politically? 
 
P-14: First thing I need to do is calm down. Because there's some issues for me that are triggers. And I 
don't understand why people would not care about other people and what they're going through and 
why we're not helping them. So to me, that's a trigger. And so I have to calm down and I have to tell 
myself, “okay, okay, I gotta find a common ground here. What is it that we may have in common?” 
 
Interviewer: Mm hmm. 
 
P-14: Do you play tennis? Do you have dogs?  
 
Interviewer: Right. 
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Participant Models & Sources Shifted Political 
Issues 





































Ideal models are 
professors. 
Appreciates when 
they ask, "Why do 
you think that?" 
The more I learned, 
the more I realized 
I understood their 
reasoning and then 
I more or less fell in 
line in that sense.  
 
Media:  
NY Times and 
liberal-media 
outlets. Aware that 
he has a bit of an 
echo chamber. Sees 







the Bible for you. 
It's really bad idea.  
Immigration: 
Stronger support, 




Stronger support.  
Used to be a pacifist 
but is now less 
idealistic and more 
pragmatic. 'Speak 
softly and carry a big 
stick' indicates 
willingness for 
American to use 
military force in some 
cases.   
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: Defensiveness and 
anger when discussing opposing 
feelings. Lot of verification going 
on from my side. It's very 
challenging when he disagrees with 
a role model, especially his mom, 
someone he is close to since it's 
difficult to see her so angry and 
bitter--not compassionate.  
 
Rewards:  
Learning: It's very rewarding 
because it forced me to think. 
Because I am curious. I do like 
learning why you came to your 
conclusion. I tend to probe a bit here 
and there. Important to take time 
and listen to role models and do 
more research. He's more attentive 
[to models] and tries to go the extra 
distance because of his professor. 
He is much more inclined to try to 
reason with  role models that he 













































Reason: I definitely engage them and I 
definitely ask them, “why?” And I 
want to understand their reasoning. 
And there’s definitely a back and forth 
on who believes in what. Discussions 
with the politically aligned are easier. 
There’s a lot of nuances. He 
approaches political disagreements by 
agreeing on certain points and probing 
into other perspectives to slowly gain 
commonality using sources and facts.  
 
Reason: Substantial amount of 
reasoning that goes into what I 
intimately define my vote on.  
 
Emotion: Moved mom left on welfare 
—she learns because ultimately, 
she's—I am her son and she knows I'm 
a good person and I don't do this 
without reason and—she learns 
because ultimately, it's compassionate 
and it's right.  
 
Reason: Finds political alignment 
through stats and numbers. If the data 
points in that direction, I don't have a 
choice.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Emotion: Common ground becomes 
very difficult with a lot more emotions 
involved. There is pre-determined 
antagonism between the parties. 
 
Reason: Because from my experience, 
our reasoning is completely different. 
We come to the conclusion from a 
completely different angle... each party 
just feels they are right and there is not 
really a discussion at all. 
OL-Attention:  
Notices an issue through facts, 
studies, or stats. The numbers are 
the numbers.   
 
OL-Retention:  
The older he gets, the more he 
remembers stories and narratives 
about political issues, such as 
refugees and what they go through.  
He feels that the current 
immigration system is not adequate 
towards providing what the Statue 
of Liberty stands for.  
 
OL-Reproduction:  
Metaphors and images have 
sometimes forced him into 
recognition. It resonates with me 
and I have to step back and 
completely reevaluate, I think in a 
cognitive sense, but it forced me to 
say, “there's a disconnect here,” 




If your goal is to benefit humanity 
or our country...it keeps me 
committed and attentive because I 
want to see your reasoning and like 
you care.  If you are just being 
mean and a jerk, I'm not going to 
listen as well because you're just 
not a very nice, and the empathy 
element is definitely not there. 
Automatically...the more reasoned 






Justin (continued III) 
 




















Religion: Very little 
importance 
EL-Return to Experience: 
Thinking about immigration, as he got older, he 
heard more stories and I heard arguments on 
both sides. When he was younger, he felt more 
opposed to illegal immigration. 
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
I shifted towards  being much more 
compassionate towards, I won't say illegal 
immigrants, but like definitely those that 
identified as such, and they should have more 
support.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
So that's one way I've thought that like my 
beliefs and my self-identity come together and 
become more synchronized. 
Empathy & Compassion:  
The world is unjust. And we 



















































Religion: Very little 
importance 
Family:  
Raised by working-class 
Democrats in the South, 
but they were 
completely different 
than the Democratic 
Party of today. 
Everybody's got to 
work. You only get 






Media Sources:  
Social media, paper 
media, and individuals. 
Acknowledges that if he 
sees something that is 
outside of his political 
views, he will have to 
do a lot of research to 
validate it, whereas if it 
is consistent, he doesn't 
need to, because it feels 
right. 
 
Political Influencers:  
John Wayne 
Opposed to: Obama, 
Clinton 
Competitive shooting: 
Stronger support.  
In the 1970s, laws were 
passed that restricted his 
access. That galvanized me. 
My story started right there 
because at that point, it didn't 
matter what party it was, it 
didn't matter, none of the rest 
of it mattered. They 
[Democrats] attacked my 
personal life.  
 
Illegal Immigration: 
Stronger opposition.  
I'm in strong favor of legal 
immigration and very, very 





Had to claim he was against 
late-term abortion with his 
friends because they are the 
only people that are on his 
side in terms of his other 
political beliefs. The people 
who are in favor of late-term 
abortion also hate me and 
my life.  
 
Legalized Drugs: Stronger 
support.  
All drugs should be legal.  It 
is very inconsistent with the 
kind of conservative crowd 
that I find myself stuck with. 
Barriers:  
Change: A belief is 
just like any living 
thing. It is going to 
fight to maintain 
itself. So, change is 
always hard. It's not 
worth raising blood 
pressure to argue 






rewarding part is if 
you build a 
consistent life view. 
If you build what 
you think, and even 
though this piece 
doesn't look like it's 
going to fit, if you 
frame it right, it 
does. Again, that 
thing when I, when I 
decided that what I 
really am against is, 











































CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: You cannot model a 
behavior that is not in line with what 
you're saying and expect people to 
take either one of those two things 
seriously.  
 
Reason: It depends on the person I'm 
talking to. If they're willing to 
engage in an actual reasonable 
debate, I’ll talk to them about it. 
Interested in having rationale 
discussions about perspectives 
without emotions, without aggression 
or anger.   
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Closed: I also I don't mean to be 
bitter about this, but I'm also not 
responsible for anybody else's 
attitudes.  
 
Emotion: Now if I get somebody that 
starts screaming that...firearms...kill 
people. And that there's no reason for 
people to have guns...I just walk 
away because if somebody is not 
going to be rational or somebody's 
not willing to hear the other 
viewpoint, then there's no use in me 
talking to them.  
 
Closed: Doesn't have many friends 
that are left leaning because what 
they want from the world is so 
different than what I want from the 
world. We're not, we're not gonna 
have any real common ground. 
 
Closed: Figured out a real long time 
ago that people who are not 
interested in changing their views 
and are not interested in having a 
rational discussion. The only thing 
they'll do is drain your energy and 
make you look like a fool. Never 
argue with a fool because nobody 
can tell them apart.   
OL-Attention:  
Vietnam War images of dead 
children that American viewers 
saw on TV. Although the 
Americans didn't kill those 
children, because the video 
interviewed an American 
soldier with a helmet on and a 
rifle and the video of these 
racks of dead kids, people 




So first-person observation, 
seeing a system work yourself, 
that is probably the thing that 
resonates more than anything 
else with me.  
 
OL-Reproduction:  
If I use the vehicle to convey 
ideas to people, it would 
primarily be analogies and I 
would get those analogies by 
talking to the person and 
finding out what their strengths 




Keeping government out of 
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Religion: Very little 
importance 
EL-Return to Experience:  
I grew up in the late 50s and early 
60s in Louisiana and the KKK was a 
big deal and not in a bad way. It was 
a big deal in a in a positive way, 
right?... And then I...get out of 
college and I go to Arizona and I go 
to Georgia, I go to other places and 
see how those places operate. And I 
come back to Louisiana, and I see 
that there's still people putting KKK 
graffiti in the bathrooms and it 
pisses me off. And when I was 14, it 
did not piss me off. 
 
EL-Attend to Emotions:  
So I think the thing that changed my 
opinion about stuff like that is 
seeing that everybody working 
together, because if you work for 
the Feds, you don't see color...and it 
don’t matter where you're from, it 
don’t matter what your accent is, if 
the inmates start to riot, you run to 
help each other. That's the way it 
works.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:   
So after seeing how that system...the 
system that I grew up under was 
very abhorrent to me when I went 
back home. And that's one of the 




be involved in 
personal lives. The 
ultimate evolution at 
this moment on this 
planet is the individual 
human. Okay, so if I 
always start with that 
premise, and so when 
I look at something, 
what does this do for 
the life and self-
determination of an 
individual human in 





politics of the US 
by reigniting racial 
tensions that had 
been pretty much 
put to sleep since 
the 1970s.  
 
Clinton:  




killed too many 
people, she’s done 










































a bit of 
importance 
Family:  
Raised by very 
conservative and 
religious Republican 
Catholic mom and 
stepdad (negative) in a 
very conservative 
district in the Midwest. 
Her mom's right-
leaning perspectives 
pushed her more left 
because it didn't align 
with her own values. 
Her Cherokee dad is 
non-political. She is 
influenced now through 
her dad's side of the 
family through 
Cherokee Nation where 




Close friend who is a 
Bernie supporter 
pushed her more left.  
 
Teachers-Mentors: 
Professor that always 
played devil's advocate 






Stepdad listened to 
Rush Limbaugh every 
day since she was 6 or 
7. Checking where 
sources are from is 
important. She asks, is 
it  reliable? She look for 
primary sources rather 
than think pieces.  
Political Ideology: Moved left.  
 
Universal Healthcare: Stronger 
support.  
Personal experience with a 
healthcare emergency changed a 
lot of things and how I saw 
myself, you know, reflected in 
other people's situations. And so, 
especially with the tribe, the 
Cherokee Nation. They have done 
so much just to provide for 
citizens throughout all of this. 
 
Welfare Drug Testing: Stronger 
opposition.  
 
Military: Stronger opposition. 
Does not support government 
spending on it. The military and 
the police are not necessary at the 
capacity that we have them today. 
There is no need for the amount 
of funding that goes into our 
military, and it's being used as a 
way to brainwash people at pretty 
young ages. 
 
Black Lives Matter: Stronger 
support. 
Where I grew up was a rich, 
white, farming community. In my 
entire high school, there were 
probably—at any given point in 
time—like 10 people of color out 
of about 500 people in my high 
school. And so, I grew up not 
really understanding viewpoints 
that were different than mine 
because I had never been faced 
with any of them. 
Barriers:  
Emotion & Reason: It 
took a lot of me 
having to say to 
myself, you're wrong... 
think of it from a 
different perspective, a 
lot of self-reflection. 
And it was 
hard...Shifting views 
takes a lot of 
unlearning...the 
implicit biases...but 
then it was also 
replacing it with 
something that was 
rewarding and 
something that I do 
truly believe in.   
 
Rewards:  
Growth as a person: I 
just feel so much more 
competent and I just 
feel so much more 
empathetic and just 
loving towards 
everyone, including 
myself. And so, I feel 
like there's been so 
much that I've learned. 
And it's something 
that I'm so grateful for 
every single day. It's 
something that I want 
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CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: Likes to ask, why do you 
think this way? Why is it this way? Why 
do you think this? Why do you think 
this?  
 
Human Rights: I definitely more so 
align, and think like the people that I'm 
with now, because it's very community 
based. It's about how we help each other 
and what we can make for each other.  
And once you have enough, how can 
you give back to others?  
 
Open: So, a lot of the time that I have 
found common ground, it's been on 
accident. Entirely depends on the 
situation and the person. 
 
Open: Seeing things from a different 
perspective...I grew up in an area where 
everyone was just kind of like me....And 
even as...a Cherokee woman...I...am a 
white passing person, and I understand 
the privileges that I have that other 
people, other native people don't. 
 
Emotions: Common ground can be 
found through facts that then... mixed 
with emotions, mixed with those 
feelings, and then wanting to do more 
with that...[If] I'm presented with an 
argument that then makes sense, and 
even if it is emotional, I know that I will 
consider that. I may not believe it....right 
away, but I will consider, okay this is 
where they're coming from. This is what 
this is.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Closed: I don't align with the community 
that I came from anymore. When—
where I grew up, was very much more 
of a—if you have enough for yourself, 
you know, you have enough for 
yourself. 
OL-Attention:  
Shifted her views on 
mandatory drug tested for 
people on welfare after seeing 
a social media post about how 
it's not just the individual who 
is impacted. It is the whole 
family. Later, she started 




Whenever welfare comes up, 
the social media post is the 
first thing that I think of. The 
absolute first thing. It's like 
that always sticks in my mind 
because it's not about just one 
thing. It's about a lot of things.   
 
OL-Reproduction:  
She has become more vocal. 
Now I like fight everyone that 
I can that like says something 
that is racist, sexist, 
homophobic, or whatever, like 
I just, I don't care anymore. 
Because I know what I'm 
standing up for and I don't 
want to question any of that.  
 
OL-Motivation:  
Wants to give back to the 
community--to live her values. 
In order for us to really help 
each other, there has to be that 
reason to, it has to be that 
emotional connection—it has 
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college, no degree 
Employment: 
Student 
Income: Less than 
$20,000 
Religion: Quite a 
bit of importance 
EL-Return to Experience:  
Primary season for 2020 
presidential election, she 
ended up having emergency 
surgery that changed her life 
and was very traumatic.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions:  
She reflected on how lucky 
she was to have had her 
medical costs completely 
covered by Indian Health 
Services. But if she hadn't 
gone back to her roots to learn 
more about her culture, she 
would have been in debt for at 
least 10 years.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:   
I'm not a Democratic Socialist, 
but like a socialist and like 
very passionate about those 
things. And like now the 
government providing and 
rather than, you know, that's 
the job of government, it's like 
they work for us, we don't 
work for them. 
Equality: Growing up when 
I looked at Catholic values, I 
did not see the conservative 
values—I saw more like 
what I now know is like 
socialist values, you know, 
the way that Jesus treated 
people and those kind of 
things. And so just learning 
my privileges and learning, 
you know, this is where I 
came from. And I can't 
escape that. I'm never going 
to escape those things in 
how I was raised, but I can 
use that and I can use those 
things to know what I want 
to do different. 
 
Empathy: But then once 
people brought emotions in 
with the facts and then 
that's—I felt like I became 
way more empathetic....And 
with that, I feel like I learned 
so much more.  
In order for us to 
really help each 
other, there has to 
be that reason to, it 






















































her husband and 
mother-in-law who 
serves on town 
council. Her mother-
in-law is white passing 
and will set other 
people straight when 
they are offensive to 
her. But she remains 




NPR, BBC. Doesn't 
watch the news 
because you'd have to 
watch four channels 
and stick it together to 
get the real truth. 
People who take 
memes as news is my 
issue. That's not news. 
Black Lives Matter: 
Stronger support.  
George Floyd. Trayvon 
Martin.  Having to explain 
to my white family why it's 
important. Obviously I am 
black, this affects me, but 
now that everybody has a 
camera in their pocket all 
the time. And there's all this 
evidence and you can catch 
a cop murdering someone 
on camera, and they still 
walk. It's infuriating.  
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: Dealing 
with people that are racist. 
There are definitely people 
I think differently about 
now, so that's one of the 
downsides. If I'm your 
friend, or if you're my 
friend, like you're going to 
be my friend like even if 
you are a racist, a secret 
racist, but you don't want 
to admit it. If you call me 
right now, and there was 
an emergency, I would 
come get you. It is just 
who I am. So, I feel like 
that's the best. You just 
have to prove their 
stereotypes wrong. And 
then maybe we'll think 
about it, maybe. 
 
Rewards:  
Being active. Having a 
voice. Being heard. I 
definitely met a new 
community of people, 
which is nice. People I can 
share with, people I could 
talk to, people I can bring 
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CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Reason: I'm very direct. It's very 
logical and analytical.  
 
Reason: Importance of facts to 
counter misinformation, opinion, 
and feelings. 
 
Context: Depends on who it is and 
the context.  
 
Open: Unspoken agreement not to 
argue. It's okay to hold different 
political opinions and still be 
friends....I'll be friends with 
everybody, including political 
rivals. Accepting of everybody and 
everything. It's okay to have 
different opinions.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Approach: It's not going to be better 
until you start listening and taking 
what I say seriously.  
 
Reason: I will out fact them and 
then they can't, they don't know 
what to say.  
 
Reason: It's difficult when people 
are stubborn and won't see reason or 
facts.  
 
Closed: She feels that some people 
are not open to learning. When 
discussing the protests emerging 
from police brutality and how some 
white people claim that black 
people should get over slavery. How 
about you get over the civil war that 
you lost? How about that? The 
statues should come down. How 
about you learn the real history, not 
the whitewashed history. Very 
infuriating, but you know, all I can 
do is bring people facts.  
OL-Attention:  
Began to pay attention to racism 
as she grew older, as she 
experienced it herself and how 
she saw her family speaking 
about Muslims in regard to 9/11 
and more recently the Muslim 
Travel Ban. Facts don't lie. Facts 
don't have a hidden agenda. Facts 
aren't really prejudiced. Yeah—
it’s kind of like math, the rules 
don’t ever change. Science might 
evolve, but facts are facts. 
 
OL-Retention:  
She recalled her family's racist 
reaction to Muslims after 9/11. 
She remembers her upbringing. 
Facts help to retain information. I 
did get swept up with the passion 
before and like the emotional 
side. But regardless of my views 
of certain people, it's about facts. 
That's what I care about. 
 
OL-Reproduction:  
Before I met them, I was just like 
silent. I would only vote like for 
President. I didn't do anything 
else. Now I vote for everything.  
I'll do as much research as I can. 
I'll write all the theses I can.  
 
OL-Motivation:  
I have a women power shirt. But I 
love it, and I wear it all the time. 
Because that's how I feel. And 
I've been on marches with it and I 
would not have done that before. 
Wants justice for innocent black 
people being murdered by police 
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EL-Return to Experience:  
Discussed 9/11. Remembered 
family's racist reaction, including all 
of like the slurs, everything you could 
hear, think of.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions:                   
She is now more open-minded. That's 
key because growing up, it was very 
conservative. And like to go out and 
experience things--like the first time I 
saw actual black people, I was scared. 
Well not scared, but like kind of 
nervous. I learned terrible things from 
my family. No, we are going to break 
those terrible habits.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
And then as I got older and more 
educated, I learned that like, hmmm, 
no--that's not the way to go.  I 
learned, it's not just about me--like 
there's so many other people going 
through so many other things. I was 
the only mixed kid in my school, in 
my family, like that's it. I went to 
college, I was like, oh my God, 
there's more people like me. It was 
good.  
Equality: But when it comes 
to racism, then I'm drawing a 
line. Thinking evolved from 
small town thinking at 
college, where there were 












































Raised by left-leaning 
mom who valued 
equality (positive). Dad 
was right-leaning 
Republican (negative). 
As a half Brazilian, she 
was upset with her Dad's 
racist comments. She is 
happy she wasn't raised 
by her dad. Ex-husband 
became more 
conservative, while she 





(positive). She keeps 
politics to herself and 
close friends. Deleted 




Motivated by her 




Malala and Greta. 
Environmental activists. 
Opposed to: Trump 
 
Media:  
NPR only, does not 
watch the news on TV. 
Social media.  
Transgender Rights: Stronger 
support.  
Still has trouble with using 
"their" pronoun. I like it 
because I like my thinking 
being challenged. I get bored 
with just the day-to-day stuff, 
and so when I'm challenged 
with my beliefs and my biases 
and all that—I really like it. 
Even though I'm 
uncomfortable, but I'm glad it 
happens. 
 
Religion: Stronger opposition 
Realized she didn't believe in 
God at age 12 when she found 
out Mormon church did not 
allow African Americans to be 
in their clergy. She told them 
Either you're wrong, or there's 
no such thing as God. So, I'm 
just going to not talk to you 
anymore. My brother was really 
into it. So, he, they kept coming 
for him. But not me. 
 
Legalized Drugs: Stronger 
support.  
Believes drugs should be 
legalized.  I think if people 
want to kill themselves on 
drugs, that's their business. 
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: I 
guess in coming to the 
decision that our 
president and his 
supporters are actually 
evil or stupid has lost 
me some friends, my 




My thing is, can I get 
up in the morning, 
look at myself in the 
mirror, and be proud 
of the person I am? 
And so that is what, 
how I get rewarded, is 
that when I do things, 
like for my students, 
so when I stand up for 
my students, you 
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active at age 8 










CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Human Rights: Aligns with her 
students when they are dealing with 
questions about their gender or other 
things. As a teacher, she worked to 
help students to see things from 
different perspectives. Importance of 
teaching kids how to trust their 
feelings so that they can take care of 
themselves as adults. 
 
Open: Tries to pay attention to her 
own confirmation bias when it comes 
to political issues. I just have to 
constantly say, oh, you're thinking that 
way because that's confirming what 
you want to believe. 
 
CP-Partisan Opposition: 
Individualism: I've always thought that 
it's not my business what other people 
do with their private lives. Okay? I 
don't want them to get into mine and 
don’t want to get into theirs. 
 
Closed: Does not see any way to find 
common ground with conservatives. 
My brother, he and I no longer speak 
because he is a Trump supporter—he 
and his wife. And they're, they're not 
nice people, you know? And so I 
know some Trump supporters and um 
I just feel like they would be Nazis if 
we were in Nazi Germany....and they 
are willfully ignorant and there's no 
talking to them. They hate liberals.  
 
Closed: On Facebook, she defriended 
anyone that was religious or a Trump 
supporter: I'm making a stand, I'm 
saying you're not okay to me, you 
know? That it's not okay to be racist 
and hateful and a terrible, basically to 
me, they're terrorists. 
OL-Attention:  
Observed her brother struggling 
as a child, being bullied in 
school with ADHD undergoing 
a Ritalin drug trial.  
 
OL-Retention:  
She thinks back to that time 




Because of this observation, she 
understand that a lot of people 
struggle, and so I don't want to 
hurt, help anybody struggle, 
especially students, young kids 
when they're just trying to 
figure things out.  
 
OL-Motivation:  
She wants to be a good 
influence on her students, 
always hoping that I am dealing 
in compassion because of what 
she saw her brother went 
through.  
One way that I would teach 
them is that I did not allow any 
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Income: Less than 
$20,000 
Religion: Very little 
importance 
EL-Return to Experience: 
Shared an experience at a conference where 
she defended Obama to a person she had 
met. I was just not.. letting him get away 
with this stuff...And I finally realized, I 
mean, because with my intelligence, I know 
how to cut people down but even though I 
was victorious, I felt like shit.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
She thought back to this experience and 
asked herself what kind of person does that? 
You just did that because you knew you 
could do it and you just wanted to cut them 
down to size and that's not okay.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
So ever since then... I don't... engage like 
that, it's just because I know that I can do it. 
Maybe I've proved to myself that I can do 
that and be mean and rude and use my 
intellect against somebody, but that's not the 
kind of person I want to be. So I realized 
that. 
Empathy:  
Teaching her students how 





































Moderate to liberal 
family members 
(positive). Raised in a 
religious setting.  
 
Teachers-Mentors:  
Professors in college. 
You had a sense of 
where they were 
politically, but that you 
never...knew for sure. 
That's, that's what I try 
to aim for. I didn’t try 
to hide anything, but... I 




Los Angeles Times, 
local newspapers, 
Washington Post,  New 
York Times, BBC, 
Politico, The Hill. Quit 
Twitter due to troubling 
tone of political 
conversations online. 
Still used FB. 
 
Memes...this isn't... 
news. This isn't real. 
This isn't factual. This 
is a picture that 
somebody has tried to 
use as a vehicle for an 
opinion of theirs. 
Trump: Stronger opposition. 
Was always against Trump, 
but his views hardened. When 
you have the leader of the 
country fomenting mistrust of 
facts, mistrust of media, 
mistrust of institutions—
something is fundamentally 
wrong. 
 
LGBTQ rights: Stronger 
support. 
In the past, it just didn't, it 
didn't register. It didn't affect 
me. I wasn't going there.  Once 
he shifted his viewed, it 
opened [him] up to some 
really great relationships with 
people. And he is now 
involved in relevant 
organization that he would 
have not considered before. 
Substantial but slow change 
over many years.  
 
Medicare for All: Stronger 
support. 
 




Sometimes it's not 
worth raising blood 
pressure to argue with 
someone you disagree 
with politically, but he 





But when you can have 
personal conversation 
about an issue 
and...change a voter’s 
mind that's to me 
rewarding. And when 
it's, when it's someone 
that I know, I'm having 
the conversation 
because I have some 
sort of relationship with 
them, and I value that, 
and I want to continue 
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CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: One politically opposite 
friend who he interacts with acts as 
a good check because his comment 
is, well, so does this post really 
move us forward in any way? And 
so, we both kind of check each 
other...It takes personal 
conversation or some sort of 
personal communication in a way 
that isn't typed in all caps...or 
lectured, corrected—that really has 
to be a conversation. And not, 
“well, you think that way, that's 
just so wrong.” 
 
Openness: Interested in learning 
new perspectives.  
 
Emotion: Importance of emotions 
when telling stories and changing 
minds.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Emotion: Troubled by the tone of 
conversation and sometimes the 
inability to have a conversation. 
And the way that social media has 
amplified that.  
 
Reason: We have different sources 
of information that make us 
comfortable. And it's just stunning 
to me how the same reality is 
reflected differently depending on 
which, you know, sources you're 
getting your information from. 
Even if it used to be that we had 
some at least some common 
starting places, and then from 
there, we could disagree, but we're 
not starting from the same place. 
OL-Attention:  
After experiencing a mass 
shooting where he worked, he 
started paying much more 
attention in the news and 
became aware of things that I 
might have missed before in 
terms of school, local school 
lock downs. 
 
OL-Retention:   
The experience was traumatic, 
and he recalls it clearly.  
 
OL-Reproduction:  
Shared the experience with 
others through 1:1 
conversation, group 
conversations, social media, 




More committed to the issue 
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He recalled experiencing 
a mass shooting where 
he worked. We had a 
mass shooting, um that 
some of our students, no 
one was killed, none of 
our students were killed, 
but there was a mass 
shooting. That was 




He became very 
emotional, and the 





He was motivated to 
share the hardening of 
his stance on gun control 









Changing minds should be 
approached from a logical 
angle, but emotions can 
also impact shifts, but I 
would want to think that it 
would be the logical ones 












Participant Models & 
Sources 
































who served in 
the Army. Was 
more 
influenced by 
father, but also 


















Political party: Moved right. 
Changed from Liberal Democrat 
to Libertarian.  
Typically, I think of going 
forward with Democrats, so it's 
kind of like the train is moving, 
and I'm just, you know, dropping 
back behind it and walking along 
well while its pulling out. 
 
Trump: Stronger support. 
Doesn't think he has done a 
terrible job. Prefers to support 
incumbents but thinks Hillary 
would have done a better job than 
him. He detests Bernie Sanders. 
Against socialism for the country 
at this time. The strength that he 
had in the Democratic Party 
started making me think, well, 
maybe the Republicans have 
something to offer. The woke 
attitudes really disturbed me 
because, you know, I mean, 
people like me are targets to woke 
people. Will vote for Trump in 
2020, which will be the first time 
in his life that he votes for a 
Republican. Trump has governed 
like a libertarian. And I think 
that's a good strategy to disengage 
us from China, to rebuild the 
economy after the pandemic. I 
mean, the pandemic you've 
shown us globalism doesn't work.  
 
Defund the police: Stronger 
opposition.  
Disagreed with a student who 
supported this issue. This 
experience led him to shift from 
riding with Biden to just 




challenge is all the shock. 
I mean, one of my son's 
friends said to me, man, I 
never would have 
expected you were cut out 
for Trump. He’s just, he's 
just like, totally 
flabbergasted.  
 
Seeing some people, I 
thought before we're pretty 
cool who just can't deal 
with people who don't 
agree with them.  I think 
of hippies, you know as 
super tolerant, you know, 
super woke, you know, but 
no, if disagree, if you 
scratch, push back at all, 




New friendships, seeing 
other dimensions of 
people's character. Started 
a political podcast with 
son's friend about 




Daniel (continued II) 
Participant Political 
Participation 






























CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: Doesn't think he should change 
people's minds, but he is interested in what 
they think and shares what he thinks. If we 
agree on things, that's great....But I don't feel 
like I should be changing people's minds, 
and I should be listening to them. And I 
should be open, but I think...you make up 
your own mind, based on your own 
conscience in your own life, and people will 
affect it.  
 
Emotion: Discussed how even though he 
doesn't agree with Elizabeth Warren's 
policies, he appreciated how she shared a 
story about an African American slave in the 
1840s, somebody taught her to read and 
write, and she wrote poems in diaries and 
Elizabeth Warren talking about that woman's 
experiences and what she went through was 
just an amazing thing.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Reason: When discussing “defund the 
police” with a student, he realized it was a 
no-win argument. There were never going to 
agree on the data, we're never going to agree 
on the experiences. 
 
Closed: I've had people stop talking to me. 
I've had a lot of more women than men who 
just say, you know, I can't deal with this. So, 
there is to a degree, political costs to this and 
social costs...And if people made up their 
minds in 2015 and aren't willing to listen to 
anything after four years of this 
administration, I can't do anything about it. 
 
Context: He detested Bush and had a friend 
who supported him. They would argue all 
the time. And he finally said to me one day, 
you know, I really like you, and we can't 
fight all the time, let's talk about baseball. 
He believes that sometimes, you just have to 
stop talking about politics if you want to 
keep some people in your lives.  
OL-Attention:  
Paying attention to his 
attitude of support for 
incumbents. In the past 
he didn't support Reagan 




Formed an attitude 
against him and I 
basically ignored what 
was going on while 
[Reagan] was president. 
 
OL-Reproduction:  




And so I kind of said to 
myself, I can't do this 
every time around. He is 
more now more open to 
acknowledging people's 
accomplishments despite 
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EL-Return to Experience:  
Recalled conversation with a 
student who supports “defund 
the police.” He disagrees with 
this stance.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions:  
This was upsetting and caused 
a big shift towards the right. 
She made a big impression on 
me because we have the 
pandemic, and I don't get to 
talk to as many people as I 
normally talk to.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
When I hear grassroots people 
saying particular things, uh 
that's when I start saying, okay 
I can form this opinion or that 
opinion. And he decided to 
move from the left to the right 
of this issue.  
Individualism:  
Political views are 
personal. Influenced by 
military father. Everyone 
is entitled their  own 
opinions. Not my job to 
change people's minds.  
 
Emotion:  
Importance of emotions 
when telling stories and 
changing minds.  
 
Openness:  
Listen to other 
perspectives. Be open 
with each other and let 


































Raised Republican.  
Spouse (positive): My 
wife and I are, have 
become, are leaning 
more liberal and I 
believe that our 
forefathers founded a 
liberal democracy or a 
liberal republic. But still 
considers himself a 
moderate conservative. 






Retired cops.  
 
Teachers-Mentors:  
Had a professor in 
college that taught 
American Revolution 
from the English side, 
the Civil War from the 
southern side. This 





reporting--with liberal or 
conservative bias. He 
discounts everything on 
social media. 
Occasionally reads NY 
Times or Washington 
Post. Interested in 
philosophical and 
historical books.  
Political party: Moved left.  
Unhappy with the current 
political situation and the 
partisanship. Has voted for both 
Republican and Democrat 
presidents, but most recently 
voted for Clinton (2016) even 
though he didn't like her and for 
Biden (2020). And what now is 
going on in our country disturbs 
me very much as a veteran. And 
I could see a tyranny starting 
and I'm just very upset with the 
current one, so I've already 
voted, and I've already voted 
pretty much a straight 
Democratic ticket because I like 
Biden and Harris.  
 
Racial injustice: Moved left. 
I've learned and grown that 
there's still a whole lot of 
inequity in the system... 
Ferguson, Missouri influenced 
this shift. An article in the 
Atlantic also influenced this 
shift, which described that 
whites are afraid of losing their 
majority in the power structure 
and want to keep minority 
groups down. He doesn't agree 
with that. I’ve become very 
egalitarian in my older age.  
 
In his youth, he evolved on his 
attitudes about racial 
segregation at his church. He 
supported ending segregation, 
but the pastor did not. I was just 
seeing too much of the, what I'll 
call the Pentecostal Evangelical 
white syndrome intervening 
with it. That started my search 
for a better process or a better 
life and a better understanding. 
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: 
Hard to explain to 
people his journey. 
You can't be a 
traveler and not 
become a world 
citizen and learn and 
live about how others 




It's been rewarding to 
me that I believe that 
I am a more 
egalitarian individual, 
but in having lived in 
the mixed 
neighborhood that I 
understand that some 
of the challenges that 







































CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: Frequently tries to get 
others to change their minds on 
political issues but is not often 
successful.  
 
Open: But there's still a lot of the 
conservative individuals out there 
that are willing to discuss with me 
and we arrived at sometimes we 
just agree to disagree, and other 
times they say, yeah, I can see 
your point of view. And I go, yes, I 
can see your point of view. I've 
made incremental progress, but 
like many individuals, they fall 
back on old habits and old 
perceptions. 
 
Reason: Values researching 
sources and sharing his 
perspectives. He expects others to 
do the same. Being a semi-cynic, I 
would probably go back and 
research their sources to see what 
the or the general perspective of 
those sources so I could make a 
decision there. 
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Context: Acknowledges that to 
remain friends with people he 
disagrees with, you ignore some of 
the ill-conceived ideas that they 
have. And they ignore what they 
consider my ill-conceived ideas, so 
you can continue the 
companionship and friendship. 
OL-Attention:  
Was impacted by the killing 
of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri.  
 
OL-Retention:  








He is motivated to support 
equality for minority groups 
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EL-Return to Experience:  
Recalled when he found out 
that in certain parts of St. 
Louis, Blacks and other 
minorities were being stopped 
by cops five times as much as 
whites for minor offenses, like 
a broken tail-light, and then 
were put in prison, couldn't 
afford bail, and then re-
arrested. This was all done so 
that the police municipalities 
could make more revenge.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions:  
And that just grates against my 
perception of fairness. He feels 
like he needs to do something. 
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
He discussed his thoughts and 
concerns on this issue with 
retired conservative police 
officers to try to get them to 
change this practice.  
Equality:  
Believes all racial groups 
should have equity. Moral. 
Considerate. 
 
Cognitive Flexibility:  
Philosophical questions are 
making me think and 
consider so that I have to 
adjust some of my 
preconceived knowledge 
and think of other things. 
 
Reason:  
Tries to be logical and not 
emotional when sharing 
political information. I find 
supporting evidence and 
then I... post the supporting 
evidence or use the 
supporting evidence. It's a 
perspective of which sites 
do you actually use and 
which sites you believe.  
Cognitive 
Flexibility: I'm a 
knowledge 
searcher...so.. as I 
learn and read and 
absorb... that items 
shift—sometimes 


























































Influenced to move 
left by college 
friends in Europe 
who were already 
more left leaning 
than American 
liberals. It opened 
her eyes to how 
things could be 










Media: NPR, AP, 
NY Times, Snopes 





meme culture by 
candidates...You’re 
reducing an issue to 
a quickly 
consumable bite. I 
don't think that's 
good for anybody.  
Political Ideology: Moved 
left. 
Was previously a centrist 
(economically conservative 
and socially liberal). Her 
experiences in college 
challenged these views and she 
is now a Democratic Socialist. 
I would say, it's been more that 
I'm critically thinking about 
any politician... I think as time 
has gone on, my interests 
have...gone back down the 
ladder of government and 
more interest in... how... are 
they proposing them, like, 
what is their 
motive?...Basically just going 
from accepting party lines to 
greater  analysis of individual 
politician’s policies. 
 
Public Services: Stronger 
support.  
Noticed the stark comparison 
between public services in the 
United States and in Ireland.  
 
Universal Healthcare: 
Stronger support.  
Doesn't understand why 
medical care costs so much. 
Believes it should be covered 
for everyone. She has watched 
her friends have to choose 
between getting medical care 
and paying for food and rent. 
She recently had to make a 
choice to either keep or stop 
taking a prescription that cost 
$300 per month. She stopped 
taking the medication since 
she recently lost her health 
care coverage.  
Barriers:  
Emotions/Reason: It's 
just...the weight of 
knowing these things, 
these horrible things that 
are happening. That every 
bit...of knowledge more 
that we get is just opening 
my eyes to the situations 
of people around the 
world that are even worse 
than I could have 
imagined. That it feels 
incredibly hopeless and 
heavy and encompassing.  
 
Rewards:  
It's rewarding when she 
knows she's done 
everything she can. That 
the side that I'm fighting 
on and what I'm fighting 
for is important and in 
time will be recognized 
as being valid...that I'm 














































CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Context: I think it's less of the approach 
and more about how close you are to 
that person. It's more about trying to 
share the information with someone, 
rather than convincing them. She was 
able to change her dad's mind on some 
issues, including same-sex marriage.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Emotion: Used to try to be more 
diplomatic when discussing political 
perspectives, but that has changed. It's 
important to call people out when what 
they are saying is untrue. And of 
course, this always gets heated because 
people don't like being told their wrong, 
but unfortunately there's no good way 
to do it. There are studies that show that 
confronting someone with new 
information doesn't change their mind. 
But she feels that she has to do what is 
morally right so that she knows that she 
has done everything that she can. If 
you're so entrenched in your own 
beliefs that you can't allow any 
criticism of those beliefs, I can't do 
anything about that. 
 
Context: I would sincerely laugh at [a 
family friend's] jokes and he at mine 
and you know treating each other like 
human beings [even though he is a 
Trump supporter]. It is possible if you 
forget everything that they stand for. 
That's what it takes. 
OL-Attention:          
Noticed the difference 
between how things are 
done in US versus Ireland 
after going to college there. 
Noticed how her friends in 
the US were struggling 





differences once she 
returned to the US and how 
the lack of social services 
is negatively impacting 
herself and her friends, 
especially in regard to 
healthcare.  
 
OL-Reproduction:   
Shares her concerns with 
friends, especially as she 
has recently lost coverage 
since she turned 26.  
 
OL-Motivation:             
She is motivated to change 
these policies and 
researches the policies 
among state senators and 
local politicians to see 
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EL-Return to Experience:      
Recalled experience when someone 
was talking about how they supported 
conversion therapy.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions:               
Made her extremely upset and angry. 
This type of political disagreement is 
not amendable to common ground.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
And it can be very difficult, and at 
times heartbreaking journey for me.  
Equality: Believes that everyone 
should have access to healthcare.  
 
Perseverance: Most of my heroes 
are people who do things right. They 
do things by the book that doesn't get 
them where they want it to. And then 
they have to adapt.  
 
Critical Thinking: Not accepting 








Participant Models & 
Sources 
























importance at all 




(positive) in a 
Christian 
household. She 
considers her dad 
a role model when 






Education is a 
large motivator 
behind who I 
would describe 
myself as today. 
 
Political 
Influencers: I feel 














cartoons. I think a 
lot of things are a 
little 
bit...oversimplified 
and meant to be 
inflammatory. 
Political Ideology: Moved left 
Growing up, she assumed that 
everyone's parents voted for Bush and 
didn't realize that wasn’t the case until 
fourth or fifth grade when she started 
questioning what Republican and 
Democrat actually meant. And it was 
posed as right and wrong, like, oh, I 
grew up Christian, so Republicans are 
like the Christian party. So that's what 
"we" vote for. In high school, she began 
to move left, but she still had the 
worldview of...if you're in a bad 
situation, it's because you did something 
bad. So, if you want your life to be 
better, like be a better person, which 
completely erases.. financial privilege 
[and] racial privilege. In college, she 
was influenced by a Psychology of 
Prejudice course, by my education, both 
through just meeting different people 
who weren't like me....not everyone 
starts on the same playing field. 
 
Policing and Black Lives Matter: 
Moved left.  
My dad was a police officer, so...you're 
sort of put into this artificial box of ... if 
you love someone who is a police 
officer... then you could not also 
participate in this other movement. Her 
dad wants her to reach her own 
conclusions. It wasn't until really 
George Floyd that I was like okay this is 
like, there's no doubt in my mind at all 
that George Floyd, Breonna Taylor... 
This is a problem that needs to be 
changed. I don't know what the solution 
is, but to say that it isn't a problem just 
isn't correct. 
 
Transgender Rights: Stronger support.  
It doesn't really affect me how someone 




people see that 
you've changed.  
I've probably said 
and done things in 
the past that have 
really hurt people. 
And like that's 
hard to think 
about, like, wow, 
I hope I wasn't 
that like white 
person in 
someone's life in 
high school who 
said or did 
something...really 
hostile, even 
though it wasn't 
intentional.... So, 
in some ways, it 
would be easier 
just to stay the 
same and never 
have to grapple 
with what you 
used to think and 




I think at the end 
of the day...I think 
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CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: I think fundamentally, just 
there are like core tenants that we both 
have to agree upon of like, we want 
this country to be better and it is okay 
to challenge what's happening and that 
we want people to be able to...pursue 
this American dream. So, I think a lot 
of it has to do with how it’s 
approached. I think that's sort of the 
core for me is knowing people's 
intentions. Like, do they really want to 
understand? 
 
Openness: Importance of asking 
questions and thinking about things 
from different perspectives.  
 
Approach: My dad and I... disagree on 
a lot of things, but I think I can 
understand sort of where he's coming 
from and we have sort of the same 
goal in mind. He just has a very 
different belief of how we get there.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Human Rights: I can be fairly 
reasonable as long as we're talking 
about something that isn't just 
someone's like right to exist.  
 
Reason: It's hard to have a debate 
when we don't even have the same 
information. It's not even just like 
different perceptions of information. 
 
Emotion: I sort of see the American 
flag as politicized nowadays... I do 
sort of get a little bit put off...because 
to me, it's sort of unfathomable how 
you can still be like proud of what 
we're doing right now.  
OL-Attention: Started paying 
attention on social media 
about the need for common 
ground between Trump 
supporters and Clinton 
supporters back in 2015. Some 
friends supported this idea and 
others did not.  
 
OL-Retention: Remembers 
thinking, how can you be civil 
with someone who you feel is 
threatening like your entire 
lifestyle? Started noticing 
more friends speaking out 
against the need for common 
ground.  
 
OL-Reproduction: It's okay 
to be emotional. Used to, sort 
of, subscribe to that like tone 
policing of, like, oh, like I 
understand what you're saying, 
but you should have, you 
know, said it like nicer or 
better because no one's going 
to want to listen to you if 
you're being nasty, which like 
might be true, but also like it's 
not fair to put that on the 
person who was grieving [in 
regard to police brutality].  
 
OL-Motivation: So, I guess 
just like I think that's a big one 
that I’ve made in last few 
years, like I've sort of 
understood, okay, like you 
can't expect people who are 
like, hurting and threatened to 
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importance at all 
EL-Return to Experience: 
Recalled how it is difficult to 
realize that her old political 
views about being pro-police 
are not in alignment with how 
she feels today.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
She feels that her old political 
views are really cringy and she 
is glad that I like took this 
class because if I hadn’t, I 
don't think I would be a very 
good person if I was still sort 
of thinking the things I used to.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
Acknowledges that some 
people have called her out on 
changing her views on police 
in a negative way. But that was 
before I really understood the 
complexity of things. Some 
friends have accused her of 
turning her back on her family. 
She now recognizes that it's 
okay to flip flop. And it's like, 
well, isn't that good? Don't we 
want people to change their 
mind, assuming that it is 
because they've actually had a 
change of heart?  
Equality:  
Once you start messing 
with people's human 
rights, it's like okay...I 
can't really sit here and 
debate that with you.... I 
think a lot of it has been 
sort of identifying what I 
value and... identifying 
what is important to me 
and what I think...a 
functioning society looks 
like. I'd rather live 
somewhere where 
everyone is sort of 
just...doing okay and 
living a decent 
lifestyle...but you also 
don't have like people 
making Go Fund Me’s to 
be able to have surgery or 
like stories of, oh, this 
like 10-year-old paid 
lunch debt for their 
classmate, what? Like it 
seems heartwarming until 
you think about it, like 





back about her own 
political views and 
reconciling this with 
her different political 







































Family: Husband and 
three daughters 
(positive). While she is 
pro-life, she believes 
her daughters are pro-
choice, but we are so 
close in terms of 
agreeing on the 
systematic approach.  
 
Friends: Has many 
friends with similar 
perspectives as her. She 
also friends with 
different perspectives.  
 
Teachers-Mentors: 
Credits her education as 




John Kasich. I think 
he's a commonsense 
person, and I think that 
he understands... 
systemic problems—if 
you want to solve 
individual problems, 
you always have to 
look at the context. 
Opposed to: Trump  
 
Media:  
NY Times, Washington 
Post 
Against Rush 
Limbaugh & Fox 
News, the outrage and 
persecution industrial 
complex that is 
designed to keep you in 
perpetual state of upset. 
Political Ideology: Moved left 
Against Donald Trump. She 
doesn't agree with the idea that all 
Republicans are all  the same, 
since she identifies as a 
Republican, but is also anti-gun, 
pro-universal healthcare, while 
also being pro-capitalism and in 
favor of lower taxes.  So, I've 
been on a little island for a really 
long time. She is against militias 
that she observed when she lived 
in Michigan, which is the “us 
against the world” mentality that 
Evangelical churches have, 
militias have, Q-Anon has...It’s 
just asinine to the extreme. 
Briefly dabbled in libertarianism 
for 2016 election but is going to 
vote for Joe Biden in 2020. Her 
conservative friends think she is 
liberal, and her liberal friends 
thinks she is conservative. Labels 
don't work for her. But I do have 
some small shred of hope that the 
Lincoln Project...I feel like my 
island has finally been put on a 
map.  
 
Organized Religion: Stronger 
opposition.  
Strongly pro-life but had falling 
out with Evangelical church. 
Believes abortion can be 
addressed through a systemic 
approach. 
 
Universal Healthcare: Stronger 
support.  
She and her husband have 
become really radical about 
advocating for universal health 
care. She believes it is a hidden 
drag on the economy, especially 
for working mothers. She also 
experienced a medical emergency 
that was financially astronomical, 
but after Obamacare was passed, 
her second surgery was much 
more affordable.  
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: I think 
that's the point of change, 
when you see somebody 
living your shared values, 
but executing it in a 
different way. It makes you 
wonder. Oh, is there really 
only one way, my way, or 
the way that somebody else 
tells me to do this and to 
achieve that goal? Could 
there be more than one 
way? To me, that's where 
the common ground really 
starts to open up... You are 
supposed to find the one 
system....It's like there's 
people simply hardwired to 
gravitate to a single point 
or a single truth. But...I 
don't...Can't there be 
several truths that are 
compatible and equally 
compelling that you can 
buy into?  
 
Rewards:  
Leaving her church. We 
didn't realize how closed 
we were to things 
that...were logical and 
actually rational, like how 
many perspectives we 
automatically discounted 
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CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Openness: Although she is pro-life, her 
pro-choice friend wrote her name on a 
piece of paper and "carried her in her 
pocket" to the first women's march. 
Thinking  this was an example of 
common ground, she wrote an article 
about how even though they disagree 
on so much, they agree on other things 
that can narrow their points of 
disagreement, which resulted in hate 
mail. This showed her how hard it is  to 
make progress, but she still believes 
there is room for common ground for 
issues such as women's rights, 
healthcare, childcare. and the economy. 
You should never have to choose 
between your baby’s life and your own 
economic well-being.  
 
Openness: There is complexity in the 
world, and a systemic approach helps 
us to make progress for any cause. 
There is possibility of common ground 
through nuances between political 
parties if you view the world through 
this lens.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Emotion: She shared a light-hearted 
video on Facebook about the 
importance of wearing a mask. One of 
her friends said the video was shaming 
and insulting and that she refused to 
wear a mask. And I thought, you know, 
she's adamantly pro-life. So, I wrote 
back if your personal convenience is 
more important than somebody else's 
health, you should be ashamed. 
 
Context: Most people are really—seem 
to find a lot of satisfaction in being 
with a clamoring group that reinforces 
their views...There is something in...the 
psyche of all people to perpetuate the 
group that they identify with. 
OL-Attention:  
Pays more attention to racial 
bias, especially since she has 
bi-racial grandchildren.  
 
OL-Retention:  
This really put a fine point on 
some of the issues that have 
been more theoretical.  
 
OL-Reproduction:  
I think it's... hearing our 
wonderful son-in-law who we 
adore, how he walks through 
life as a man who has dark 
skin in America has, I think, 
deepened my husband’s and 
my resolve to try to—I don't 
like the word tolerance, 
because to me it's always like 
gritted teeth like we’ll tolerate 
that, but to try to. 
 
OL-Motivation:  
She is motivated to make a 
difference in this regard 
through her company, 
including how we frame and 
present questions about the 
value of...diversity programs 
and about the level of self-
awareness they have in terms 
of corporate culture 
generically, but also 
specifically how they work 
with individuals who have 
greater or lesser levels of self-
awareness about the 
opportunities that they've had 
and the barriers that have or 
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EL-Return to Experience:  
Recalled an experience where 
she encountered one of her 
cousins who she had muted on 
Facebook due to her racist 
comments. She makes Rush 
Limbaugh look like Dolly 
Parton. I mean she's just awful 
online. She shares the most 
racist horrible things. It's 
appalling. She is totally into 
QAnon and she puts out there 
the most scathing horrible hate 
speech on a routine basis. She 
was concerned about seeing 
her in person, but when she 
did, found her to be a delight. 
She was so much fun. 
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
But in that instance, my 
experience has been that it was 
worth it for me to overcome 
my anger at her for being so 
blatantly hateful. So, I was 
sort of proud of myself in that.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
So I still think she's a racist. 
I'm trying to accept the 
complexity of who she is.  
Equality: Runs 
company as a career 
counselor, coach, 
and author to 
advance women in 
different industries. 
Believes in the 
complexity of the 
world and that 
common ground can 
be made by looking 
at everything 
through a systemic 
approach.  
Reflection: Values were 
tied to her church. Mission 
driven. When she and her 
husband left their church, 
they reflected on how they 
had been misled: You're 
like, was I a sucker? Or 
were there other factors that 
were more important so I 
just sort of ceded my 
decision making to these 
bigger authorities, or to this 
belief structure, or to this 
institution because it felt 
like too much work?...So I 
think you have...to go 
through a process and 
people intuitively know 
that, that if you break out of 
that system, that you're 
going to be, you're going to 
go through a self-
examination process...and it 






































Raised by Democratic 
parents (positive). 
Influenced by dad, who 
taught her to do research 
growing up. Husband is 
Republican. They are a 
military and police 
family.  
 
Political Influencers:  
Kayleigh McEnany and 
Candace Owens 
Opposed to: Obama, 
Clinton 
 




OANN, Parler, Dan 
Bongino, and Blexit. 
Talk radio: Ben Shapiro, 




And I do a lot of my own 
fact checking because I 
don't trust the media. She 
checks multiple sources. 
I think that [some 
people] see the headline 
and it drives an 
emotional response, and 
then they make an 
assumption about what it 
is. 
Political Ideology: Moved 
right.  
Up until 2008, considered 
herself as a moderate 
Democrat, but has since 
shifted to a Republican. 
Proudly voted for Trump...I 
support our president 100%. I 
think he's maybe America's 
best president probably since 
Abraham Lincoln. He's almost 
reached—I mean if you've 
watched his rallies. I haven't 
been to one...He has reached 
like rock star status.  
 
I'm concerned [the 2020 
election] is a choice between 
freedom and communism.... I 
don't agree with everything on 
the Republican side, but there's 
no way I want to associate 
myself with how far left the 
dark Democrats have gone. I'm 
not willing to take that chance. 
I think they're taking away our 
freedoms. I think that this is 
the path to socialism and 





Was pro-choice until more 
recently and is now moving 
towards a pro-life stance. 








hard being a Trump 
supporter. We don't 
feel comfortable 
expressing that view. 
It's challenging to feel 
like my Christian 
conservative views are 
looked at as bad. And 
that in America, I 
don't feel comfortable 
in expressing them... I 
will stand by them.  
 
Rewards:  
Knowing that you're 
doing what you feel is 
right and standing up 
for what you believe 
in.  I'm teaching my 
children and being a 
role model for them 
and standing up for 
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due to their 
political 
stances 
CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach:  I'm not trying to force 
my opinion on you, but I want you to 
have the right information to be able 
to make your own opinion.  
 
Context: Depends on the person and 
environment. 
 
Shared Values: Although she shares 
core values and morals with her 
Democratic Party mom but believes 
that her mom's values are actually 
more aligned with the Republican 
Party.  
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Approach: If you can't treat people... 
like human beings and with respect, 
there's no place for that. And I don't 
care what your viewpoints are, 
whether you're liberal or 
conservative.  
 
Emotion: Conservative Americans 
are sick of being...walked over...It's  
really disheartening, and we feel like 
we finally have somebody who's 
standing up for us, whose standing 
up for what's right and for what 
America was founded on. 
 
Emotion: Her children don't want her 
to put out Trump signs in her yard 
because they're afraid we'll get 
targeted.  
 
Closed: I don't agree with everything 
on the Republican side, but there's 
no way I want to associate myself 
with how far left the dark Democrats 
have gone. I'm not willing to take 
that chance. 
OL-Attention:  
Paid attention to Obama's 
policies after police shooting 
in Ferguson. Although she 
had voted for Obama in 
2008, she didn't agree with 
his response. As a military, 
first-responder family, she 
thought that Obama 
discredited police officers 
from the very beginning.  
 
OL-Retention:  
She remembers these events 
and has friends that were 
mobilized from the Missouri 
National Guard  to St. Louis. 
And then I saw...the start of 
Black Lives Matter and some 
of that movement starting to 
take over. And I saw a huge 
shift in a... racial divide in 
our country that I think 
started around that time. And 
I'm not saying it didn't exist 
before, but I think that's 
where it really became more 
mainstream, and people 
noticed it.  
 
OL-Reproduction: 
Ferguson kind of opened my 
eyes and from that point on, I 
started paying closer 
attention to the decisions 
[Obama] was making, the 
things he was pushing, the 
things he was voting for, and 
the Democrats.  
 
OL-Motivation:  
Protecting her family. She 
believes that Black Lives 
Matter is a domestic terrorist 
organization, comparing 
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EL-Return to Experience: 
As pro-police, season-ticket 
holding NFL team super fan, 
her family stopped attending 
games, due to NFL siding 
with the players who were 
protesting. As a military and 
police family, these player 
protests were extremely 
upsetting to her family.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
She can't morally get behind 
what the NFL is doing right 
now because they're playing a 
black national anthem and a 
regular national 
anthem....And then you know 
disrespecting our police and 
our military the way that they 
do. You know, they have 
Black Lives Matter on their 
caps and I just, you know, my 
kids are watching me.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
What really matters in your 
life—your character, your 
values, and your 
foundation....So I feel like if 
I'm going to stand on my 
moral high ground, I've got to 
stand on it as much as it's 
breaking my heart [to not 
support NFL team]. 
Morality:  
Stressed the 
importance of raising 
children with values 
and morals. It isn't 
about how much 
money you have. It is 
about how you're 
treated and how you're 
raised and your 
character your values, 
all those things are 
instilled in your 
youth....Kids in 
general are molded by 
their parents political 
views and the way that 
they think because as a 




Proud military and 
police family.  
I'm a Christian and I try...I 
make mistakes, but I try to 
think of how He would 
interpret this or how He 
would...affect change or go 
into these situations. It's 
really hard to not be 
judgmental...Too quick to 
judge or make assumptions 
and I think without knowing 
what people have gone 
through in their personal 
experience... that's a really 
hard thing to do.... you have 
no clue what's been going on 







































Immigrant to the US 
from Canada. Raised 
by conservative 
parents. Attended 
Catholic school, but 
he and his parents 
were a different 




His peers of color 
have been educating 
him on what their 
community faces and 
their lived 
experiences. As a 
male and very  white 
passing, I don't 
experience things like 
that nearly as much as 
any of my friends of 
color.  
 
Political Influencers:  
Pete Buttigieg: 
admires the way he 
frames things as well 
as the way he is able 
to kind of just keep 
moving past someone 
trying to interrupt him 





post, New York 
Times, Fox News, 
BBC, CBC, 538, 338. 
Fact checks his 
sources. Makes sure 
he sees a range of 
biases. 
Political Ideology: Moved left.  
Was more moderate when he 
was younger, but after moving 
to the US became more liberal. 
Equal rights is his most 
important issue.  
 
Police Brutality: Moved left. 
Was previously pro-police but 
moved to 100% police reform. 
He now believes that they need 
to be completely dismantled 
and reconstructed from the 
ground up with a focus on 
making sure they're meeting the 
needs of the community they 
serve. He is particularly 
concerned with the rights of 
Black and Indigenous people of 
color and specifically as it's 
related with policing has 
substantially shifted in the last 
year. Recognized that there is 
severe systemic problems that 
we as a society should probably 
consider fixing because again I 
consider the rights of a person 
to be number one. 
 
Black Lives Matter: Stronger 
support.  
He believes that a lot of the 
people who are aligned 
exclusively with the Blue Lives 
Matter movement are willfully 
or not, misinformed about what 
the Black Lives Matter 
movement is asking for. He 
doesn't agree with how Blue 
Lives Matter movement seems  
to focus heavily on being anti-
Black rather than pro-police. 
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: It's 
been difficult with the 
George Floyd protests. 
That's been very 
challenging to kind of 
reconstruct my—
unlearn and reconstruct 
my view on certain 
core societal issues like 
whether or not police 
brutality is a thing. 
Because I lived in a bit 
of a bubble where I 
kind of expected the 
best from things and 
people and I expected 
everyone to be a good 
faith player and that's 
been...really difficult to 
have my worldview 
kind of knocked down.   
 
Rewards:  
It's rewarding because 
the past five years have 
been really 
transformative in my 
life. I feel like I've 
become a person who 
has maybe a little bit 
more empathy and I try 
to see where people 
might be coming from 





Jonathan (continued II) 
Participant Political 
Participation 





























CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: He tries to determine 
what they agree on first to make 
sure there is some common 
ground and then determines what 
they disagree on and why, and at 
the very least, we both walk away 
having learned something about 
what another person might 
believe.  
 
Emotions: In regard to differences 
between health care in US and 
Canada, he shared a personal 
story of how his stepmom died of 
cancer while in the Canada health 
system. He modeled his 
discussion by starting small, 
growing it bigger in relation to 
the personal, hospital, and 
societal experiences. People 
respond very well to humanizing 
experiences because if you're 
removed, you're not going to have 
remembered it as well. 
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Emotions: If they are hostile, he 
tends to withdraw from the 
conversation.  
 
Human Rights: It takes a lot of 
emotional labor to try to discuss 
[rights for immigrants or rights 
for same-sex marriage] because 
often if I'm finding someone who 
doesn't agree...they may also...not 
see me as human or as a lesser 
human. So, with those, that takes 
a lot of personal restraint.  
OL-Attention:  
Through a conversation with a 
friend who is Latino, began 
paying attention to how people 
of color are policed differently 
that largely white communities 
in the US.  
 
OL-Retention:  
This conversation reminded 
him of his own lived 
experience, which was 
different. He was raised in a 
town with a heavy police 
presence, but the police 
presence was just for show. His 
friend shared that when he saw 
the police, he held his breath. 
He put his head down and he 
made sure that he was as 
unassuming as possible and 




This reminded him of how he 
felt constantly "othered" at his 
Catholic elementary school for 
not being Catholic. And that 
really drove the experience or 
the story home for me and I 
was like, oh, okay, it's like 
being constantly othered for 




The reminding that my 
experience is not the same 
experience for everyone...It's 
easy to get caught up in your 
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EL-Return to Experience: 
He recalled a heated political 
discussion with a family member 
where things got so bad that we 
just left the city altogether and 
came back to where we live.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
Recalling the emotions he felt, 
he shared that: If you're talking 
politics, things get personal, and 
there's a lot of emotions, it 
doesn't end super well, because 
I'm talking one thing, their 
talking another thing, someone's 
being called a fascist, someone's 
been called a damn commie and 
yeah, there's a lot of yelling and 
then there's a very tearful drive 
for three hours. 
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
Looking back, he now realizes 
that he was using a tone that was 
perceived negatively and caused 
defensiveness. It reinforced in 
him the importance of 
establishing common ground 
before diving into a political 
discussion.  
Equality:  
I believe that the 
rights of people 
should be 
respected and are 
non-
negotiable....as in 
their right to live 
in a society freely 
and openly—by 
the way, relevant, 
actually I should 
have mentioned, I 
am gay. And that 
was also very 
much frowned 
upon in a Catholic 
school in a 
relatively religious 
household in a 
conservative part 
of the country.  
 
Empathy:  
All of his 
experiences 
growing up helped 
him to build 
empathy.   
Blue Lives Matter and 
Black Lives Matter: I have 
been trying to listen more 
to my friends of color and 
it's been really rewarding 
because well, it's kind of 
destroyed my worldview. 
It's also made me, oddly 
enough a little bit less jaded 
than before, because I now 
have a bit of hope for 
change for the better. And 
it's a hard national 
conversation to be having 
but it's better to be having 
this conversation than 
pretending it's not needed. 
And that's also in its own 
bizarre way rewarding. 
Because again, as I said, 









































Immigrant to the 











Tries to be a good 
Christian. How did 
He do that? He did 
it through parables, 
through stories. I 
try to do that with 
my own history 
with my stories. 
Ask reflective 






Oprah Winfrey  
 
Media:  
Only reads news 
from abroad. The 
outside world has a 
better view of what 
we are than us here.  
Social media. 
Political Ideology: Moved left.  
Was previously a Republican, then 
moved to a Democrat. She is now 
unaffiliated. Can't align with extremes. 
Needs to stay in the middle. I don't want 
to be stuck in one political view.  
 
Back in 1980, she was at a cocktail party 
for Ronald Reagan...and the Chairperson 
of the California Republican Party...told 
me that they were going to let in the [far] 
right religious side. That they were going 
to become closer within the Republican 
Party, which and I told him...“you're 
crazy. You have no idea what you're 
about to unleash. Our party will be 
destroyed.” ... But then over time, I 
noticed this incredible shift to the right, 
whereas the Republican Party was always 
pretty much centered.  
 
Trump: Moved left and right.  
The 2016 election shifted everything...I 
have seen things in this country that I 
never envisioned as a young woman 
when I became an American citizen. I've 
seen a loss of respect for each other. A 
lack of caring for each other. And I see it 
on both sides. There are extremes. And 
how do we come back to the middle?  
 
Economically, she admires some of the 
things Trump has accomplished in terms 
of how to trigger jobs. But her basic 
beliefs that I have about human life and 
human rights, that has never changed, 
and it will never change. And I won't 
allow myself to change it. 
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: 
You may have a 
belief for just about 
your entire life and 
then you realize 




You grow as a 
person. And I'd like 
to think it makes 
me a better person, 
a more whole 
person. And not a 
fragmented person. 
I see a lot of 
fragmented people. 
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Participant Political 
Participation 

































CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Open: Her and her fiancé are 
different political orientations but 
have shared values...we will never be 
100% together politically, but we 
share a lot more. 
 
Approach: Tries to be more personal 
and less emotional. She listens even 
when she disagrees, but asks, "have 
you ever considered it this way?" 
 
Emotions: I don't expect to change 
your opinion. It's pretty hard....But I 
like to say, okay, here's my 
viewpoint, and this is how I—why I 
feel like that. I'll give personal 
examples, like Covid. People are 
saying, well, it's no big deal. Well, I 
come back and I'll say, well, it's a big 
deal in certain people's lives. For 
example, my sister has had Covid. 
She has neurological issues now. Her 
husband was in the hospital for four 
weeks. 
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Emotions: I don't understand why 
people would not care about other 
people and what they're going 
through and why we're not helping 
them.... And so, I have to calm down 
and I have to tell myself, “okay, 
okay, I gotta find a common ground 
here. What is it that we may have in 
common? 
OL-Attention:  
She will pay attention when 
someone is calm, who will base 
their viewpoint, not just 
intellectually, but on their 
personal beliefs, their 
experiences, their stories. I think 
stories are very powerful.  
 
OL-Retention:  
Stories help her remember 
because it makes them human.  
 
OL-Reproduction: Shares her 
shifts with inner circle, fiancé 
and sister. If I don't like you, I 
always try to find something we 
have in common because that'll 
help me not to see the parts of 
you I don't like. And it'll give us 
some kind of bonding. Bonding, 
I think is very important when 
you're trying to change 
somebody's mind.  
 
OL-Motivation:  
It changed because I grew as a 
person. I gave it a lot of 
reflection. I talked it over with 
someone I trust, who had an 
opposing viewpoint. Did I shift 
completely to that side? No, but 
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EL-Return to Experience: 
As a very small child, she 
experienced Cuban 
Revolution. She was separated 
from parents for two years in 
Spain. Once reunited, moved 
to Los Angeles, California.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
Would not want any child to 
go through what I went 
through and what I saw and 
what's happened to me.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
As a result of this experience, 
she values human rights and 
women's rights. It led her to a 
more liberal but moderate 
stand. Can't do extremes.  
Equality:  
Not just our bodies, but 
socially, economically 
[women's rights]...The 
basic beliefs that I have 
about human life and 
human rights—that has 
never changed, and it 
will never change. And I 
won't allow myself to 
change it. 
 
Compassion:              
The greatest 
commandment besides 
loving God, is to love 
one another as we 
should. So that also 
plays a big role in the 
way I shift. 
People on social 
media equate political 
beliefs with their 
value as a person. 
Why do you feel the 
need to negate me as 
a human being? And 
people can't answer 
that. And to me that's 
frightening. Thinks 
our country is 
heading towards 














Participant Models & 
Sources 





































son and nieces 







(World War II 









Fox News (to 
see what the 
other side is 
saying). 
Information 
from her son.  
Political Ideology: Moved left 
Thinks Trump is the most 
disgusting divisive—I hate to say 
it, non-intelligent president that 
we've ever had. I'm horrified by 
the things he comes out with. 
Influenced by her son, she and her 
husband voted third party in 
2016. In 2020, she and her 
husband will be voting for Biden. 
And so I've changed. I've changed 
dramatically. And I can't see me 
going back to the Republicans for 
a while.  
 
LGBTQ rights: Stronger 
support.  
 
Legalized Marijuana: Stronger 
support. 
Feels that it should be 
decriminalized and be legalized 
for medical use.  
 
Universal Healthcare: Stronger 
support.  
Doesn't want welfare handouts, 
but also understands that  not 
everyone starts out at the same 
place. Now feels that some people 
need support.  
 
Illegal Immigration: Stronger 
support.  
We need to work on it, but she is 
not sure what the right answer is. 
We can't just build a wall and say, 
eh , you can’t come in....And you 
can't be dividing kids from their 
parents...that's not...the American 
thing to do.  
  
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: Hard when 
you realize you have 
changed views that you have 
held for a long time. She 
realized that she has way 
more Republican elephants 
than she has Democrat 
donkeys. It's not that it's bad 
or good. It's just, it just feels 
weird.... but so that's what 
makes it uncomfortable. It's 
kinda like, whoa. I’ve just 
kind of changed stuff that 




She has become more open 
to thinking about her shifts, 
as opposed to putting an 
issue in a left or right box. 
Now I'm willing to say, 
okay, tell me why you feel 
that way? And let me think, 
if that's really something I 
can support.  I like the 
feeling of being an 
Independent that I don't have 
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able to work 









CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Open: Listening to people on 
both sides...It's not as black and 
white as you want to make it. 
Asks  people she is close with 
why they think what they think, 
what they base it on? She 
learned from her parents that is 
okay not to put yourself in one 
bucket. Meaning it is okay to 
look for the best candidate rather 
than alignment with a particular 
party. Everybody tries to put you 
in a bucket, you're either on the 
left or you're on the right. You 
can't be in the middle.  
 
Approach: She received a 
compliment from a friend about 
how she approaches political 
discussions with respect and 
civil discourse. 
 
Reason: Facts are important. For 
example, if you are talking about 
immigration, you have to think 
about the impacts. If I go this 
way, the trickle down is this, and 
if I go that way, the trickle down 
is that. Show me the facts and 
then let me decide which way I 
think is the better approach. 
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Reason: She doesn't like when 
people present their argument 
without supporting evidence. 
Will not listen to stupid Q-Anon 
conspiracies.   
OL-Attention:  
Grew up traditionally where 
she believed that marriage 
should be between a man and a 
woman. However, she now is 
aware of at least two relatives 
that are gay, which made her 
pay more attention to the issue.  
 
OL-Retention:  
Once you have a personal 
situation that impacts 
something, you go, wait a 
minute, you know, that's 




It makes me personally 
uncomfortable, but I see it now 
as their right. And I think that 




She is motivated by thinking, 
what's more important? This 
ideal or belief or whatever that 
you have over here—or this 
person that you care about? 
And that kind of answers it, it's 
like, well, it’s the person that I 
care about that is more 
important so, I need to, I need 
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Disabled, not able 
to work 





EL-Return to Experience: Discussed “defund 
the police” debate. Doesn't understand why you 
have to be either for the police or against them. 
This makes her upset because she views herself 
as patriotic and wants to put a Police Flag next 
to her Biden flag. She is disgusted by the fact 
that the Republicans are trying to take the 
American flag as theirs, it's not! I'm sorry, that 
is the American flag and I don't care if you're 
Republican, Democrat, or whatever you are.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
That's our flag. And so that made me ballistic. I 
do support the police. Now I also 
support...Black Lives Matter... So I guess, 
who's really turned me was Trump.  
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
Prior to Trump, she usually voted for 
Republicans, but now she won't vote for him or 
anyone that supports him. She feels that he has 
agitated this issue instead of building bridges. 
Patriotic:                                
Parents are both World War II 
vets. Her husband's parents 
escaped World War II from 
Lithuania. She flies the 
American flag every day.  
 
Compromise:                          
Nobody's willing to 
compromise anymore. It's like 
it's left or it's right—period. 
And I just, I have a huge 
problem with that. We got to 
work together, we have to work 
together because it's just 
nobody's 100% right and 
nobody's 100% wrong.  
 
Morality:                                   
She learned the important of 
honesty from her dad, who 
wouldn't even tell a white 
lie....And so when I see 
somebody that out and out lies, 
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Sources 

















































Fox (to see the 
other side), 
social media  
Illegal Immigration: Stronger 
support.  
Motivated by the separation of 
children from their parents.  
 
Trump: Stronger opposition.  
Always was against Trump, but 
her negative feelings have 
escalated. She remembers how 
she was angry with Mitt 
Romney for talking about 
"Binders of Women." Now that 
seems harmless compared to 
children in cages. What used to 
trigger her was so small in 
comparison to what Trump has 
done to this country. She feels 
like she would even vote for a 
Republican if she had to  get 
Trump out of office.  
Barriers:  
Emotion/Reason: It's 
exhausting. And Trump's only 
caused that, so it's just 
exhausting because I'm having 
to constantly, like okay, well 
what’s my view on that. Let 
me figure out what I really 
believe. You know, I don't 
remember ever having to do 
that with Obama and I'm pretty 
sure the Republicans, even 
though they might have hated 




Loves being active in politics. 
Her kids are involved in 
politics--they know what's 
going on. They have an 
opinion. And I think that it 
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CP-Partisan Alignment:  
Approach: One way to find 
common ground is to get down to 
a moral basis for your argument.  
 
Reason: Importance of facts and 
evidence. Do I have the capacity 
to believe that I could be wrong? 
Um, yes. Just I need facts and not 
Q-Anon. 
 
CP-Partisan Opposition:  
Emotion: Wearing masks for 
COVID-19 has been politicized. 
There are brawls in grocery stores 
when someone is asked to wear a 
mask where she lives. People that 
wear masks are called sheeples. 
My husband's African American, 
so he's like, if our only 
inconvenience is I need to put on 
a fucking mask, you should try to 
be black.  
 
Emotion: Her neighbor put up 
signs in his yard that started with 
We Back the Blue, but later 
escalated to Black Lives Matter is 
a Terrorist Organization and 
Hitler Burns Books. Another 
neighbor has a sign that says, 
“Touch My Trump Sign and I'll 
Kill You." What if my kid is just 
riding his bike and he fell...in 
your yard exterior 
slightly....When are you going to 
misread a situation and you've got 
this black kid that fell in your 
yard? It’s scary. 
OL-Attention:  
Notices a lot of outrage on social 
media but wonders how some 
people who are not engaged in 
politics at all--they don't even 
watch the Nightly News decide 
on who to vote for.  
 
OL-Retention:                            
She has a close friend like this 
and knows others like this. They 
will just go with what they see 
on Facebook, what their co-
workers say, and what their 
parents say, or whatever. And 
that's it, that's all they have and 
then that's how they vote.  
 
OL-Reproduction:  
So knowing this, she feels that 
maybe her social media posts 
will touch somebody and get 




She is motivated to reach people 
with her political perspectives, 
especially in regard to trans 
rights and women's rights. 
During COVID-19, her son 
came out as trans and she is 
trying to persuade her mom to 
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EL-Return to Experience:  
Prior to Trump, didn't pay attention to 
immigration. But after she found out about 
the separation of immigrant children from 
their parents, she was outrages.  
 
EL-Attend to Emotions: 
She is concerned with the way our country 
handles it and the policies that affect these 
children and their parent. That's just crazy 
to me. And I would never think our country 
would do something like that.  
Believes that Trump's words...and the 
things that he says are just, they they're 
hurtful or mean, they're terrible, they're 
totally prejudiced, they're totally not 
substantiated. 
 
EL-Reevaluate Experience:  
So my views shifted more liberal..and 
more humanitarian than before [on 
immigration]. 
Morality:                                         
I can normally land with a 
moral answer, you know, I 
mean, like, I don't have a ton of 
information on the kids in 
cages. I don't think I need to. 
What is right here? What is 
right for others? What is right 














Analytical Memos by Theme 
 
MEMO: Open versus Closed 
 
Common ground refers to alignment on an idea, belief, perspective, or person. Polarization refers 
to opposition to an idea, belief, perspective, or person. 
 
Definition 
To find political common ground, one must be open to it. Openness refers to being interested in 
new perspectives, ideas, or change, with an interest in complexity of thought or new experiences. 
Closedness refers to decisiveness and already having the answer, and to more fixed beliefs, with 
less interest in exploring alternatives or other explanations.  
 
This continuum of openness versus closedness could differ within an individual or across 
individuals, depending on the political issue.  
 
Codes 
Attitude Shifts (AS); Cognitive Perception (CP): Partisan Alignment and Partisan Opposition; 
Models & Sources (MS) 
 
Summary of Data  
• OPEN: Partisan Alignment: Perception of aligned political perceptions about person or 
group (us vs. them) 
 
Aspects of openness to new perspectives, ideas, and change and openness to complexity 
in thought or new experiences was captured widely across all participants. For instance, Emma 
(liberal Democratic Socialist) noted that “a lot of the time I have found common ground, it’s 
been on accident…entirely depends on the situation and the person.” She also discussed her 
interest in seeing things from different perspectives since she “grew up in an area where 
everyone was just kind of like me…and even as a Cherokee woman,” she described that she is 
white-passing and thus understands the privileges she has that other native people don’t. Another 
participant (William, conservative Independent) shared that he was a “knowledge searcher...so.. 
as I learn and read and absorb... that items shift—sometimes they regress and sometimes they 
move forward.”  Aleena (liberal Green Party) shared that she tries to pay attention to her own 
confirmation bias when it comes to political issues, thus she reminds herself, “oh, you're thinking 
that way because that's confirming what you want to believe.” An interesting example of 
openness was shared by Diana (conservative Republican), who is pro-life. She described how her 
pro-choice friend wrote her name on a piece of paper and "carried her in her pocket" to the first 
women's march. Thinking this was an example of common ground, Diana wrote an article about 
how even though they disagreed on so much, they agreed on other things that can narrow their 




progress, but she still believes there is room for common ground for issues such as women's 
rights, healthcare, childcare. and the economy.  
Betty (moderate Independent) expressed the importance of “listening to people on both 
sides…It’s not as black and white as you want to make it.” She asks people she is close to why 
they think the way they think and tries to uncover what they base it on. She learned from her 
parents that you don’t have to be stuck in just one bucket. The world is complex. Others also 
talked about the importance of political compromise. For example, Jenny (liberal Democrat) is 
open to be friends with everybody, including political rivals. She is accepting of everybody and 
everything. It's okay to have different opinions. Likewise, William (conservative Independent) 
shared that he still has a lot of conservative friends that are still willing to talk to him even 
though they typically disagree, thus they agree to disagree—yet he believes he has made 
incremental progress in helping others to shift their views towards more equalitarian 
philosophies. And finally, Julia (moderate Independent) shared how even though she and her 
partner are different political orientations—they have found shared values and that even though 
they will never be 100% together politically, they share a lot more.  
 
• CLOSED: Partisan Opposition—Perception of political opposition about person or group 
(us vs. them) 
 
Aspects of closedness includes decisiveness, already knowing the answers, and having 
more fixed beliefs, with less interest in exploring alternatives or other explanations. For instance, 
Marc (conservative Libertarian) shared that “I don’t mean to be bitter about this, but I’m also not 
responsible for anybody else’s attitudes,” going on to say that he “figured out a long time ago 
that people who are not interested in changing their views are not interested in having a rational 
discussion. The only thing they’ll do is drain your energy and make you look like a fool.” 
Moreover, Marc shared that he doesn’t have many friends on the left because “what they want 
from the world is so different than what I want from the world. We’re not, we’re not gonna have 
any real common ground.” Likewise, Aleena (liberal Green) stated that she does not see any way 
at all to find common ground with conservatives sharing that, “My brother, he and I no longer 
speak because he is a Trump supporter—he and his wife. And they’re…not nice people, you 
know?” going on to compare them to Nazis. She has deleted all of her Trump-supporting friends 
on Facebook and believes she is making a stand to say that she is not okay with their racism—
“basically to me, they’re terrorists.” Diana (conservative Republican) believes that most people 
“seem to find a lot of satisfaction in being with a clamoring group that reinforces their views.” 
Likewise, Julia (moderate Independent) was concerned that people on social media were 
equating their political beliefs with their perception of the values of other people, which 
prompted her to ask, “Why do you feel the need to negate me as a human being? And people 
can’t answer that. And to me, that’s frightening.” She believed that our country was heading 
towards nationalism. Jenny (liberal Democrat) feels that some people are not open to learning. 
For example, when discussing the protests emerging from police brutality, she was upset with 
how some white people were claiming that black people should get over slavery. This prompted 
her to respond, “How about you get over the Civil War you lost…The statues should come 
down. How about you learn the real history, not the whitewashed history.”  
Others complained about how they had lost friends due to their shift in political attitudes. 
For example, Daniel (liberal/leans Libertarian) shared that he’s had people stop talking to him, 




in 2015 and aren’t willing to listen to anything after four years of this administration, I can’t do 
anything about it.” And even those who expressed openness acknowledged that with some 
people, it will never be possible to find common ground. For example, Daniel (liberal/leans 
Libertarian) shared how he and one of his friends decided to end political discussions and just 
talk baseball. Similarly, William (conservative Independent) acknowledged that to remain 
friends with people he disagrees with, he has to ignore their ill-conceived ideas and they have to 
ignore what they consider to be his ill-conceived ideas “so you can continue the companionship 
and friendship.” And finally, Harper (liberal Democratic Socialist) reflected on how she would 
“sincerely laugh at [a family friend's] jokes and he at mine and you know treating each other like 
human beings [even though he is a Trump supporter]. It is possible if you forget everything that 
they stand for. That's what it takes.” 
 
Deviant Cases 
One participant (Shawna, a conservative Republican) shared that she believed her core values 
and morals aligned with her mom (Democrat), thus her mom must really be a Republican that is 
using the wrong label, since she has always voted Democrat, her parents voted Democrat, and 
that’s just what she does. Shawna believes that if her mom wrote down her values on a piece of 
paper, it would actually align with the values of a Republican.  
 
Points for Further Consideration  
• What is the role of learning as it relates to open and closed political perspectives and 
approaches?  
• In what ways are open and closed traits related to liberalism and conservatism?  
• What do the labels of political parties actually align with in terms of values? Can 







MEMO: Emotion versus Reason 
 
Common ground refers to alignment on an idea, belief, perspective, or person. Polarization refers 
to opposition to an idea, belief, perspective, or person. 
 
Definition 
To find political common ground, one must be able to think and reflect on their political 
attitudes. Political attitudes are influenced by cognitive reason (knowledge, rationality, logical, 
data-driven). We are more critical of evidence we don’t agree with than evidence we do agree 
with (Westen, 2007). Political attitudes are also influenced by emotion (feelings). People tend to 
view the world through positive or negative emotions, which can be elicited through stories, 
metaphors, images, or symbols. Negative emotions may reduce our ability to see other 
perspectives (Lakoff, 2008).  
 
This continuum of reason and emotion could differ within an individual or across individuals, 
depending on the political issue.  
 
Codes:  
Models & Sources (MS), Observational Learning (OL), Experiential Learning (EL), Values 
 
Summary of Data  
• REASON: Partisan Alignment—Perception of aligned political perceptions about person 
or group (us vs. them) 
 
Reason refers to knowledge, rationality, logic, and data. Participants that shared constructive 
approaches towards finding common ground are summarized here. For instance, Justin (liberal 
Democrat) shared that “I definitely engage them, and I definitely ask them, “why?” And I want 
to understand their reasoning. And there’s definitely a back and forth on who believes in what. 
Discussions with the politically aligned are easier. There’s a lot of nuances.” He approaches 
political disagreements by agreeing on certain points and probing into other perspectives to 
slowly gain commonality using sources and facts. He also revealed that numbers and statistics 
speak to him most when forming a new political view—“If the data points in that direction, I 
don’t have a choice.” It is also important for Jenny (liberal Democrat) to have “facts to counter 
misinformation, opinion, and feelings,” describing herself as “very direct…logical, and 
analytical.” William (conservative Independent) shared how he values researching sources and 
sharing his perspectives and that he expects others to do the same through logic and without 
emotion. Likewise, Marc (conservative Libertarian) shared that “If they’re willing to engage in 
an actual reasonable debate, I’ll talk to them about it,” but that these discussions must be 
“without emotions, without aggression, or anger.” Finally, Betty (moderate Independent) 
discussed how “facts are important. For example, if you are talking about immigration, you have 
to think about the impacts. If I go this way, the trickle down is this, and if I go that way, the 









• REASON: Partisan Opposition—Perception of political opposition about person or group 
(us vs. them) 
 
Reason refers to knowledge, rationality, logic, and data. Participants that shared barriers to 
finding common ground are summarized here. Many people argued that conservatives and 
liberals are receiving their information from different worlds. For example, Paul (liberal 
Democrat) stated that “we have different sources of information that make us comfortable, and 
it's just stunning to me how the same reality is reflected differently depending on which, you 
know, sources you're getting your information from. Even if it used to be that we had some at 
least some common starting places, and then from there, we could disagree, but we're not starting 
from the same place.” Likewise, Justin (liberal Democrat) shared that “our reasoning is 
completely different. We come to the conclusion from a completely different angle…each party 
just feels they are right and there is not really a discussion at all.” Samantha (liberal Independent) 
stated that “It’s hard to have a debate when we don’t even have the same information. It’s not 
even just like different perceptions of information.” Betty (moderate Independent) and Ava 
(liberal Democrat) both shared their concern with people who believe in QAnon conspiracies—
they both prefer facts and evidence. And finally, Jenny (liberal Democrat) shared that “it’s 
difficult when people are stubborn and won't see reason or facts.” 
 
• EMOTION: Partisan Alignment—Perception of aligned political perceptions about 
person or group (us vs. them) 
 
Emotion refers to our feelings elicited through stories, metaphors, images, or symbols. We can 
experience positive or negative emotions. Participants that shared constructive approaches 
towards finding common ground are summarized here, especially in regard to the sharing of 
stories and personal lived experiences. For instance, Jonathan (liberal Independent) shared a 
story about the differences in health care between the US and Canada, he shared a personal story 
of how his stepmom died of cancer while in the Canada health system. He modeled his 
discussion by starting small, growing it bigger in relation to the personal, hospital, and societal 
experiences. People respond very well to humanizing experiences because if you're removed, 
you're not going to have remembered it as well. Similarly, Julia (moderate Independent) admitted 
that while “I don't expect to change your opinion. It's pretty hard....I like to say, okay, here's my 
viewpoint, and this is how I—why I feel like that. I'll give personal examples, like COVID-19. 
People are saying, well, it's no big deal. Well, I come back, and I'll say, well, it's a big deal in 
certain people's lives. For example, my sister has had Covid. She has neurological issues now. 
Her husband was in the hospital for four weeks…. Bonding, I think is very important when 
you're trying to change somebody's mind.” Likewise, Paul (liberal Democrat) admitted that it is 
important to use emotions when telling stories in order to change minds. Daniel (liberal/leans 
Libertarian) discussed how even though he didn’t agree with Elizabeth Warren's policies, he was 
emotionally moved by a shared a story she shared about an African American slave in the 1840s 
that was taught to read and write and learning what she went through was just an amazing thing. 
And finally, Justin (liberal Democrat) discussed how he moved his mom left on the issue of 
welfare explaining how she ultimately learns because “I am her son, and she knows I'm a good 
person and I don't do this without reason and—she learns because ultimately it's compassionate 





• EMOTION: Partisan Opposition—Perception of political opposition about person or 
group (us vs. them)  
 
Emotion refers to our feelings elicited through stories, metaphors, images, or symbols. 
We can experience positive or negative emotions. Participants that shared barriers towards 
finding common ground are summarized here. For instance, Marc (conservative Libertarian) 
expressed that “if I get somebody that starts screaming that…firearms…kill people. And that 
there’s no reason for people to have guns…I just walk away because if somebody is not going to 
be rational or somebody’s not willing to hear the other viewpoint, then there’s no use in me 
talking to them.” As Justin  (liberal Democrat) stated, “common ground becomes very difficult 
with a lot more emotions involved. There is pre-determined antagonism between the parties.” 
Others expressed concern with tone as well. For example, Paul (liberal Democrat) shared that he 
has been “troubled by the tone of conversation and sometimes the inability to have a 
conversation and the way that social media has amplified that.” Similarly, Jonathan (liberal 
Independent) said that if others are “hostile, he tends to withdraw from the conversation.” Julia 
(moderate Independent) shared that she didn’t understand why people don’t care about what 
other people are going through, and so must remind herself to calm down and ask, “what is it that 
we may have in common?” 
 Others shared more charged emotions, including from Harper (liberal Democratic 
Socialist), who stated that she “used to try to be more diplomatic when discussing political 
perspectives, but that has changed. It's important to call people out when what they are saying is 
untrue. And of course, this always gets heated because people don't like being told their wrong, 
but unfortunately there's no good way to do it. There are studies that show that confronting 
someone with new information doesn't change their mind. But she feels that she has to do what is 
morally right so that she knows that she has done everything that she can. If you're so entrenched 
in your own beliefs that you can't allow any criticism of those beliefs, I can't do anything about 
that.” Likewise, Shawna (conservative Republican) shared that “conservative Americans are sick 
of being...walked over...It's really disheartening, and we feel like we finally have somebody 
[Trump] who's standing up for us, whose standing up for what's right and for what America was 
founded on…. If you can't treat people... like human beings and with respect, there's no place for 
that. And I don't care what your viewpoints are, whether you're liberal or conservative.” She is 
fearful of expressing her beliefs, sharing that “ger children don't want her to put out Trump signs 
in her yard because they're afraid we'll get targeted.” Likewise, Ava (liberal Democrat) shared 
how COVID-19 and wearing masks has been politicized where she lives with brawls in grocery 
stores. She also describe how her neighbor was displaying hateful signs in his yard, such as 
“Black Lives is a Terrorist Organization” and “Touch My Trump Sign and I’ll Kill You.” She is 
worried about her children’s safety, stating, “What if my kid is just riding his bike and he fell...in 
your yard exterior slightly....When are you going to misread a situation and you've got this Black 
kid that fell in your yard. It’s scary.”  
 
Outlier Cases 
Interestingly, Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) placed equal importance on reason and 
emotions, stating that: “common ground can be found through facts that then... mixed with 
emotions, mixed with those feelings, and then wanting to do more with that...[If] I'm presented 




that. I may not believe it…right away, but I will consider, okay this is where they're coming 
from. This is what this is.” She went on to say, “In order for us to really help each other, there 
has to be that reason to, it has to be that emotional connection…. Once people brought emotions 
in with the facts and then that's—I felt like I became way more empathetic....And with that, I feel 
like I learned so much more.” 
 
Likewise, Paul (liberal Democrat) evolved in his thinking during our conversation, reflecting-in-
action that changing minds should be approached from a logical angle, but that emotions could 
also impact shifts, even though he “would want to think that it would be the logical ones that 
work.” 
 
Points for Further Consideration  
• What is the role of learning as it relates to political reasoning and emotions?  





MEMO: Equality versus Individual Freedom 
 
Common ground refers to alignment on an idea, belief, perspective, or person. Polarization refers 
to opposition to an idea, belief, perspective, or person. 
 
Definition 
To find political common ground, one must recognize that people have different core belief 
structures, such as the desire for equality versus the desire for individual freedom. Equality refers 
to collective core values of equality, compassion, and empathy. Individual freedom refers to the 
individual core values of freedom and autonomy. Core values are related to both of these 
concepts, which is defined as beliefs on how things should or should not be. 
 
This continuum of equality and individual freedom could differ within an individual or across 
individuals, depending on the political issue.  
 
Codes 
Shifting Political Issue (SPI), Attitude Shifts: Barriers & Rewards; Values 
 
Summary of Data  
• EQUALITY: Partisan Alignment—Perception of aligned political perceptions about 
person or group (us vs. them) 
 
Equality refers to the collective core values of equality, compassion, and empathy. Participants 
that shared constructive approaches towards finding common ground equality are summarized 
here. For example, Jenny (liberal Democrat) stated that, “If I'm your friend, or if you're my 
friend, like you're going to be my friend, like even if you are a racist, a secret racist, but you 
don't want to admit it. If you call me right now, and there was an emergency, I will come get 
you. It is just who I am. So, I feel like that's the best. You just have to prove their stereotypes 
wrong.” However, it is harder for others, for example, Jonathan (liberal Independent) shared that: 
“I believe that the rights of people should be respected and are non-negotiable....as in their right 
to live in a society freely and openly—by the way, relevant, actually I should have mentioned, I 
am gay. And that was also very much frowned upon in a Catholic school in a relatively religious 
household in a conservative part of the country.” Likewise, Julia (moderate Independent) 
described how equality for women’s rights was very important to her, “not just our bodies, but 
socially, economically,” going on to say that her beliefs about human life and human right would 
never change—“I won’t allow myself to change it.”  Emma (liberal Democratic Socialist) 
recalled that when she was growing up, she did not see Catholic values as conservative values, 
rather she “saw more like what I now know is like socialist values, you know, the way that Jesus 
treated people and those kinds of things. And so just learning my privileges and learning, you 
know, this is where I came from. And I can't escape that. I'm never going to escape those things 









• EQUALITY: Partisan Opposition—Perception of political opposition about person or 
group (us vs. them)  
 
Participants that shared barriers towards finding common ground through equality are 
summarized here. For instance, Jonathan (liberal Independent) shared that “it takes a lot of 
emotional labor to try to discuss [rights for immigrants or rights for same-sex marriage] because 
often if I'm finding someone who doesn't agree...they may also...not see me as human or as a 
lesser human. So, with those, that takes a lot of personal restraint.” Likewise, Samantha (liberal 
Independent) stated that “I can be fairly reasonable as long as we're talking about something that 
isn't just someone's like right to exist. And finally, Jenny (liberal Democrat) shared that “when it 
comes to racism, then I'm drawing a line.” When this topic comes up, she will address it even 
though she may still want to be your friend.  
 
• INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: Partisan Alignment and Partisan Opposition  
 
Individual freedom refers to the rights of the individual through the core values of freedom and 
autonomy. For instance, Marc (conservative Libertarian) shared that “the government shouldn't 
be involved in personal lives. The ultimate evolution at this moment on this planet is the 
individual human. Okay, so if I always start with that premise, and so when I look at something, 
what does this do for the life and self-determination of an individual human in this country. 
That's my litmus test.” Daniel (liberal/leans Libertarian) believed that political views are 
personal and that it was not his job to change people’s minds. Likewise, Aleena (liberal Green) 
stated that “I’ve always thought that it’s not my business what other people do with their private 
lives…I don’t want them to get into mind and don’t want to get into theirs.”  
 
Outlier Cases 
The following participants’ comments didn’t fit neatly into either category of individual freedom 
or equality—namely about morality, patriotism, compromise, and character. For example, 
Shawna (conservative Republican) stressed the importance of “raising children with values and 
morals…It is about how you’re treated and how you’re raised and your character your values, all 
those things are instilled in your youth....Kids in general are molded by their parents’ political 
views and the way that they think because as a general rule in America.”  Likewise, Betty 
(moderate Independent) discussed the value of honesty, which she learned from her dad. This 
value led her to dislike both Trump and Clinton due to their lies. Moreover, Ava (liberal 
Democrat) shared that she can “normally land with a moral answer…I don’t have a ton of 
information on the kids in cages. I don’t need to. What is right here? What is right for others? 
What is right for me?” Both Shawna and Betty discussed their patriotism as part of their values. 
And finally, Betty was concerned that “nobody’s willing to compromise anymore…It’s like it's 
left or it's right—period. And I just, I have a huge problem with that…We have to work together 
because it's just nobody's 100% right and nobody's 100% wrong.” 
 
Points for Further Consideration  
• What is the role of learning as it relates to the core values associated with equality and 
individual freedom?  













Question from Survey: What does political participation mean to you? 
 
Survey respondents from the Democratic Party and other left-leaning individuals: 
 
Being informed on the issues, including fact checking and assessing the accuracy and 
reputation of the entity presenting info. Avoiding just skimming the headlines but seeking 
more detail when needed. Talking with friends & family about issues. VOTING! 
 
Learning enough to make informed voting decisions and sharing that information with 
others. Educating the next generation of voters to think critically and analytically is vital 
to having a functioning democracy. When appropriate, protest, donate, and volunteer. 
 
It is our privilege to live in a democracy where citizens can speak and be heard. If we do 
not exercise that right, then it can be taken away if we don’t protect it. 
 
Finding opportunities to voice your opinion in a way that might possibly shift somebody's 
views. One clear example would be volunteering for a political campaign and doing door-
knocking or phone calls, having valuable conversations. But it could also mean 
something as simple as having a conversation with a friend about an issue you care about, 
or even just putting a sign in your yard. 
 
Survey respondents from the Republican Party and other right-leaning individuals:  
 
To participate as an informed citizen in all aspects of our nation’s political process, 
including voting, awareness of and communicating my opinion on all proposed 
legislation, and holding elected and appointed officials to Constitutional standards. 
It is critical that a voter know the issues and the candidates who are asking for their 
support. Political participation should involve an informed decision, as well as some sort 
of action on behalf of the views a person holds. Since politics has invaded every area of 
life in the U.S. it is completely unacceptable to let down your guard in regard to your 
rights, your children's safety, or your property. 
 
Voting at every opportunity, staying informed, knowing the issues, and knowing the 
candidates’ positions on critical legislation. 
 
As expected, qualitative comments from the online survey also revealed disagreement and 




Survey respondents from the Democratic Party and other left-leaning individuals wrote that 
political participation and polarization meant:  
 
Standing for my morals. It’s saying a law is just or unjust. It is questioning those we have 
elected and evaluating if they really stand for what I believe in. It is speaking my truth 
and the truth of others in the face of a government that doesn't always think people like 
me and people and other minorities deserve to live. 
 
Speaking out for the underserved, defending political advances, speaking the truth to 
power and making conservatives justify their crazy statements. 
 
I must vote. I must stay informed. I must contact my representatives and keep them aware 
of my view. Since 2016, it has become clear to me that the current Republican party 
needs obliteration, and it is my duty to vote against it at every level until every single 
person who enabled Donald Trump is out of office, and his abhorrent base crawls back 
under its rock. 
 
Survey respondents from the Republican Party and other right-leaning individuals shared that 
political participation and polarization meant:  
 
Being educated about who and what you vote for, but that decision is a personal and 
private one. My views should not be forced on another like we see the left doing in our 
schools and university systems. 
We must participate as conservatives to stop the spread of socialism and communism as 
promoted by the left. 
 
Changing the education system to consider conservatism instead of total liberalism. 
 
Vote, write congress, write governor. Engage in civil discussion which is effectively 
impossible because of the hysteria of the left. 
 
Because I can’t fly a Trump flag without fear of being targeted and attacked, I just send 
money to candidates.  
 
Survey respondents from the Democratic Party and other left-leaning individuals shared that 
finding political common ground meant listening and sharing:   
 
Political participation includes the more obvious actions, such as voting and 
corresponding with elected officials. But nearly as important as those is to listen to those 
whose positions with which one may not immediately agree and seeking credible 
information that more fully describes them and their impacts on society as a whole. We 






Political participation for me means making one's views known, sharing information with 
others and trying to reach understandings on policy matters that allow people to work 
together and socialize in a friendly way. 
 
Survey respondents from the Republican Party and other right-leaning individuals shared that 
finding common ground meant civility:  
 
Well, it certainly does not mean destroying property, pulling down statues, and creating 
chaos. Political participation means, to me, studying issues and reading and 
contemplating what is the media putting out as truth. It means friends getting together 
and talking about it WITHOUT getting mad, screaming, hollering, and walking away 
from the group and pouting. 
 
Voting. Sharing your thoughts and opinions in a respectful way in appropriate ways. 
Participating in political processes like protests, petitions, etc. 
 
Shifting Political Attitudes on Diverse Representation and Equal Rights 
 
Questions from Survey: In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or 
experiences led you to change your views on 1) the diversity of elected officials in the United 
States government or on 2) the importance of equal rights for racial minorities, women, and the 
LGBTQ community? 
 
Survey respondents from the Democratic Party and other left-leaning individuals shared that 
diversity and equality was extremely important to them: 
 
I have learned so much about racial equality as the country has responded to the murder 
of George Floyd. I learned about the racial underpinnings of EVERY document and 
historical decision. My worldview re[garding] race in the USA has changed dramatically 
and become more radical. 
 
There has been a tide of anti-minority, anti-women, and anti-LGBTQ sentiment and 
legislation amongst our politicians and our populace. We need greater diversity and 
representation of our country in order to give a voice to those who have been 
systematically oppressed for generations. The murders of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna 
Taylor, George Floyd, and countless others, along with the brutality against protestors, 
has lit a fire in me to work for this change. 
 
It grew more important to me as I had increased exposure via social media to injustices 
and joined a graduate program which includes a strong social justice focus—I learned 
more individually, but then as Trump took office and my POC friends/contacts shared 
more about feeling unsafe ... I started to see it more. 
 
The rhetoric coming from the Trump White House has solidified and strengthened my 






Trump’s overt racism and hate of minorities and women made me more willing to speak 
out against those views. 
 
The Trump presidency, and the events of the past three and a half years, have 
demonstrated that America could easily go backward in terms of equal rights for 
minorities, women, etc. We cannot and must not let that happen! 
 
Seeing more frequent police brutality against minorities made me more aware of my 
privilege as a white male. 
 
Survey respondents from the Republican Party and other right-leaning individuals wrote that 
they believed that Trump was doing a good job on promoting diversity, which led them to 
oppose increased diversity or equal rights:  
 
I feel that President Trump cares about me and all Americans. Minorities have been 
elected to positions without regard for their ability to do the job of representing the 
people but solely based on their minority status. These people are destroying our nation. 
Or better yet, letting our nation be destroyed by BLM terrorists. 
 
BLM, and the radicals of the LGBTQ community has made me dislike them even more, 
because they already have more rights and opportunities than others (affirmative action 
and immunity from criticism unless it’s not involving liberal views). The media and 
liberals made me feel like this, NOT Trump. 
 
Another set of stupid questions from a false viewpoint. Trump isn't racist and hasn't done 
a thing to take freedoms. Yeah, he runs his mouth. Yeah, you idiots in the intelligentsia 
always falsely interpret that. Then while you are paying attention to what he wants, he 
does something to strengthen the constitution and to limit the government. 
 
I don't think race, gender, or sexual preference should be an important issue. I think those 
elected should represent the majority of the voters' choices. I don't feel someone deserves 
to be elected, just because of their gender, race, or sexual orientation. 
 
I think descriptive representation is meaningless. I’d much rather have someone that 
represents my viewpoints than someone who looks like me. Therefore, while I’m 
definitely in favor of women, minorities, and LGBs in office, I think taking those factors 
into consideration when voting for someone is dumb and we certainly shouldn’t make 
decisions about who represents us on that basis. In theory, a chamber of white men could 
represent me just as well as a chamber of black women if their viewpoints were the same. 
 
I no longer care about pushing minorities or females to be part of government. I want 
people being elected on merit ONLY. 






Everyone already has equal rights. There is a narrative being presented that they don't 
which is untrue. 
 
Cancel culture. I used to be more liberal, but we have gone off the deep end. I’m a 
woman, and I think all of what is happening is nonsense. 
 
The entire idea of the only way to think feel or be in this country has gone from freedom 
to if you do not agree with us you are racist, you hate us, you are evil. This country was 
founded on the right to disagree and be able to live a life of freedom where you can think, 
act, feel, and say whatever you please. Now days, if you speak a word of something that 
does not align with the views or actions of those running the liberal party, then you are 
judged labeled and condemned....which is ironically the very thing they are supposedly 
trying to change. 
 
Survey respondents who identified as Independents shared that:   
 
As someone who just turned 20 this year and started college in 2018, I was able to learn 
about new political ideas and express them more openly when away from my 
conservative parents. I always felt that I was personally more liberal, but I could not 
express my opinions or even look at more liberal ideas without risking punishment from 
my family. 
 
I shifted from a very conservative, mostly white privilege view to a more inclusive view. 
The views really began to change with the Michael Brown murder in 2014. Police abuse 
of minorities increased the change. By becoming more inclusive the U.S. will become a 
more perfect union. The Citizens United decision increased my knowledge of the effect 
of money in politics. 
 
And finally, the following respondent from the Republican Party wrote that their views on the 
importance of diversity and equal rights were strengthened because:  
 
[Their] son was part of the Supreme Court case that gave equal marriage rights to those 
of the same sex. 
 
Shifting Political Attitudes on Current Political Issues 
 
Survey Question: In the time since President Trump was elected in 2016, what events or 
experiences led you to change your views on a political issue? For example, you could think of a 
specific issue, such as police brutality, immigration, or something else. 
 
Survey respondents from the Democratic Party and other left-leaning individuals indicated that 
they shifted their views on a host of issues related to their negative perceptions of Trump, some 
of which are quoted below:  
 





George Floyd's death. Kids in cages. Covid. Rampant corruption. 
 
Trump’s vilification of black Americans standing up for their rights is indicative of not 
only his morals but his views on race and freedom of speech. I see how some things are 
even more important than I did.  
 
President Trump's handling of crises has laid bare the inequalities and prejudices in our 
society. In addition, the willingness of some people to believe the falsehoods Trump 
repeats highlights the weakness inherent in our educational system that funds schools 
through property taxes and allows local school boards to approve the curriculum. A 
national educational system would have the potential (if designed and run fairly and 
efficiently) to ensure that ALL children have a healthy, robust and fair-balanced 
education. 
 
The police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor; the administration’s failure to 
develop and implement a coherent policy response to Covid-19; the proliferation of right-
wing extremist groups; the detention of immigrations and separation of immigrant 
families; the opening of protected lands to natural resource extraction: the realization that 
nearly half the citizens of this country are just fine with these horrors. 
 
The open racism of Trump and the numbers of racists shocked me and made me very sad. 
I knew we had racists but was overwhelmed at the number existing in our society.  
 
Trump lies constantly, and the Republican Party does absolutely nothing to stop it, which 
has profoundly changed my attitude toward that party. 
 
The brutality of the Trump administration and its supporters toward immigrants and 
refugees, the greater concentration of wealth, the fact that police relations with minorities 
have become a more prominent issue. 
 
George Floyd changed my views on police brutality. Trump's anti-immigrant stance has 
made me more supportive of immigration. 
 
Trump and his presidency have made me extremely fearful for our country and its future. 
This is the first time in my 70 years on this earth that I have felt fearful in and for my 
country. Before Trump, I felts that I had similar goals as my conservative friends, just a 
difference of opinion on how to reach those goals. In the last 4 years, those friends seem 
to hat things just because liberals like them and there is no sense of unity or compromise. 
The fact that a liberal likes an idea seems to be enough to make them hat it, even if they 
agreed in the past. 
 
I’ve become more aware of how minorities too often suffer at the hands of the police. 
And the government’s handling of the pandemic has been very poor. Worse yet, it’s 
distressing to see whether or not you wear a mask has become a political litmus test.  
Trump has emboldened right wing hate groups and white supremacists to the point militia 




Trump has sought to dismantle almost every department he has authority over, including 
eroding our public schools with Betsy DeVos’ war on school funding, overturning civil 
protections for LGBTQ people, pushing for the repeal of the ACA, and pushing an 
expensive and pointless wall against our southern border while accelerating both racial 
profiling and attacks on both immigrants and refugees. Every hope that I had for the 
direction of our country was moving four years ago has been squashed. Watching how 
gleefully some people cheer this destruction of a just social fabric makes me more 
committed not just to the changes we need to make but to helping develop the rhetoric to 
convince people blinded by endless propaganda due to understand why we need to do 
better. 
 
Trump’s lack of professionalism has allowed concealed racism, discrimination, 
xenophobia, sexism, and extreme biases of every kind to reveal themselves in our 
civilized society. His words and actions have lowered the standards required to uphold 
the position of POTUS.  
 
Survey respondents from the Republican Party and others right-leaning individuals shared that 
they shifted their views on a host of issues related to their positive perceptions of Trump, some 
of which are quoted below:  
 
Trump derangement syndrome is worse than Covid-19.  
 
My views on everything have changed. I have become more aware of the corruption of 
the previous administration. That was a crime spree. Also, the way the democrats have 
treated innocent people. They have lied, cheated, acted foolish, stolen money, and twisted 
everything that has been done to us. Benghazi alone changed my mind. The scandals 
were mind blowing and just unbelievable. The constant attacks on President Trump are 
disgusting and shameful. It is an embarrassment to our country.  
 
I have lost a large amount of respect for the black community because of the violence by 
BLM and the lack of good people standing up. 
 
Media exists to tear down the president and Christians.  
 
Never in my life, 66 years (with 20 some years in small market radio) have I ever seen 
anything the likes of today’s mainstream media. Cronkite’s dead and Huntley and 
Brinkley have left the building. The anti-Trump bias is so overwhelming I rarely watch 
any news programming at all. 
 
I feel more secure with President Trump in charge.  
 
The total melt down of the Democrat Party as a result of the election of Donald Trump 
has led me to totally disrespect the Democrat Party. Their total disregard for trying to 
work for the good of the country and their promotion of violence on the streets has ruined 





I have become highly more conservative. The leftists are enemies to the Republic.  
 
My views have changed considerably and more against LGBTQ, illegal immigration, 
BLM, the news media, public education, and higher education as I watched them move 
our country to the point of Civil War because they refused to accept an elected president.  
 
I switched my opinion of the Democratic Party drastically after I saw the way Obama 
handled Ferguson. The amount of racial divide that increased and occurred in our country 
during his 8 years in office was shocking. Promises he made never came to fruition. The 
Democrats continue to push the leftist narrative in regard to racism, police brutality, and 
immigration. It’s quite sickening to see the way they are willing to sacrifice America. 
President Trump drastically improved our economy and we have seen the lowest 
unemployment rate in history. The hatred for Trump by the media and the left is 
appalling, and I will never understand the evil. They are not just hating Trump—they are 
hating America. We absolutely need term limits!!!  
 
The left has an agenda. They only show part of a clip showing something that President 
Trump has said when taken out of context changes the meaning. I believe that the news 
has exacerbated the racial unrest and tried to prove that President Trump is a racist.  
 
The major news networks and newspapers have reported the news especially about 
Trump in an extremely biased manner. They no longer print truth but opinion or simply 
make up news. I used to be much more moderate and the news lying and inciting a 
racially motivated narrative to divide the country, ignoring child sex trafficking, and 
constantly attacking Trump along with the BLM Riots and Antifa attacking federal 
buildings and police made me much more conservative in all political views.  
 
There were also some respondents that switched parties based on their perceptions of 
Trump. Some examples are included below.  
 
I have been a Republican for 50 years. I have supported their candidates with my money 
and my votes. Trump’s ignorant, bullying, lying, incompetent lack of leadership has 
moved my support to the Democratic Party in 2020. 
 
The election of Donald Trump…has pushed me to change my attitudes and views. I was a 
Republican Party official in my county until my resignation the day after the 2016 
election. Donald Trump’s values are not mine. 
I used to be a Democrat and detested Republicans. The last three years watching the 
Democrats tear this country apart has disgusted me. I now feel that Trump is the only 
saving grace for America, and I hate that I am forced to think that way. 
 
Democrats have now openly shown their corruption. Used to be a lifelong democrat.  
 
I have less and less respect and hope for the democrat party. I voted as a democrat for 
years. They changed and I have been totally disgusted with the way they have treated 




betrayal of the truth and constant attacks on him only made him worse. He wasn't my first 
choice for president, but he's done better than I expected. 
 
Shifting Political Issues from Observational Learning 
 
Survey Question: [After answering a series of question on observational learning, respondents 
were asked to briefly] describe the political issue they changed your perspective on. 
 
The following statements were the most poignant in terms of the influence of family and friends, 
on learning. For example, the following excerpt exhibited aspects of observational learning since 
the person noticed an issue, reflected on the issue even though it didn’t impact them personally, 
and then shared it with a family member that didn’t agree with their perspective. 
 
I remember the disbelief and disappointment in my mother’s eyes when I told her that I 
support gay rights. I figured that what they do in their bedrooms doesn’t affect me, nor 
does their legal designation, so it makes little sense to oppose their political agenda.  
 
Likewise, the following comments also displayed factors of observational learning since 
everyone noticed an issue, retained it, shared it with others, and was motivated to learn 
about their shifting perspectives through interactions with trusted sources.  
 
When the Black Lives Matter movement first originated after George Zimmerman’s 
acquittal (which I’m still angry about), I was put off by their name. I originally thought 
something along the lines of “all minorities have issues” . . . But having conversations 
with people I loved and who cared about me enough to be willing to discuss these issues 
with me definitely pushed me into a different type of understanding that definitely 
realigned my political ideology slightly. 
 
Following the death of George Floyd, I have become a lot more educated on the 
prevalence of racial injustice in the US and have been trying to have discussions with my 
friends and family about the issue and what we can each do to improve it. 
 
Over a long period of time (three decades) I changed my views on LGBTQ issues. 
Originally, this wasn't a concern to me. I didn't have strong negative feelings, but I tended 
to think these were sexual matters of a private nature, not societal issues. Then I found 
myself attending a mainline church in a city hit hard by the early AIDS crisis and saw the 
hatred directed against gay men and how our pastors welcomed and cared for them 
through illness to death. Then a beloved colleague developed AIDS. Later, at another 
church, we called a gay pastor and faced church discipline when he gained a partner. 
Over time, I saw all of the obstacles faced by LGBTQ, the discrimination they face, and 
the [e]ffects of discriminatory laws and policies (such as gay men being unable to claim 
their partners' bodies when they died in the hospital from AIDS, gay people in general 
being unable to use sick leave to care for a partner, or being prevented from adopting 





My dad was a police officer and so I grew up seeing policing through a very naïve lens. I 
always assumed that when Black people were killed by police, they had done something 
wrong that led to the unfortunate event. Now I’ve seen that police officers are not held 
accountable and that they seriously abuse their power. It has been very difficult to 
maintain a good relationship with my dad since I’ve become more aware of these 
atrocities and am more vocal about it, but I think it’s important that I am vocal about this. 
As a highly educated white woman who has a close tie to policing, I think my voice can 
really make an impact if I stand up against police brutality. 
 
I changed my view on abortion. I was a "right to choose" person and then my family and 
friends and thoughtful pundits started to educate me. I learned about DNA and how a 
baby has a completely different DNA than the mother. I learned about how early a baby 
dreams, hiccups, sucks its thumb, and how alive and aware it is. I changed my mind and 
became pro-life. For this my liberal friends cursed me and unfriended me and told me I 
was a bad person. I have never regretted changing my view, and I am proudly pro-science 
and pro-life. 
 
My family is very conservative, but my college friends lean very far left, and their 
perspectives have encouraged me to think beyond what I heard a lot growing up, and I 
realize that I was wrong.  
 
Trade policy became a major concern for me and my family because of the decline of 
manufacturing. I come from a manufacturing family, and my family used to be 
proponents of free trade, but my father started shifting his views on the subject around 
2013 or 2014. He became convinced that free trade was anathema to a healthy 
manufacturing economy, especially as he aligned himself more and more with Pat 
Buchanan. I was skeptical of his change in views, but then I saw a CBS 60 Minutes 
segment about the decline in manufacturing and manufacturing around late 2014/early 
2015 and I became convinced of his position. Since I live in a city so heavily dependent 
on foreign trade and at the time attending a university in Washington DC where the 
College Republicans tended to be very much into either the neoconservative or libertarian 
wings of the party that were prominent at the time, I found myself with few people in 
agreement with me both at home and at school. 
 
